



## **Forbidden spaces? Public participation in Solid Waste Management in Lusaka**

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## **Abstract**

Participatory processes are increasingly sought (internationally and nationally) in natural resource and environmental decision-making to embrace different interests, values and knowledge. In Zambia, public participation is anchored on the National Decentralisation Policy (NDP). The decentralisation policy provides for the creation of grassroots structures (herein public spheres) for “people spirited participation.” Public participation in Solid Waste Management (SWM) in the country is thus [supposed to be] premised on decentralisation. Different grassroots structures have been formed to facilitate actors’ participation in waste management districts and zones. However, pursuing participatory approaches has not improved managing waste (particularly in Lusaka) where SWM has faced resistance from households. Hence this study explored practices in participatory processes and strived to understand how actors problematise SWM in Mtendere township in Lusaka. Qualitative data collection methods (interviews –individual and focus group – and field observations) were utilised in the inquiry. Relevant themes and patterns to theories and concepts used in the study were captured from interviews and formed the study results and a basis for analysis and discussion.

Accounts of lived experiences in my study suggest that socio-economic, political affiliation, gender and age are used to exclude actors from participatory processes. Holders of different kinds of power (economic, political or expert) dominate grassroots spheres; making them seem forbidden to others. Politicisation of participatory spheres, information gaps (and rumours) and mistrust among actors have compounded the problem of SWM. However, although actors like households are often excluded from participatory processes, they are required to pay for managing waste. Households’ actions framed as “*chikonko*” (displeasure) by the waste collecting company and feelings that their (households) ideas are not appreciated typify SWM problematisation narratives. In seeking compliance to SWM systems, the Lusaka City Council introduced the Fast Track Court to prosecute SWM defaulters. Households have counteracted litigation through shielding each other and using dishonest and indiscriminate waste disposal means. Some methods of shielding others include paid-up households adding waste for non-paying neighbours to theirs; and paying workers for CBEs “small amounts” to collect unpaid for waste. The actions of mistrust deprive CBEs finances for efficient SWM. Mistrust in authorities and participatory process seem to have eroded actors’ confidence in participation. Largely, actors’ lived experiences are characterised by exclusion, frustrations, intimidation, arrests or convictions.

*Keywords:* public participation, public sphere, decentralisation, power, trust

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## **Abbreviations**

CBEs	Community Based Enterprises
GRZ	Government of the Republic of Zambia
IPA	Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis
LCC	Lusaka City Council
MLGH	Ministry of Local Government and Housing
MP	Member of Parliament
NDP	National Decentralisation Policy
PP	Public Participation
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
SWM	Solid Waste Management
UN	United Nations
UNECE	United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
UNEP	United Nations Environmental Programme
WDCs	Ward Development Committees
WMDs	Waste Management Districts
WMZs	Waste Management Zones

# CHAPTER ONE

## 1.0. Introduction

Public participation (PP) is a buzzword and desirable practice internationally and locally such as under the UN Agenda 21 – UN (1992); Århus Convention – UNECE (1998); African and Regional Frameworks (SADC, 2010); and National Decentralisation Policy in Zambia (Government of Zambia [GRZ], 2013). It is more preferred in complex, uncertain and multi-scale problems that affect many actors (Renn, 2006). PP is underpinned by democratic worldviews such as participative and deliberative, which seek to transform attitudes and opinions towards the common good (Hansen, 2014; Pateman, 1970). It is premised on (inter alia) providing spaces for [re]building trust, deliberation or dialogue in crafting a society actors desire, (Raitio, 2012). In Zambia, decentralisation is regarded as a valuable step towards people's efficient participation in public affairs for better informed and more legitimate decisions (GRZ, 2002). This is a shift from centrality governance that retained excessive power over citizens and restricted their participation to electing representatives (such as Members of Parliament).<sup>1</sup> However, representatives' failures to fully represent community needs disfranchised people from taking part [even] in electoral processes (Mutungwa, 2011). In seeking improved public involvement, Zambia has been transforming governance structures through local government reforms to create platforms for ordinary citizens to participate in planning and other processes (Zambia Diakonia, 2013).

Decentralisation implementation by Lusaka City Council (LCC) is hence premised on participatory principles such as grassroots planning (LCC, 2008). Through participatory means, the council aims at mobilising people to participate in a more democratic planning manner. Grassroots involvement is regarded as one of the practical steps in devolving power, resources and functions from the centre to sub-district structures (LCC, 2008). Ward Development Committees (WDCs) are some grassroots structures (see appendix 1) through which people's views should be captured. The WDCs are responsible for facilitating grassroots participation. It is argued that substantial development is achievable when ordinary actors participate in planning and evaluating interventions meant to improve their well-being (Ministry of Local Government and Housing [MLGH] 2013).

In pursuance of enhanced household participation in SWM at the grassroots, wards have been divided into Waste Management Zones (WMZs). Zones are seen as cardinal sub-structures for primary beneficiaries or those likely to be affected by any intervention to be involved in decision-making or outcome evaluation of interventions (MLGH 2013). Households can participate in zones as individuals or affiliates to community associations such as resident development committees. WDCs are required to work with households and waste collectors to develop waste management plans in zones. Further, WDCs can make decisions on certain issues and submit others to the council for higher level decision-making consideration.

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<sup>1</sup> Shortly after gaining independence from Britain [in 1964], Zambia's first President Kenneth Kaunda banned multi-party democracy and public participation except in voting for leaders. In 1991, Zambia returned to multi-party democracy. However, the governance system remained grounded on representative democracy (Zambia Diakonia, 2013).



## 1.1. Research background

SWM is problematic in Zambian cities. The situation is however worse in Lusaka due to its higher population stimulated by economic and social factors. The city's population growth rate is 3.7%, with a population of 2.8 million more than other cities. Kitwe, the second most populated city has 0.7 million people (Central Statistical Office, 2013). Lusaka's high population has correlatively increased waste generation, constraining the council's ability to manage it adequately. The city's annual domestic and commercial waste generation is estimated to have risen by 141% [from 220,000 metric tonnes] in 2000 to 530,000 metric tonnes in 2011; with per capita generation at 0.38kg/person/day<sup>2</sup> (Ntambo, 2013). Less than 40% of the waste is collected and disposed at the landfills. Low waste collection rate has made the city littered with different sorts of waste attracting discontent among residents; earning it the "garbage city" cynicism (Shalala-Mwale, 2012). Heaps of waste have become breeding sources for vectors. Households<sup>3</sup> complain of flies transiting diseases after feasting on the waste. During the rainy season, drainages get blocked by the waste thus causing floods (Environmental Council of Zambia, 2004; LCC, 2007).

## 1.2. Problem statement

With SWM becoming remarkably problematic in Lusaka, the need for participatory SWM at policy, planning and execution levels was encouraged mainly through decentralisation (GRZ, 2013). In this view, the LCC formed structures and planning guidelines that consider PP an essential planning process instead of the top-down planning approach (LCC, 2008). Decentralisation is thus seen as a vehicle for increased public involvement in decision-making and finding valid outcomes and positions based on the "public spirit" rather than through aggregation mechanisms such as voting (LCC, 2008; Mutungwa, 2011). Objectives of decentralisation include empowering local communities by devolving decision-making authority; designing and implementing mechanisms to ensure grassroots integrated planning and budgeting; developing local authorities and communities' capacity in development planning, financing and managing service delivery in their areas; and providing a legal and institutional framework to promote autonomy in decision-making at local level (GRZ, 2013).

Despite pursuing participatory approaches, SWM has remained problematic and faces resistance from many residents resulting into cumulative uncollected waste that has made the city extremely dirty (Meulenbeek, 2011). Due to the problematic nature of SWM, less than 40% of the generated waste per month in the city is collected and aptly disposed; while the rest of it is burned, buried or dumped in drainages, open spaces and roadways, (Shalala-Mwale, 2012). The city's sprawling peri-urban townships are the most littered with waste, leading to annual health and environmental risks such as outbreaks of diarrheal diseases, soil and water contamination (Chaampa, 2014). Thus, this study explored practices in

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<sup>2</sup> Sweden generates 0.453/kg/person/day (EU, 2013) while USA generates 2.0kg/person/day (Environmental Protection Agency, 2013).

<sup>3</sup>A household here refers to a group of persons who normally eat and live together under the same roof (blood relatives or not) and make common provision for essential living needs and have one person heading the household (Central Statistical Office, 2012).

participatory processes in waste management and how actors problematise SWM in the context of PP in public spheres.

### **1.3. Study aims**

The aim was threefold: firstly, explored participatory practices in SWM public spheres; secondly, examined how actors problematise the issue and what they think should be done to improve the situation; and thirdly, ascertained connections between resistance to waste management systems and exclusion from participatory processes.

### **1.4. Main research question**

How do actors take part in participatory processes in Mtendere waste management district?

#### **1.4.1. Sub questions**

- Q1. How are participatory processes facilitated in SWM?
- Q2. How does the LCC respond to emerging issues in SWM systems?
- Q3. How do households influence decision-making?
- Q4. How do actors describe trust in processes of PP and in others?

### **1.5. Thesis structure**

Chapter 1 gives the problem background, research aims and questions. Chapter 2 focuses on research methodology and methods as Chapter 3 synthesises the conceptual framework guiding the study. Chapter 4 presents the study findings while chapter 5 interprets and describes the implication of the findings. Chapter 6 concludes the study.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **2.0. Materials and research methods**

This chapter has three sections. The first section provides brief overview of the study area. The second one explains research methodology and methods; while the third focuses on data analysis method used to interpret the interviews contextual to concepts used in the study.

#### **2.1. Study area overview**

Mtendere township was established in 1967 as a government strategy to organise squatter settlements. The strategy was meant to relocate squatter settlers to more planned community with public services (Hansen, 1997). The township is divided into sections A, B, C, D and Extension. It has 26,088 households and 125, 430 inhabitants (Central Statistical Office, 2013). It is a low-income township with the majority of its residents occupying blue-collar jobs (trade and/or semi-skilled occupations such as cleaning or reception), and micro and small scale businesses with average household income of US\$334.57 per month (FinMart Trust, 2009). Most income generating activities in Mtendere are micro and small scale informal trade businesses<sup>4</sup>. Households in informal businesses mainly sell second hand clothes, charcoal, vegetables, make carpentry and metal products or sewing apparels (Hansen, 1997; FinMart Trust, 2009).

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<sup>4</sup>Informality means the businesses are not registered with the Zambia Revenue Authority and do not pay tax as their revenue is below the tax threshold of US\$200 (Shah, 2012).

## **2.2. Methodological approach**

This study is guided by the phenomenological worldview, which involves understanding and describing lived experiences as perceived by actors in a situation (Lester, 1999; Cresswell, 2014). The phenomenological epistemology is a qualitative approach that necessitates ‘suspending’ (‘bracketing’) taken-for-granted assumptions to gain insight into how actors perceive the situation, their motivations and actions in relation to their individual experiences (Schutz, 1967; Inglis, 2012). Typically, it utilises interviews, discussions and participant observations with emphasis on actors’ perspective and interpretation of the situation (Lester, 1999).

This study was done in Mtendere Waste Management Zone (WMZ) 11 for in-depth understanding of how and to what extent actors participate in public spheres. Actors’ views on practices in grassroots spheres provided valuable insight on their lived experiences for interpretation using analytical and theoretical arguments. A case study approach, which focuses on interactive social processes (Silverman, 2014) was utilised.

## **2.3. Case study methodology**

A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a phenomenon within its real-life context (Noor, 2008; Yin, 2009). Methods utilised in this inquiry were individual and focus group interviews, personal observations and documents (elaborated on below). These sources provided insightful realities and differences between what is planned for (in policy papers) and actual practices. A case study can be done on a community, organisation or process; placing emphasis on intensive examination of the setting in a case.

Scholars define case study differently. Here it is used in reference to the study of a social phenomenon to develop descriptions and explanations to what is happening within and between social institutions (Yin, 2011; Cresswell, 2014). SWM in Mtendere was not chosen out of its unusualness; but it provided an important context for research aims and questions that sought insight and meaning construction on how actors problematise waste management, identify common narratives, and find philosophical reasons to situate those narratives and practices in participatory processes.

## **2.4. Pitfalls of case studies**

Criticisms of case studies include time consumption and overwhelming data and/or the researcher allowing biased views shaping findings (Yin, 2009). Taking down notes immediately after interviews, transcribing recorded interviews on the day of interviews [or the following day] and thematising emerging patterns helped in managing time and data in a more systematic manner. Secondly, utilising varied forms of data including observations, documents and [semi-structured] individual and focus group interviews were vital in preventing data biasness. According to Shenton (2004), individual viewpoints and experiences can be collaborated with other sources to develop a rich picture of how individuals and groups perceive the same social phenomenon.

## **2.5. Data Collection Methods**

Mtendere WMZ 11 was the research area. Actors interviewed in the zone were a Community Based Enterprise, WDC and households. At the council, I interviewed the Head of Waste Management, and Health and

Environmental Inspector; Communications and Public Relations Manager and Mtendere Peri-urban officer. Focus group discussions with households (randomly selected within the zone) were used in data collection. Twelve households and one CBE (waste collector) were interviewed. The number of household members per group interview was between 5 and 9. They included the young, adults and elderly who provided varied lived experiences on SWM. I also made observations in the zone. Various documents on participatory processes and SWM were obtained to supplement interviews and observations. Multiple data collection approaches are important for triangulating views about a phenomenon and patterns attributed to it (Shenton, 2004; Kvale & Brinkmann, 2008).

