Sveriges lantbruksuniversitet
Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences

Faculty of Natural Resources and Agricultural Sciences

The ideological symptom of tenure insecurity

- Peasant experience of formalisation between dispossession and neoliberal discourse in rural Tanzania

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Department of Urban and Rural Development
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Asante Sana | Thank You

From the aeroplane window I could finally see the contours of the African continent take shape below me. Blue water and white sand appeared underneath us as the plane made a turn around the island of Zanzibar before approaching Julius Nyerere International Airport in Dar es Salam. The houses and the palm trees increased in size as we lost altitude and suddenly the abrupt thump from the plane hitting the ground indicated that we had reached our destination. As I turned on my phone it rang immediately. At the other end of the line I could hear the voice of my friend Amiri: *Dada, Umefika*? *Yes my friend*, I replied, *I have arrived*. *Hahaaa*, he exclaimed, *Karibu tena Tanzania, tulikumiss! Thank you*, I answered him, suddenly remembering the Swahili-influenced English I had become so accustomed to during my last visit, *even me I am very happy to back, I have missed you all too much*. And so my journey from Sweden to Tanzania reached its end as another one, yet to be known, began.

Now I am once again back home and although this was my third visit to Tanzania, as on previous times I carried home with me millions of happy memories, new friends, new wisdom and many people to thank for helping me in my efforts to conduct my field work and write this thesis: Nordic Africa Institute for granting me a travel scholarship, enabling me to conduct my fieldwork; Linda Engström, for being my supervisor both in Sweden and in the field, for helping me with my interview guides and my research methods and for valuable comments on my many thesis drafts, but most of all for being my friend and my companion during our time in the village and for supporting me through my entire Master's thesis process; Oscar Jansson, for giving me excellent theoretical advice and guidance and for providing feedback in a way that always made me realise how fun it can be to write a thesis and for always making me leave our meetings with new energy to write and think; Flora Hajdu, for your valuable comments and assistance towards the end of my thesis process; Frida Kjellin, who managed to bear with me and my never-ending talk about my field work as we met in Bagamoyo towards the end of my stay in Tanzania; Adiel, for sharing with me all your invaluable insights regarding the similarities and differences between Tanzanian and Swedish culture and for always taking time for our discussions and my many questions about the Swahili language.

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Abstract

This thesis describes the peasant experience of land tenure formalisation in a context of repeated and continuous dispossession, from the introduction of colonial land legislation to current processes of alienation of land in favour of large-scale investment, and in the presence of a strong neoliberal discourse. Taking a stand against measuring the success of land tenure formalisation simply based on statistics and numbers and advocating a stance whereby experience is explored in the presence of a strong neoliberal discourse, a qualitative infield interview study was executed over nine weeks in Bugaga village, Tanzania. The thesis describes how the peasant experience is expressed in the local narrative and draws on the combined ideas of Marx, Bloch and Žižek on the function of ideology to analyse this narrative as a symptom. The analysis showed that the local narrative on land tenure formalisation is divided in the sense that the villagers both embrace and reject the formalisation and revealed the paradoxical fact that even though the villagers fear the formalisation might lead to dispossession, they ultimately also embrace it as a way to protect themselves from dispossession. This conclusion could not have been reached simply by consulting statistics and numbers.

Keywords: *Land tenure formalisation, ideology, dispossession, neoliberalism, peasant experience*

Abbreviations

CCRO	Certificate of Customary Right of Occupancy
DANIDA	Danish International Development Assistance
DFID	Department for International Development
FELISA	Farming for Energy for Better Livelihoods in Southern Africa
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
ILD	Institute of Liberty and Democracy
IMF	International Monetary Fund
LTSP	Land Tenure Support Programme
MKURABITA	Property and Business Formalisation Programme
SACCOS	Savings and Credits Cooperative Society
SIDA	Swedish Development Cooperation Agency
TANU	Tanganyika African National Union, also the number 5 in Swahili
VICOBA	Village Community Bank
VLA	Village Land Act
VLC	Village Land Certificate
VLUP	Village Land Use Plan

