



Sveriges lantbruksuniversitet
Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences

**Faculty of Natural Resources
and Agricultural Sciences**

Meaning Making in Service of Power at the Climate Change Negotiations

A Critical Discourse Analysis of the Speeches held by
Xi Jinping and Barack Obama at the Opening
Ceremony of COP21

Christoffer Söderlund

Department of Urban and Rural Development
Master's Thesis • 30 HEC
Environmental Communication and Management - Master's Programme
Uppsala 2016

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Christoffer Söderlund

Supervisor: Dr. Hans Peter Hansen, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences,
Department of Urban and Rural Development

Examiner: Dr. Helena Nordström Källström, Swedish University of Agricultural
Sciences, Department of Urban and Rural Development

Credits: 30 HEC

Level: Second cycle (A2E)

Course title: Independent Project in Environmental Science - Master's thesis

Course code: EX0431

Programme/Education: Environmental Communication and Management – Master's Programme

Place of publication: Uppsala

Year of publication: 2016

Online publication: <http://stud.epsilon.slu.se>

Keywords: Climate Change Negotiations, Ideology, Critical Discourse Analysis, COP21, Speech Analysis

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Abstract

Human induced climate change is already beginning to affect the world, and the increasing amount of research relating to climate change is showing that the effects will intensify over the coming century if nothing is done to change society. Still very little substantial change is to be seen. In this paper I investigate part of the problem with changing course by utilising the concept of ideology and employing it in a Critical Discourse Analysis of speeches held by two of the world's most powerful individuals, President Barack Obama and President Xi Jinping, at the opening ceremony of COP21 in Paris. The analysis is focused on how climate change is portrayed, what the goals of the agreement should be and what the solutions to climate change are, according to the speeches. This is combined with a focus on what ideological discourses are used, and how climate change is incorporated in these ideological discourses. The analysis shows that, although the speeches have their separate characteristics, they draw on and reinforce largely the same discourses; neoliberalism and nationalism. Both speeches portray climate change as a phenomenon with long lasting consequences for human society and the main threats are perceived to be decreasing economic growth and potential instability of the nation-state. Climate change is also incorporated in the neoliberal ideology through an inspiration discourse, portraying climate change as an opportunity to extend the market and privatise commons. At the same time nature is reduced to resources for the economy and human society is reduced to its economy and nation-state.

Keywords: Climate Change Negotiations, Ideology, Critical Discourse Analysis, COP21, Speech Analysis

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Abbreviations

CCP – Chinese Communist Party

CDA – Critical Discourse Analysis

CIA – Central Intelligence Agency

COP – Conference of the Parties

COP21 – The 21th Conference of the Parties

CNCCP – China’s National Climate Change Programme

ENGO – Environmental Non-Governmental Organisation

EU – European Union

GDP – Gross Domestic Product

IMF – International Monetary Fund

INDC – Intended National Determined Contributions

IPCC – Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

NGO – Non-Governmental Organisation

UN – United Nations

UNFCCC – The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

USA – The United States of America

WWF – World Wildlife Fund

1. Introduction

Environmental Communication has been described as a field of study focusing on ‘the relevance and crucial role that inter-subjective communication plays in connection to ecosystems and natural resources.’ Research within Environmental Communication aims at ‘understanding, explaining and interpreting conflicts and environmental crisis associated with political processes linked to the use of natural resources and human interactions with ecosystems.’ (Alarcón Ferrari, 2015, p.52). Following this definition; climate change can be described as the ultimate environmental crisis associated with political processes and humanity’s interaction with various ecosystems, and the communication on climate change cannot be described as based on inter-subjectivity. The situation rather reminds me of how H.G. Wells describes the arrival of the Martians in the sci-fi classic ‘The War of the Worlds’ (2005(1898)). To paraphrase his description: Most people are still unaware. Some people have heard about it but don’t believe it. Others have heard about it but are quite sure the threat is overstated. Yet another group knows about it but displays a rather callous fascination about it, not connecting the events to themselves as persons. And finally one group is running around, waving their arms, screaming at the top of their lungs about impending doom...

Although we have accumulated a lot of knowledge about climate change and the various Earth systems that are and will increasingly be affected; there is very little substantial change in human society or human behaviour occurring. One way of approaching the issue of climate change from a social perspective, and interpret the conflict, is through Critical Theory and the study of ideology. Part of understanding this lack of change in society is through communication and language, since how we define and communicate about an issue undoubtedly constitutes the very understanding of it and the options for solutions. Therefore, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), as method for understanding and investigating power and ideology in communication, is a useful tool for analysing the case of climate change. Furthermore, the COP21 in Paris offers an excellent opportunity to study this communication.

The Paris agreement, the result of COP21, was largely hailed as a success. Mainly by the heads of states and almost everyone engaged in the negotiations, but also by major environmental NGO’s, like WWF (WWF Global, 2015-12-15) and Greenpeace (Greenpeace, 2015-12-12). The picture becomes a little more complex when reading the longer official statements by these ENGOs. But in media, through interviews with representatives of Greenpeace and WWF, the message was that Paris was huge step forward. The world had finally gotten a binding agreement, which states that we are to keep the temperature from rising more than 2 degrees above pre-industrial levels and aim for 1.5 degree (Paris Agreement 2015, Article 2, p.22). However, there is another take on this agreement. The agreement is unclear; it gives no directions or obligations as to how the world will achieve this goal. In a pessimistic reading it allows all countries to continue polluting until 2023 when new national goals are to be set. And even then it doesn’t have any sanctions for not complying with the goals countries set themselves. The agreement lacks financial mechanisms to support the least developed countries in both mitigation and adaptation. And it includes a clausal that allows for discounting of emissions, a so-called zero-sum mechanism, introduced in the Kyoto Protocol (Hulme, 2009, p.296). The 1.5-degree target, which was reported to have taken up a lot of time during the second week in Paris, is arguably a lost cause to start with, since climate scientist are pointing to the fact that we are approaching 1.5 degrees now or in the very near future (Climate Central, 2016-04-20). Still the general message was that it was a success.

The Paris Agreement thus follows in a recent tradition of being hailed as a turning point. Other examples are the Kyoto protocol in 1997, the Kyoto Protocol in 2005, the Stern Report in 2006, IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report in 2007, ‘An Inconvenient Truth’ and Al Gore’s Nobel Prize (together with the IPCC) in 2007, IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report

in 2014, The G7's statement on Climate Change in 2015. So far it is hard to discern an actual turning point. The average temperature is rising, sea levels are rising and more importantly greenhouse gas emissions are still rising.

This lack of actual progress caused Dr. James Hansen, the 'Grandfather of global warming' (Hansen, 2009, p.xii), to state in an interview with the Guardian during the last days of the Paris Conference: 'It's a fraud really, a fake, It's just bullshit for them to say: "We'll have a 2C° warming target and then try to do a little better every five years." It's just worthless words. There is no action, just promises. As long as fossil fuels appear to be the cheapest fuels out there, they will be continued to be burned.' (Milman, O. 2015-12-12).

In a substantial study from 2015 Christopher Shaw and Brigitte Nerlice points to one of the reasons why we make such slow progress by analysing 63 international science-policy reports and showing that all of them are using a similar language where a dichotomy is created between 'impacted/not-impacted' and that climate change is reduced to a cost-benefit analysis. This arguably creates barriers for understanding climate change and responding in other ways than through an economic framework. (Shaw & Nerlice 2015). Similarly Gasper et al (2013) uses Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to analyse a World Bank report and a Human Development report, both dealing with climate change and development, showing a clear difference in use of discourse, where the World Bank report clearly manifests a neoliberal discourse and the Human Development report being more ambivalent, using the neoliberal discourse in part and criticising it in part (ibid.). Melo et al focuses on Climate, Community and Biodiversity (CCB) certification schemes and distinguishes four different narratives or discourses being employed; a neoliberal marketization, a technocratic, participation and poverty alleviation. But showing that the two former are dominating, while the two later a secondary (Melo et al, 2013). These different studies show that the climate change debate is dominated by a neoliberal ideology to supply solutions, but also that it isn't hegemonic and is still being disputed. This can also be seen in how the Paris Agreement was communicated, since the main argument why it was successful was because it would send a clear message to the financial market (Kuylentierna, J. L., 2016-01-04; United Nations, 2016-04-22), which is indicative of the neoliberal paradigm dominating political understanding.

As a basic understanding I will define ideology, a key term in this thesis, as 'meaning in service of power', just as John B. Thompson (1990). The entry point into climate change and negotiations is then to understand the underlying assumptions and world-view described and projected by the powerful. I will in this thesis focus on the USA and China. They are the two biggest contributors to greenhouse gas emissions, among the most important political entities in the world and they are the two biggest economies (CIA, 2016-08-15: United States; CIA, 2016-08-25: China). But more interestingly in this case they are widely seen as two of three climate change leaders (together with the EU), meaning that negotiators from all of the world are looking to these three to be the driving forces for addressing climate change. There is no doubt these three political entities need to work together and to some extent agree if we are to manage and adapt to climate change (Parker et al, 2014, p.9). These three actors also have their own spheres of influence, which cover more or less the entire world. In that sense their ideology (as meaning in service of power) covers the world, but largely different areas of the world. They also, to a large extent, have different ideologies in the American tradition of the word i.e. a body of ideas on how to govern society.

The UN Climate Change Conference is an arena that more than most is concerned with so called 'wicked' problems (Rayner in Hulme, 2009, p.xxif), with a combination of science, politics and social problems as well as ethical questions. Even if this seems self-evident, and few would argue against the complexity of climate change, there is usually a very one-sided focus when it comes to the proposed solutions, as indicated above.

As Shaw and Nerlich puts it: ‘there is nothing intrinsic to anthropogenic changes in the chemical composition of the atmosphere which demands that decisions about whether and how to respond should be made solely through economic frames. Rather, we suggest that focusing attention on climate change as an economic problem is a conscious political act, performed primarily through language.’ (Shaw & Nerlich, 2015, p.35). Furthermore, Michael Toman has pointed out that ‘improved scientific and economic understanding about climate change can “mask deeper and more complex disagreements about social values. Neither science in general nor economics in particular can resolve the fundamentally moral issues posed by climate change.”’ (from Hulme, 2009, p.138)

In this thesis I investigate the discourses employed and the ideology conveyed through the speeches held by the USA’s and China’s Presidents at the Climate Conference in Paris 2015, in order to give an interpretation of the conflict and environmental crisis that is climate change.

1.1 Problem Formulation and Research Questions

Human-induced climate change is a huge problem for this planet and its lifeforms. Our inability to effectively respond to these changes can be analysed through studying sectional interest or ideology. I argue, together with James Hansen (2009), Norman Fairclough (2015), Ulrich Beck (2002), Christopher Shaw and Brigitte Nerlice (2015) among others, that the ideology of neoliberalism and nationalism are the dominating discourses in international politics in general, and in the understanding of and debate about climate change in specific. An important step forward is then to understand how and why these ideologies are reproduced through language. In studying this I will be utilising a framework of critical theory, drawing upon Thompson and his understanding of ideology, Fairclough and his framework of Critical Discourse Analysis, and Giddens and Beck’s description and understanding of the nation-state.

The aim is to critically investigate the communication and specifically the speeches held at COP21, through Critical Discourse Analysis, in terms of ideology, by the two single most powerful actors; USA and China. I will focus on how climate change is described, how the problem, solutions, responsibilities and goals are constructed through the speeches held by President Barack Obama and President Xi Jinping.

The research questions can thus be stated as:

- How is the problem of climate change posed? What are the solutions being offered? What are the goals of the agreement, according to their speeches?
- How is climate change as a phenomenon portrayed and incorporated in ideological discourses in the speeches?
- How is the political, and social, aspects of climate change affected by ideological discourses, and how are they manifested in the speeches?

1.2 Literature Study

In this section I will briefly go through some of the recent research that is concerned with communication about either climate change or other environmental issues, with a focus on studies using Critical Discourse Analysis. The purpose of this section is to show examples of studies done in similar subjects and place this study within the field, as well as showing what this study may contribute with.

In general, the studies concerned with climate change, communication and discourses can be divided into three categories; 1) the study of media, usually printed media; 2) the study of policy; and 3) the more socially directed studies, typically based on interviews or done by following a conference etc. To this division there can be an additional category that transcends the other three, which concerns whether the studies are aimed at developing

methods and/or methodology or not. Some examples of the additional category are: Capstick et al who sets out to develop what they call a 'longitudinal methodology' to discern changes in the public discourse around climate change over time (Capstick et al, 2015), D.A. DiFrancesco and Nathan Young (2010) that wants to develop the method of CDA to account for visual representation and does so by studying Canadian newspapers and Wozniak et al (2015) that develops a rather ambitious multimodal method for cross country comparison on medias' framing, but arguably is more concerned with description than CDA.

An example of the first category, focusing on media, can be found in Ulrika Olausson's (2009) study of Swedish newspapers. The article investigates three Swedish newspapers and their reports about climate change. The focus is the inherent local and national focus of newspapers and how this affects reports about climate change, which by its nature is global. Olausson concludes that Swedish media discourse on climate change correlates closely with international policy discourse, but also that mitigation and adaptation as two different subjects and frames hardly ever are reported on together (ibid.). In a different article Olausson together with Peter Berglez (2007) argues that the media, specifically newspapers, need to move beyond 'banal nationalism', to be able to provide a bridge between different discourses, and in doing so advancing democracy in 'late modernity' (Olausson 2009). Other examples of studies with similar focus are Stefan Rahmstorf (2012) on scientific journalism, C.R. Foust and William O'Shannon Murphy (2009) on discourses, or frames as they call it, regarding climate change in the USA and Mayar Sabat's study of prevailing discourses in the UK, done by analysing three BBC Radio shows (2014).