### **2.5.1. Semi-structured interviews**

Semi-structured interviews are flexible, offer wider response leeways and options to focus on important issues in the study (Bryman, 2004). They are mainly interviews aimed at producing knowledge that describes interviewees' lived experience in the lifeworld and to interpret the meaning of the described phenomena (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2008). Brinkmann (2013) contends that semi-structured interviews are suited for studying specific situations or validating data. Validation can be achieved by utilising different methods to compensate each method's limitations in capturing shared experiences or emerging patterns about the phenomenon (Shenton, 2004; Kvale & Brinkmann, 2008).

### **2.5.2. Observations**

This method is connected to behaviour studies in providing information about individuals' habits and an intuitive understand of what is happening in a particular setup (Kombo & Tromp, 2006). Walking in WMZ 11, I observed actions of households and CBEs on SWM. The method offered me an advantage to observe behavioural patterns directly. However, I needed to contextualise emerged patterns by exploring unclear issues with interviewees to gain better understanding, especially that encountering unexpected issues is common during observations (see Kothari (2004)).

### **2.5.3. Focus group discussion**

Less structured group interviews were used to encourage households talk and exchange notes on SWM. Those who did not know certain issues sought clarity from others. Mostly men were less knowledgeable on many issues related to SWM and women provided clarity. Through clarifying issues and reminding each other during discussions, actors provided shared lived experiences and highlighted issues that might not have come out through other methods. For example, most men did not know waste collection fees and procedures when disposing waste at bins.

## **2.6. Ethical considerations**

Some research ethical considerations I made were not to record unwilling interviewees and taking pictures. With victimisations being common in the township (as explained in chapter 4 –results), most households only accepted to talk on assurance that no recording will be done. Bryman (2004) puts it that caution should be taken against invasion of privacy, deception or causing harm to participants (physical/emotional).

Most households were also not willing to be photographed. They cited a case when their interview footage by ‘researchers’ was given to a television station and they were verbally victimised by the authority over their views.

### **2.7. Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA)**

Understanding how people construct meaning of their lived experience in SWM was done using IPA. The IPA is a qualitative approach that focuses on understanding actors’ lived experience and their interpretation of those experiences (Kleiman, 2004). Interviews and observations were useful tools in understanding issues in SWM, how actors experience them, and generating themes on patterns of actors’ lived experiences. Interviewed age groups (youth, adults and the old) provided a spectrum of households’ accounts on SWM.

The IPA entails *being-in-the-world* listening to actor’s every day narratives and reflections in their mundane world (*lebenswelt*) to interpret and understand their ways of perceiving and making sense of their life-world – double hermeneutics<sup>5</sup> (Schutz, 1967; Inglis, 2012). The themes and patterns that emerged formed results for the study and basis for analysis and discussion. Relating and linking the themes and patterns with theories (Löfgren, 2013) used in this study helped me develop in-depth descriptions of actors’ lived experiences in SWM. Campell (2011) states that an individual lived experience in the lifeworld in relation to theory and practice can be a reflection of society as a system and a lifeworld. Hence, practices in SWM in Mtendere, narratives and lived experiences could be a reflection of commonly lived experiences in participatory processes in Lusaka.

### **2.8. De/limitations**

Boundaries (delimitations) of this study were set by adopted theories (and key concepts), research aims and questions and chosen actors. One boundary that arose from chosen actors was the dissolution of WDCs at the time of the study by the Ministry of Local Government and Housing (where all councils belong). It limited access to multiple views from WDC members on SWM. Only the WDC trustee member was retained and available for interviews. Other limitations included non-availability of participatory processes to observe, households refusal to be recorded, and financial and time inadequacies.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **3.0. Theoretical framework**

#### **3.1. Literature review**

The theoretical starting point of this study is communication with a focus on practices in participatory public spheres. An interplay of trust and power in public spheres formed part of the concepts used. The study is situated in Environmental Communication through the analysis of practices in participatory processes towards policy and decision-making.

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<sup>5</sup>Double hermeneutic or dual interpretation process entails actors’ constructed meaning of their lifeworld and the researcher trying to interpret and understand actors’ meaning making of their lived experience (Smith & Osborn, 2008).

### 3.1.1. Public participation

Participation is interpreted and pursued differently. Some scholars conceptualise it as an ideology, approach and culture while others as a method or guidelines to achieve a particular goal (whether the goal is to meet ‘participatory’ project requirements or consult people to sanction already made decision) –described as ‘transformative and instrumental’ participation (Pateman, 1970; Chambers, 1997). Practices considered ‘participatory’ (in theory and practice) can be situated within a typology to differentiate the degree and kind of participation. In this study, the transformative (participative and deliberative –Pateman 1970) perspective of participation is utilised. Arnstein’s (1969) ladder of participation (as expanded on below) is used to place practices in participatory processes [in SWM] within a particular level of involvement.

The transformative perspective of participation has participative and deliberative notions that seek to alter structural or institutional practices that lead to marginalisation and exclusion (Dahlberg, 2005; Pateman, 1970). It entails a shift from the notion of “professionals know best” to inclusion of grassroots’ knowledge in decision-making (Hansen, 2014; Juarez & Brown, 2008). Smith (2003) contends that discursive processes provide for legitimised dialogical participation through non-coercive communication, which can reduce the distance between policy makers and citizens and increases possibilities for more engagement, ownership and control of the public spheres and practices within them. Participation is not a fixed notion; it is deeply embedded within complex realities. It is a struggle of ideologies and spheres to be involved, speak, and to be heard (Pateman, 1985). Access and interaction are important conditions in participation, which are based on the principle of providing actors spheres to be heard (Senecah, 2004).

Participatory and deliberative processes are viewed to have many positive implications in complex and dynamic problems. SWM is among complex, uncertain and multi-scale environmental problems that affect many actors and agencies (Reed, 2008), thus requires multi-actor to improve its management. Involving varied actors in policy or decision-making could help fine-tune decisions to local contexts, which might minimise implementation hitches arising from oversights. It is argued that when seeking to improve community lives, including local actors (preferably from the beginning) could provide vital insights (such as losses or harms to local people or environment) planners could have overlooked (Corburn, 2003; Cox, 2010). There are however times when citizens are involved, but their views excluded by the authority during decision-making. In other situations, distortions (manipulation, coercion or misinformation) by the authority limit levels of deliberation to educating others (Depoe & Delicath, 2004). Despite problems and pitfalls in achieving participatory assured goals; its desirability cuts across many aspects including planning, decision-making or research (Lewin, 1946; Chambers, 1997).

As stated above, households’ participation levels were assessed using Arnstein’s ladder of participation. The eight-rung ladder has non-participation [manipulation and therapy], tokenism [informing, consultation and placation], and citizen power [partnership, delegated power and citizen control] as main participation typologies (Arnstein, 1969). Arnstein regards manipulation and therapy as non-participation, but a way by powerholders

to ‘educate’ or ‘cure’ participants. Informing, consultation and placation rungs are tokenistic as they provide minimal power to participants to change things. Citizen power is on top of the ladder. It is underpinned by the degree of power for ‘have-nots’ to negotiate, make tradeoffs and have a stake in decision-making (Arnstein, 1969; Kessy, 2013).

### **3.2. Habermasian Public Sphere Theory**

The public sphere concept was first developed in Jürgen Habermas’ 1962 treatise (Thomas, 2005). It has a complex and long genealogical transformations; revealing criticisms and shifting meanings. Thus, it has many connotations among them political, social and philosophical. In this study, its use has political aspects of participatory spaces that [can] amplify public voices in forming public opinion (see Koçan (2008)). The concept’s roots were meeting places for the public to discuss and express their desires and needs without coercion (World Bank, 2009; Habermas, 1990 [1983]).

The public sphere’s contested meanings and practical application are central to controversies about politics, society, rationality, and public life (Pinter, 2004). Its meanings and applications integrate and stimulate many discussions on normative [theoretical or practical] assumptions valuable for providing explanations to social change complexities and communication processes in democracies (Juarez & Brown, 2008; Pinter, 2004). Its conceptual form by Habermas is associated with democratic deliberations and their shortcomings (Pinter, 2004). According to Khan, et al (2012), the public sphere offers opportunities for citizens to act as a public body in an atmosphere that guarantees freedom of assembly and publishing opinions through communicative actions maintained by the manner public affairs are conducted.

The origin of the bourgeois public sphere in social institutions and political philosophy was important for Habermas to draw the public sphere normative model and seek answers to questions about what makes democracy work (Mafuta, 2014; Carpentier, 2011). Democratic beliefs of the public sphere emphasise on the provision of public arenas where citizens talk, public views are collected by authorities and responsibilities assigned to some actor to ensure shared goals are achieved and feedback provided to others no matter the results (see Habermas, et al (1974)). Participatory practices in the public spheres are based on the principle of “public-ness” which symbolises a physical entity and “openness” and communicative actions embedded in the view of “marketplace ideas” that transform (otherwise) private people into a public through different ways of communication (Habermas, 1989; Thomas, 2005).

The public sphere idea is central in participatory approaches through which people seek answers when they feel there are legitimacy deficits in existing policies, practices, or situations (Kemmis & McTaggart, 2005; Habermas, et al., 1974). However, public sphere scholarship concedes that there are times when the public is reduced to spectators while expert opinions replace ‘true’ public opinion (Ubayasiri, 2006). It is argued that the efficiency of participatory processes depends on the extent of access (space to be heard); the degree of autonomy (actors’ freedom from coercion); the rejection of hierarchy (depoliticisation); the rule of law (subordination of the state); and the quality of participation (Rutherford, 2000). The principal aim

of the public sphere theory is to create shared communicative spaces that allow people think, talk and act together openly and with a commitment to make a difference in a particular community.

Two-way communication between actors is envisaged in public spheres. But in situations where [for example] authorities publish information without listening to multiple publics; then the public sphere does not exist as discursive closures suppress particular views (World Bank, 2009; Deetz, 1992). It is contended that marginalised groups [*Frasian subaltern counterpublics* –Fraser 1997] in the public sphere may form parallel discursive arenas, which could be interpreted as disobedience to deficits in democratic processes (Fraser, 1997; Markovits, 2005; von Essen, 2016). Placing resistance within the democratic theory, Markovits (2005) argues that democratic disobedience to policy or decision by the public could signify democratic deficits and done in seeking correction of the deficits that threaten collective authorship of common goals.

### **3.3. Power**

The concept of power is understood from varied perspectives including social, ideological, political, feminist or relational. In this study, it is used in reference to social power (power over and power to). Social power can be economic, authoritative or expert. Actors can use social power either for the common good or to coerce others. Oliga (1996) views social power as the ability to achieve common goals (power to) or to oppress and exploit others (power over). According to Giddens (1984), since some actors are privileged to access “allocative and authoritative resources” (have control over resources and people), they tend to create ‘them –us’ divisions and thereby exercise power over others. One of the implications of this phenomenon (them –us division) is the creation of skewed power relations that give some actors advantage to control interactions while limiting other actors’ participation (Foucault, 1991). Imbalanced power relations are typical in social power situations where ‘subjects’ are socialised to live within what exists even when it is unjust (Foucault, 1978) rather than them being co-creators of common goals.

Mann (1986) contends that power clashes emerge in participatory processes as powerful actors restlessly pursue goals that increase their enjoyment of good life. Actors with social power are able to derive systematic benefits from the subordination of others using many methods such as coercion; and in the process inhibit the ability of other actors to develop and exercise their abilities, express their needs, thoughts and feelings (Tew, 2006; Young, 1990). However, Weber (1946) cautions that people’s ability to make others do things against their wishes can be challenged through subversive actions to express discontent. The use of coercive means thus does not guarantee public obedience to the system. Although denied access to their lifeworld resources and discursive spaces; actors subjected to oppressive power could become adept at resisting or subverting expectations of them from powerholders (Tew, 2006; Butler, 1993 [1997]). According to Tew (2006), actors in coercive environment can find strategies to form networks to dialogue and cooperate in seeking ‘exit doors’ to survive outside the coercive environment.



It is argued that powerful actors often build structures that strengthen their control (Fairclough, 2001); limiting further freedoms of expression and assembly to actors that are lower. This is against the Habermasian principle of openness in public proceedings (*publizittit*) to help actors utilise their shared capital to achieve common goals (Inglis, 2012; Habermas, et al., 1974). Habermas, et al., (1974) contend that coercive tendencies in deliberative arenas can be so powerful that the influence of lower becomes less and less. Njoh (2007) states that when 'abilities' of other actors to take action in a process are coerced, then their [p]ower does not exist as they cannot put it into action. Thus, the breakdown in participatory processes can lead to ideas being imposed on others by powerful individuals, groups and institutions. The lifeworld becomes colonised, and communicative actions which were meant to reach commonality tend to be used to dupe or bully other actors into submission (Inglis, 2012).

### **3.4. Trust**

Trust is an important concept in environmental and public policy in general. According to Tsang, et al., (2009), trust's prominent role is in facilitating collective actions and providing legitimacy (whether legitimacy means acceptance or support) to institutions, policies and actors' roles in implementing collective actions. Much of the literature on participation, planning or deliberative processes consider trust (and its restoration) as a vital component to score higher on participatory/deliberative scorecard.

Understanding trust can be drawn from psychological, historical, anthropological or other schools of thought; each approaching the concept with particular disciplinary lens and filters (Tsang, et al., 2009; Lewicki, 2006). In this study, it is drawn from the social perspective, which emphasises on major roles trust plays in social processes (such as participation/cooperation) that are grounded on relations built through interaction (Tsang, et al., 2009; Gilson, 2003). The core meaning of social trust lies between people, people and organisations, and people and events or social processes. Tsang, et al., and Gilson further put it that citizen trust in government facilitates collective action that can improve outcomes from environmental decisions and can provide legitimacy to public institutions. Trust builds willingness in actors to cooperate towards a common goal even when not all their wishes have been met. However, the opposite can also happen. Decrease in [social] trust is typified by reduced faith and confidence in government institutions (Tsang, et al., 2009).