Glossary

Bodaboda	Motorbike
Kibarua / Vibarua [1]	Casual worker often employed by the day or for short periods of time, such as during planting or harvesting season, but can equally be a worker in any other sector.
Kitongoji / Vitongoji	Sub-village or hamlet
Shamba / Mashamba	Garden or plot of farmland, but only referred to as farmland in this thesis. A shamba is normally not located next to the home.
Muha / Waha	Waha is the ethnic group native to Kigoma Region. Muha is a person who belongs to the Ha tribe, while when referring to the whole tribe the term *Waha* is usually used, meaning the people of Ha. The meaning of 'ha' is "born here, local, African". They speak the language Kiha, also known as Giha, Ikiha or Igiha (Harjula, 2004).
Mwami / Wami	A mwami is a traditional figure of authority in North Western Tanzanian society, at least prior to Ujamaa, when the more formal title of Village Chief was introduced.
Mwalimu / Walimu	Mwalimu means teacher in general, but is also the epithet used to address the first President of Tanzania, Mwalimu Julius Nyerere*, Baba wa taifa*, father of the nation.
Mzee / Wazee	Village elder/s or old person/s, usually male
Mzungu / Wazungu	European/s or white people, in some instances rich people in general.
Sukuma / Wasukuma	The largest tribe or ethnic group in Tanzania, originally inhabiting what is referred to as 'Sukumaland' in the northern parts of Tanzania around Lake Victoria. In Swahili, sukuma also means 'to push' and is the name of a kale usually fried and eaten as a side dish.
Ujamaa	Lit. family-hood, fig. the process of villagisation in Tanzania

[1]In Swahili, singular and plural are indicated and differentiated by the subject prefix, hence we get ***Ki**barua* meaning one casual worker while ***Vi**barua* instead means two or more casual workers. The same is true for the other words in this glossary where the prefix differs.

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1. Introduction

> [L]and is an element of nature inextricably interwoven with man's institutions. To isolate it and form a market for it was perhaps the weirdest of all the undertakings of our ancestors. Traditionally, land and labor are not separated; labor forms part of life, land remains part of nature, life and nature form an articulate whole.

This opening statement to the fifteenth chapter of *The Great Transformation* by Karl Polanyi tells us that our land is part of us and we part of it and that for those reasons, we depend on each other. It also illustrates one of the most fundamental features of the process that transformed 15th Century Europe from Feudalism to Capitalism, the dispossession of the peasants of their land. This thesis describes the peasant experience of land tenure formalisation in a context of similar patterns of dispossession but in the presence of a strong neoliberal discourse, as played out in rural Tanzania.

1.1 The birth and expansion of land reform

The way in which we have organised ourselves in relation to our land has throughout history been analogous to the general economic and social organisation of society. Land has always constituted one of the major factors of production and as societies have evolved or changed, so has the way in which people have organised themselves, or been organised, in relation to their land (Marx & Engels, 1998 [1932]; Polanyi, 1944).

However, the way in which we organise ourselves in relation to our land differs depending on context. In Western Europe there is a long tradition of formal land ownership dating back to the 15th Century and the birth of capitalism as a mode of production and, perhaps most of all, as a result of the central place given to the right to own land as private property during the French Revolution and the English Civil Wars alike. To this day, the original source of property rights law is the French Civil Code from 1804-08, but the same principle of the individual right to private property is also embedded within English Common Law and is now even regarded as an 'inalienable right' by the United Nations Universal Declaration on Human Rights (Ishay, 2008; Bernstein, 2002; Payne, 1996; Marx, 1977 [1867]).

In other parts of the world, however, this is not the case and in many places the first encounter with something resembling the property rights regime in Western Europe was

during colonisation, when the various colonial administrations introduced a more private ownership structure in relation to land, often favouring access to land by the European settlers and often resulting in the dispossession of native populations of their land (Larsson, 2006; Sundet, 2006).

When investigating the Luo tribe in Western Kenya and their relationship to land, Shipton (1992, 2009) discovered that the notion of owning land privately was indeed alien to them, as was the concept of selling and mortgaging land, mainly due to the fact that they buried their loved ones on their land. Selling that land would thus mean selling their relatives. Instead, they based their land management and allocation of land on kinship, and rights to collect water and firewood and other land-based resources were shared by the neighbours within the community, just as among other tribes in Kenya and elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa (Mwangi, 2006; Berry, 1993; Lawren, 1968).

1.2 Land tenure formalisation in a neoliberal era

Nonetheless, there have been repeated attempts at land reform[2] with the aim of altering the way in which the people of the Global South organise themselves in relation to their land. A recent publication from the World Bank – *Securing Africa's Land for Shared Prosperity: A Program to Scale up Reforms and Investment* – marks the continued importance of land tenure formalisation[3] on the international agenda:

> Nearly half a century after independence, Sub-Saharan African countries still struggle to implement land policies that can ensure social stability, achieve economic growth, alleviate poverty, and protect natural resources from irrational use and pollution (Byamugisha, 2013:45).