The second strand of studies that relates to CDA and climate change (or environmental issues) in recent years focuses mainly on policy. An example is C.L. Pandey's article from 2015, which concerns climate change and policies, but employs a specific take on the matter. Namely the role of international ENGO:s. The article points to the failure of the big ENGO:s like Greenpeace and WWF to make real impact over the last decades on international policies and criticises them for being elitist, top-down run and having problems with lack of internal democracy. The author instead suggests that the future lies in organisations organised as 350.org, which is a grass root-movement that has had significant success with divestment campaigns (Pandey 2015). A couple of other examples are Aviel Verbruggen and Erik Laes' (2015) paper 'Sustainability assessment of nuclear power: Discourse analysis of IAEA and IPCC frameworks' and Steven Sarasini's (2009) article on policy discourses in Sweden concerning climate.

A third direction of CDA in climate change and/or environmental issues related topics is the more socially directed studies, typically based on interviews or done by following a conference etc. Some of these studies include Arif Attar and Audley Genus (2014) on GMO in the UK, H.R. Nielsen and May-Britt Ellingsen (2015) on climate change discourses among Norwegian tourism companies, Phil Macnaghten and Bronislaw Szerszynski (2013) on public discourse about geoengineering in the UK, among others.

There seems to be little done through CDA concerning climate change and ideology with a focus on elected political power-holders, i.e. politicians, which is the focus of this study. The direction is however closely related to one strand of CDA, as Fairclough analyses interviews with, and speeches held by, politicians, although not concerning climate change. This study of course has connections methodically to articles in all three of the suggested categories and most of them are referred to more explicitly throughout this paper, but by analysing high-profile political speeches on climate change I hope to contribute with an analysis that doesn't seem to be readily found in the literature.

2. Theory

In this chapter I outline the theoretical framework of the thesis. Starting with the foundation in Critical Theory and moving on to discuss important terms used in this thesis notably ideology and discourse.

2.1 Theoretical Framework

Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels wrote in 'The German Ideology' that the ideas of the dominant group in a certain time are also the ideals of the same. For example, during the Feudal period the aristocracy ruled and concepts like honour and loyalty was the dominant values. They continue with the bourgeoisie saying that during this time the ideals of freedom and equality rose to prominence. Marx and Engels make two points. Firstly that the ideals are part of ideology and meant to reproduce the power of the dominant group(s), and secondly that these ideals can be presumed to become more and more vague and abstract since the shift in ideology needs to present itself as universal and appeal to the common interests of society (Marx & Engels, 1845). Following their analysis; society is still capitalistic and society's elite is still made up by the financial elite. But capitalism has penetrated society even deeper than in Marx and Engels time. This can be seen as a continuation, and the values being promoted today is still connected to 'freedom' and 'equality' as Marx and Engels suggested, but they have now taken a form to suit the market even more. Freedom is very often seen as freedom of choice as a consumer, and although we have come far in many aspects when it comes to 'equality' in terms of suffrage, education, property rights etc. the idea of equality is also based on the promise that the market doesn't discriminate; everybody is supposedly equal as consumers (and producers) on the market.

Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno sharpened the critique of contemporary society in the essay 'The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception' (1944 (1977)) arguing that modern capitalism had invaded culture turning it into a mass industry removing authenticity and with it individuality. In their essay they focus on the technological developments that are, at least implicitly, described as a missed opportunity to further and strengthen democracy. Instead capitalism takes over, mass produces and concentrates power under cover of technological advancements and consumer demand. Adorno and Horkheimer write:

'In the culture industry the individual is an illusion not merely because of the standardization of the means of production. He is tolerated only so long as his complete identification with the generality is unquestioned. Pseudo individuality is rife [in modern society]. What is individual is no more than the generality's power to stamp the accidental detail so firmly that it is accepted as such.' (Horkheimer & Adorno, 1944 (1976))

They continue their critique of modern society by pointing to another phenomenon in the capitalistic state when stating that mass production involves 'idolization of the cheap'. This has the effect that the average becomes the heroic, which leads to a general deterioration of quality (ibid.). It is said that Horkheimer was heavily influenced by Arthur Schopenhauer, with the effect that his critical theory is in essence in sympathy of the suffering of humanity, which is a different foundation compared to classical Marxism that has its starting point with the proletariat (Krogh, 1992). The connection to the work of the Frankfurt School and Horkheimer to this thesis is their notion that capitalism, and even more so the present neoliberal paradigm, seeps into society's every corner. As politics (and bureaucracy) is more and more subjugated to serve the market and increase consumption (and production). Where

they looked at the culture industry I will instead focus on climate change, and the communication of it.

Anthony Giddens discusses the relationship between capitalism and industrialism in his book from 1982, *Sociology – A Brief but Critical introduction*. According to Giddens there are two strands of thought arguing that either industrialism or capitalism is the main driving force of societal development in modernity. Giddens takes up a position in between using the term ‘industrial capitalism’ (Giddens, 1982, p.23). But he is leaning more towards an Marxist understanding that holds capitalism as the main driver, although this seems to be mainly because the implications of the theories based on the alternative are rejected (as they are connected to a kind of evolution sociology). Giddens does however seem sympathetic to the notion that industrialism is something separate from capitalism, indeed that capitalism is only a mode of production for industrialism, like Soviet’s communism was. His analysis is however undoubtedly coloured by the Cold War since the book was written in the beginning of the 1980’s. In later work, like ‘The Consequences of Modernity’ (1990), he levels capitalism with industrialism, together with military power and surveillance (Inglis & Thorpe, 2012, p.225f). In this thesis I will concern myself mostly with capitalism, and not with industrialism, because although capitalism and industrialism may be intertwined I see capitalism as the dominant force, even if it can be described as an extension or mode of industrialism.

The third and fourth drivers of modernity that Giddens points to, military power and surveillance can for the purpose of this thesis be translated into the nation-state and the accompanying nationalism, which connects to the writings of Ulrich Beck discussed below. The nation-states can and should be understood as separate from capitalism/communism and democracy/totalitarian regimes, although they are in every specific case interwoven. The foundation of the nation-state has been its military and bureaucratic power to assert sovereignty over its territory and population (Giddens, 1982, p.153). Even though times have changed since the inception of the nation-state its heritage lives on. The very identity of a nation-state is anchored in a notion of animosity and arbitrary differentiation towards people outside its borders, which is something that is still very much present in politics today.

Beck stresses in the paper *The Terrorist Threat: World Risk Society Revisited* (2002) that we live in a society that has created risks of a new kind and new dimensions than any society before us, some examples of this is climate change and environmental issues; another is the (global) financial market. The characteristics of these problems can be described in three aspects. First these issues aren’t spatially confined; they do not recognise any borders. Secondly we have invented and created things which will potentially have effects for 10 000 years from now, for example nuclear waste and GMO. One important question is then how do we communicate the risks we’ve created to societies thousands of years from now? The last aspect is social and concerns the aspect of accountability or responsibility. In climate change and financial breakdowns, it is near impossible to hold anyone accountable at least in legal sense, as Beck puts it (ibid.). Beck makes two claims in his article, the neoliberal ideology is a very important driving force in creating these problems and the neoliberal body of ideas has failed to deliver responses or solutions to these new problems. The other point which is equally important and interconnected is that the nation-state is not equipped to handle these new issues, Beck even goes as far as to say that the idea of the nation-state ‘is a zombie idea. It still looks alive, but it is dead.’ (ibid., p.10). This, as Beck points out, is not to say that the state is a dead concept, but that the ideas which are the foundation for the *nation-state* can no longer be said to be effective. An example of this is that traditionally there has been a clear distinction between domestic and foreign/international affairs, this no longer holds true, not for climate, terrorism or economic activities.

A contemporary example of a study taking its starting point in critical theory is Tina Sikka's article on geoengineering, a subject very much connected to climate change. In the article the main contribution, which is significant and typical of the critical theory, is that the author acknowledges the problems of geoengineering as steeped in unpredictability, uncertainty and risks, but the main thrust against this type of technology is that it alienates people from nature and weakens democracy, by defining the solutions in scientific and technical ways that are inaccessible for the public (Sikka 2012). In essence the critique is not only based on uncertainty of technical outcome; it is also an insightful critique of what kind of development for society as a whole that it implies, and from there a suggestion on how to move towards a more democratic and inclusive society. As Indian environmentalist Sunita Narain has eloquently formulated the critique of the technological solutions closely associated with the neoliberal politics 'All techno fixes [for climate change] – biofuels, GM crops or nuclear power – will create the next generation of crisis, because they ignore the fundamental problems of capitalism as a system that ignores injustice and promotes inequity.' (from Hulme, 2009, p.268)

To connect critical theory to communication I'm leaning on the writings of Stanley A. Deetz, and he bases his analysis of society and communication on Jürgen Habermas. According to Deetz communication is always distorted, since no communication lives up to the standard of an ideal speech situation. But what is relevant in this thesis, which connects closely to CDA but adds an important part, is his description of how communication is systematically distorted. 'Systematically distorted communication operates like strategic manipulation, but without overt awareness. The latent prejudice, preconception, predefined personal identity, or object production precludes open formation' (Deetz, 1992, p.457f). This means as Habermas puts it, that in systematically distorted communication at least one party is deceiving himself in believing he is taking part in communicative action (aimed at understanding) but is really involved in systematically distorted communication (with an underlying goal of success). This is to be seen in contrast to what Deetz terms strategic manipulation, which he simply describes as 'morally reprehensible' and is always aimed at success (ibid., p.459). Deetz continues with stating, again following Habermas, that '[p]rocesses of systematically distorted communication can be said to be pathological', because of three reasons. 1) It 'endangers the survival of the humans and other species by limiting important adaptation to a changing environment', 2) by violating the common and freely shared normative standards of a community, and 3) by posing arbitrary limits on the realisation of collective good and on the development of individualisation (ibid.). Deetz makes one other important point about distorted communication in explaining that groups, defined loosely as families, organisations etc., create their own internal logic, which reinforces itself and distorts communication. This can be related to ideology, which I will discuss in the next section, and the neoliberal logic of modern politics.

2.2 Ideology

The concept of ideology was first used, at least in print, in 1796 by the French philosopher Destutt de Tracy. Although some traces its history as far back as Francis Bacon and his use of idols or 'idola' in *Novum Organum* published in 1620 (Giddens, 1979, p.165; Krogh, 1992, p.50-52). The word ideology literary means 'the science of ideas' and was described by de Tracy as 'the greatest of arts[...], that of regulating society in such a way that man finds there the most help and the least possible annoyance from his own kind.' (Thompson 1990, p.29f). For de Tracy ideology was to be the new foundation of science, based on Enlightenment ideals. However, the term 'ideology' quickly came to refer to the ideas in themselves and not to the new science proposed by de Tracy. This turn of events has largely been connected to Napoléon Bonaparte and his opposition to the new science, which he forcefully argued were

misleading and disconnected from the real world. Marx later picked up Napoleon's critique of ideology when criticising the young Hegelians for their idealism (Schjelderup & Winsnes, 1959, p.121). The concept of ideology has since then gone through such a variety of changes in use and meaning that it is near impossible to give a comprehensive history of the word, which has even made scholars proclaim the concept to be useless (see for example Thompson discussion, 1990, p.6). Another response, if not to discard the term, has been to develop the more modern neutral conception of ideology. This modern neutral conception of ideology has mainly been associated with American scholars active after the WWII. In this tradition ideology is viewed more as a body of ideas on how to govern society, i.e. liberalism, communism, Marxism, fascism etc. Thompson describes that those who use ideology in the modern neutral sense claims that the scientific study of ideology can be done without 'any pejorative judgement concerning the systems of thought or belief.' (Thompson, 1990, p.6). However in Fairclough's words this conception of ideology is turned in to a weapon against Marxism (Fairclough, 2015, p.115). This is simply because it takes the focus away from power. In many ways this neutral conception of ideology is the everyday understanding of the term today. But I would argue that there is an undertone in this understanding that echoes Napoleon – ideology is something that isn't true. As Thompson points out, few people would call themselves ideologists (Thompson, 1990, p.5). It is always someone else who's ideological, even in the neutral conception, which gives it an undertone of critique.

I will now briefly discuss some modern thinkers understanding of ideology. This is mainly due to the fact that I will utilise Fairclough's Critical Discourse Analysis, where ideology is an essential part, but I will not fully accept the definition given by Fairclough. In defining my own take on the term, indebted to Thompson, and to be able to juxtapose it to Fairclough it is meaningful to portray some of the term's development and usage through time. I will, however, mainly discuss Thompson and Fairclough. Their views are overlapping since both of them take their starting point in the Marxist tradition of the term (and not the modern American version). But they do differ significantly in their interpretation.

2.2.1 Ideology According to Thompson

In his book *Ideology and Modern Culture* (1990) Thompson sets out to reformulate the concept of ideology. He distinguishes between two broad but very different uses of the term 'neutral conceptions of ideology' and 'critical conceptions of ideology' (Thompson, 1990, p.53). Thompson places his own use of the term in the critical conception of ideology and starts with a simple definition. Ideology is 'meaning in service of power' (ibid., p.7). Thompson sets out to sketch the development of ideology and distinguishes two different versions of ideology in the works of Marx and Engels. The first conception of ideology is defined as 'ideology is a theoretical doctrine and activity which erroneously regards ideas as autonomous and efficacious and which fails to grasp the real conditions and characteristics of social-historical life.' (ibid., p.34f). The second definition, which is largely the fundament for understanding ideology in Marxism today, is 'the epiphenomenal conception of ideology'. In this understanding of ideology, it takes a definition as 'a system of ideas which expresses the interest of the dominant class but which represents class relations in an illusory form.' (ibid., p.37). This definition is in turn based on three different assumptions: 1) in any given society we can distinguish between the economic conditions of production, the political and legal superstructure and the ideological forms of consciousness. 2) Ideological forms of consciousness must be explained by refereeing to the economic conditions of production, and can't be taken at face value. 3) 'The development of modern capitalism creates the conditions for a clear understanding of social relations and for the elimination of the class antagonisms upon which ideology depends.' (ibid., p.38-40).