Although trust is said to be riddled with paradoxes and complexity to build and maintain, it is argued that implementing an agenda (without trust) through use of coercive resources is considerably disadvantageous (Tsang, et al., 2009). Actors can rebut decisions that are distant from their lifeworld realities. Citing Kwong (2004), Tsang, et al., state that without trust in government and limited space to influence policy; people in China tend to seek ways of expressing themselves such as via newspaper columns and editorials. Scholars theorise that trust encourages compliance to laws and regulations and enhances democratic governance efficiency. Building trust in public institutions (and other actors) is thus vital for state action legitimacy and garnering public support (Gilson, 2003). Social exchanges and interrelationships formed by actors based on trust that others would

meet their obligations towards common goals reinforce collectivity. Embracing trustworthy behaviour and practicing trustworthiness either by accepting sharing decision-making power or providing deliberative spaces is required [even] amid distrust among others (Tsang, et al., 2009).

It is however common for authorities to use coercion when citizens are noncompliant. Yet still, it is argued that paying attention to both trust and distrust is central in participation as they are expressive actions by citizens over deficits in the system or process (Tsang, et al., 2009). Distrust increases the cost of transactions by requiring more laws, monitoring or enforcement; and decreases government efficiency by rendering policy making and implementation more difficult (Laurian, 2007).

## CHAPTER FOUR

### 4.0. Results

The empirics in this chapter are divided in three sections (see figure 2 below). The sections present actors' problematisation of SWM in Lusaka, and in particularly Mtendere WMZ 11. The sections are accounts of households, the CBE in the zone and the LCC/WDC.




Figure 1: Summary of actors' problematisation of SWM.

Source: Author's compilation

### 4.1. Observations

I made observations by sitting with the CBE owner at the waste bin, moving around Mtendere WMZ and observing discussions on the LCC Facebook page. At the waste bin, all adults disposing waste were women. When it came to focus group discussions, women often spoke through men sited next to them. In one group, it was indicated that some husbands stopped their wives from talking to WDCs or CBEs because they “harass” them. Men in focus group discussions were however less knowledgeable about SWM issues. I also observed that some CBEs burn the waste at their waste bins although it is prohibited under the 2004 SWM by-law.



Figure 2: Pictures 1 and 2 – roadway waste dumping in Mtendere; Picture 3 – household waste burning at home; Picture 4 – Waste burnt at CBE primary disposal site.

Source: Author’s fieldwork photograph compilation

#### 4.2. Households<sup>6</sup>

Payment duplication (through municipal taxes and polluter’s pay principle)<sup>7</sup> is one of the ways households problematise SWM. One of the households stated: *“it is about where we are coming from, waste collection fees were part of municipal taxes. But when the new system was introduced, we do not know whether there was a downward adjustment to municipal taxes or not. If not, it means we are paying twice for waste.”* Imposing things on people is another issue. *“We have a history of this figure (individual or public institution) telling us what to do.”* Some households do not know where ward planning (WDCs should facilitate) take place. *“We do not know where they meet, maybe at the ward councillor’s home.”* Households’ enthusiasm to participate is low for fear of being labelled anti-government and victimisation over dissent views on public institutions. There is a tendency of mixing ruling political party issues and public institutions. Thus, divergent views over public institutions’ actions (or intended actions) are often seen as discrediting government.

Grassroots spheres seem dominated and used for political activities by political systems. Actors who do not support the ruling political party are often excluded and sometimes victimised (verbally or physically). An example was given of a Mtendere resident who was murdered and his property destroyed by political supporters from the ruling party in 2015 for being *“anti-government.”* Threats and arrests related to SWM are also typical in Mtendere. WDCs focus on arresting households for non-subscription to SWM systems. The Fast Tract Court was established to prosecute *“defaulters.”* Arrests have created tension among households who report others over SWM. Those who report others are considered bad and experience exclusion from community support systems such as informal lending circles households use to provide financing to each other.

<sup>6</sup> Some households were not willing to be recorded or photographed for fear of being identified and victimised. Thus, no house numbers, pictures or names are included herein. However, coding numbers are used to trace views of interviewees in the appendix.

<sup>7</sup> From the late 19980s to 2004, waste fees were embedded in municipal taxes .

CBEs, WDCs and LCC tend to use “*inappropriate*” words towards households. Some CBEs are “*disrespectful*” and harass women for non-payment of waste collection fees. Door-to-door “*enforcement*” visits by WDCs, CBEs and LCC accompanied by police are viewed “*intimidating.*” Further, feelings of being disqualified and their ideas not appreciated typify households’ narratives. They said they were “*not some of us*”<sup>8</sup> to be involved in planning processes. “*There is this question about who is talking? Is it a woman, youth, political supporter of which political party (opposition or ruling party) or someone with a high social economic status in society? This silences us.*” Some households use the media to speak out.

Mistrust in CBEs and their workers is the other problem. CBEs burn waste at the bin instead of having it disposed at landfills. CBE workers were accused of disposing waste within WMZs. CBEs’ capacity to adequately manage waste was doubted due to limited human resource and transport as they use wheelbarrows for waste collection. Poverty and lack of budgeting for waste emerged as another problem. Some households struggle with meeting basic needs and paying for waste due to poverty. However, some households felt that “*budgeting for waste is not a priority to some people.*”

#### **4.3. Community Based Enterprise<sup>9</sup>**

Some households’ actions are out of *chikonko*<sup>10</sup> (proving a point) that they are not happy with something. “*I do not know really what causes illegal waste dumping. It is either people are not happy or they are doing it deliberately.*” Some households subscribe to CBEs outside their zones if unhappy with the CBE in their zone. According to the CBE households’ mindset and lack of knowledge on good practices of SWM contribute to the problem. For example, some households question why they cannot dig waste pits. The CBE also views the older generation to have gotten used to ‘free things’ when SWM was financed through corporate tax in the 1970s. “*There are so many old people living on social welfare support here, so when it comes to paying for waste, it is difficult to them.*” The CBE sees subsidy from high income waste management districts as key in bridging financial deficits in peri-urban areas. But stated that “*we as CBEs do not know what happens to the subsidy coming from those districts.*”

The CBE felt that landlords have not been helpful in collecting waste fees through rentals. CBES thus lose reliable SWM financing as approaching tenants to pay and have their waste collected proved problematic. Asking landlords to add waste fees to rentals has been unsuccessful. “*I have tried to request landlords to help me add waste fees to rent. Sometimes I have shared with them how I do it with my tenants. But people do not want to be told like children.*” CBEs further face the problem of acceptance by households. They feel they are political supporters rewarded for their work to politicians to start waste collection businesses. “*People called us CBEs thieves. We had*

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<sup>8</sup> “**Some of us**” can be the educated, socio-economically wellup or politically connected.

<sup>9</sup> CBE and CBES is used interchangeably because the CBE owner I interviewed was also the secretary for the CBES Association. He thus spoke in general and specific to his CBE.

<sup>10</sup> The term *chikonko* is derived from Nyanja [one of Zambian languages]. It means harbouring something negative. The CBE interpreted its use to keeping something to for some time and at some point letting it out.

*to engage WDCs and LCC; and we went to talk to them door-to-door. But people are still not paying despite taking such steps.”*

The CBE owner did not trust some workers and some households. Households sometimes add non-paying neighbours' waste to theirs. Others do not pay to CBEs, but make arrangements with [CBE] workers to collect the waste for “*small amounts.*” The CBE indicated that “*there are times I find the waste bin full, yet there is no money. My clients also come to complain that waste was not collected from them for days. I lose some clients due to dishonest actions.*” In addition, some households dump the waste late in the night. The CBE conducts night-watch over the waste bin or do street patrols to avoid people dumping waste in the zone. The CBE also views political interference to be compounding problems in SWM such as the ruling party wanting its supporters to run CBEs. “*With political interest in community businesses like CBEs, people are made to think it is true we are political party supporters.*”

#### **4.4. Lusaka City Council/Ward Development Committee**

The LCC views CBEs' failures as serious problems to SWM. The LCC stated that CBEs fail to monitoring compliance to SWM systems in zones; do not create awareness on SWM among households; and do not meet everyday SWM obligations such as consistently paying for secondary waste collection and paying workers. “*Private collectors (franchises and CBEs) are not helping; they come back to us for help to manage the waste. Sometimes they do not pay workers or they fail to collect the waste.*” The LCC added that households' mindset and polluter's pay principle pitfalls (non-reliability of payment system) exacerbated SWM problems. The LCC contended that “*going to people's homes to tell them to pay for the waste for it to be collected is inconveniencing and people are not accepting it. The polluter's pay principle was put into effect without a reliable way of collecting waste fees due to political interest to 'reduce' municipal taxest, in the process 'sweeping under the bridge' expert views.*”

The LCC also felt that “*people like free things. We introduced the fast track court to prosecute defaulters to make them comply.*” Prosecutions are used as “*warning to others that the law will visit them*” if they do not comply. In addition, grassroots structures such as WDCs and zone assemblies were seen as political arenas by the LCC. Thus, the purpose of grassroots structures has been diluted with political interests. One cited example was the shifting of WDCs activities to ward councillors. The political leadership (ward councillors/MPs) “*do not trust us, when we give advice on certain things; they think we are working against them and making them unpopular to voters.*” There were instances when LCC staff got transferred to rural councils for giving an opinion on something the ward councillor or MP intended to do in their area. In addition, bad relations between households and CBEs create tension between them. Households complain to WDCs about some disrespectful (in words/actions) CBEs or refuse to subscribe to CBEs they were in bad relations with. In such cases, CBEs were spoken to and if the problem persisted; the WDC obtained petitions from households to have that particular CBE's contract terminated.

Other sources of bad relations are persistent reminders to households to pay for waste collection and reporting them to the LCC/WDC for non-

subscription to SWM systems. The tension in relations has also been compounded by dishonest actions of some CBEs or households. Some CBEs do not properly monitor their workers, which results into non-collection of waste from households who pay for the service. Similarly, some households are not reliable in their role in SWM. *“We have cases where households are brought to us for burning waste and they claim they do not know it is prohibited. But when we check the list for people who used to pay and stopped; they are on that list.”*

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **5.0. Analysis and discussion**

This chapter is divided into three main sections and sub-sections. The first section discusses participatory practices in SWM and situated them within Arnstein’s (1969) ladder of participation. The second section discusses mis/trust issues in the spheres. The third looks at power dynamics. The discussion is guided by research aims/questions that explored: how and to what extent actors participate; how actors problematise SWM; and sought links between resistance to SWM systems and exclusion from participation.

#### **5.1. Public spheres: forbidden spaces?**

People spirited participation that seeks to take power to the grassroots is one of the anticipated goals of the NDP (MLGH , 2013). However, from this study’s findings, some households do not know where actors meet for grassroots planning. Other narratives show a shift from the NDP principles on strengthened grassroots participatory processes in decision-making to exclusion, threats and arrests over noncompliance to SWM systems. The LCC stated that the Fast Track Court which was created to speed-up waste management related prosecutions was not part of the NDP but a means to seek compliance. Gramsci (1971) contends that repression by the authority never secures a stable social order that works for the authority’s interest. Actors outside power structures [Frasian *subaltern counterpublics*] can emerge to oppose authorities when denied access to spheres to voice issues. By subaltern counterpublics, Fraser (1992) referred to parallel discursive arenas for subordinated actors who create and circulate counterdiscourses that form oppositional interpretative actions, identities, interests, and needs. Identities as not *“some of us”* emerged from households who view themselves disqualified from public spheres due to their socio-economic, gender or political status. Households also felt their ideas were not appreciated in SWM.

Grassroots spheres for planning and decision-making in SWM were dominated by the WDC and political leadership. According to the WDC, planning was done by WDC executive and the ward councillor. *“We plan for the people and inform them afterwards about decisions.”* This is contrary to WDC guidelines that provide for sub-planning units in each zone known as first level of participation for ordinary citizens (MLGH , 2013). The tendency to “plan for people” was described as “imposing things on others” by households. They were unhappy with the approach of planning for them. It is argued that people’s dissatisfaction in public sphere’s normative promises like being inclusive or deliberative tends to lead to

public resistance of the decisions (see Habermas, et al., (1974)). Colonised public spheres lead to external [keeping actors away from the spheres] and internal [preferring technical-scientific reasoning] exclusion (Arts, et al., 2012) of community voices that have limited inclusion opportunities in institutionalised public spheres (Maia, 2007).

Providing deliberative spaces and inclusivity of actors (like households and CBEs) and their views in decision-making is vital SWM in Mtendere for a number of reasons. Firstly, because decisions made on SWM affect [for example] CBEs who carryout primary waste collection. Secondly, the polluter's pay principle places SWM financing on households. Thirdly, households and CBEs are required to sort and dispose the waste in primary waste facilities. In my view, without inclusivity and collective constructivity (sharing and learning) of SWM policies; chances of resisting imposed SWM systems are high. Issues to do with developing more reliable payment systems might be reflected upon by different actors in deliberative and inclusive spheres. Sirianni (2009) argues that through deliberative actions; people are more likely to appreciate varied perspectives and hard trade-offs, thereby increasing acceptability of decisions made even when some actors' preferences were not fully met.