Recognising the failure of previous attempts at land tenure formalisation in sub-Saharan Africa, mainly during the Structural Adjustment era of the 1970s and 1980s, through

[2]Lipton (2009a) suggests that land reform could be defined as "legislation intended and likely to directly redistribute ownership of, claims on, or rights to current farmland, and thus to benefit the poor by raising their absolute and relative status, power, and/or income, compared with likely situations without the legislation". The current process in Tanzania is not of a redistributive nature and has for those reasons been termed "new wave land reform" or "market assisted land reform" by some scholars (Hundsbæk Pedersen, 2012; Lipton, 2009b; Bernstein, 2002). Such reforms build on the idea that previous land reforms aimed at active redistribution of land to poor farmers have failed and instead emphasise the positive effects of registration and formalisation of claims to land on the creation of a market in land that subsequently will transfer land to the most effective user. However Lipton (2009a) still argues that "to be land reform, a law must intend land redistribution, and must be likely to achieve it. Tenancy reform or land use reform sometimes meets both requirements, but often meets neither". For these reasons, I refrain where possible from calling the current process in Tanzania land reform, and instead use the term *land tenure formalisation*, which better describes the actual, practical activities carried out.

[3]Land tenure refers to "the mode by which land is held or owned, or the set of relationships among people concerning the use of land and its product". Property rights to land and land tenure are thus almost synonymous, since they both refer to the right of an individual or a group to access, use, develop or sell/transfer the resource (Payne, 1996). The concept of formalisation suggests that there is something informal that needs to be made formal. The formalisation of land tenure or property rights to land thus entails bringing informal land use arrangements, i.e. non-governed or regulated by rules, laws or policy, into the formal realm of laws and government policy (Clark *et al.*, 2007; Sundet, 2006).

‘Western-style land titling projects’ aimed at full privatisation of land, the report nevertheless proposes that what sub-Saharan Africa needs to reach the ‘shared prosperity’ indicated in the title of the report is land tenure formalisation. This is because only 10% of rural land in sub-Saharan Africa is registered, which leaves 90% unregistered and subsequently vulnerable to “land grabbing expropriation without fair compensation, and corruption” (Byamugisha, 2013:xvi).

In his article *Land Reform: Taking a Long(er) View*, Bernstein (2002:447) refers to Deere and León (2001) and illustrates the economic theoretical foundation of the argument behind the World Bank focus on land tenure formalisation in saying that:

> One of the pillars of neo-liberal thinking about the future of the agricultural sector is the need to provide security of tenure to producers to encourage investment and, hence, productivity and production increases. This is one of the main motivations behind land-titling projects and efforts to modernize cadastral systems and land registries. The other motivation is to foster a more efficient land market, making it easier for land to be purchased and sold [which will subsequently transfer land to the most efficient user].

However, studies on the possibility of land tenure formalisation materialising in this way and bringing said benefits often show that in most cases it does not (*e.g.* Payne *et al.*, 2009; Pinckney & Kimuyu, 1994) and the theories backing decisions to formalise land tenure along Western property rights standards are often deemed unrealistic under the conditions present in rural Africa (*e.g.* Payne *et al.*, 2009; Barnes & Griffith-Charles, 2007; Platteau, 1996). Furthermore, based on their studies in Kenya and Tanzania, Pinckney and Kimuyu (1994) found no significant difference in terms of tenure security or farm investment levels between land held privately and customarily.

Berry (1993) criticises the land tenure formalisation carried out in Africa after Western standards by suggesting that access to resources is often regulated or facilitated through existing social, cultural and political structures at local level and that if formalisation is to work, it has to be adapted to local realities. However, Peters (2013:542) claims that it would be wrong to view the existing customary land tenure systems in Africa as better *per se*, since “many existing customary or local forms of land tenure embody considerable inequality”.

It is ultimately suggested by Chimhowu and Woodhouse (2006) that most scholars agree on the importance of access to land and tenure security in the battle against poverty, but that the debate is still polarised between views promoting land titling after Western models, along the lines argued in the quote above, and views that instead argue

that “strengthening of non-transferable land ownership vested in ‘tribal’ or ‘village’ authorities” is the better option.