However, Thompson moves on to describe a third understanding of ideology, what he calls Marx's latent conception of ideology (ibid., 40-44). Thompson describes this as:

Ideology is a system of representations which serves to sustain existing relations of class domination by orienting individuals towards the past rather than the future, or towards images and ideals which conceal class relations and detract from collective pursuit of social change. (Thompson, 1990, p.41)

Thompson builds on this definition, retaining the idea that the study of ideology is indeed a critical endeavour and not neutral, but he also modifies the definition. For one thing the criterion that ideology must be misleading or in some sense epistemological false is dropped. It may be misleading, but that is not a necessary part of the definition for something to be ideological. Thompson continues and gives his definition of ideology as 'a system of representation which conceals and misleads and which, in doing so, serve to sustain relations of domination.' (ibid., p.55). By incorporating the latent definition of ideology in his understanding the term also gets a focus on history, tradition and culture in its own sense.

Symbolic phenomenon, as vessels for creating meaning, are ideological to the extent that when situated in a socio-historical context can be said to establish and sustain relations of power which are systematically asymmetrical. This approach to ideology and domination also relieves the study of the one sided focus of class relations. It takes into account that ideology, as in meaning in service of power, can include traditional symbols and values dating before the creation of modern capitalism or based on different ideas and opinions. Therefore, ideology cannot always be reduced to economic conditions and/or class relations. It opens up to talk about other structural asymmetries in society. Thompson names this the latent definition of ideology because of the reasons listed above, i.e. that they don't really fit with the traditional understanding of ideology in Marxism, but also because even though Marx were aware of these other grounds for 'meaning making' he himself didn't name them ideology (ibid., p.41).

2.2.2 Ideology According to Fairclough

Fairclough starts one of his more enlightening papers on ideology with this remark: 'The key issue is whether ideology is a property of structures or a property of events, and the answer is "both". And the key problem is to find a satisfactory account of the dialectic of structures and events.' (Fairclough, 1995, p.71). Fairclough explains this to put it briefly by quoting Giddens: 'There can be no theoretical defence for supposing that the personal encounters of day-to-day life can be conceptually separated from the long-term institutional developments of society' (from Fairclough, 1995, p.35f). Fairclough takes this as a fundamental theoretical assumption (ibid., p.35f). In explaining the structural properties of ideology Fairclough employs the concepts of 'order of discourse' and 'power behind discourse' from Foucault, and to what he refers to as 'events'. This latter part of his analysis is heavily indebted to Antonio Gramsci. Especially in his earlier work Fairclough uses the concept of hegemony to great extent to conceptualise the struggle over power in society. For Fairclough ideology seems to be 'tied to action' and ideologies should then be judged in terms of their social effects (ibid., p.76). This dislocates the term from any connection to truth and thus Fairclough's position is in this similar to Thompson's use of ideology. However, in adopting Gramsci's concept of ideologies as a field of societal struggles the definition becomes something very different from the view given by Thompson. As in Thompson's theorising it would be more fitting to talk about the struggle to define *the* ideology (in the specific context).

In Fairclough's writings ideology is often described in a way that correlates with a neutral sense of the term, for example when Fairclough in his earlier work describes ideological struggles between different camps, so to say, within an institution. Here he borrows the term 'ideological formations' from Louis Althusser. Althusser is however known for defining ideology as social cement, which is necessary for meaning making in general and rejected the idea that ideology is in service of domination, even though he is based in Marxism (Giddens, 1979, p.179). Fairclough himself uses the term ideology here as in 'meaning making', which creates barriers between different fractions (Fairclough, 1995, p.40). In that sense it seems he is dropping the last part of the definition '...in service of power'. This seems to be at odds with the whole purpose of studying ideology in the way that Fairclough suggests with his framework of CDA.

At first glance on Fairclough's later work he and Thompson seems to share their view on ideology. Fairclough states that 'ideological common sense [is] common sense in the service of sustaining unequal relations of power.' (Fairclough, 2015, p.107). However, Fairclough doesn't limit his understanding of ideology to what Thompson would call the critical or negative definition of ideology, but draws his understanding of the term very much from Gramsci even in his later work. In doing so he defines ideology as something that can be used as a counter measure as well, and paradoxically continues from there to implicitly define ideology in the neutral sense as a body of ideas on how to govern society. This means that although Fairclough's work to a large extent circulates around the concept of ideology, his definition and usage of ideology becomes rather vague and sometimes contradictory. Since for Fairclough the essential axis of 'unequal relations of power' is class, based on the modes of production, it seems strange to call the counter measures to disrupt those relations ideological as well. This can only make sense if the base is broadened to equalise class with gender, ethnicity etc., since this will mean what Fairclough (and Gramsci) refer to as ideological in a counter activity manner, can be properly ideological in certain contexts where it is indeed in service of power.

2.2.3 Ideology in this Thesis

As I started to elaborate upon above there is a problem in how Fairclough describes society and ideology. The focus becomes too one-sided and too narrow, because for Fairclough the modes of production constitute the foundation of everything and class is the most important struggle (Fairclough, 2015, 63f). These are indeed among the most important aspects in 'late modernity' (as described by Giddens in *The Consequences of Modernity*) to study for critical researchers as well. But it is problematic to lock social theory in Marxist concepts of humans and society. As an example the imperialistic period starting in late 1400's is no doubt an era marked by inequalities, injustice and domination. But it is also a period without modern capitalism, which is widely regarded to have taken form around 1820 (O'Rourke & Williamson, 2002). Hence following these assumptions Fairclough's analysis of ideology seems to render itself irrelevant if it succeeds to change society away from (neoliberal) capitalism. It also follows that the analysis is based on the shaky premise that power struggles are always based on capitalistic classes (or at least the notion that this is always the most important struggle), which isn't true historically, isn't undisputed today and might not be relevant tomorrow. In essence the study of power and ideological struggles must focus as much on gender, ethnicity, sexuality, age and other grounds for discrimination and domination in different contexts.

Thompson's view on ideology of course owes a lot to Marx as well, but shifts the focus from being solely on the means of production to a combined focus of culture or traditions (even though those concepts are also based in a historical material context). With this definition the foundation becomes more suited to understand struggles between sexes,

ethnic groups etc. and not only classes. However, the CDA approach to studying ideology is still highly relevant in terms of method, but the focus becomes slightly different with Thompson's definition of ideology as a foundation.

To sum up my theoretical understanding of ideology is largely based on Thompson and can thus be defined as '*a system of representation which conceals and misleads and which, in doing so, serve to sustain relations of domination.*' (Thompson, 1990, p.55). As elaborated upon above I see neoliberal capitalism and nationalism as ideological, as it is misleading, in differentiating people in an arbitrary way (nationalism) and falsely claiming equal opportunities, while concealing who benefits from the system (neoliberal capitalism). Both neoliberal capitalism and nationalism, sustain a system that is unjust and harmful for a majority of people and the entire planet. The presence of neoliberal capitalism and nationalism as meaning making systems in service of power is therefore the foundation of my analysis of the communication of climate change.

2.3 Discourse

Let's now turn to elaborating on other concepts that will be important for this thesis. I will start with discourse and surrounding terms like order of discourse, and power in and behind discourse. These concepts, which were important contributions from Michel Foucault, are central in the work of Fairclough.

The concept of discourse is usually associated with Foucault but the modern notion of discourse is based on the work of Ferdinand de Saussure and his definition of language as divided between 'langue' and 'parole', where langue is referring to the structure of the language, which later has evolved into discourses (Inglis & Thorpe, 2012, p.171). For Saussure the division between langue and parole was partly a distinction between the underlying structure of language and the actual use of language. Saussure seems to have assumed that the knowledge of langue was a condition for using language, which is logical, however he also writes as if everyone had equal access to the relevant langue. Fairclough criticises this arguing that langue is better understood as discourse, and if homogeneity or standardisation is achieved it is imposed by those in power (Fairclough, 2015, p.55). Fairclough does however maintain the division between actual use of language and discourse, which he inherits from Saussure.

Discourses can be described by their features: they create their own objects; present the objects as real and present themselves as natural (Inglis & Thorpe, 2012, p.171). This definition owes a lot to a purely structuralist view of language and discourse since it implies that discourse and language is something given. The addition to the definition given by Fairclough is therefore important: discourse is 'language as a form of social practice' (Fairclough, 2015, p.55). This is the basic notion that Fairclough builds his critique of other linguists upon. He argues that language is a part of society, not external to it, and that it is a socially conditioned process (ibid., p.56). In other words, language and society cannot be studied separately; they are interconnected in 'an internal and dialectical relationship' (ibid.). Another definition that leans more to an agency directed understanding is given by Shaw. Shaw describes discourses as 'linguistic actions' that aim to act and influence the social world. Discourses are purposeful, directed and concealing 'the interests and power relationships inherent in linguistic performances' (Shaw, 2013, p.564). This in turn means that societal struggles do in part take place *over* language not just through language. By combining these descriptions, we have a basic description of discourses and how they are constituted. Discourse can now be operationalised as referring to 'social conditions of production and interpretation', which implies that the socially constructed framework of discourse is present in both producing texts and in understanding texts. Furthermore, the

analysis of discourse can be differentiated into three levels: the social situation, the social institution and the society as a whole (Fairclough, 2015, p.57f).

Let's now turn to the concept of order of discourses. I will mainly summarise the view and description of Fairclough here. To start with we can simply assert that for it to be an order of discourses there must indeed be competing discourses. Fairclough explains that in any given situation there are a number of discourses a person can draw upon. These types of discourse do however vary for the individual and in the context or the social order. For example, in the discourse of university teaching, there may be a complementary discourse in the form of conversation (ibid., p.61f). It is however clear that in general the teacher will be much freer to draw upon different discourse types than the student. This is referred to by Fairclough as power in discourse, and relates to who has the mandate to enforce the code of conduct in the situation. This brings us to the concept of power behind discourse. In essence who decides which type of discourse is the correct one in the specific institution? According to Fairclough this is one of the arenas where the societal struggles takes place and the group who is dominating society has power over the order of discourse. In Fairclough's words it is here the clash of ideologies occur. But in framing the struggle in these words he is using the term ideology in a sense that is not consistent with the definition elaborated above. Instead he uses the term in the hegemonic tradition here, which is associated with Vladimir Lenin and Gramsci. And as I've argued before lies closer to the modern neutral usage of the word and therefore becomes somewhat vague in parts of Fairclough's own analysis.

3 Method

In this chapter I will start with outlining Critical Discourse Analysis, taking my starting point in the work of Norman Fairclough. I'll move on to elaborate on how CDA is used in this thesis, what I focus on in terms of linguistic actions and why. Lastly I point to some limitations in the method and in the thesis.

3.1 Critical Discourse Analysis

Fairclough takes his starting point in claiming that language and society is in an internal and dialectical relationship (ibid., p.36ff). This leads to critical discourse analysis having a threefold focus, which in turn means that the study of any text must be done with regards to the actual text, what is presented (and what is not), what are the interactions surrounding the inception of the text and finally what is the context (what discourses are drawn upon and what is the historical conditions and developments in this field) (ibid., p.58f).

In terms of Fairclough's method this mirrors the three layers. The first step of the analysis, which it shares with all discourse and language studies, is a descriptive phase. The second step is to interpret the text, and the resources the author has drawn upon in creating the text. Finally, the text is to be explained and put into context. Or phrased differently there are three dimensions of the analysis; text, discourse practice, and sociocultural practice (Fairclough, 1995, p.9). The first stage of analysis focuses on the attributes of the text posing questions connected to vocabulary, grammar and textual structures (Fairclough, 2015, p.129f). The second and third stages of analysis are more interconnected than the first. The stage of the analysis referred to as interpretation by Fairclough focuses on how texts are interpreted and understood, through the listeners' and the




Figure 1 –
The three layers of CDA

Own production inspired by
Fairclough (1995, p.98)

producer of the text's common sense, or as Fairclough names it 'members' resources'. These common sense assumptions, which are induced by a text, are connected to the discourse(s) the text draws upon and are therefore a matter of interpretations, since these features are not explicit. The third stage concerns the explanation. It is explanatory because the 'common sense' is itself mediated and made real through social realisation, which depends upon institutions and societal patterns. These are in turn formed by struggles over the relationships and order of discourses (ibid., p.154).

The main focus of CDA is on how practices and strategies are used for legitimisation or delegitimation. These strategies are specific but not always conscious or intentional. They are specific in the sense that they can be understood and described through how things are described as 'positive, beneficial, ethical, understandable, necessary or otherwise acceptable in the text in question' and on the other side things are instead portrayed as 'negative, harmful, intolerable or, for example, morally reprehensible.' (Joutsenvirta & Vaara, 2015, p.744). Deetz discusses similar communicative instances as 'disqualification', his focus is however here on how individuals and specific inputs or views are discredited, manifested in statements like for example 'you are only saying that because you are [a woman, an economist, Swedish etc]' (Deetz, 1992, p.465). Through this the connection to ideology can be made, but also to historical context. For Fairclough the focus is usually neoliberal ideas, the protection and deregulation of the market, business and (transnational/international) corporations, but it's a powerful method in other discourses as well, nationalism for one.

In a similar fashion as Sarasini I will use Fairclough's framework to look specifically at 'manifest (elements stated explicitly) and constitutive (elements referred to implicitly) statements prescribing a suitable course of action' (Sarasini, 2009, p.638). Relating this as described above to positive and negative statements. Additionally I will utilise the same approach as described by Gasper et al (2013, p.30f). How 'we' and 'our' is used is potentially important since it implies chosen viewpoint and/or loyalties. Metaphors and definitions are also important, since it's a way to infer specific perspectives (Fairclough, 2015, p.136f). 'Naturalization' and 'nominalization' are two other crucial aspects to study in any text through CDA. Naturalization refers to when things are communicated as natural, normal or even inevitable (Gasper et al 2013, p.31). As Deetz points out this severs the connection and the understanding of the social historical process of how and why socially produced phenomenon are seen as natural (Deetz, 1992, p.465). Nominalization refers to when processes, represented through verbs, are exchanged for nouns, which obscures the meaning and especially accountability (Fairclough, 2015, p. 140). This can be related to whether the sentence is passive or active, i.e. if it refers to or conceals agents. Deetz also points to some other phenomenon of discursive closure. One being neutralization, which is when 'processes by which value positions become hidden and value-laden activities are treated as if they were value-free.' Another is meaning denial, which refers to when the inherent ambiguity of language is used either as strategic manipulation or when it occurs as systematically distorted communication. It is essentially to say one thing and at the same time 'not' say it or being able to deny it. The example Deetz uses is when a person shouting at the same time proclaims 'not to be angry'. Pacification is yet another type of discursive closure that Deetz distinguishes. This refers to when an issue and/or the attempts to address it is pacified, usually through two different strategies, either by making the issue trivial and not worth the effort or by portraying the issue as daunting and inevitable (Deetz, 1992, p.467ff). Finally, attention is usually given to recurrent vocabulary and key terms, often analysed together with what these terms are paired with (Gasper et al, 2013, p.31).