## **5.2. "Who is talking?"**

Actors are mainly excluded from participatory processes based on their socio-economic, political affiliation, age and gender. These exclusions silence households (creating discursive closures –Deetz 1992). Silencing households through socio-economic, gender selectivity or intimidation suppress them and their views. Households with divergent views were often considered anti-government and victimised physically or verbally. Households thus tend to keep ideas to themselves for fear of their utterances being construed to rebellion rather than voices seeking attention over poor SWM. Alvesson and Deetz (2000) contend that discursive closures hinder genuine dialogue by privileging particular actors or views over others. Households stated that they were often disqualified from PP based on the question of who is talking. "Is it a woman, youth, political supporter (from opposition or ruling party) or a person with high socio-economic status?" Some households are thus discouraged to participate or bring forward issues on SWM in their zones. Some CBEs are similarly often excluded from grassroots spheres in preference to [what CBEs view as] people with political connections in wards. The CBEs thus formed an association to look at issues affecting them in SWM.

The socio-economically and politically powerful, are seen as movers and shakers of things in WMDs. Exclusion from processes that should be participatory make households feel they have little influence over issues and their ideas not appreciated. It seems political interests in grassroots spheres are due to high numbers of voters residing in peri-urban areas than high-income areas. Grassroots structures meant for PP are thus used to penetrate communities by the political system. It is argued that actors with power in public spheres tend to have control over crucial domains of governance (Koch, 2013) in the process excluding others.

On the part of the LCC, participation in SWM public spheres at grassroots and above has been weakened and dominated by political stakes.

The polluter's pay principle was cited by the LCC as one politically influenced system; hurriedly effected before devising reliable modalities for household payment for waste and financing SWM infrastructure in each WMD, among other requirements. The LCC noted that people appreciate a convenient system. But with the polluter's pay principle, CBEs have to go to people's homes asking them to pay before collecting their waste. Ubayasiri, (2006) contends that there are times when some actors are reduced to spectators while particular opinions replace 'true' public opinion in the public sphere.

### 5.3. Communication practices

Freedoms of assembly, speech as equals and access to information in the public sphere are some normative assumptions vital for shared communicative spaces (Carpentier, 2011; Mafuta, 2014). Communicative spaces allow people to think, talk, and act together with a commitment to make a difference towards the common good (see Habermas (1984)). It is however argued that building long term relations in the public spheres is difficult when communicative circumstances among actors deteriorate into back-talking, spreading of rumours and personal threats (Hart, 2003). Actors' narratives in Mtendere WMD are characterised by rumours (such as CBEs are political party agents) and information gaps. But the LCC argues that responsible citizens have to take steps to find out which CBEs are servicing their areas. Households' counter-views are that responsible citizens are usually in the minority when it comes to seeking information on acting responsibly (see LCC Facebook page (2015)). Households place the responsibility for strategic exploitation of communicative approaches on the LCC rather than people to look for information.

The CBE interpreted some households' resistant actions towards SWM systems as a communication of displeasure (*chikonko*). *"What can I say about some of these people's behaviour? It looks like chikonko. How can I explain a situation where people heap 4 to 7 waste bags by the roadside? It is not like someone was eating a banana while walking and throws the peel by the roadside."* The CBE added that some households *"come here and dispose the waste without saying anything. When you ask for the receipt they will say we have money and we cannot keep the waste at home."* Depending on how the CBE treat households who take such actions; the situation could erupt into tension. For married women, the CBE indicated that husbands took offense on 'harassing' their wives over waste fees.

Narratives and identity as not *"some of us"* emerged from households excluded from spheres where their voices should be heard. Given the theoretical perspective [of public sphere], this could be understood that the lack of collaboration created a vacuum; making households feel they have nowhere to go when they have problems. They argued that *"if the LCC engages us, we can have a point of talking to them."* Households also felt that CBEs have no capacity to manage public meetings and have no mandate over public issues. *"We have public institutions to talk to when things are not going well. We do not believe in CBEs taking our issues to government."* Shielding each other against litigation for non-subscription to SWM systems is the other narrative that emerged among households. They argued that they prefer protecting neighbours who help them when in need



than the LCC that cannot even do its public duties. Crossley & Robberts (2004) state that discourses of individuals reflect problems experienced in personal life histories in connection to wider social structures. Mtendere residents' lived experiences could be a reflection of experiences in other peri-urban WMDs in the Lusaka. However, actors have reacted differently to their lived experiences as explained below.

### **5.3.1. Acting on the message**

Actors have found ways of getting around emerging issues over waste management. Some dispose waste anyhow while others form associations (networks) to meet their needs and discuss matters affecting them. Other counteractions include colluding with CBEs' workers to have the waste disposed. Could these actions be 'invitational' to authorities to relook at way things and involve actors in a better way? It is contended that [environmental] disobedience can be an act of seeking dialogue over a phenomenon so that it is understood and possibly resolved with target actors (von Essen, 2016; Markovits, 2005). The manner some actors dispose waste is done to make their feelings known as some households put it that *"nobody wants to be surrounded by garbage, but it seems no one cares about hurdles we face."* Utterances of dissent in the media or by action could be used to initiate deliberations and finding ways of embracing varied views on how to address some deficits in SWM systems.

Resistance towards policy or decisions can be an outcome of democratic deficits and a message to the authority about those deficits by other actors. According to Markovits (2005), policy/decision disobedience could denote democratic shortfalls and could provide opportunities for the correction of deficits threatening collective authorship of common goals in a situation. Actions by households to dispose garbage along roadways, at the market to avoid confrontations with WDCs and CBEs or subscribing to CBEs outside their WMZ could be expressions of displeasure towards SWM planning, policy-making or waste collection. The actions could be publicity about deficits in grassroots democratic spheres meant for "public spirited participation" where actors were supposed to meet and "ask each other and share views on what they hope for their wards" (LCC, 2008).

### **5.3.2. Changing the narratives**

Respectful and regular communication among actors could help avert some misunderstandings and rumours on SWM. Existing grassroots structures might provide valuable communication where actors are discursively involved. Acting truthfully and timely on raised issues by actors could help improve trust or relations. According to households, they have been frustrated by lack of feedback on many issues by the LCC. During focus group discussions, a participant asked: *"how rightly are we supposed to dispose waste? People are talking about WMDs, who is accountable or who do we see in case of a problem in SWM?"* Such narratives maybe changed by taking responsive or proactive steps on issues directly taken to the LCC, through the media or by action.

Narratives like name calling (*"CBEs are thieves"*) might also change through discursive processes as actors co-create SWM systems. In cases where something planned for did not work well, spaces for talking would be created. Actors could learn from each other's experiences, seek

priority areas in each WMD and zone, know each others' needs, perceptions, and other relevant aspects in seeking improved SWM. Actions or issues that hamper effective SWM could be discussed and disagreeing actors might reframe their views and listen to others. Households might feel things are no longer imposed on them and they might valuably come forth whenever issues that hinder SWM emerge in their WMDs or zones. Households for example, might become the 'eyes' of the LCC in ensuring things do not escalate into conflict but brought to the fore without delay. Narratives about the polluter's pay principle being duplicate payment might be altered as actors gain understanding of the principle [how it came about or what it entails]. Creating understanding and making actors be part of the process might help in minimising tensions and improve on waste financing and management.

#### **5.4. Trade offs**

Households shield each other against waste management prosecutions to preserve socio-economic benefits derived from their social networks. With the enforcement of SWM by-laws by the LCC, reporting each to the WDCs for noncompliance to SWM systems is common. Reported households are often summoned to the Fast Track Court for prosecution. Thus, tensions and exclusions from social networks arise among households for reporting others over SWM. Social networks are sources of financial, social assistance and community bond in Mtendere. Households stated that *"it is hard to survive here if you are not in good terms with others. We depend on each other during funerals, weddings or for financial support for business. We have financing cycles, where we lend each other money at no interest. But if you are not in good relations with others, you will be alone. That is why we say 'do not insult a crocodile while legs are still in water.'*<sup>11</sup>

Bourdieu (1998) argues that networks are not only about loose associations for 'playing games of amusement' but are about institutions, relationships, and norms that shape the quality and quantity of a society's social interactions. The community networks underpin households; they are the 'glue that holds people together.' Hence households have opted to shield each other against arrests over SWM. The CBE was also discouraged to constantly remind households to pay for waste collection for fear of being called a "wizard" and lose out from social networks in the area.

Mtendere households have situated resources that members negotiate to access through interaction with one another and members of other households (Hansen, 1997). Hansen's observation (based on her two decades ethnographic studies in Mtendere) could explain the worries households expressed over tensions arising from reporting neighbours over non-subscription to SWM systems. Since households have financial and social networks for supporting each other, those reporting others over SWM related issues seem to disintegrate households' networks. Households contended that associations or networks are valuable in their poor communities. The networks provide social, financial and moral support to members. As mentioned above, most of the households in low-income townships like Mtendere are in blue-collar-jobs and small scales businesses.

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<sup>11</sup> The metaphor "do not insult the crocodile while legs are still in water" implies that someone should not insult or say bad things about people whose help they still need.

Low income and lack of collateral exclude them from access to finance (FinMart Trust, 2009). Informal money lending circles provided within households' networks are thus highly valued sources of finance. Authorities could thus help in ensuring that networks are not disintegrated due to lack of actions on emerging tensions in the community.

### **5.5. Degree of actors' participation**

According to the LCC, ward councillors speak for households in their wards and represent them in decision-making processes. Ward councillors are part of WDCs which are decision-making committees at ward level. Actors also 'participate' by responding to public consultation advertisements in the media. Actors are further engaged on many issues using the Lusaka City Council Facebook page.<sup>12</sup> Others call or visit the council to present their various issues. The council often writes to CBEs on issues like increases secondary collection fees or changes in SWM systems.

Participatory scholarship situates PP at different levels. Arnstein's (1969) participation ladder (as explained above) is used in this study to locate the level of PP in SWM grassroots spheres. Arnstein's participation model is however used with recognition of its criticisms. For example, Painter (1992) criticised the assumption that decision-making occurs at a final point in the process as decisive events and contributions might come at any stage. However, the choice to use this model is because its conceptually sound in exploring actors' level of involvement in participatory processes.

On Arnstein's participation ladder, participatory practices in SWM spheres could be situated within tokenism. Civic leaders "*speaking*" for households in decision-making, consultative meetings and public information packages channelled through the media are tokenistic practices. While opinions from other actors can be obtained via consultation, Arnstein regards it as a tokenistic exercise because it confers little real degree of power and control to non powerholders (Arnstein, 1969; Lane, 2005). Another view by Rioonwatch (2014) is that if involving the public ends at informing them of what is happening, or will happen in future by the authority, participation has not occurred. In addition, tokenism falls short of required level of participatory as information could be provided late when no changes could be made to the process, consultations done to endorse already made decisions (Raitio, 2012) and selecting two community members to represent others is only two voices among many others (Rioonwatch, 2014). For example, the ward councillor's voice is just one voice in SWM, especially that councillors do not involve other actors to get a detailed picture of problematic issues in waste management.

Based on my research findings, grassroots planning involves few actors under Ward Development Committees. CBEs' associations hold their parallel meetings on issues that affect them in SWM. To be part of the WDC is by election or nomination by the community. However, in practice (at least in Mtendere), the WDC is composed of the ward councillor, ruling political party representatives such as chairpersons for the Ward, Section and Constituency and other party officials. Grassroots spheres seem to have been turned into political party spheres with less focus on community

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<sup>12</sup> In March 2016, the Facebook page had 709 members who joined it.

participatory processes. Some households indicated that ruling parties have a tendency of picking people from grassroots party structures to make-up the WDC contrary to WDC guidelines of 2013 ( see MLGH 2013). Households who are key actors in SWM have been left out of participatory processes in preference to political actors. Thus, issues that affect households in SWM do not get the required attention or not attended to at all as political interests dominate the public spheres. In expressing their lack of spaces to engage the LCC; households stated that *“if the LCC involved us, we would have somewhere to start from talking to them”* rather than using tokenistic practices (information, consulting or placating).

## **5.6. Delinked**

WDCs are (supposed to be) the primary link between community members, ward development agencies (such as CBEs) and the LCC (MLGH , 2013). However, the LCC stated that ruling parties just allocate party members to constitute WDCs contrary to composition guidelines which provide for the inclusion of people from zones. WDCs are mainly seen to serve political interests instead of coordinating discussions on development needs and to provide feedback to the community on agreed issues during grassroots meetings (see MLGH 2013 for WDCs’ guidelines). This study’s findings generally show domination of WDCs by the ‘haves’ (elite and politicians) and non-institutionalisation of participatory principles. Thus, decolonising and depoliticising them might enhance inclusivity in discursive processes meant to improve SWM. Various actors could discuss and develop collective action plans on issues hindering effective SWM.

It has been shown that when there is inclusivity, there is greater appreciation and understanding of issues by actors and possible ways of fine-tuning them in case of failure or for more improvements (see Crewe (2001)). Maia (2007) views public spheres as models of deliberative democracy where actors could justify their intended decisions and expose them to others’ perspectives and analysis to create democratic bonds actors view legitimate through interactive processes. Such interaction within the public sphere might create a balance between stability and social change, maintainable through the manner public affairs are conducted (McChesney, 2007). SWM spheres could provide actors chance to talk, collect public views and assign responsibilities to some actors to ensure shared goals are achieved and feedback is provided to others.