Nonetheless, there is a prevailing belief in land tenure formalisation after Western standards within the development community. Chimhowu and Woodhouse (2006:346), supported by Peters (2013), suggest that the question of land tenure formalisation has entered a new phase in light of the current push for large-scale investments in land:

> On the one hand African governments, actively supported by the International Financial Institutions that fund them, are seeking to raise the productivity of their agricultural sectors. Modernization of farming through capital investment in technology is required to achieve this, and security of land tenure is needed to safeguard the returns that investors can expect to receive from modernized farming, hence the advocacy of individualized land titles to protect investment and profits. […] On the other hand, an increasing number of African governments and their international donors have undertaken commitments, through the adoption of internationally-supervised Poverty Reduction Strategies, to ensure that processes of socio-economic change benefit the poorest groups of their population, and believe that one way to achieve this is to maintain access to land by the poor.

This positioning of land tenure formalisation as the solution both for large-scale investors and small-scale farmers and villagers brings new processes of dispossession, commodification and commercialisation of land and agriculture into play (Peters, 2013; Woodhouse, 2010). These are investigated further later in this thesis.

1.3 Statistics vs. experience

Based on the above, it is interesting to note how the success of land tenure formalisation exercises structured after neoliberal ideals is articulated in documents from institutions engaged in their implementation. In an example from the World Bank report cited above, in efforts to explain the opportunities offered by the scaling up of land tenure formalisation it cites other what it calls “successful” projects and states that:

> Tanzania has surveyed almost all their communal lands; about 60% have been registered, at an average cost of about US$500 per village. […] In 2003-5, Ethiopia issued certificates for 20 million parcels of land at less than US$1 per parcel. […] In June 2012 Rwanda completed a nationwide program to issue land titles (with a photomap) at about US$10 per parcel with significant positive impacts on investment and gender equity. […] Following Brazil’s successful model of market-assisted land reform, Malawi successfully piloted a community-based willing-seller willing-buyer approach to land reform, benefiting more than 15,000 poor families, raising agricultural income by 40 percent a year (Byamugisha, 2013:3-4).

Borras *et al.* (2012:51) refer to the above as a “preoccupation of mainstream development institutions with cranking out as many land titles as possible”. They argue that this propensity to measure the degree of success of such efforts by the number of land titles issued is a way to “avoid dealing with ‘messy’ land-based social relations and

[instead] focus only on more easily measured and managed 'things': clean land titles, clear property boundaries and so on".

The same fascination with statistics is noted by Thompson (1963) in his description of the European transition from Feudalism to Capitalism, in particular in relation to the experience of the Industrial Revolution by the newly created English working class. When the Industrial Revolution is discussed in modern times, Thompson (1963) suggests that it is praised for the improvements it made in terms of the standard-of-living for the people, based on statistical records indicating a slight improvement in terms of general income and consumption. This is not very different from how the success of land tenure formalisation is argued by the World Bank, in terms of its "positive impacts on investment and gender equity" and its ability to "raise agricultural income", based on numbers and figures.

Thompson (1963) makes the point that it is not enough to measure the implications of events like the Industrial Revolution, or land tenure formalisation for that matter, from a purely statistical point of view because this overlooks the crucial aspect of how the people living through the event experienced it, which also says something about the degree of success. On this note, he (1963:199) argues that written sources from that time show that "for most working people the crucial experience of the industrial revolution was felt in terms of changes in the nature and intensity of exploitation" rather than in terms of increased standard-of-living.

Fist there is the experience among the English peasants of their separation from their land as a result of the enclosure of the common lands. Thompson (1963:232) reports that in a letter to "the Gentlemen of Ashill" a Norfolk agricultural labourer writes:

> You have by this time brought us under the heaviest burden & into the hardest Yoke we ever knowed […] You do as you like you rob the poor of their Commons right, plough the grass up that God send to grow, that a poor man may feed a Cow, Pig, Horse, nor Ass; lay muck and stones on the road to prevent the grass growing… There is 5 or 6 of you have gotten the whole of the Land in this parish in your own hands & you would wish to be rich and starve all the other part of the poor…

Then, to illustrate the experience, the misery, of the people, once employed as workers in the city factories, Thompson (1963:197) quotes J.L Hammond's "town labourer":

> Locked up in factories eight stories high [the factory worker] has no relaxation till the ponderous engine stops, and then he goes home to get refreshed for the next day; no time for sweet association with his family; they are all alike fatigued and exhausted. This is no over-drawn picture: it is literally true.

Nowadays, he suggests, when the capitalist mode of production is fully established, it is as though the recorded actual experiences of the people living through the revolution are forgotten, and instead the statistics indicating a slight improvement in standard-of-living are taken as proof that the Industrial Revolution indeed made the people happier.