In this thesis I use the outlined method to analyse the speeches held by President Obama and President Xi. My focus is on how specific aspects of climate change are

addressed, rather than investigating for example what metaphors are used in the speech in general. This means that my use of the method on the data is exploratory in a sense. In other words, all of the described linguistic actions described in this section are used in the analysis, but since not all of them are occurring they may not be discussed in the analysis.

3.2 Limitations

Communication is in itself a term that is hard to define and the subject of communication as a scientific field of study can hardly be described as homogenous. One of the limitations in this study is that I will primarily focus on the verbal communication, or 'texts' to use Fairclough's terminology, and not for example body language etc.

On a more practical note the exclusion of the EU, which is the third major player in climate change negotiations, is mainly due to limited space in the thesis paired with the complexity of the EU itself, which would be too time consuming and page consuming to address in the paper.

The study as a whole could also have been extended to more speeches, or other communicative instances, either by Obama and Xi, or by contrasting them to actors with a different status or roles in the negotiations. This would in any case be a natural extension to this paper.

Lastly the analysis of the speeches should be taken with caution, as any interpretation of text and discourses are to some extent ambiguous and open for competing interpretations. Perhaps even more so with the speech held by Xi since, as Fairclough and Deetz among other points out, the interpretation and explanation of text is in part connected to culture and there might be things lost.

4 The Actors and Background

In this chapter I begin with portraying a number of important discourses on climate change. I move on to describe the developments and discourses in China and USA, to give a national and historical context to the analysis of the speeches.

4.1 International Discourses on Climate Change

My understanding of the relevant discourses is influenced by the description given by Gwendolyn Blue, who in a paper from 2015 distinguishes five different discourses. The mainstream sustainability discourse, the expansive sustainability discourse, the limits discourse and the green radical discourse. Apart from these there is a fifth one, which can be called the scientific climate change discourse, represented primarily by the IPCC (Blue, 2015, p.450f). The first four can be said to compete to some extent, whereas the fifth one is more complementary to the others. Of course other discourses can be added, a sceptic discourse for example.

The mainstream sustainability discourse is concerned with dealing with climate change through the existing political and economic framework (Blue, 2015). This is to be understood as the general conservative and liberal understanding of climate change and its solutions, which are technical and economic solutions, within the neoliberal paradigm of protecting and deregulating the market. The idea is that by doing so the companies and the market will be 'unleashed' and develop the solutions. Melo et al describes this discourse in a similar fashion, but divides it into two separate discourses, marketization and technocratization, although showing that they are largely interdependent and usually reinforcing each other (Melo et al, 2013, p.50f).

The expansive sustainability discourse challenges the economic systems by arguing for wealth redistribution as part of facing climate change (Blue, 2015). This discourse

might be understood as Social democratic discourse on climate change. The neoliberal system is not fundamentally challenged, but taxation on rich and/or on polluting is necessary, usually connected with international efforts to help and support poor countries. This discourse can be connected to what has been described as the ‘poverty alleviation discourse’. It is however a separate discourse that according to John Dryzek stems from the radical green movement, but has been very effective and therefore is drawn upon by different actors (Melo et al, 2013, p.51).

The limits discourse focuses on the economic structure, and challenges generally the neoliberal economic structure and its lack of ability to handle climate change and its impacts, but doesn’t argue for political power to be redistributed (Blue, 2015). This is the general left-wing side, at least if we don’t move into the communist areas of left-wing politics. In this discourse there is a clear critique of the economic system, but the political system with liberal and representative democracy is not challenged.

Finally, the green radical discourse challenges both the (neoliberal) economic structure and the political system, and sees reform in both as necessary to cope with climate change (Blue, 2015). Here we find similar kinds of critique regarding the economic structures as in the limits discourse, but this is combined with a critique of the distribution of political power. Usually there is an argument for more deliberative democracy, grass-root movement and decentralisation. The green radical discourse is also connected to what Melo et al describes as the ‘participation discourse’, which connects to the critique of the distribution of political power. This discourse has however been rather influential as well, and traces of it can be seen in many different settings. This means that it should not be seen as only part of the green radical discourse, because in many cases it has been argued that the participation discourse is used more instrumentally for promoting other agendas than actual participation (Melo et al, 2013, p.51).

The sceptic discourse is a vague one that has many facets, and is usually combined with other discourses as shown by Mike Hulme (2009) and Alex Y. Lo (2015). The general idea, at least on a linguistic basic description, is usually based around two separate critiques. Either the whole science around climate change is a hoax, i.e. there is no global warming. It is simply a gigantic conspiracy to fund scientists and green radicals. Or there is global warming – but it is not caused by humans, it is naturally occurring and therefore nothing society and politics should be concerned with. The subtler and more dangerous features of this discourse is its attempt to discredit science and spread disinformation, with everything from proclaiming that the climate weather-stations are placed in cities and therefore not accurate, to twisting scientific findings, for example claiming that the glaciers are not melting - in fact they are spreading (which is true for about 1-2% of the worlds glaciers, whilst the rest are decreasing in rapid speed). The disinformation has in many aspects been tremendously effective, partly because climate change is very complex and the science around it is not precise or complete, which opens up for questioning. Resulting in that in many situations it is still deemed relevant to ask whether one ‘believes’ in global warming or climate change. But apart from manipulative disinformation it also relates to the problem of ‘balance as bias’ in journalism, which Rahmstorf writes about (Rahmstorf, 2012).

Hulme also goes into briefly describing four present and salient discourses concerning climate change. This first is ‘Climate change as a battle ground’, which to a large extent can be connected to the sceptical discourse, but also to the opposite discourse of green radicalism (Hulme, 2009, p.xxvii).

Climate change as justification, especially for commodification of for example the atmosphere. This is in effect the neoliberal discourse on climate change, where climate change is seen as an opportunity to extend the market and its power by converting commons into privatised assets (ibid.).

The third portrays climate change as inspiration, for change in political, economic and social systems on local and or global scale. This can be connected to both the limits discourse but also the green radicalism, as it is drawn upon to create and argue for global networks, new forms of social movements and activism (ibid.).

Finally, there is also a discourse portraying climate change as a threat, which is best understood as sort of an overarching discourse since what it threatens is quite diverse for different groups. It can be divided into at least two different subcategories. One closely related to nationalism and the nation-state, where it is seen to threaten national or global security. The other one is a form of cosmopolitan discourse, focusing on ethnic groups and or global security especially for socioeconomically exposed groups, but not focusing on the nation-state. (ibid.).

4.2 The People's Republic of China

Since the revolution in 1949 China has been a one party state ruled by the Chinese Communist Party, the CCP. According to the constitution the CCP 'retains supreme political power over all administrative divisions of the central, provincial and local government, state-owned enterprises, and public institutions (including universities), by appointing non-elected partisans as top executives.' (Lo, 2015, p. 757).

There is no legitimate political opposition, although there have been tendencies in the last years to move towards decentralisation, allowing for elections in villages and neighbourhoods. But since it is not allowed at provincial or national level political participation on a larger scale remains very limited (Shi, 1999).

Since Deng Xiaoping took over in 1978 and after China has increased its GDP substantially, and according to the CIA World Fact Book it is in 2015 the world's largest economy. It is also the world's largest emitter of carbon-dioxide, in terms of quantity. Even though China has gradually moved away from the communist and authoritarian ideas this is only true as far as the market is concerned, and freedom of speech is still very limited (Lo, 2015, p.758). China is still making great efforts at controlling internet and other media, prosecuting journalists and activist who are seen as a threat to stability. The last decades stability has to large extent been equated with economic stability and growth. The main discourses have revolved around economic development and institutional stability, and an undertone from politicians, civilians and experts that anything goes as long as those goals are met. This is clear in 'China's National Climate Change Programme' (CNCCP) from 2007, which is the main climate change policy document in China. Climate change is recognised as a serious concern and China 'will swiftly adopt measures ranging from laws, economy, administration and technology which will combine to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and imbue the country with a flexible approach to climate change' (CNCCP, 2007, foreword). But it is also clear that China will not accept any obligations to reduce emissions that could hamper economic growth, and that the actual measures outlined in the report was voluntary adoption of a target to reduce energy intensity, reforestation and lastly claiming the 'one-child policy' as climate change mitigation policy (Hulme, 2009, p.271f). In effect none of the core policies addresses real emissions. Intensity says nothing of actual emissions, since the number of factories etc. keeps increasing. Reforestation is good in many aspects but carbon sinks are still not fully understood, and doesn't address the source of emissions. The 'one-child policy' as a climate change policy is possible through the Kyoto protocol where you can 'cash-in' on mitigation projects. The issue of population is one rarely touched upon in connection to climate change, since it opens up a whole other set of ethical considerations, but in any case the same goes for the last policy as the other two; it doesn't address real emissions. And as a consequence emissions in China are rising both in absolute terms and per capita.

It is therefore interesting that Jingrong Tong shows in his study of 10 major

newspapers in China that rather than reinforcing these discourses of economic growth and stability, when it comes to environmental issues and climate change, uses environmental discourses as a critical tool in criticising the focus of economic development (Tong, 2015). Tong explains this finding by claiming a connection to the general oppression of journalism in China. Since outright critique of the political system is not allowed the environmental discourse opens a window for critical reflection that is seen as more acceptable, because it doesn't explicitly name the state party. Another interesting finding is that in the 10 newspapers investigated in the study there are four 'avant-garde' newspapers, five more moderate and the People's Daily, which is run by the Communist Party, and in the study there is no significant difference between the People's Daily and the moderate newspapers. This indicates that a more open discussion on environmental issues is not just allowed by the Communist party, but to some extent also participated in (ibid., p.359). Two other findings that are worthy of note is that reporting on 'environmental risks' has steadily and quite substantially increased in the years between 2008 and 2011, which are the years for the study (ibid). The other is that climate change is one of the 'environmental risks' that are least reported on. Instead pollution and 'man-made geological problems' dominate the reports. Pollution is no doubt a big problem in many of the big cities in China (ibid., p.357), but there is potentially another connection here as well. Namely that China is to a large extent focused on national and domestic issues in general, and at least on the surface keeps this policy as a general guideline for international policies as well – domestic issues are domestic issues and the international community should not interfere in sovereign states (especially not in China). Therefore, climate change is less focused on since it can't easily be fitted into Chinese national discourse.

There is another tendency in international policy from China, and that is the ambiguity concerning its own status as a developed or a developing country. As mentioned China is now the world's biggest economy in terms of GDP, but it only ranks around 85-90 in terms of GDP per capita according to CIA (CIA: Country Comparison), IMF (World Economic Outlook Database) and the World Bank (The World Bank, International Comparison Program database) statistics, which opens up for this ambiguity and dual status of China. This is also complicated in climate change negotiations as China is listed as a non-Annex I country to the UNFCCC. In general the non-Annex I countries are labelled 'developing countries', but this distinction isn't clear cut since China, Saudi Arabia and South Korea are among these countries (UNFCCC, List of Non-Annex I Parties).

There have been quite substantial changes in terms of freedom of speech, especially concerning journalists reporting on environmental issues. According to a study by Hugo De Burgh and Zeng Rong from 2011 there has been an ongoing development since the beginning of the 1990's towards a more open debate. The reason for this is mainly the external pressure through globalisation, marketization and increased segregation between rich and poor within the country. This has, together with an increasing middle-class, pushed media to be more critical and report on problems concerning their readers to stay relevant (De Burgh & Zeng 2011). As we have seen this relative openness has developed more in environmental journalism than other areas. So much that De Burgh and Zeng claims that 'it is now legitimate for its citizens to point to failings in environment protection; acceptable to question decisions that appear to damage the environment; commonplace to form pressure groups to defend the environment; and axiomatic to demand transparency and accountability in the name of the environment.' Their conclusion might however be a bit overstated, since they themselves write about how journalists trade information about environmental issues across provinces to reduce the risk of being prosecuted by the state, especially if connections to politics are displayed. Nonetheless it shows some progression over the last 30 years.

Lo picks up on the relative openness in the debate on climate change in China in an article from 2015. In this study Lo interviews a number of young Chinese people with an interest to understand the existing discourses surrounding the environment and climate change. One finding is that the discourses to a large extent are devoid of political responsibility and consequences (Lo, 2015). The results are a bit ambiguous, on the one hand the study shows that there is knowledge and concern about climate change, but also that there is not much interest or ideas on how to handle climate change. The results are potentially also a bit optimistic in the sense that the author has chosen to conduct interviews with university students, with an aim of finding interviewees that are more likely to have some interest and knowledge about climate change. Lo describes three different discourses found through the study:

1) Prosaic Environmentalism, that trusts in the climate sciences and display fear of the consequences climate change likely will bring, but are at the same time politically neutral and doesn't engage in activism or in other way try to change human impact on the climate (ibid., p.763ff). This may come closest to the scientific discourse, represented by the IPCC, in the way that it is concerned with climate change but at the same time remains largely unpolitical.

2) Co-operative economic optimism. The knowledge and understanding of climate change is more limited in this discourse than the first, but those in the discourse don't deny the existence of climate change. Instead the risks are seen with less alarm, and more belief in that economic development and the market can solve the issue. There is also optimism and a belief that all parties should co-operate to help solve the issue, both in domestic setting as in people, companies and institutions and on international level where little distinction is made between developed and developing countries in their responsibility in managing climate change. But even here political and democratic solutions and responsibilities are played down (ibid., p.766f). In terms of connecting this to the discourses that Blue draws upon it might come closest to what is called mainstream sustainability, and in China this discourse correlates with a west-friendly discourse.