Arnstein (1969) contends that participation that does not redistribute power is a frustrating and empty process for the powerless. Households’ sentiments that things were imposed on them seem to discourage their contribution towards improving SWM. They opt to keep ideas to themselves or go to the media. It should be acknowledged that whereas actors in SWM expressed low zeal to participate in public spheres; there are cases in Zambia when a participatory process met actors’ desires. For example, the Energy Regulation Board in 2015 reconsidered hiking hydroelectricity tariff after public submissions against it during public sittings. One participant during the sittings stated: *“we managed to get the domestic fixed charge maintained. It would have gone up 300%,”* (Mwebantu Media, 2015). Actors’ lack of involvement enthusiasm in SWM participatory processes could be attributed to (inter alia) views that things were imposed on actors

or past experience in such processes or attaching views to the speaker's socio-economic status.

### **5.6.1. Practising what is on paper**

Good policy provisions about grassroots participation are contrary to practices on the ground in SWM. Firstly, devolution of power and facilitation of grassroots participatory processes through WDCs has been abandoned. WDCs instead facilitate arrests and prosecutions of households resisting SWM systems. Secondly, the LCC argued that there has been enough talking; contrary to decentralisation principles that provide for grassroots processes where people could be asked what they wanted done. Thirdly, the LCC use coercive means such as visiting households [with police] and making them pay for waste or face the law. Intimidating actions have contributed to making households feel things were imposed on them. But from focus group discussions experience, households can be engaged discursively when an atmosphere is cordial. For example, some household members who said they had nothing to do with SWM issues, contributed to the discussions even when they initially sat at a distance and preoccupied themselves with newspapers and cellphones. They could have gained trust in the discussion and became part of it. Creating a cordial environment where actors feel safe to meet and deliberate could provide an opportunity for co-creation of SWM systems actors might support.

The LCC does not seem to have institutionalised participatory principles. In terms of short and long term plans, it is focusing on enforcement, re-introducing old system of paying for waste through municipal taxes, increasing workforce for more enforcements and prosecuting defaulting actors in SWM. Improving on grassroots participation does not seem priority. Upholding participatory principles from the top to grassroots might improve SWM in so many ways. It might help fill information gaps, create a sense of ownership, broaden understanding, and create awareness about environmental implications of poor SWM. Actors like households who currently feel their ideas are not appreciated and keep things to themselves might valuably come forth whenever there are issues that emerge impeding SWM in their zones.

### **5.7. Dis/trust and rumours**

Trust is an important “glue or lubricant” (Raitio, 2013) required in participatory processes. SWM is one complex issue that requires actors' collaboration because it involves various people in waste financing, collection, sorting, disposal and recycling. However, narratives on SWM in Mtendere are characterised by distrust. Rumour, lack of information and inadequate deliberative actions have worsened mistrust in actors' relations. There are many facets of distrust narratives. On the part of households, their mistrust arise from past [dishonest] experiences in their interaction with CBEs, WDCs and LCC. CBEs workers some times dispose waste within WMZs or burned it at the primary disposal sites instead of having it disposed at the landfills. These actions seem to undermine households' trust in CBEs. Households also trust issues with WDC and the council for failure to take action on issues raised with them (although some of them were unrelated to SWM). Households also engage in actions that risk trust in their

relations with other actors. For example, non-paying households for waste conspiring with CBE workers to collect their waste for small amounts.

It is argued that mistrust, suspicions and rumours are not conducive in participatory processes. When suspicious and rumours are high, actors tend to be on guard against their stake rather than the common good (McMillan, 2013). Sustained cooperation and active civic culture also diminish. Eroded confidence in SWM systems and grassroots participatory processes can be exemplified by households' utterances that they would rather keep ideas to themselves for they feel unappreciated. Restoring trust is an important to score higher on participatory scorecard. The sustenance of trust could be enhanced through information sharing and deliberation in participatory spheres (Luarian, 2009). Luhmann (2005) links trust to participation through its growing relevance in complex issues and ability to mobilise particular public involvement to enhance the degree of participation. With trust in others, in the system and process; there is a possibility for actors in SWM to actively participate in collective actions. Deliberative approaches can foster collective learning on what is working or not, system limitations, emerging issues as other actors interact in WMDs; and possibly create more responsive and proactive actions plans towards SWM.

Scholarly consensus on trust, mistrust and rumour contends that lack of information or taking it for granted that people know; strengthens speculations and could escalate mistrust. Rosnow (1988) argues that rumour is an explanation that reflects personal anxiety and general uncertainty in people when information to validate those improvised explanations is not provided. Unexplained issues tend to be speculated on to fill-in information gaps. People use rumour as public communication, infused with personal assumptions about how the world works (Rosnow, 1991). Amid mistrust in SWM participatory processes, rumour is used for sense making to help actors cope with uncertainty and worrisome things in their lives. For example, households supply 'explanations' on the introduction of the polluter's pay principle as a duplication of payment to make money from them because they lack of information on how it came about. Deliberations in grassroots spheres could help minimise rumours.

It is contended that when the public is involved early, their views obtained and reflected upon and possibly included in decision-making; chances of public trust in the system and support increases. For example, after analysing citizen participation in Boston Southwest Corridor project in the 1970s and 1980s, Crewe (2001) posited that the more designers valued citizens' input, the more appropriate their designs became to users. Facilitators of participatory processes in the project obtained better ideas that made their final plans more accepted and much easier to carry-out. Similarly, in SWM, actors' views could be obtained and unclear issues clarified. Mistrust could reduce actors' seeming unwillingness to listen, reflect and understand the position of others. Investing in deliberative processes could thus enable actors meet in a non-coercive atmosphere to discuss, learn and provide preferred actions over the problem (Lukensmeyer & Torres, 2006). Actors could use grassroots spheres to share their concerns, fears and suggestions to improve SWM.

Amid distrust, rumour and information gaps, the LCC argues that there has been enough of talking as it is time to enforce by-laws on SWM

and not talking stage. However, the ‘talking’ with actors has been mainly through the mainstream media (television, radio and newspapers), and online via the website and Facebook. Ward development committees that are supposed to be the link with grassroots do not involve actors deliberatively on SWM issues. The committees mainly focus on arresting and facilitating prosecuting noncompliant households. The talking stage was under the Sustainable Lusaka Programme, a donor driven programme that ended in 2004. The LCC views PP as a time-bound activity. But Reeds (2008) contends that participation is a process of learning and collective actions building on people’s needs. It requires ongoing involvement of actors to get a particular level of desired outcomes in decisions-making. The LCC needs constant participatory processes to ensure that emerging issues are timely included into SWM systems.

Communication by the council mainly targets waste collectors (CBEs and franchises) and cooperating partners. To widen its communication, court convictions of SWM defaulters are used for information dissemination. The media is invited to cover them to warn others. However, households questioned the ‘excitement’ over SWM related convictions without making information on several SWM issues available in the public domain. Commenting on the LCC Facebook posting, a participant wondered: *“but how can I be prosecuted when no waste company came to my home asking me to join the scheme? Where is the offence?”* (LCC, 2015). It is argued that actors’ dissatisfaction in PP can arise when communication is inefficiently done as it deprives less informed actors knowledge of the scope of issues to be deliberated on; thus distorting the public sphere as meeting space as equals (Thomas, 2005). Information inadequacy or distortions could create discontent in actors to be involved in matters of common importance. Inness (1998) puts it that understanding the real purpose of participatory processes in decision-making or planning lies in communicative actions. This entails that the manner information is exchanged creates meaning to the process and influence actors’ participation. Hanna (2000) views information as one of the biggest issues in participation, in terms of who controls it and whether it is trustworthy.

### **5.7.1. Rebuilding trust**

Although participatory spheres in SWM are typified with multi-actor interests and complexities; there are openings that could be used to reframe actors’ views and help in building relations towards a shared-vision on SWM. Openings in involving others or talking could help create trust and improve on emerging conflicts in public spheres. Improved trust among actors could be sought by acting on causes of mistrust. Some issues raised included lack of action on matters presented to authorities, information void, dishonest and “imposing things” on others.

Issues the council never acted on from households negatively affected their trust in it. One participant during focus group discussions stated that *“I do not want to follow the LCC any longer. I have been going there for more than two years over surveying my land, but nothing has been done.”* Such sentiments show displeasure and loss of confidence in the LCC. Loss of confidence in the council could erode actors’ willingness to collaborate with it over SWM unless steps that reframe actors’ perceptions

were taken. Most issues requiring action by the LCC were often in the media or posted on the institution Facebook page. In this study, I propose provision of information on SWM systems as one of the steps to reframe public perceptions. Households lack information on a number of issues to do with SWM and the LCC has not made information readily available.

In terms of information gaps; firstly, it is unclear to most households how the polluter's pay principle came about and what happened to waste fees imbedded in municipal tax. Secondly, how and why private waste collectors were introduced is mainly speculated on among households. Thus, triggering rumours that CBEs came about as political payback to political supporters. Thirdly, households do not seem to know the role of WDCs as facilitators of grassroots participation. People often call, visit, email or post of the council Facebook page to know more about SWM. However, even when people take such steps, some responses by the council are discouraging. For example, on the council Facebook newflash about an old woman convicted by the Fast Track Court over SWM, one person commented: *"leave the old lady alone and put things in order. Are rubbish pits not allowed anymore?"* The council responded that *"your thoughts are so retrogressive and hypocritical. People complain of the city being dirty, but when we take action others are condemning. It does not make sense"* (LCC, 2015). With such a tone, it could be hard for the person who asked to have trust in a discursive process with the LCC.

## **CHAPTER SIX**

### **6.0. Conclusion**

Based on actors narratives, although 'participatory' arenas for SWM exist; exclusion using socio-economic, political or gender selectivity typify PP in Mtendere. Grassroots spheres created for actors to "make known and discuss what they hope for" (LCC, 2008) in their lifeworld are dominated by the powerful (economically, politically or experts) contrary to discursive spaces that allow collective actions to improve a situation (Habermasian conceptualisation). Actors like the council have not utilised participatory opportunities to deliberate on issues they are at variance with other actors on how to approach them. They pull in different directions (for instance, experts versus politicians). Actors working in isolation seems counterproductive to SWM. For example, CBEs and WDCs formed parallel structures for developing operational strategies and decision-making without involving households who are the most likely to be affected by those strategies and decisions. Amid lack of collaborative work, households formed counteractions [*chikonko* waste disposal] against the imposed SWM systems, thus making Mtendere filthily littered with waste.

Politicisation of participatory spheres and mistrust have compounded the SWM problem. Grassroots structures for PP are fertile grounds for politicians to penetrate communities where majority voters reside. As a result, SWM and other problems households face are given little (or no) attention in pursuance of political interests. People who seem to discredit politicians in their utterances are often victimised. With mistrust among actors, further exclusion of 'bad neighbours' from networks takes place. Mtendere has networks that provide financial and social bufferzone to



households in hard times. The networks are based on trust and good relations. Mistrusted individuals are excluded from the networks. Households thus tend to side with social networks requirements than complying with SWM systems.

Despite participatory processes in SWM being typified by varied interests and complexities; there are utilisable openings to help actors reframe their views and build relations towards a shared-vision. Perceptions and speculations that the polluter's pay principle is a duplication of municipal taxes or CBEs are political party payback entities could be minimised when people are made part of decision-making processes. They would not lack information on many other SWM issues. Other openings the council could utilise are people's actions or utterances in the media. It could use them to seek means of involving concerned actors in co-creating improved systems of managing waste. Trust could be built and sustained by acting on concerns raised by actors as soon as they emerge to avoid them escalating into tension. In the long run, people might use grassroots spheres to bring forward their concerns or fears in SWM rather than keeping ideas to themselves.

#### **6.1. Further research ideas**

Potential SWM research includes participatory research on how to deal with power aspects of the local processes or [re]building trust in decision-making.

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
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*Appendix 1: Conceptual design of grassroots participation*



Source: MLGH (2013)

*Appendix 2: Interview guide –Waste Management Unit*

1. How is planning for SWM done?  
Follow up questions
  - Which actors are involved in the process?
  - How do you involve them?
  - Do you have actors you consider more important in this process?
  - Specifically, how do you involve households?
  - What channels/platforms do you use to communicate/involve them?
  - How do you get feedback from actors, for instance, in case there is a dispute about something in SWM?
2. Where do you think the problem/s lies in SWM from the perspective of:
  - Planning process
  - CBEs
  - households
  - What is working and not working?
  - How can things be improved?
3. How much waste is generated/day/month?  
Follow up questions:
  - How much is collected?
  - Why the shortfall in collection?
4. From your experience in SWM, how would you describe trustworthiness of:
  - CBEs?
  - Households?
  - Politicians?  
Follow up questions:
  - Why would you describe it that way?
  - What do you think it causing the mistrust?
  - How do you prefer things to be?
  - How did you feel being treated that way?



5. How are decision made on SWM?  
Follow up questions:
  - What influence do households have in decision-making?
  - Who do you consider movers of things in SWM?
  - How does influence by other actors affect your work in SWM?
  - Why do you think there is power clash in grassroots structures?
  - How best do think power of actors can be used to improve on SWM?
6. Future
  - What are your future plans/hopes on waste management?
  - What are your concerns/fears?
  - How do you think your concerns/fears can be resolved?
  - What would have to happen to make this happen?
  - How differently can actors be involved in SWM? i.e. households, CBEs, central government, public agencies, etc?

*Appendix 3: Interview guide –Communications And Public Relations Unit*

1. How do you communicate with different actors on SWM?  
Follow up questions:
  - How do you obtain feedback from them?
  - Do you have any face-to-face discursive platforms with actors?
  - Do you have actors you consider more important in your communication strategy?
  - Which ones could those actors be?
2. How are actors communicated to in case they go to media to raise an issue on SWM?  
Follow up questions:
  - How do you feel when actors go to the media to complain or highlighting problems in their area on SWM?
  - How do you provide feedback to actors who use the media to raise issues in general and SWM in particular?
  - How do you dialogue with actors in SWM in case of a dispute exhibited by actions or directly communicated to you?
3. How do you communicate with households on good and bad practices of SWM?
4. How do you communicate or collaborate with CBEs and WDCs to get the information to households on SWM?
5. What are your concerns with communicative actions between the LCC and different actors?

*Appendix 4: Interview guide –Ward Development Committee*

1. What is your role in SWM in this area?
2. How would you describe SWM in Mtendere WMD from the perspective of:
  - Planning process?
  - CBEs?
  - Households?
  - What problems impede effective SWM?
  - How can those problems be improved on?
3. How do you facilitate the inclusion of various actors in grassroots planning, etc?  
Follow up questions:
  - Which actors do you often involve?

- Do you have preferred or actors you consider more important?
  - Specifically, how do households?
  - What platforms do you use to communicate/involve them?
  - How do you get feedback from actors on things not working well or any suggest over something on SWM?
4. From your experience in SWM, how would you describe trustworthiness of:
- CBEs?
  - Households?
  - Politicians?

Follow up questions:

- Why would you describe it that way?
  - What do you think it causing the mistrust?
  - How would prefer things to be?
  - How did you feel being treated that way?
7. How are decision made on SWM?
- Follow up questions:
- What influence do households have in decision-making?
  - Who do you consider movers of things in SWM?
  - How does influence by other actors affect your work in SWM?
  - Why do you think there is power clash in grassroots structures?
  - How best do think power of actors can be used to improve on SWM?
  - What are you concerns? Fears? Hopes concerning waste management?
  - How do you think your concerns/fears can be resolved?

#### *Appendix 5: Interview guide –households*

1. Do you have bins for throwing garbage in your area?
2. What are you not happy with in SWM from the view of:
  - CBEs?
  - LCC?
  - Any other?
3. Do you attend SWM planning meetings?
 

Follow up questions:

  - If not, how do you know what you are required to do in SWM such as waste collection fees or change of SWM system?
  - If you do, are your views given satisfactory attention in decision-making?
  - Are there other meetings you involved in?
  - How do you feel being treated that way?
4. From your experience in SWM, how would you describe trustworthiness of:
  - LCC
  - CBEs?
  - Politicians?

Follow up questions:

- Why would you describe it that way?
  - What do you think it causing the mistrust?
  - How would prefer things to be?
5. What are you concerns? Fears? Hopes?
- Follow up question:
- How do you think your concerns/fears can be resolved?

*Appendix 6: Interview guide –Community Based Enterprise*

1. What zone do you collect the waste from?  
Follow up questions:
  - What challenges do you face in SWM?
  - How do you involve households when you facing a problem?
  - In case the problem persists, do you involve WDCs or the LCC directly?
  - Why do you prefer doing it that way?
2. Do you attend SWM planning meetings organised by WDCs or the LCC?  
Follow up questions:
  - If not, how do you know what you are required to do in SWM such as how much waste collection fees to charge or change of SWM system?
  - If you do, are your views given satisfactory attention in decision-making?
  - Are there other meetings you involved into?
  - If you are not involved in any SWM meetings, how do you raise issues you feel are not working for you?
  - How do you feel being treated that way?
3. From your experience in SWM, how would you describe trustworthiness of:
  - Households?
  - LCC?
  - WDCs?
  - Politicians?
 Follow up questions:
  - Why would you describe it that way?
  - What do you think it causing the mistrust?
  - How would prefer things to be?
4. What are your concerns? Fears? Hopes?  
Follow up question:
  - How do you think your concerns/fears can be resolved?

*Appendix 7: summary of interviews with actors*

<b>ACTORS</b>	<b>CODING</b>
<p><b>7.1. Households</b></p> <p><b>Participatory process</b>  <i>We do not know where they mee, maybe at the ward councillor’s house. Can they call us? We are not some of us. We only get letters telling us that fees have been increased, this what has been agreed upon, payment for waste will be made to this person now onwards, etc. With such kind of communicating, someone can simply type and tell us we have increased waste fees. The letters are written on plain papers [not official headed paper] without a date stamp. We may have a lot of things in our heads, but we can’t say them out in fear of being considered wrong citizens instead of taking bad waste management as a wrong to people’s well being. We end up keeping things to ourselves and let things be as they are managed. We feel our voices are not appreciated</i></p> <p><i>We are coming from an imposing background where this figure [President or government institution] did things for us and told us what to do. Despite having moved from a one party state to democracy, we feel most of the people are not ready to participate in national issues without fear of being labelled anti-government. We</i></p>	<p><i>1. Exclusion/mistrust</i></p> <p><i>2. Domination/coercion</i></p>

cannot hold anyone accountable for failure to do their duties if waste is not collected. We run a risk of being accused of not subscribing to SWM for demanding better services, we fear being looked at as labels (labelling against the system).

Basically, it is about where we are coming from; the waste collection fee was part of the land rates payable to the council. But when the collection fees were unbundled from the land and property rates, we were not informed. We are not sure whether there was an adjustment downwards from the property and land rates after introduction independent waste collection fees or it is still there; meaning we are paying twice for the waste. Nobody bothers to explain to us what is happening. The council is rigid; it has very rigid structures for public voices.

Sometimes when we complain about things we are considered to be opposing government. It is not considered our right for clean environment. We cannot freely speak without being labelled 'opposition political party members.' Political supporters beat for saying bad things about government. Someone had his shop and stand at the market destroyed by political party supporters. They latter went for him and murdered him.

There is this question about *who is talking?* If it is a woman, youth, political supporter from the opposition parties or someone with a high social economic status in society. If you are not part of them, your views mean nothing. We are silenced in most cases. Zambian society is influenced by patriarchal system which places much emphasis on men as heads of systems [home, institutions, government, etc]. Secondly, there is unwritten code of conduct which promotes respecting elders to an extent that even when they "*step on your toes*" you should politely tell them "please may I remove my toes under your foot" [i.e. when an elderly person does something which takes away a young person's freedom to achieve their rights, the young person who not say it but try to smile about it.]

CBEs also only come when collecting waste and fees. We do not sit down to discuss anything. We do not even know the approved fees because people pay differently between K20 and K30 since they charge us differently. We feel sidelined in the process of improving the way waste is being managed. Nobody listens to us. For example, we do not have enough bins in the area; as a result, people throw the waste down since bins cannot keep the waste generated in our yards. We end up burn it. Ward councillors do not provide platforms for discussing issues that affect us here. In my area, I have never heard a public discussion, I do not even know when public meetings are held [if at all they are held]. People end up going to the media to present their anger. Those who do not have the courage to go to the media, mind their business. If one has a kantemba [corner shop] they focus on it and see how to survive.

### **Politics in grassroots spheres?**

Most voters are in compounds [low income areas], we are the play ground for politicians. We are not just majority voters, it is easy to buy off people with small things like beer, money or causal jobs since most people do not have income, they fall for anything. When you look here in Mtendere, how many voters are here compared to Kabulonga for example [Kabulonga is a high income area], we are more here, politicians prefer such places like Mtendere for political reasons. They would not mind about wards in high income areas. In high-income areas, people have small family sizes, like two children, but here most people have more than 6 children. We also keep a lot of our relatives. All these make compounds fertile grounds for politicians. These officials at ward and other zones are used to do political duties instead of their duties. For instance, the WDCs here are always at the ward councillor's house, they more like his assistants. [2 times I contacted the WDCs executive for interviews he was at the ward councillor's house and indicated he was sent to do something for 'the boss'].

People here can kill for their political parties. We have people who were sentenced to death over the murder of someone in Mtendere Extension. You could have read about

3. Domination/  
information gap

4. Freedom of  
speech/intimidati  
on/power clashes

5. Disqualifying /  
culture/power  
dynamics

6. Lack of  
communicative  
spaces/  
alternative  
actions

7. Politicisation  
of spheres/  
exclusion

8. Politicisation/  
violence/desired

it. The man refused to supporting ruling party activities, he was supporting the opposition party. They looted his shops and beat him to death. Such incidences tells you something about how much political interest in on areas with higher numbers of voters. We would love the same attention when it comes to our wellbeing, when it comes to things that affect our lives, we are most affected with a lot of things here (e.g. cholera, water shortages, power outages, drainages, floods, etc).

We do not have a voice here, we are not at the same level with high income people. Maybe because we do not pay tax from our small businesses, nobody seems to care about our wellbeing. During elections yes we see them around, they give us t-shirts, chitenge [wrappers], buy people chibuku [local brew], etc. But after elections that is the end, we only hear about them in newspapers and on tv. Even ward councillors are not seen. But they live with us here. How do we talk to them? Will they listen to us? Most of the times they just agree with what people say and once they leave, that is the end, nothing will happen, our problems will not get any attention

### **What do you wish?**

We prefer the LCC engaging us. Currently, if we have a problem we cannot go anywhere if the LCC was involved with us. We could have a point of talking to them. Look at the markets, there are LCC offices who deal with every day issues of markets. People can walk there and present their issues. They can engage them and iron out things before they get worse. Now us, we are dealing with CBEs, at times they start quarrels with our wives telling them off on the road for non payment. They tell them “*after all you do not even pay, what are you saying?*” In our society we cannot allow CBE employees to be harassing our wives over waste. [interjection] on that point, we cannot be working with people who do not respect our women. With me if I am not there, no CBE should start asking anyone to pay for waste. We have decided to be paying to a different CBE because others are not respectful. CBE need support from the LCC and government. Capital projects for buying reliable transport requires a lot money. CBEs cannot manage such projects. Even the LCC does not have adequate transport for secondary collectio, government has to support the LCC on transport

### **Waste collection**

The bins are not enough. The population in Mtendere is too high. People end up being limited to 25kg of waste per week and the excess they either burn it or burry it to avoid paying extra cost or prosecution [in case of indiscriminate dumping] of the excess waste. “We keep the waste if it is more than 25kg limit per month at our homes and burry it or burn depending on the type of waste. We cannot risk being arrested and prosecuted or charged extra fee for generating more waste than the recommended in a particular timeframe.”

The K30/month collection fee is too much. “We would prefer to burn the waste and use that money to buy food for the family. Cholera can break out, but we have little option. Meeting our livelihood is more important compared to paying for waste collection.” CBEs only come when collecting waste and fees “we do not sit down to discuss anything. We do not even know the approved fees because people pay differently between K20 and K30.

Some households dispose the waste at the market to avoid paying extra for excess waste. At market, market committees manage the waste at the market by collecting collection fees from all those selling at the markets. It is bad to have garbage around. We all want to throw it away. But the way things are happening is discouraging for anyone to suggest anything. We have a lot of ideas.

### **Trust**

Households have trust issues with the LCC mostly due to their past experience with it. It was noted in one FGD: “when you talk about LCC; my perception or trust in them [laughs, shaking head] is a bad one. I have taken papers for my land and it has taken almost two years, they have not done anything. I am sited here, they will come when

actions

9. Exclusion/  
listening and  
damning actions

10. Lack of  
participatory  
spheres/  
inappropriate  
communication/  
counter-actions/  
suggestions

11. Inadequate  
waste bins/  
limiting waste  
disposal  
amounts/counter-  
actions

12. Trade-off:  
waste vs  
food/poverty

13. Counter-  
actions/ view on  
SWM

14. Trust  
/examples:  
causes of mistrust

they want.” In terms of providing services for the community, household described the LCC to be “never been there, we have not confidence in them.” CBEs are not trusted as they collect the waste and dispose it within the area; mostly because they hire ‘freelance collectors’ who are in a hurry to finish the work and go do other things. In addition, households indicated that “CBEs clean drainages and leave the waste for days due to lack of transport to take it to waste bins. As a result, the waste gets back into the drainage as vehicles push them back. The CBEs end up doing same things every day instead of collecting waste from other areas.”

Other trust issues emerged within households themselves. With the introduction of the Fast Track Court by the LCC, some households report others for illegal dumping of waste and they get summoned or warned by the WDCs. This has created mistrust among households. As a result, some have lost their networks. Lose of networks have social and economic implications on households since they depend on each other for a number of community activities such as: 1. *Financial support*: households run lending circles to finance ‘capital projects’ since borrowing from banks without collateral exclude them from formal lending systems. The informal lending circles in the area involve a group of different households who give money to one individual in a month [e.g. US\$50 by 10 members]. Such money is used as initial capital to purchase merchandise to sell at the market or any other micro scale business such as selling dry fish, vegetables, second hand clothes, etc. Households who report others for illegal waste dumping are excluded from the lending circles. 2. *Social support*: households have moral and financial support among themselves in times of problems such as funeral or when there is a wedding in one the households. Those who are not trusted are sidelined and do not get help from others. Reporting neighbours for illegal waste dumping is one source of such divisions. The households stated:

“[...] without good relations with neighbours here, it is difficult to survive. We depend on each other so much. Provoking neighbours means no one will help during problems. In times funerals or weddings, we contribute in whatever way for it. In fact, we are better off protecting our neighbours from the council. They stand by us every day. That is why we say ‘do not insult a crocodile while legs are still in water .’ [The metaphor “do not insult the crocodile while legs are still in water” implies that someone should not insult or say bad things about people whose help they still need]. 3. *Social, religious and market clubs*: there are associations and clubs co-managed in these societies such as Mtendere Churches Response Alliance (MCRA).