3) Actor scepticism: This is the discourse that is the hardest to define when reading Lo. To start with this group has less belief in the climate sciences, showing a distrust towards whether climate change is real or not, and if it is, if it is human induced. But on the other hand there is also an awareness of climate change's impact on human society, but this is played down. But assuming climate change is real this group express a general distrust in human agency, showing scepticism towards individuals' willingness to change behaviour, the market's ability to cope with climate change and political institutions to handle climate change. There is however a tendency to believe more in technological advancements, which Lo connects to the general distrust in humans (ibid., p.767f). This discourse obviously has connections to a general sceptic discourse. But instead of being connected to a neoliberal discourse, as in the USA, it is rather leaning towards an authoritarian discourse where individual agency and the market cannot be depended upon.

4.3 The United States of America

The USA has a complicated history when it comes to climate change in terms of policy, communication and discourse. What has been called climate science was made famous by the NASA scientist James Hansen. The same man who had such harsh critique of COP21. Al Gore, who made the documentary 'An Inconvenient Truth' and received the Nobel Peace Prize, is American. One of the most successful ENGOs in recent years, 350.org, is also an American initiative. Still the USA has among the strongest and well-organised sceptics in the world, reaching as far as the senate, congress and the presidential candidates. The 'official' stance of USA, at least according to the Senate, is that climate change is indeed occurring, but

it is not due to human activities. A bill was passed 98-1 stating that climate change is 'not a hoax', but at the same time a bill stating that 'human activity significantly contributes to climate change' was voted down in the US senate by 49 – 50 (Goldenberg, S., 2015-01-22).

Apart from the general discourses mentioned previously, the US debate is heavily influenced by both nationalistic and neoliberal discourses. It might be useful to distinguish between a general public debate and the (party) political debate. Especially since the climate scepticism to a very large extent has been a dividing factor between Republicans and Democrats during the last 20 years. Studies made by the National Research Centre and Pew Research Centre in 2013 show that 69% of Americans believe the Earth is getting warmer, however only 42% believe that human activities are the primary cause (Nisbet et al, 2015, p.285), and there is a clear and increasing divide between Democrats and Republicans. In 1997 52% of Democrats and 48% of Republicans agreed that global warming had already begun. In 2013 87% of Democrats believed global warming had begun but only 44% of Republicans did (ibid., p.286). This shows of an increasing politicisation of the issue, and the disturbing fact that Republicans are actually less likely to 'believe' in climate change now than 20 years ago, even though the scientific evidence are mounting and there is a broad consensus in the scientific community. It has also been shown that the American public are more sceptical towards climate change and climate science than any other developed country in the world (ibid.).

A lot of this can be understood through political discourse as the divide between Republicans and Democrats show. Republicans since Reagan has been the core political movement of neoliberal policy were the state should be minimised and primarily focus on protecting the free market, i.e. ensuring maximum profit for the private sector (and the idea is that this would benefit society as a whole). The divide in the US over climate change has another quite disturbing feature, which is shown by Paul R. Brewer in his paper on the polarisation. According to studies it is clear that the relation between higher education and 'belief' in climate change has negative relation among Republicans. The opposite is true for Democrats, where education correlates with more developed understanding of climate change. This consequently means, as the same studies show, that Republicans with less education are more likely to 'believe' in climate change (Brewer, 2012). The explanation for this is likely to relate to the knowledge and devotion to the Republican Party according to Brewer. It seems that Republicans with higher education follow their party officials and leaders more closely and therefore hear and accept the sceptical discourse, whereas Republicans with lower education follow news in general more than the political leaders (ibid.). There is more to say on the subject but here I will just make the point that climate change has through politicisation over the last 20 years or so been constructed as something that will harm growth and profit for many core industries, like fossil fuel and car industry, prompting denial of the existence, effects or the causes to climate change. This kind of protectionism also connects to nationalism. It is, however, clear from studies that this construction of climate change has been a gradual development, and by no means that neoliberal inclinations equal climate denial, in most circumstances it would rather correlate with the mainstream sustainability discourse, which makes the US hard-core scepticism a somewhat special case.

The Democratic Party's message in general, and the Obama administration in particular, has not been a sceptic one, but one that at least in rhetoric terms have taken it seriously. The centrepiece of suggested action has however been a federal cap-and-trade scheme, a solution that must be seen as a neoliberal measure. However even that has been hard to set up. The bill was passed in the House of Representatives, but stopped by the Senate. When Obama assumed office he had a slim majority in the Senate, it was therefore needed to achieve consensus among the Democrats to approve the bill on cap-and-trade or convince some Republicans to support it. None of this happened before the Copenhagen UNFCCC

summit in 2009, which was the plan. Republicans didn't back the bill and some Democrats didn't either on account of being backed by fossil fuel industry in their home states, according to Brewer (2012, p.8). The Waxman-Markey Bill never got further.

Although, as I have mentioned, there are a few examples of high profile people in the environmental movement from the USA it has nonetheless been suggested that the green activism in the US has greatly decreased since the 80's (Ungar, 2014). And when it comes to the green movement in the USA today it has been argued that there is tendency for apocalyptic rhetoric, which alienates rather than encourages people of acting. In a study from 2009 Foust and O'Shannon Murphy claims there are two different kinds of discourses (or frames as they call it) in US 'elite media'. The Tragic Apocalyptic discourse that treats global warming as matter of cosmic fate, and in doing so removes all individual agency, and the Comic Apocalyptic discourse that retains some agency, but within limits (Foust & O'Shannon Murphy 2009). This study has, as many American communication studies, an understanding of communication as rhetoric, which means they focus a lot on narrative. This is evident in their conclusions of the two different discourses that are structured as stories with end-points that are more or less inevitable. It also shows in their proposal for change, which is limited to changing the rhetoric to open up for more agency in the narratives. This means it is another perspective, to some extent, on discourses concerning climate change, but a perspective that greatly influences the American public debate and therefore is an additional layer to analyse in the case of the USA. In terms of other discourses present in the USA I will follow Blue's description; since that study is concerned primarily with the western world it is highly relevant for the USA as well, of course with the addition of the sceptic discourse and the overall understanding of the very present discourses of neoliberalism and nationalism.

5 The Setting and its Development

In this chapter I briefly sketch the development on climate negotiations through the UN since the Earth Summit in 1992 to give a broader context leading up to the speeches.

5.1 UNFCCC and COP

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was established at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. The convention aims at 'stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system' (UNFCCC, 1992, p.9). The UNFCCC sets no actual limits, nor has it any enforcement mechanisms, instead it is as the name suggests a framework for how 'Protocols' or 'Agreements' should be negotiated. This is the framework for the COP, Conferences of Parties, that has been taking place since 1995, and the Kyoto Protocol is in effect an extension of the UNFCCC (UNFCCC, Background on the UNFCCC).

5.2 IPCC

The IPCC is a scientific intergovernmental body within the UN. It is independent, but the assessment reports are made in support of the UNFCCC. IPCC does no research itself but works more as a reviewer of the relevant climate science and assesses and compiles the research for its Assessment Reports (IPCC, Organization). The IPCC has the somewhat impossible mission to assess relevant (scientific) knowledge on climate change and deliver 'policy-relevant' reports, but never be policy prescriptive (Hulme, 2009, p.96). To keep a clear boundary between science and policy is not easy though. Science cannot be neutral, because humans cannot be neutral. In the sense that we cannot have a neutral perspective, science is made by humans who make choices based on their experience, knowledge,

situation etc. This means IPCC will shape policy, which is not bad in itself, but it does open up for critique since IPCC supposedly doesn't interfere in politics. In a similar line of thought Silke Beck elaborates on this impossible position the IPCC has, concluding that IPCC is part of 'depoliticizing politics and politicizing science' concerning climate change (Beck, S., 2011, p.301f.). Since the consequence of claiming that IPCC's work is neutral, which it cannot be, the debate has turned to focus on the credibility of IPCC and climate science in general because controlling science is to control politics. In Beck's words it creates 'proxy debates' (ibid., p.302).

5.3 The Kyoto Protocol

The main point of the Kyoto Protocol was to make industrialised nations reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by 5.2 percent collectively (UN, 1997, Kyoto Protocol). The reduction was to be achieved in the period 2008-2012, compared to the levels of 1990. However, the protocol allowed a variety of different mechanisms to discount the emissions (Hulme, 2009, p.290). The most prominent example being Russia, which is the only one of the four biggest polluters to have ratified the protocol (not counting the EU), neither China nor the USA did. But Russia benefited greatly in terms of 'emission credits' due to the comparison with the Soviet Union in 1990, making the protocol very ineffective in the case of Russia (ibid., p.296). The protocol was conceived in December 1997 but didn't come into effect until 2005, when enough nations had ratified it. The protocol was largely modelled on the successful Montreal Protocol and is based on a very top-down view of dealing with global warming (ibid., p.291). The Kyoto Protocol can also be said to have started, or at least cemented, the idea of the 'marketization' of climate change as a solution, since its main feature was to create markets for emission trading on six different greenhouse gases. It has been described as a neoliberal solution, where nation-states are employed as managers for a new global market (ibid., p.302f).

5.4 The Copenhagen Accord

The Copenhagen Summit, COP15, was largely seen as a failure (Parker et al, 2014, p.9). The summit in Copenhagen was supposed to deliver the successor to the Kyoto Protocol, but due to poor mediation, negotiation structures and conflicting visions of the goal with the new agreement, especially among the USA, China and the EU, the negotiations stranded (ibid., p.12f). Obama had prior to Copenhagen promised to get the USA back in the climate debate and take a leading role, but came weakened to Copenhagen due to failures at home to implement his policies. The EU had tried to take the position as the global leader concerning climate change and devoted a lot of resources to get a binding agreement in Copenhagen. This was something especially China would not accept, as it was seen to hinder Chinese economic growth. In essence the most powerful actors in the negotiations were pursuing conflicting goals (ibid., p.15). The result was the 'Copenhagen Accord', which was not legally binding, hasted through behind closed doors in the last hours, and was only 'taken note of' not 'adopted' by the assembly (UN, 2009, Copenhagen Accord).

5.5 The Paris Agreement

The Paris Agreement is essentially two documents. It is the actual agreement, which is legally binding. The most essential part of this agreement is the 2° target, and aim for 1.5° temperature rise compared to pre-industrialised time. It also introduces the so called (INDC, (Intended) Nationally Determined Contributions. The agreement makes it compulsory to put together national targets to address climate change, however these targets doesn't have to be met and there is no sanctions for not meeting (or not even trying to meet) the targets. The agreement also states in Article 4.1 that parties to the agreement should 'aim to reach global

peaking of greenhouse gases as soon as possible' and in the second half of the century achieve a balance between anthropogenic emissions and sinks (UN, 2015, The Paris Agreement,).

The Paris Agreement however contains another part as well, which precedes the actual binding agreement and is named the Paris Decision. This part can be seen as an explanation, at least in some cases, on how the agreement should be understood. For example, it makes clear that (developing) countries that are damaged by climate change cannot get compensation by rich countries, even though the Agreement acknowledges developed countries shall provide 'financial resources' to assist developing countries (ibid., p.26 & p.8). The decision also contains 'urges' and 'requests' etc., in other words paragraphs and decisions that are not legally binding.

When the agreement was adopted by the assembly in La Bourget the USA's Secretary of State John Kerry held a speech claiming the agreement was a 'critical message to the global marketplace' (Kerry, J. 2015-12-12.), since it won't be the governments that will solve the problems caused by climate change. 'It will be the genius of the American spirit [sic]'(ibid.). According to Kerry the agreement will move investments and business will be 'unleashed' (ibid.).

6 The Speeches

The two speeches that are analysed in this thesis were held in Paris on the 30th of November 2015 as part of the opening ceremony at COP21. The speeches don't state the official negotiating positions of the USA and China, but they are held by their respective Presidents and can therefore be assumed to indicate the perspectives held by the two countries going into the negotiations. President Obama's transcribed speech has been taken from the White House's official webpage (Obama, B. 2015-11-30). President Xi's transcribed and translated speech has been taken from the Chinese, English-language, newspaper China Daily's web page (Xi, 2015-12-01). Both speeches are found in full in the appendix. The speeches can also be viewed at the UN webpage for COP21 (UNFCCC, Leaders Event, His Excellency Mr. Xi Jinping; UNFCCC, Leaders Event, His Excellency Mr. Barack Obama).

The analysis of the speeches is structured around the research questions and starts with the definition of climate change and problem formulation and continues with the goals and solutions in respective speech, then follows two sections in the analysis of each speech which points to the characteristics of the two different speeches.

6.1 Xi's Speech

President Xi's speech was entitled 'Work Together to Build a Win-Win, Equitable and Balanced Governance Mechanism on Climate Change' and was held as the fifth speech at the La Bourget on the 30th of November 2015.

6.1.1 Climate Change and Problem Formulation

There are not many passages that provide clear definitions of climate change in Xi's speech. There are two sentences that implicitly give an understanding of the viewpoint. In the beginning of the speech the President quotes a passage from 'Les Miserables' by the French writer Victor Hugo when saying 'supreme resources spring from extreme resolutions.' The quote directly relates to the willingness to do something, rather than directly to climate change. It does however give a sense of urgency. How much weight should be given to the fact that he quotes 'Les Miserables' in this situation is unclear, but since the title is given in the speech, not just the writers name it is an interesting choice, which adds to the sense of urgency. It is also interesting to note that he in the beginning of the speech quotes a Western author. Of course the meeting was held in France so the meaning of it should not be

overstated, but it is a sign of western influence and cultural dominance.

The second passage that relates to a definition or problem formulation comes soon after. ‘A successful international agreement should not just address immediate challenges but more importantly, it should also present a vision for the future’. Here climate change is acknowledged as having immediate challenges, but the emphasis is that it has potentially long lasting consequences and that more challenges are to come due to climate change. As it is formulated it however also draws on the ‘inspiration discourse’, seeing climate change as an opportunity.

6.1.2 Goals

Already in the second passage of the speech the first sentence on the goals of the conference is stated as ‘to strengthen implementation of the UNFCCC and bring about a comprehensive, balanced, ambitious and binding agreement on climate change. [---] to achieve sustainable development [...] for mankind’. This early passage sets an ambitious and optimistic tone as it acknowledges the goal of a binding agreement. It is notable that it ends with ‘Sustainable development’ for mankind, as it has connections to two different discourses. Sustainable development is a term that in the beginning was connected to the green (radical) movement, who argued for substantial changes in society, today it has become a more problematic term as it is more of a buzzword. It is now more connected to the mainstream sustainability discourse or the expansive sustainability discourse. The use of ‘mankind’ as a term, which is reoccurring in the speech, points to a cosmopolitan discourse.

The second goal that is mentioned in the speech by Xi Jinping can be summarised as ensuring the Paris Agreement creates effective control on greenhouse gases and pursue ‘green, circular and low-carbon development’ but not hampering economic growth. This manifests a somewhat top-down vision for the solution, which is part of the all-over structure of UNFCCC, but it also clearly manifests the mainstream sustainability discourse since it proclaims the agreement should feature ‘both economic growth and an effective response to climate change.’ It thus naturalises this connection.

The next passage relates to the goal of the agreement as well and draws from the participation discourse, as it states that the agreement ‘should help galvanize global efforts and encourage broad participation’ and include not only governments but also ‘mobilize business, non-governmental organizations and all players in society to participate in international cooperation on climate change, thus raising public awareness of pooling resources on climate change.’ This short segment on participation naturally comes across as somewhat hollow in light of the authoritarian regime that is the CCP.

The fourth part of the speech that relates to the goals of the agreement, but also the perceived solutions begins like this: ‘The Paris Agreement should help increase input of resources to ensure actions on climate change. To obtain financial and technical support for capacity building is essential for developing countries to address climate change.’ Here the goals of the agreement and the solutions for global warming are seen as financial and technical, which are the main ideas in the neoliberal discourse concerning climate change, but there is also a clear connection here for differentiation and wealth redistribution as is part of the expansive sustainability discourse.

The fifth and last passage that concerns the goal of the Paris agreement can be said to draw upon the poverty alleviation discourse.

‘The Paris agreement should accommodate the national conditions of various countries and lay emphasis on practical results. It is imperative to respect differences among countries, especially developing countries, in domestic policies, capacity building and economic structure. A one-size-fits-all approach

must be avoided. Addressing climate change should not deny the legitimate needs of developing countries to reduce poverty and improve their people's living Standards. Special needs of the developing countries must be well attended to.'

The linguistic meaning of this passage is agreeable, the poverty alleviation and a concern for the developing countries capacity to find their own way forward. However, as it is phrased it has constitutive elements of nationalistic discourse, as it focuses on the 'national conditions' in combination with 'domestic policies'. It is also one of the first passages where a 'meaning denial' or ambiguity is employed in the speech. The second sentence is formulated as to include all developing countries but it is quite clear this refers directly to China. The effect is that China is saying that their internal and national policies are not to be discussed or criticised, but at same time they are giving themselves the opportunity to deny the meaning of this passage.

6.1.3 Solutions

The solutions that are presented in the speech are of course closely connected to the goals of the agreement, and reoccurring terms are 'Sustainable development' and 'win-win' situations as well as 'economic growth' or sometimes 'low-carbon growth'. Sustainable development is, as discussed above, a term that has been substantially watered down in recent years and is now more connected to the mainstream sustainability discourse or possibly the expansive sustainability discourse, than anything else. The term 'win-win' stems from business lingo, and is therefore associated with the neoliberal discourse as it is connected to utilising market forces. Economic growth is of course one of the main terms in the neoliberal discourse, and even though there are discussions on development and sometimes low-carbon growth in other discourses as well the interchangeable usage of economic growth and low-carbon development without any explanation or distinguishing of alternative meaning, paired with a focus on marketization places these terms within a neoliberal mainstream sustainability discourse as well. Another reoccurring feature that relates to the solutions are international rules and agreements, however these terms are always followed by either a mentioning of ensuring economic growth and/or a protection of the integrity and sovereignty of the nation-state, especially for developing countries. In many of these passages the mainstream sustainability discourse is employed and at the same time the 'climate change as a battlefield'-discourse is challenged as the contradiction between economic growth and mitigating climate change is disapproved, as shown for example in this sentence: 'Incentive mechanisms to encourage countries to pursue green, circular and low-carbon development featuring both economic growth and an effective response to climate change'.

Another passage that says something about the perceived solutions comes in the second half of the speech where President Xi states that: 'China is vigorously making ecological endeavours to promote green, circular and low-carbon growth. [...] We attach equal importance to mitigation and adaption, and try to make progress on all fronts by resorting to legal and administrative means, technologies and market forces.' The solution is here framed as including legal, technological and market based forces. Since legal and administrative initiatives are not elaborated on, and these are neutral measures that can be employed for green radicalism or neoliberal ideas or any other, the passage comes across as reinforcing the neoliberal ideas of technocratization and marketization.

The last section of the speech that says something about the solutions follows directly after the one above and begins with a Chinese proverb.

“All things live in harmony and grow with nourishments.” Chinese culture values harmony between man and nature and respects nature. Going forward, ecological

endeavours will feature prominently in China's 13th Five-Year Plan. China will work hard to implement the vision of innovative, coordinated, green, open and inclusive development. China will [...] build a nation-wide carbon emission trading market so as to foster a new pattern of modernization featuring harmony between man and nature.'

This is the only passage that mentions culture and nature, respect for nature and something different from the mainstream sustainability discourse or the expansive sustainability discourse. However, it ends with the statement that China will implement a cap-and-trade market to create harmony, which is something that seems contradictory. To commodify the atmosphere is not something that necessarily will create harmony between society and nature. It is rather the standard solutions within the neoliberal ideology, and is often criticised to do precisely the opposite.

6.1.4 Developed vs. Developing Countries and the Status of China

Below follows a longer segment from Xi's speech. Here he speaks about support for developing countries, the interesting part here is however the status of China and how it changes within this segment.

'China upholds the values of friendship, justice and shared interests, and takes an active part in international cooperation on climate change. Over the years, the Chinese government has earnestly fulfilled its policy commitments of South-South cooperation regarding climate change to support developing countries, especially the least developed countries, landlocked developing countries and small island developing states, in confronting the challenge of climate change. In a show of greater support, China announced in September the establishment of an RMB 20 billion South-South Climate Cooperation Fund. Next year, China will launch cooperation projects to set up 10 pilot low-carbon industrial parks and start 100 mitigation and adaptation programs in other developing countries and provide them with 1,000 training opportunities on climate change. China will continue to promote international cooperation in such areas as clean energy, disaster prevention and mitigation, ecological protection, climate-smart agriculture, and low-carbon and smart cities. China will also help other developing countries to increase their financing capacity.'

There is a clear ambiguity in this passage, China is in the beginning portrayed as a supporter and financier of developing countries, but in the end of the passage it is instead twice implied that China is itself a developing country. This is of course interesting because as mentioned the status of China is ambiguous, and China uses this, as they on the one hand wants to be, and already is, one of the dominating states in the world, but on the other hand use the protection of the developing countries discourse instrumentally to protect themselves from responsibilities and commitments. This is of course to be seen in connection to many other passages in the speech where the integrity and financial support of developing countries are mentioned a number of times as well as the repeated message that developed countries are historically responsible and should carry more of the burden in the mitigation and adoption work. As shown in the passages below:

'Developed countries should honour their commitment of mobilizing US\$100 Billion each year before 2020 and provide stronger financial support for developing countries afterwards. It is also important that climate-friendly

technologies should be transferred to developing countries to help them build green economy.’

‘The Paris Conference should reject the narrow-minded mentality of “zero sum game” and call on all countries, the developed countries in particular, to assume more shared responsibilities for win-win outcomes.’

‘Given the difference between developed and developing countries in historical responsibility, developing stage and coping capability, the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, instead of being obsolete, must continue to be adhered to.’

Notable in these passages is that there is a clear focus here too on neoliberal ideas, sometimes combined with the expansive sustainability discourse, on how to manage global warming with explicit mentioning of technological advancements and financial means and transfers and the reoccurring phrase ‘win-win outcomes’. The second passage also comes across as implicitly blaming the developed countries for the lack of progress in managing global warming, since it calls for a rejection of ‘zero sum’ games and calls on developed countries to take responsibility. This should be seen in connection to the UNFCCC where China is listed as Non-Annex I country, i.e. a developing country.

Much of this, referring to the differentiation between developed and developing countries as well as the historical responsibilities, is very plausible. The reason for this being interesting and problematic is because it is presented by China (and not for example Vanuatu). China is arguing for a binding agreement to reduce greenhouse gases, and at the same time wants to protect the domestic policies (for economic growth) in developing countries. This becomes problematic because China is now the world’s largest economy and largest emitter, and China is using the ambiguity on its status between developed and developing country to pressure the western world while opening up for not committing in the same way themselves.

6.1.5 Cosmopolitan Ambiguity and Democracy

Although Xi’s speech is in many different parts defending the nation-states there are also passages where cosmopolitan language is instead used. Like the one below for example:

‘The Paris Conference is not the finishing line but a new starting point. As an important part of global governance, the global efforts on climate change can be taken as a mirror for us to reflect on what models to have for future global governance and how to build a community of shared future for mankind. Much valuable inspiration may thus be drawn.’

The focus here is rather on mankind, instead of the states and as this passage is formulated it also invokes the inspiration discourse. The following passage also starts of in a cosmopolitan manner, but changes focus towards the end.

‘We should create a future of inclusiveness, mutual learning and common development. Facing global challenges, countries need to increase dialogue and exchange best practices. We should draw on each other’s strengths to achieve common development through mutual learning, and deliver benefits to all our people. At the same time, we should be prepared to accept harmony without

uniformity, allowing individual countries to seek their own solutions that best suit their respective national conditions.’

There is an ambiguity concerning the use of the cosmopolitan discourse, which is notable in this passage. It starts off in a more cosmopolitan fashion but ends up defending the nation-state, focusing on ‘individual countries’ and ‘national conditions’. Since the speech focuses a lot on the sovereignty of states in general the message of international cooperation might instead be understood as a ‘realist’ view on international cooperation, rather than cosmopolitanism (See for example Nye, 2007, p.17).

‘We should create a future of the rule of law, fairness and justice. It is imperative to enhance the standing and role of international law in global governance, ensure effective observance and implementation of international rules, uphold democracy, equity and justice, and build international rule of law.’

The use of democracy in this fashion by the president of China is a clear neutralisation. It’s not easy to agree upon a definition of democracy but most people do however agree that China is not a democracy. This passage seems somewhat contradictory in other perspectives as well. Early on in the speech Xi proclaims that they want a binding agreement, but they are repeatedly also saying that developing countries should be respected and not hampered in their development. The logical conclusion is then to assume that the binding agreement should not put as much pressure on developing countries, i.e. China.

6.2 Obama’s Speech

President Obama’s speech was not named in the same way as Xi’s; instead it is just called ‘remarks’ by the White House administration. Obama held his speech as number three of the opening speakers, which means before president Xi.

6.2.1 Climate Change and Problem Formulation

Obama’s speech has three passages that give some indication on the underlying understanding of climate change as a phenomenon. The first sentence directly addressing climate change comes in the second passages of the speech. ‘The growing threat of climate change could define the contours of this century more dramatically than any other.’ Late in the speech Obama quotes Dr. Martin Luther King when he says: ‘For I believe, in the words of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., that there is such a thing as being too late. And when it comes to climate change, that hour is almost upon us.’ In both these utterances climate changes is seen as something very dire, with potential effects to shape the century, it also conveys a clear sense of urgency.

The speech follows to a great extent what Foust and O’Shannon Murphey deems the Comic Apocalyptic discourse. It portrays climate changes as something huge and daunting, and (almost) inevitable. But it is evident Obama leans on the discourse of climate changes as inspiration in his rhetoric. The following segment is rather long but is a good example of the speech since it summarises much of the different characteristics.

‘This summer, I saw the effects of climate change first-hand in our northernmost state, Alaska, where the sea is already swallowing villages and eroding shorelines; where permafrost thaws and the tundra burns; where glaciers are melting at a pace unprecedented in modern times. And it was a preview of one possible future -- a glimpse of our children’s fate if the climate keeps changing faster than our efforts to address it. Submerged countries. Abandoned cities. Fields that no longer grow.

Political disruptions that trigger new conflict, and even more floods of desperate peoples seeking the sanctuary of nations not their own.

That future is not one of strong economies, nor is it one where fragile states can find their footing. That future is one that we have the power to change. Right here. Right now. But only if we rise to this moment. As one of America's governors has said, "We are the first generation to feel the impact of climate change, and the last generation that can do something about it."

It conveys the message of urgency in very a colourful language. It speaks of impending catastrophe, but retains a message of agency, following the Comic Apocalyptic discourse. It starts out describing the potential effects of global warming, 'submerged countries', 'abandoned cities' etc. causing peoples to migrate. The consequences of this are however portrayed as a threat to economic stability and nation-states.

6.2.2 Goals

There are three passages that relates quite clearly to the goals of the Paris agreement seen from the perspective of the USA and Obama, although these are formulated a bit vaguely.

'Here, in Paris, let's secure an agreement that builds in ambition, where progress paves the way for regularly updated targets -- targets that are not set for each of us but by each of us, taking into account the differences that each nation is facing.' This passage draws on a participation type of discourse, but at the same time reinforces the nation-state discourse as these are the naturalised actors.

'Here in Paris, let's agree to a strong system of transparency that gives each of us the confidence that all of us are meeting our commitments. And let's make sure that the countries who don't yet have the full capacity to report on their targets receive the support that they need.' This is the second paragraph that relates to the perceived goals of the conference and is connected to the expansive sustainability discourse, as it implicitly points to some kind of resources redistribution as necessary measure for coping with climate change.