### **CBEs’ Capacity**

Using wheelbarrows is not an efficiency way to collect waste from Waste Management Districts [WMDs] with high numbers of households like Mtendere WMD. Zone 11 in Mtendere WMD for instance has more than 1800 households whose generated waste cannot be adequately collected using wheelbarrows. For CBEs using wheelbarrows to collect waste from all these households per week or month is not achievable. Increasing the numbers of CBEs and waste bins would help improve waste management in WMDs. As a result, it forces CBEs waste collectors to throw the waste along roadways, waterways or undeveloped pieces of land/structures. They do not have the capacity to do a good job in meeting waste collecting requirements in relation to waste generated by households. CBEs clean drainages and leave the waste for days due to lack of transport to take it to waste bins. As a result, the waste gets back into the drainage as vehicles push them back. The CBEs end up doing same things every day instead of collecting waste from other areas. Some CBEs organise freelance wheelbarrow owners to collect the waste and CBEs pay them for the waste collected. However, these freelancers are too busy to do a good job; they often throw the waste anyhow instead of taking it to the waste bins located in different locations. Very few people feel a citizenry responsibility to manage the waste. The current system is not a sustainable way of managing waste. We do not know why LCC cannot collect the waste as it used to be done previously. No one explained to us why there was a change of the waste management system. There is no information on good and bad SWM practices for us to work with as we participate in waste management. We are not communicated or educated on what is happening on SWM

15. Trade offs:  
network  
exclusion vs  
SWM

16. Narrative on  
value of social  
networks

17. Trust/ CBE  
capacity/  
information gaps/  
unawareness

**Suggestions, fears, hopes?**

Integrated SWM where all stakeholders be involved, the issue is not for the LCC, it involves all of us, limiting SWM to LCC as the preserve of knowledge on what works for the people excludes people outside the SWM process. Can waste be transferred into cash, so that it becomes attracted or how best can we put it to make people see value in it, see it a resource? Then how are we dividing the area for managing waste? Some waste management zones are too big for CBEs. CBEs are not cost effective, they gamble by saying CBEs should manage waste without infrastructure and equipment like transport trucks, wheelbarrows are not viable for collecting waste. How many workers do CBEs need to collect waste from more than 500 homes using wheelbarrows per week?

*Innovation*

When you talk about CBEs, do they see value in the waste or it's waste as waste? The CBEs do not look at waste as a source of money, otherwise they would have created links with recycling companies and make money from it and dispose at the primary what can be recycled by the companies they have agreements with. There is need for mindset change and there is need to see waste as a means to earn money and input into the production system. People [CBEs, LCC/WDCs] involved in SWM should be proud of their role in environmental protection through stimulating and supporting good SWM practices. What is there for people? How do you make them see value in waste? LCC/WDCs can look at holding meetings on improving waste management – looking at best and bad waste management practices, issues affecting effective waste management, what are locals not happy with, where do they feel they are excluded and act out of defiance to signal their displeasure to the authority. What are the perceptions towards waste collectors in communities? Mostly waste collectors are looked down upon and their work is ridiculed. This erodes their pride to be doing something towards protecting the environment. It seems there are no guidelines to protect waste collectors against diseases by ensuring they have protective clothing and proper tools for collecting the waste. The current status [using wheelbarrows, not protective clothes, bad public perceptions, etc.] is discouraging people to work in waste management.

We have to learn to use politics for the good of people. Whether politics is used in these planning structures for the LCC, it should work for the good of us. Politics should not derail things, not all activities with political connotations are bad. We should use politics to improve the welfare of communities.

18. Infrastructure void/ inadequacy of CBEs=worse SWM

19. Changing the narratives

20. Framing power / collectivity

**7.2. Community Based Enterprises –CBES**

People dumping waste illegally are there, it's not clear why...we made a follow up with LCC in sensitising households [landlords] about good and bad SWM practices. Illegal dumpers we have tried, but there is a problem, they come at night [e.g. mid night] because before mid-night as CBEs we patrol to monitor who is throwing waste anyhow.

We told households that landlords should include waste collection fee on rental charges since most of the tenants don't pay if it is left for them to pay. We proposed that the same way landlords include in water and electricity bills, the waste collection fee should be added to the cost of renting the house. The tenant-landlord agreement should include waste collection to ease the process of collecting SWM collection fees. It reduces chances on non-payment.

Some landlords comply and pay for their tenants then the CBE go to the houses the landlord paid for to collect when we go to collect we only collect from those who have paid. Some of the people are just used not paying, some pay others do not pay within the set of flats so when we go to collect, and we expect every household to dispose a 25kg per week. If we find more we will not collect the excess because at times you find others are paying while others are not paying. If you find more, the other waste you do not collect. We cannot force them, last time we tried to involved

1. Illegal dumping

2. Information provision

3. Payment arrangement/Mindset/tension

the police, but it creates conflict with our neighbours, they feel we are bad people, they do not look at us as service providers of SWM

In the dry season most people burn the waste, we collect less waste even the bins are often not full. Illegal dumpers we have tried, but there is a problem, they come at night [e.g. mid night] because before mid-night as CBEs we patrol to monitor who is throwing waste anyhow. When we started, people were apprehensive, they did not trust us, they thought we were stealing money from them since they were not used to paying for the waste and LCC did not communicate adequately on the new system

4. Trust/ opinion  
on  
communication

People are now understanding, sometimes I catch illegal dumpers [those disposing waste in undesignated places] and I talk to them more like educating them on existing SWM systems. If they are arrogant I take them to the police and the following day we arrange to take them to LCC at the Fast Track Court where they are prosecuted. But you know we are neighbours taking them to the Fast Track Court make our neighbours look at us with *red eyes* [as bad people] or they can call you a *wizard*, who does not have their welfare at heart especially where the person sent to prison catches a disease due to bad conditions in prison. We end up taking them to the police where they pay a fee for detention to the police. They pay K22.5 as commitment of the wrong. They are then forced to pay the additional K20 [for disposing the waste in the bins or K30 for us to collection from their homes] before they are released from the police cell.

5. Communicative  
actions/ fear of  
public  
perceptions/  
litigation

Like me who runs a taxi business as well, bad relations with households can cost me my taxi business. People cannot be booking my taxi. That is why I stopped following people in their homes asking them to pay for waste. If things get worse, I will stop running the CBE and concentrate on by small business (grocery shop and taxi).

6. Fear of losing  
from networks/  
community  
benefits

#### **Why do you think households do not pay?**

There are many causes. Some people are not honest. Sometimes you will find myself I am paying and my neighbour does not pay. But I will come and use the garbage bag of that person paying to add my waste so that it is disposed off. We told them when going round [CBE association], I gave them the example of myself where I gave all my tenants a form of agreement where garbage, water & electricity is there. So I do not wait for them to pay for rent first, they pay for everything together. There is no way someone will tell me this month I am not paying for waste because I am moving out or do not have money, it is part of the rentals.

7. Mistrust

As CBE association we have been telling people some have listened. We do not have problems with some households. You find at the month end they come and tell you "I am paying for my houses; how many people, maybe 4 for myself and my tenants" and it remains on us to go and collect from those houses. But you find some houses others you find 2 are paying others are not. We only collect from those who pay because we have a 'requirement' every household should dispose 25kg every week and when you go at a house you are supposed to collect two 25kgs and if you find more, the rest you do not collect.

8.  
Communicative  
actions

Some of them are sincere they will tell you some of these bags it is those who brought them waste bags and when you go to them they will tell you "first my husband comes I talk to him about it" The thing is you cannot force them because last time we went round with the police [silence]; some people are complicated. Some dig and bury some are too poor, even when you look at the person you will see poverty the moment you arrive at home then you just leave because they will tell you here I have not paid for water and electricity. After talking to those who dig pits, they will say we have stopped. People burn the waste mostly during the dry season. But during the rainy season, the waste bin gets full within two days. We usually more clients during the rainy season. Illegal dumpers we have tried. But you find they come at night, sometimes the bin empty during the day, but by morning it will be full. They dispose at mid-night sometimes. So when I knock off late from my taxi business maybe around 23 I watch over the bin since it is near home or do patrols in the zone.

9. Poverty vs  
SWM/ night  
patrols /  
discursive  
actions



**Waste along roadways?** People have a tendency of throwing waste at night .sometimes just here you can be sited watching someone will come walking and drops are plastic of garbage without bending. Others dump several bags as if they agreed. Sometimes 4 to 7 bags lied along the road. It is not like someone walking while eating a banana and throws the peel, this is deliberate, *chikonko* maybe. It is not easy to pinpoint at the actual cause of their behaviour.

10. *Chikonko* – expression of displeasure

**Communication when you change waste collection fees?** We write them letters and give them give them a month or two months because when we change it is across all CBEs depending on their area of collection [conventional or nonconventional]. But in this area of mine I have [conforming from the book] I have 1804 households, but less than a quarter of that number pay. To me, 456 pay the rest do not pay; others stopped after paying for few months. Ok we have tried but to talk to these people; "you people, what can we do for you to improve SWM?" But you know, people are difficult. When we (as CBEs) tell LCC people are not paying, they tell us it is business try your business to get them paying. Last time I was suggesting to LCC that since people in Mtendere pay for ground and property rates why cannot 10% come back to use we improve on the shortfall in waste management but you know they are busy preparing themselves doing political errands. There are times trucks for collect waste are taken somewhere even if they find it collecting waste here they will tell the driver to stop and take the truck to an area of political interest.

11. *Communication on waste fee increase/ suggestion on improvement /politicisation of SWM*

Running a CBE is very involving the LCC gave new ones 1 contract instead of 3 to see if they are strong you always need to be on the ground ensuring the waste is collected. There are times my workers do not collect from my clients, they are paid small [like K10] amounts by households who do not pay to me. You find the waste bin is full but there is no money, the workers find their own hidden clients and you find my actual clients come to complain that you have not collected my waste.

12. *Mistrust*

### **Power?**

We are allowed to set waste collection fees but the LCC approves them. But since the LCC has a tendency of increasing secondary collection fees without discussing with us CBEs, we also increase whenever the cost of managing the waste goes up. There is too much politics "*I cannot say much*" [silence] there is a problem with political influence in running things. There is nothing much we can do. For example in Mtendere they wanted political supporters, their cadres to run the CBEs when the new govt when they came into power in 2011. They thought CBEs were companies for the Movement for Multiparty Democracy [the former ruling party]. We told them no, no! We are from different political parties serving the people, so they even wanted to terminate our contracts. Some of the CBEs had the contracts in fact like one at Mahatma Gandhi [Mahatma Gandhi WMZ is one of the zones in Mtendere ward]

13. *Politicisation of SWM*

### **Attitudes?**

Some people are stubborn they do not want to pay and they dump the waste anywhere at times they come and dump at the bin without them paying. There is inconsistency in paying and people give all sorts of reasons at times out of 100 houses, only 15 would pay in a month. We have stopped tell people to pay for waste people can bewitch you out of it. Some people think we are making a lot of money from SWM. Old people are willing to pay because of the old system when government provided SWM services for free they feel we are exploit them. They think up to now they should not pay for the waste. We explain to them that the trucks require fuel to remove the bins to the final disposal points. Some people are difficult, when you go there today they will tell you we have no money, we will pay when we have it. So do not pick our waste. That is why myself I have stopped telling people to pay or following them in homes to tell them to pay.

14. *Mindset/ perceptions*

Some of them listen but at night they are the same culprits who come and throw here

and when you ask them why are you throwing here without paying? They will tell you I do not have money what can I do with the waste? Sometimes you find them carrying bags of waste going to dispose and when you ask them where they are going that late? They will tell you we did not know we are required to pay. But there are bins everywhere in the country no one should lie they do not know. We told them they should not be burning or burying because the land is for the LCC, they are just given to build their houses there, it is not their land that's why it has a tenure system. People used to say "we are thieves" and they refused to pay since the LCC did not educate them about the new system of SWM

15. *Mistrust*

### 7.3. Lusaka City Council –LCC

#### Legal mandate

The mandate of waste management for the LCC is under two Acts: Public Health Act and Local Government Act. The Acts mandate the council to collect residential and non residential waste. Residential waste collection fees are divided into *low, medium* and *low cost*. Conventional areas/ households subsidize nonconventional areas/peri-urban areas to have enough financial capacity to collect the waste. The current status/level of collection is not bad. Collection levels fluctuates between 45-50% to above 50% depending on collection compliance and CBEs' collection equipment availability and condition [good or bad road condition]

1. *Law/ WMDs/ collection estimates*

Firstly, the system [where private collectors come into play] in place could be good if supported by the community i.e. people to do their part in terms taking the waste to designated collection points where bins are located and paying the collection fees consistently. Secondly, the current system operating under the "Polluters' Pay Principle" (PPP) is not helpful as waste generators are not willing to pay for the waste they generate e.g. households want free things. They have a bad mindset towards paying for waste collection. The application of PPP entails that CBEs only collect waste from households that pay the collection fee. As a result, those whose waste is not collected illegal dump the waste anywhere they find space. Most the times, such spaces are waste ways (drainages). This blocks the drainages resulting into water borne diseases, and bleeding grounds for mosquitoes which cause malaria.

2. *Nonpayment by households/ PPP pitfalls*

Waste collection is divided into Waste Management Districts (WMDs) and further sub-divided into Waste Management Zones (WMZs) where private individuals sign contracts with the council to collect the waste. The private collectors are in two categories: Franchise and CBES. The franchises are large scale collectors from high residential areas [those with high income levels]. CBEs are local enterprises within each township who sign contracts with the council to collect the waste. CBEs have problems of equipment breakdown and non payment of collection fees by households thus forcing them to leave the waste generated by households who do not pay the collection fees.