Lastly there is a passage on what outcome the conference and the agreement should aim for in this segment: 'Not simply an agreement to roll back the pollution we put into our skies, but an agreement that helps us lift people from poverty without condemning the next generation to a planet that's beyond its capacity to repair. Here, in Paris, we can show the world what is possible when we come together, united in common effort and by a common purpose.' Here is a connection to the poverty alleviation discourse and to international cooperation; in this kind of phrasing it is usually connected to the expansive sustainability discourse. This is one of very few passages in Obama's speech where 'countries', 'nations' or 'economies' are not the subject. In this one the focus is instead turned to the actual people. There is in this passage also an undertone of inspiration, to see climate change as an opportunity to change the world's trajectory in more areas than climate and pollution.

6.2.3 Solutions

As with Xi's speech it is in Obama's speech hard to clearly distinguish between the goals for the agreement and the general solutions concerning global warming, which is of course natural. The passage that is clearest in terms of solutions is the following segment:

'And finally, here in Paris, let's show businesses and investors that the global economy is on a firm path towards a low-carbon future. If we put the right rules and incentives in place, we'll unleash the creative power of our best scientists and engineers and entrepreneurs to deploy clean energy technologies and the new jobs

and new opportunities that they create all around the world. There are hundreds of billions of dollars ready to deploy to countries around the world if they get the signal that we mean business this time. Let's send that signal.'

Here the solutions are entirely market-based, following the logic that was cemented through the Kyoto protocol, where the nation-states are seen as managers and enablers of the market. It is a message with a very clear resonance in the neoliberal discourse, as it suggests that a solution could be reached, since 'hundreds of billions of dollars' are readily available, but the outlook on profit has not been favourable, since the market has not reacted before.

6.2.4 On Pacification and the Sceptics

There are a number of passages that are interesting in the speech that relates to, or rather opposes, the Sceptic discourse. In these passages Obama is also arguing against pacification, the type of discursive closure connected to one strand of the scepticism. In this first passage scepticism is discredited: 'Our understanding of the ways human beings disrupt the climate advances by the day. Fourteen of the fifteen warmest years on record have occurred since the year 2000 -- and 2015 is on pace to be the warmest year of all. No nation -- large or small, wealthy or poor -- is immune to what this means.' And this second passage explicitly addresses pacification or cynicism as he puts it. 'One of the enemies that we'll be fighting at this conference is cynicism, the notion we can't do anything about climate change.'

Yet another passage that addresses humanity's, and specifically politicians, inability to act follows in this quote:

'And, my fellow leaders, accepting this challenge will not reward us with moments of victory that are clear or quick. Our progress will be measured differently -- in the suffering that is averted, and a planet that's preserved. And that's what's always made this so hard. Our generation may not even live to see the full realization of what we do here. But the knowledge that the next generation will be better off for what we do here -- can we imagine a worthier reward than that? Passing that on to our children and our grandchildren, so that when they look back and they see what we did here in Paris, they can take pride in our achievement.'

This passage is very interesting as it implies something about human nature, as understood by Obama, the underlying message is that humans, or at least politicians, need clear and quick satisfaction in everything, which is an ideal connected to the consumerism that has followed and been necessary for the neoliberal capitalism. The phrasing here may be unlucky or unthoughtful, but in essences it could be reformulated to 'it's hard to save the world and avert suffering because there is no clear reward for it, even if you're elected (or have taken it upon yourself) to lead and govern your country'. As this is formulated it implicitly describes one of the fundamental problems of the current economic and political system; that it is designed for short-sightedness. However, it doesn't really address this problem it just assumes it as an explanation for inaction. Obama is of course then trying to move past this and invoke a sense of reward and pride in this commitment.

6.2.5 Economic Growth and Inspiration

Below follows an example of how the speech is very much rhetorical, as Obama employs real world people and situations to create an emotional connection to the point he wants to make.

‘And let there be no doubt, the next generation is watching what we do. Just over a week ago, I was in Malaysia, where I held a town hall with young people, and the first question I received was from a young Indonesian woman. And it wasn’t about terrorism, it wasn’t about the economy, it wasn’t about human rights. It was about climate change. And she asked whether I was optimistic about what we can achieve here in Paris, and what young people like her could do to help.’

Notable here is that the way the mid-section is structured it becomes somewhat of a ranking that concludes with an unexpected winner. It also has the effect of separating these as if they were in opposition and severs the connections between the subjects he lists.

Finally, this short segment on climate change and economic growth is interesting to analyse:

‘Last year, the global economy grew while global carbon emissions from burning fossil fuels stayed flat. And what this means can’t be overstated. We have broken the old arguments for inaction. We have proved that strong economic growth and a safer environment no longer have to conflict with one another; they can work in concert with one another.’

This can be seen as a naturalisation both of causality in the specific case and economic growth as the overarching goal in every situation. To say that economy grew while fossil fuel emissions stayed flat one year and to claim it to be the new world order might be a bit drastic. And although this is meant as an argument for action towards climate change the priority here is economic growth, since it is structured as ‘now that economic growth isn’t threatened now we can get to work’. What happens then if economic growth as it is defined isn’t compatible with a stable climate? Even if economic growth is possible without fossil fuels, which of course it is, exponential growth from finite resources will (mathematically) lead to depletion of all resources (at faster and faster pace). To condition action on climate change with a ‘as long as it doesn’t affect economic growth’ cannot be a long term solution.

7 Reproduced Discourses and Comparison

There are clear differences between the speeches, especially in the type of speech and language used by the two different presidents. Obama relies a lot on rhetoric and refers to physical places, people he met and talks a number of times in first person. Xi on the other hand is more formal in his speech, but because of that his speech comes across as more concrete. The somewhat informal type of language use that Obama has makes it harder to distinguish specifically what the goals of the agreement are for the USA. The goals seem to be linguistically even more intertwined with the solutions in Obama’s speech than in Xi’s due to the somewhat unclear and emotionally appealing speech. To put it another way Obama is more lively and ‘likeable’ in the way he delivers his speech, but it says less about what he and the USA aims for. In neither of the speeches, but especially in Xi’s speech, a clear definition of climate change is presented. From what is stated there are however some differences. Obama do convey a sense of urgency in a number of segments, whereas Xi recognises an urgency and importance, but do not really take up this position himself, instead more focus is given to the effects of the solutions, as he cautions against measures that can hamper economic growth. There are very few passages in the speeches that directly relates to previous negotiations within the UNFCCC framework. What comes closest is perhaps Xi’s criticism of previous negotiations and so-called zero-sum mechanisms. When it comes to responsibility it is clear that Xi wants to put more responsibility upon the developed countries, and it is also

clear that he doesn't consider China a developed country in this sense. The clearest indication of this, by Xi, is that developed countries' responsibility is connected to historical burden, together with the contextually important fact that China is listed as non-Annex I country. Obama touches less upon responsibility, but acknowledges the Western worlds and USA's role and responsibility.

Although the speeches have distinct characters it is interesting to see how the speakers draw upon a range of different discourses and that these are largely similar in the two speeches. Both of them refer to climate change through the inspiration discourse, as a chance to change, but since the solutions presented are without exception based in neoliberal ideas of 'win-win cooperation', 'entrepreneurs' and unleashing businesses it can also be described as justification of privatisation of commons. Whether this should be seen as change is then debateable, since it most often ends up with proposing more of the same. Both of the speeches do however draw upon the quite loosely defined discourse of expansive sustainability, where ideas from poverty alleviation and participation are incorporated, but they are always secondary to economic growth and stability, again reinforcing the neoliberal ideology.

At other times both speeches move even more clearly within the mainstream sustainability discourse, as they focus on the effects of climate change on the economy and nation-states and see the solutions through neoliberal ideas. There is a tendency to describe the goals of the agreement more in line with what can be described as the expansive sustainability discourse, with more focus on resource redistribution, poverty alleviation and participation from different parts of society. However, when the solutions are more concretely addressed they fall clearly within the neoliberal discourse. In terms of ideology this can be seen as a clear indication of neoliberalism, as the solutions proposed are reproducing the process of inequality, by pointing to the market and the private sector as the solution. There is a connection back to Marx and Engels understanding of ideology here, as they suggested that the ideals need to develop in a way to appeal to the masses. The incorporation of poverty alleviation and participation discourses in the neoliberal discourse can be seen as a counter measure, since they are included but always secondary to the economic goals of growth and stability.

It is also interesting to see how the speeches relates to and responds to domestic discourses surrounding global warming. Obama explicitly talks about scepticism and cynicism a number of times in his speech, which is something Xi doesn't mention once. This should of course be seen in the context of American politics, where scepticism is far more pronounced than in China. It is also clear that Obama uses what Foust and O'Shannon describes as the Comic Apocalyptic Discourse. He portrays climate change as potentially the greatest threat of this century, but urges for action and retains human agency. In Xi's speech there are instead clear traces of China's nationalistic discourse, which is present in their foreign affairs at all time, with a focus on the sovereignty of the state. Here we see two different displays of ideology as well. In the case of Obama, the Comic Apocalyptic Discourse is used to urge action and claim humans still can change the future, but this is again argued for because the economic stability needs to be protected, and it is also said that this can only be done through the market (and continued economic growth). On the other hand Xi's speech, with its traces of the Chinese national discourse, instead displays the ideology of nationalism and protection of the nation-state. It should however be said that this can be seen in Obama's speech as well. However, in Obama's speech it is not as pronounced as in Xi's speech, since it is more implied rather than argued for. When it comes to the relation between the nation-state and economic growth the two presidents seem to take up opposite positions. Xi seems to regard the sovereign states as a prerequisite for economic growth and Obama to regard economic growth as a prerequisite for a sovereign state (or at least stable states).

This defence of domestic policy and independence is much more evident in Xi's speech than in Obama's speech. There is also a kind of challenge from China towards the 'developed' world, i.e. the western world. The use of democracy by Xi is also a kind of challenge, since it clearly implies that China is a democracy. This obviously does not fit with the western definition of democracy, and thus challenges the meaning and definition of the word. This kind of challenge is not present in Obama's speech. On the other hand, Obama's use of 'we' can be linked to what Beck calls Pax Americana (Beck, U, 2002, p.49). In Obama's speech the meaning or rather who is included in 'we' is shifting throughout the speech. Usually the undertone is that Obama speaks for the western world or for all the leaders present. In some passages it's obvious he speaks for the USA, as for example when talking about all the investments and progress that has been done during his period as president. On the other hand, when he addresses the whole conference and the problems they will face the wording is similar. 'We will face...' This has dual effects. It shows a sense of belonging and of loyalty, but combined with passages like 'I've come here personally, as the leader of the world's largest economy' it also creates a sense of dominance.

Throughout the speeches there is almost no mentioning of culture or nature. Xi speaks about Chinese culture and respect for nature, but ends this segment with proclaiming a privatisation of the air, through a cap-and-trade scheme, as a way to create harmony between mankind and nature. Obama on the other hand describes his experience in Alaska, but this segment also ends in worrying about economic stability. In general, throughout both speeches nature and the climate is demoted to being viewed as resources necessary for humanity's (economic) development. There are no instances of seeing a value in nature or other species other than human society. It's also worthy to note that human society is also reduced to its economy, since there is no mentioning of everything that is threatened by climate change in terms of culture or cultural land marks, cities, villages, traditions and even other ways of life etc. Furthermore culture or change in culture to address climate change is not addressed at all throughout both speeches.

8 Conclusion

In the beginning of this thesis I posed these questions: How is the problem of climate change posed? What are the solutions being offered? Where is responsibility put? What are the goals of the agreement, according to their speeches? How is climate change as a phenomenon portrayed and incorporated in ideological discourses in the speeches? How is the political, and social, aspects of climate change affected by ideological discourses, and how are they manifested in the speeches?

The problem of climate change is in both speeches related to the prospects of economic growth and stability to the nation-states in the world, which is an ideological interpretation of the problem, since it diminishes a lot of aspects. Climate change is furthermore described as a more urgent problem in Obama's speech. But both Xi and Obama stresses that climate change will have long lasting consequences for human society.

The goals of the agreement can be said to fall within the discourse of expansive sustainability, as it incorporates ideas of poverty alleviation and broad participation as measures to slow down global warming, but the solutions being offered are without exception focused on financial, technical and market oriented solutions. The responsibilities are by Xi clearly put on the developed countries, as in the western world, whereas Obama talks less about the issue, but rather just states that he accepts the responsibility the western world has.

Climate change is in both speeches incorporated in ideological discourses in the way that it is portrayed as an opportunity to 'change' society, but the change described is instead used as justification to reproduce and further neoliberal ideas. This is done by

proposing and naturalising solutions to climate change in the form of marketization and commodification of common goods like our air and atmosphere.

The political aspects of climate change pose a problem in the ideological discourse of the nation-states, as one of the fundamental characteristics of climate change is that it doesn't recognise any borders. The speeches therefore manifest expressions belonging more to a cosmopolitan world-view, with phrases like 'mankind' and 'international cooperation' etc. This is however in almost every case mitigated as the naturalised actors always are nation-states. Climate change is therefore incorporated in a nationalistic discourse as a threat to sovereignty, stability and economic development.

The ideological interpretation of climate change through neoliberalism, as a threat and opportunity concerning economic growth, and nationalism, as a threat to sovereignty and stability, has the effect that it excludes other aspects of climate change. In the speeches this is manifested through the fact that virtually no aspect of climate change, or how to manage climate change, is addressed except those related to the economy or nation-states' stability.

The dominant discourses of neoliberalism and nationalism is not unchallenged, not even in the speeches of Obama and Xi, as they both incorporate ideas originating from the green radical discourse, mainly participation and poverty alleviation. This dialectical development shows that the debate is ongoing, but has the effect that especially poverty alleviation is in the speeches connected to neoliberal ideas as solutions for poverty. The dominance of neoliberalism as ideology is however evident as climate change is throughout both speeches reduced to a threat to stability and economic growth.