3. *WMDs/ private waste collectors*

#### Participatory spaces

People participate through civil leaders (councillors) who represent the people at municipality level. The councillors are heads of wards. Each ward has Ward Development Committees (WDC) which serves as a platform for discussing issues that affect locals within their ward area. The public relation office is the entry point for issues that affect people in various set ups. Community radio stations are used to create awareness and educating people on why they should pay for waste collection. LCC does not initiate things for dialogue/public participation to take place on a face to face basis. Using radio does not guarantee listenability of intended audiences. But face to face platforms guarantees feedback on how people feel about the way waste is being collected in the city). Phone calls and walking into LCC offices for any issues are some channels used. Door to door methods are also used to enforce payment of fees. Advertisements: notifications in forms of adverts are put in the public media and people give at least 2 weeks or more to respond either in written or verbal. "We allow people to give us feedback. But when people do not bring issues within that window, it's difficult for us to be inclusive in our processes."

4. *PP spheres: WCs/ media/calling/ letters/ advertisements/ notifications*

SWM is a shared and multi-stakeholder engagement responsibility that LCC alone sustainably manage. It requires the involvement of everyone from child to elderly people. But the mindset is affecting the engagement of different stakeholders in waste management. It derails sustainable waste management in the country. The by-laws on SWM provide that 40% of the waste is managed by the LCC while 60% is shared between CBEs and the Franchises. But CBEs are facing problems in managing the waste mostly because people are not willing to pay for the waste. Their mindset is bad. They want the council to do it for them. As a result, the LCC has to come in and collect the unpaid for waste by the households to ensure the waste disposed in right places. The fact that the LCC does not have enough police officers to patrol townships to ensure no one dumps waste anyhow; people have taken it for granted and litter the city with waste anyhow. The K450 for defaulters is not enough hindrance to careless waste disposal ; meaning LCC have to do more than using enforcement to make people comply to SWM system.

5. Views on SWM =shared responsibility/ mindset of actors /failures of CBEs/ lack of human resource

Waste and diseases increase, thus making the situation is very bad. We need people to support the course and promote good SWM practices. We also need education and enforcement: education to change mindset and enforcement to ensure there is discipline among citizens. The population has grown, but since 2003/04; there has been poor SWM leading to increased amounts of diseases caused by poor SWM. Education/awareness creation can change mindset and help people know/links between SW, diseases and the environment such as water table pollution and air and other areas. Mindset of the people is very bad we cannot be collecting waste from people who are not paying. As long as the mindset of people is not changed, even if we collect the waste, people's mindset unchanged makes them throw the waste anyhow.

6. Desired actions / awareness void /mindset

**Policy inconsistency:** the policy does not provide good SWM practices that take care of health waste handlers and health of people. Focus in the current policy is more on keeping Zambia clean without highlighting practical risks poor waste management could cause to humans and the environment. For example, due to lack of awareness about SWM and environmental effects; people building houses around landfills have created new problems as they encroach landfill areas. Allowing people live in a place that will endanger them is very risk; some people are ignorant and that is when as LCC we should advise people on SWM risks to their health and other aspects of life. But ask me why we are not doing it? Political interest takes over everything. Removing or stopping people from building around landfills attract political 'muscles' and we are let it be. We have ended up using courts in some cases and demolished homes built illegally. But by that time, politicians who supported the construction would have been voted out and left people to face the law on their own.

7. Politicisation of SWM/ information void/ power dynamics

Some people dig boreholes within landfill areas where water tables are likely to have been contaminated by waste in the landfills. All those are health risks they do not take into account. Private collectors come back to the LCC that people are not paying; the LCC is forced to do what CBEs are supposed to do because they cannot meet their roles. There is need to collaborate with stakeholders to harness SWM. The media is not doing much to ensure people are educated on SWM, the media is a good platform to some extent involve the people to educate them maybe they would be prompted to take interest in such matters and participate effectively in municipality SWM planning processes

8. Information void/ collaboration desirability

**Communicative channels**

Community radio i.e. do programmes on community radio to educate people e.g. on radio Yatsani. People are able to call to put their thoughts across and we respond to them where we can and see how we can deal with things within our jurisdiction. Advertisements are the other ways of communicating. We put advertisements seeking public views on what the council is planning to do either in their communities or in other communities. The public response has been very low. People often shun responding to advertisements soliciting for their comments. "What else can we do, they are not willing to be engaged? We can't force them; we have to do something

9. Mediated communication/ feedback seek

with or without their input.”

Fast Track Court: The FCT is a means to communicate to the public about repercussions of noncompliance to SWM system, so we are getting the message across that “if you don’t comply the law will visit you.” The media covers such arrests; we are thus able to communicate it to others in other waste management zones. Since both electronic and print media give publicity to the prosecutions, it means the message get adequate dissemination. Unless someone does not listen or read news but even then there is chance those who did would tell them.

10. *Double duty: Communicative – prosecutions*

Smart Zambia Campaign: We are moving steadily except we can't be everywhere at once. Talking of compounds also take note that these are informal developments, it is not easy to control things in such places because from inception there are no set standards of development people build anyhow and mostly without permission. So it is important to have that background too. We introduced Smart Zambia Campaign to join hands with people in keeping the city clean. It was launched in October 2015. What’s its projected life span? It will depend on public response, but we intend to make it part of our operations to go out once in two weeks to clean. People are communicated to through advertisements, as way to invite them to participate in the cleaning process

11. *Campaign*

#### **Waste generation in Lusaka**

- Per/capita generated =350g/day/person in Lusaka & the estimated population for Lusaka we put it at 3m, we can’t over rule waste collectors’ failures as well,
- Per capita per generate per person to find the amount waste generated per day
- We also have data on the amount of waste we have received per day, then we find the difference, basically if our records and reports we have, we sometimes go beyond 50% collection and it changes

12. *Estimates*

#### **Future plans?**

We are calling for enactment of a system where SWM fees can be bundled into other charges like we had it before, we need law to do so. In the past we had it but with politics it was removed and put separate. We had very beautiful cities in the past because the collection of waste fees was more effective. We had contractors who swept all streets and even when they did not find someone at home, they will mark the house and come back to collect a day or two later. If we had such a system, we will be policing waste collectors, not whereby CBEs have to see households first to tell them to pay for waste before collecting it. We have to improve the system of financing.

13. *Financing/ problematisation of PPP*

**How do you plan involve households and other actors more?** WDCs are doing that already. They are in every WMD to create awareness and provide a link between actors at the grassroots and us (LCC). We created sub-structures below WMDs called zones to ensure people at the lowest level are involved in planning, monitoring and evaluation of existing SWM systems. Although there is politics in WDCs, there are the link we have with the people. We also want to see, maybe we can up with a policy to bind producers to follow the lifespan of their products i.e. where they follow their products packages to disposal points. The landfills are full, land in Lusaka is full, and we may extend the boundary of Lusaka to find space for dumping. LCC has requested the President to allow LCC to start dumping in Chongwe town which is about 35km east of Lusaka. Recycling is the way to avoid landfills getting full, even if we found new dumping sites, they will be full again thus recycling becomes more pertinent. We need to look at SWM in terms of recycling.

14. *Emphasis on WDCs/ recycling*

#### **7.3.1. Ward Development Committee –WDC**

CBEs go to households sensitizing them about SWM. They introduce themselves as the company assigned to collect waste from a given zone. We ensure that CBEs collect waste from their zones as part of the contract. We come in when there is a

1. *Delegation of facilitative role to CBEs*

problem, we only help CBEs when households are not paying .We had sensitization through door-to-door and giving them call outs for those who do not pay. We did the sensitizations with health inspectors, us (WDCs) and CBEs in company of police. We put CBE's names on the data base and monitor their performance. In the past we had few CBEs, LCC has given us room to bring new companies. Currently 9 CBEs in Mtendere, plus 3 are new applicants; improvement will be seen when new CBEs come on board. With the increase in CBEs, collection would be better

**Households participation in planning for SWM, etc?**

CBEs go to people's homes introducing themselves as collectors of waste in that zone and give them guidelines on how to pay and other logistics. CBEs are the ones who engage the people in a way they feel it works for them. We [WDCs] only get involved/facilitate talking between households and CBEs during door-to-door sensitization on SWM and give call outs for those who do not pay and take them to court – Fast Track Court (FTC). People call us whenever they know someone who is not paying and we go to them and ensure that they pay or take them to the police for keeping in the cells before we take them to court (FTC) the following day for prosecution. Those with complaints come to us although we are mobile as we are often in the field seeing what's happening in the zone

CBEs that are non-performing we recommend to LCC for cancellation of contract and obtain petition from households for cancellation back up. New CBEs have no spaces where to put waste bins. We have had one CBE in Zone C which is supposed to be managed by 3 people but there have been only one CBE. Most people apply to run CBEs, but they are not working, they fail to perform since waste collection is very involving; it's very hard to manage there is always someone. The LCC train CBEs in waste management in a number areas before granting them permit to collect waste in a given zone

**Planning/participatory processes?**

We plan for the people and inform them on our decisions. We have an executive that plans for the wards/WMDs and zones as well. People present their issues to us and we pick it up to see how best to address them or engage other stakeholders who can help get over the matters. We entrusted CBEs to engage the public for them to appreciate waste management and improving the current status quo of waste management. CBEs are the ones who sensitize households on waste management, we only come in to enforce the law for those who don't pay and illegally dump the waste. The CBEs give us lists of non-compliance households and force them to pay or they face the law.

When there is a problem we (WDCs) come in to mediate. In case on non-payment we follow up and talk to people as individuals not as a group. CBEs give us lists of people who are not complying and we follow them up to tell them to pay. Those who do not pay, we give them call outs to appear before the court. We ensure that person pays, we take them to the CBE and make them pay for collection, and other fees for non-payment in the previous months or if they are taken to police they also pay a guilty fee to the police before being taken to court. If a household is arrogant, insult or confrontational to the CBE, we follow up and make them comply with them law or face an arrest

**Problems?** Number of CBEs e.g. C section which requires 3 CBEs is managed by one CBE. Section C has more than 3000 households. CBE non performance due to non commitment to the duty since the work is too involving

**How can describe the current state of SWM?** There is nothing wrong with it; except low numbers of CBEs in the area. We are waiting for new CBEs to be approved. The low number of CBEs is making effective waste collection hard and poorly executed hence making the waste management badly done. Some CBEs are not adequately collecting the waste. LCC is looking for new players to replace them. Waste collection is very involving, most CBEs give up when they realise how difficult it is to do the work. LCC train CBEs on proper waste management practices

2. As above/  
action on  
noncompliance to  
SWM systems/  
FTC

3. Problematisati  
on of SWM/  
power to award  
and cancel  
contracts for  
CBEs

4. Domination/  
exclusion

5. Arbitration/  
coercive actions

6. SWM  
problematisation

7. Problematisati  
on of SWM i.e. #  
of CBEs/  
information  
sharing with  
CBEs

i.e. packaging, separation, disposal and other aspects that they need to know as they get into the waste management business.

Households complain when they are not happy with a particular CBE. We then discuss with the CBE to find out why and see how well we can help them. CBEs that fail to meet the waste collection targets are submitted to LCC for cancellation of their contract to collect the waste in a particular zone/district. Our recommendation to cancel a CBE contract is often supported by residents' petition in written or orally to avoid cases where a CBE unfairly loses its contract either due to a misunderstanding with the WDC or few people at the LCC.

**Trust?** Some people are unreliable, therefore we have to use the law to make them comply. This place is a messy on Mondays; people throw the waste all over during weekend. They keep it in their homes waiting for weekend when we are not working. They do not want to pay for the waste, they want someone will do it for them. People throw the waste at the middle of the road, cars pass over the waste and it scatters all over. The CBEs collect the waste dumped anyhow, it is their zone. The same people will start complaining about waste; those who do not pay are the ones who complain more. They make so much noise, they to go MUVI TV [private TV station] or report to go to the member of parliament.

**How do you involve households you see making noise in the media?** We visited them before with the LCC, CBEs and the police, we went to their homes talking to them, telling them things have changed, they have to pay to CBEs. Some CBEs are also not straight forward, they do not work, they have other things to do and think running a CBE is one of the ventures they can earn extra income. We are forced to find means to collect the waste when CBEs do not do their work well. We call the director waste management and have it collected by the LCC. The ward councillor help us to have issues taken to the LCC

**What power do you have?** We have power to award contracts to CBEs and have the contracts cancelled. It is us with the ward councillor who evaluate CBEs and award contracts and submit the names to the LCC. If the CBE is not performing, we get signatures as petition from households to attach to our recommendation to the LCC for the cancellation of the CBE's contract. We also enforce the SWM by-laws by arresting and present to the LCC for prosecution households who not subscribe to SWM systems. We plan for households and CBEs and submit our consolidated ward development plans to the LCC for final decision making. Most of the things we put in the ward development plan appear in the final decisions made by the LCC. Not everything can pass the decision making process. There are things we are often not aware about when planning that are determinants of the decision making process. Since we do not sit in LCC meetings, except our bosses the ward councillors and Member of Parliament, we cannot know some things relevant to the planning process. We depend our bosses to give us feedback on priority areas. When we arrest someone, we ask the police to keep them for us and they pay admission fee of non subscription to SWM system. The following day we take them to the FTC. We process papers works and submit to the LCC the time the person we catch dumping waste illegally or doing something against SWM by-laws. "we do a lot. Like me, people call me always, I am always busy resolving issues" Sometimes households fight with CBEs, we [WDC executive members or ward councillor] have to intervene. We either sit them down or talk to them separately. We work with the bosses (ward councillors and MP) we report to them than we report to the LCC.

8. *Bad relations e.g. insults/verbal fights b/n households and CBEs*

9. *Mistrust/counter-communicative actions i.e. going to the media*

10. *Coercion*

11. *Decision-making [ward level]/ planning/awarding and cancelling contracts for CBEs*