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10 Appendix

10.1 Work Together to Build a Win-Win, Equitable and Balanced Governance Mechanism on Climate Change

Speech by H.E. Xi Jinping, President of the People's Republic of China
At the Opening Ceremony of The Paris Conference on Climate Change
Paris, 30 November 2015

President Hollande,
Dear Colleagues,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Dear Friends,

Today, we are gathering here in Paris for the opening ceremony of the United Nations Conference on Climate Change. Our presence shows that terrorism cannot hold back mankind's efforts to address climate change and pursue a better future. Let me take this opportunity to express my sincere sympathy to the French people and my gratitude to President Hollande and the French government for their meticulous preparations for this conference.

Thanks to joint efforts of all parties since the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change entered into force over 20 years ago, global actions on climate change have made progress although there are still numerous difficulties and challenges. This Paris Conference is hence convened to strengthen implementation of the UNFCCC and bring about a comprehensive, balanced, ambitious and binding agreement on climate change. The conference is also expected to come up with equitable, reasonable and effective global solutions to climate change and explore pathways and governance models for mankind to achieve sustainable development. The French writer Victor Hugo once observed in *Les Misérables* that "supreme resources spring from extreme resolutions." (*Les ressources supêmes sortent des résolutions extrêmes.*) I believe that with all parties making joint efforts with sincerity and confidence, the Paris Conference will yield satisfying results and meet the high expectations of the international community.

Dear Colleagues,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

A successful international agreement should not just address immediate challenges but more importantly, it should also present a vision for the future. The Paris agreement should focus on strengthening post-2020 global actions on climate change and boost global efforts to pursue sustainable development.

- The Paris agreement should help meet the goals of the UNFCCC and chart the course for green development. The agreement should follow the principles and rules set out in the UNFCCC and contribute to its full and effective implementation. The agreement should put effective control on the increase of atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases and set up incentive mechanisms to encourage countries to pursue green, circular and low-carbon development featuring both economic growth and an effective response to climate change.
- The Paris agreement should help galvanize global efforts and encourage broad participation. The agreement should provide institutional arrangements that propel countries to make concerted efforts. Besides governments, it should also mobilize businesses, non-governmental

organizations and all players in society to participate in international cooperation on climate change, thus raising public awareness of pooling resources on climate change.

- The Paris agreement should help increase input of resources to ensure actions on climate change. To obtain financial and technical support for capacity building is essential for developing countries to address climate change. Developed countries should honor their commitment of mobilizing US\$100 billion each year before 2020 and provide stronger financial support to developing countries afterwards. It is also important that climate-friendly technologies should be transferred to developing countries to help them build green economy.

- The Paris agreement should accommodate the national conditions of various countries and lay emphasis on practical results. It is imperative to respect differences among countries, especially developing countries, in domestic policies, capacity building and economic structure. A one-size-fits-all approach must be avoided. Addressing climate change should not deny the legitimate needs of developing countries to reduce poverty and improve their people's living Standards. Special needs of the developing countries must be well attended to.

Dear colleagues,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The Paris Conference is not the finishing line but a new starting point. As an important part of global governance, the global efforts on climate change can be taken as a mirror for us to reflect on what models to have for future global governance and how to build a community of shared future for mankind. Much valuable inspiration may thus be drawn.

- We should create a future of win-win cooperation, with each country making contribution to the best of its ability. For global issues like climate change, a take-more-give-less approach based on expediency is in nobody's interest. The Paris Conference should reject the narrow-minded mentality of "zero sum game" and call on all countries, the developed countries in particular, to assume more shared responsibilities for win-win outcomes.

- We should create a future of the rule of law, fairness and justice. It is imperative to enhance the standing and role of international law in global governance, ensure effective observance and implementation of international rules, uphold democracy, equity and justice, and build international rule of law. Given the difference between developed and developing countries in historical responsibility, developing stage and coping capability, the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, instead of being obsolete, must continue to be adhered to.

- We should create a future of inclusiveness, mutual learning and common development. Facing global challenges, countries need to increase dialogue and exchange best practices. We should draw on each other's strengths to achieve common development through mutual learning, and deliver benefits to all our people. At the same time, we should be prepared to accept harmony without uniformity, allowing individual countries to seek their own solutions that best suit their respective national conditions.

Dear colleagues,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

China has been actively engaged in the global campaign on climate change. China is both sincere and determined to contribute its share to the success of the Paris Conference. In the past few decades, China has seen rapid economic growth and significant improvement in people's lives. However, this has taken a toll on the environment and resources. Having learned the lesson, China is vigorously making ecological endeavors to promote green, circular and low-carbon growth. We have integrated our climate change efforts into China's medium- and long-term program of economic and social development. We attach equal importance to mitigation and adaption, and try to make progress on all fronts by resorting to legal and administrative means, technologies and market forces. China's installed capacity of

renewable energy accounts for 24% of the world's total, with the newly installed capacity accounting for 42% of the global total. China tops the world in terms of energy conservation and utilization of new and renewable energies.

"All things live in harmony and grow with nourishments." Chinese culture values harmony between man and nature and respects nature. Going forward, ecological endeavors will feature prominently in China's 13th Five-Year Plan. China will work hard to implement the vision of innovative, coordinated, green, open and inclusive development. China will, on the basis of technological and institutional innovation, adopt new policy measures to improve industrial mix, build low-carbon energy system, develop green building and low-carbon transportation, and build a nation-wide carbon emission trading market so as to foster a new pattern of modernization featuring harmony between man and nature. In its Intended Nationally Determined Contributions, China pledges to peak CO₂ emissions by around 2030 and strive to achieve it as soon as possible, and by 2030, reduce CO₂ per unit of GDP by 60-65% over the 2005 level, raise the share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption to about 20% and increase forest stock by around 4.5 billion cubic meters over 2005. This requires strenuous efforts, but we have confidence and resolve to fulfill our commitments.

China upholds the values of friendship, justice and shared interests, and takes an active part in international cooperation on climate change. Over the years, the Chinese government has earnestly fulfilled its policy commitments of South-South cooperation regarding climate change to support developing countries, especially the least developed countries, landlocked developing countries and small island developing states, in confronting the challenge of climate change. In a show of greater support, China announced in September the establishment of an RMB 20 billion South-South Climate Cooperation Fund. Next year, China will launch cooperation projects to set up 10 pilot low-carbon industrial parks and start 100 mitigation and adaptation programs in other developing countries and provide them with 1,000 training opportunities on climate change. China will continue to promote international cooperation in such areas as clean energy, disaster prevention and mitigation, ecological protection, climate-smart agriculture, and low-carbon and smart cities. China will also help other developing countries to increase their financing capacity.

Dear Colleagues,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Tackling climate change is a shared mission for mankind. All eyes are now on Paris. Let us join hands to contribute to the establishment of an equitable and effective global mechanism on climate change, work for global sustainable development at a higher level and bring about new international relations featuring win-win cooperation.

Thank you.

10.2 Remarks by President Obama at the First Session of COP21

Le Bourget
Paris, France
12:47 P.M. CET

PRESIDENT OBAMA: President Hollande, Mr. Secretary General, fellow leaders. We have come to Paris to show our resolve.

We offer our condolences to the people of France for the barbaric attacks on this beautiful city. We stand united in solidarity not only to deliver justice to the terrorist network responsible for those attacks but to protect our people and uphold the enduring values that keep us strong and keep us free. And we salute the people of Paris for insisting this crucial conference go on -- an act of defiance that proves nothing will deter us from building the future we want for our children. What greater rejection of those who would tear down our world than marshaling our best efforts to save it?

Nearly 200 nations have assembled here this week -- a declaration that for all the challenges we face, the growing threat of climate change could define the contours of this century more dramatically than any other. What should give us hope that this is a turning point, that this is the moment we finally determined we would save our planet, is the fact that our nations share a sense of urgency about this challenge and a growing realization that it is within our power to do something about it.

Our understanding of the ways human beings disrupt the climate advances by the day. Fourteen of the fifteen warmest years on record have occurred since the year 2000 -- and 2015 is on pace to be the warmest year of all. No nation -- large or small, wealthy or poor -- is immune to what this means.

This summer, I saw the effects of climate change firsthand in our northernmost state, Alaska, where the sea is already swallowing villages and eroding shorelines; where permafrost thaws and the tundra burns; where glaciers are melting at a pace unprecedented in modern times. And it was a preview of one possible future -- a glimpse of our children's fate if the climate keeps changing faster than our efforts to address it. Submerged countries. Abandoned cities. Fields that no longer grow. Political disruptions that trigger new conflict, and even more floods of desperate peoples seeking the sanctuary of nations not their own.

That future is not one of strong economies, nor is it one where fragile states can find their footing. That future is one that we have the power to change. Right here. Right now. But only if we rise to this moment. As one of America's governors has said, "We are the first generation to feel the impact of climate change, and the last generation that can do something about it."

I've come here personally, as the leader of the world's largest economy and the second-largest emitter, to say that the United States of America not only recognizes our role in creating this problem, we embrace our responsibility to do something about it.

Over the last seven years, we've made ambitious investments in clean energy, and ambitious reductions in our carbon emissions. We've multiplied wind power threefold, and solar power more than twentyfold, helping create parts of America where these clean power sources are finally cheaper than dirtier, conventional power. We've invested in energy efficiency in every way imaginable. We've said no to infrastructure that would pull high-carbon fossil fuels from

the ground, and we've said yes to the first-ever set of national standards limiting the amount of carbon pollution our power plants can release into the sky.

The advances we've made have helped drive our economic output to all-time highs, and drive our carbon pollution to its lowest levels in nearly two decades.

But the good news is this is not an American trend alone. Last year, the global economy grew while global carbon emissions from burning fossil fuels stayed flat. And what this means can't be overstated. We have broken the old arguments for inaction. We have proved that strong economic growth and a safer environment no longer have to conflict with one another; they can work in concert with one another.

And that should give us hope. One of the enemies that we'll be fighting at this conference is cynicism, the notion we can't do anything about climate change. Our progress should give us hope during these two weeks -- hope that is rooted in collective action.

Earlier this month in Dubai, after years of delay, the world agreed to work together to cut the super-pollutants known as HFCs. That's progress. Already, prior to Paris, more than 180 countries representing nearly 95 percent of global emissions have put forward their own climate targets. That is progress. For our part, America is on track to reach the emissions targets that I set six years ago in Copenhagen -- we will reduce our carbon emissions in the range of 17 percent below 2005 levels by 2020. And that's why, last year, I set a new target: America will reduce our emissions 26 to 28 percent below 2005 levels within 10 years from now.

So our task here in Paris is to turn these achievements into an enduring framework for human progress -- not a stopgap solution, but a long-term strategy that gives the world confidence in a low-carbon future.

Here, in Paris, let's secure an agreement that builds in ambition, where progress paves the way for regularly updated targets -- targets that are not set for each of us but by each of us, taking into account the differences that each nation is facing.

Here in Paris, let's agree to a strong system of transparency that gives each of us the confidence that all of us are meeting our commitments. And let's make sure that the countries who don't yet have the full capacity to report on their targets receive the support that they need.

Here in Paris, let's reaffirm our commitment that resources will be there for countries willing to do their part to skip the dirty phase of development. And I recognize this will not be easy. It will take a commitment to innovation and the capital to continue driving down the cost of clean energy. And that's why, this afternoon, I'll join many of you to announce an historic joint effort to accelerate public and private clean energy innovation on a global scale.

Here in Paris, let's also make sure that these resources flow to the countries that need help preparing for the impacts of climate change that we can no longer avoid. We know the truth that many nations have contributed little to climate change but will be the first to feel its most destructive effects. For some, particularly island nations -- whose leaders I'll meet with tomorrow -- climate change is a threat to their very existence. And that's why today, in concert with other nations, America confirms our strong and ongoing commitment to the

Least Developed Countries Fund. And tomorrow, we'll pledge new contributions to risk insurance initiatives that help vulnerable populations rebuild stronger after climate-related disasters.

And finally, here in Paris, let's show businesses and investors that the global economy is on a firm path towards a low-carbon future. If we put the right rules and incentives in place, we'll unleash the creative power of our best scientists and engineers and entrepreneurs to deploy clean energy technologies and the new jobs and new opportunities that they create all around the world. There are hundreds of billions of dollars ready to deploy to countries around the world if they get the signal that we mean business this time. Let's send that signal.

That's what we seek in these next two weeks. Not simply an agreement to roll back the pollution we put into our skies, but an agreement that helps us lift people from poverty without condemning the next generation to a planet that's beyond its capacity to repair. Here, in Paris, we can show the world what is possible when we come together, united in common effort and by a common purpose.

And let there be no doubt, the next generation is watching what we do. Just over a week ago, I was in Malaysia, where I held a town hall with young people, and the first question I received was from a young Indonesian woman. And it wasn't about terrorism, it wasn't about the economy, it wasn't about human rights. It was about climate change. And she asked whether I was optimistic about what we can achieve here in Paris, and what young people like her could do to help.

I want our actions to show her that we're listening. I want our actions to be big enough to draw on the talents of all our people -- men and women, rich and poor -- I want to show her passionate, idealistic young generation that we care about their future.

For I believe, in the words of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., that there is such a thing as being too late. And when it comes to climate change, that hour is almost upon us. But if we act here, if we act now, if we place our own short-term interests behind the air that our young people will breathe, and the food that they will eat, and the water that they will drink, and the hopes and dreams that sustain their lives, then we won't be too late for them.

And, my fellow leaders, accepting this challenge will not reward us with moments of victory that are clear or quick. Our progress will be measured differently -- in the suffering that is averted, and a planet that's preserved. And that's what's always made this so hard. Our generation may not even live to see the full realization of what we do here. But the knowledge that the next generation will be better off for what we do here -- can we imagine a more worthy reward than that? Passing that on to our children and our grandchildren, so that when they look back and they see what we did here in Paris, they can take pride in our achievement.

Let that be the common purpose here in Paris. A world that is worthy of our children. A world that is marked not by conflict, but by cooperation; and not by human suffering, but by human progress. A world that's safer, and more prosperous, and more secure, and more free than the one that we inherited.

Let's get to work. Thank you very much. (Applause.)

END

1:01 P.M. CET