In contrast, there are also studies that put the emphasis on experience and see this experience as produced by history, *e.g*. Taussig's (1980:13) portraits of the proletarianisation of South American peasants and how they articulated their experience of this process by ascribing it to the devil. Among the peasants employed as wage labourers on the sugar cane plantations in the Cauca Valley in Colombia, he (1980:13) tells us, "are some who are supposed to enter into secret contracts with the devil in order to increase their production and hence their wage", while in the Bolivian tin mines workers worship the devil for the same purpose. Simultaneously, the profits made on the cane fields or in the mines are considered by both communities as barren and investments made with such profits are believed to lead to infertile land and ultimately premature death.

Likewise, although with less use of magic in their vocabulary, the members of the Luo community in Western Kenya made similar objections to the registration and commodification of land during the nationwide attempt at land titling in 1954. Shipton (1992, 2009) found that the logic of land registration did not sit comfortably with the Luo. Drawing up borders between kin in some attempt to protect individual plots of land was considered dangerous and against Luo traditions. Moreover, the concepts of land sales or mortgaging were not welcomed, as the Luo feared this would result in the creation of two different classes within the tribe, one landless and one owning the land.

Taussig (1980) attributes the references to the devil among peasant workers to resistance to the expansion of the capitalist mode of production and suggests that in their struggle to understand the logic of this, peasants and neophyte proletarians call on concepts of evil and danger to explain the fact that their "mode of production[4] and life is

[4]A mode of production is constituted by the way "…in which human beings organize their production. Each major way of doing so constitutes a mode of production – a specific, historically occurring set of social relations through which labor is deployed to wrest energy from nature by means of tools, skills, organization and knowledge". A mode of production is thus not simply the physical or technical way of transforming the means of production, but also the mental and social processes and structures related to the transformation of nature (Wolf, 1982:75). The crucial distinction to be made between the capitalist and the peasant mode of production is in terms of the control of the means of production and work and labour. In the capitalist mode of production the means of production are controlled by the capitalist and alienated from the general population and work is constituted by the concept of labour, i.e. work turned in to a commodity for sale. In the peasant mode of production work is still mainly the act of putting effort into

being supplemented by another" and that they are losing control of their means of production, to instead be controlled by them (Taussig, 1980:17).

Shipton (2009:161) also highlights the tension between peasant and capitalist ways of organising production in writing about the Luo community that "If land were titled as privately alienable property, access right acquired through work, kinship, and local citizenship stood to be channelled by rights acquired through capital alone". The objection to this way of dealing with land is clear among the Luo in their fear that the registration of land and the subsequent use of land as collateral would alienate them from their means of production and destabilise the social organisation of their tribe.

It is apparent from this that statistics and experience tell very different stories about the outcome of various projects and how they affect the communities in which they are implemented. It is also apparent from Taussig (1980) and Shipton (2009) that regarding land tenure formalisation as something affecting only the institutional organisation of land management would be to neglect one crucial aspect of the question. To fully grasp the magnitude of the issue, we need to realise that the process of land tenure formalisation in sub-Saharan Africa is also a vehicle for the expansion of the capitalist mode of production. Against this background, the peasant experience of land tenure formalisation, as played out in rural Tanzania, is investigated in this thesis.

1.4 Statistics, experience and neoliberal discourse

In 1999, Tanzania adopted a new land law, the Village Land Act (VLA), which is the main driver of land tenure formalisation at village level in the country. The law is currently being implemented at different locations throughout the country. The process is heavily donor-driven and is both financed and implemented in practice by international and bilateral organisations such as the World Bank, ILD, IFAD, DFiD and SIDA, in cooperation with the Tanzanian government. The land tenure formalisation process in Tanzania is consequently highly influenced by the neoliberal ideas on the positive outcomes of formalisation described above and the end goal of implementation is to issue individual titles to land in the form of a Certificate of Customary Right of Occupancy (CCRO) to the village population. The work described in this thesis concentrated on Bugaga village, in Kigoma region in north-west Tanzania where

utilising benefits from nature directly and the means of production are still more or less directly in the hands of the people (Wolf, 1966).

MKURABITA[5], one of the many projects to implement the VLA, is active (Locke *et al.*, 2014; Hundsbæk Pedersen, 2013).

At this point it is already clear that there is one major factor distinguishing the contemporary Tanzanian context from that in which English workers experienced the Industrial Revolution or in which South American peasants experienced their proletarianisation, namely the presence of a strong neoliberal discourse that, moreover, leans on research focusing on statistics and numbers to legitimise and promote its purpose. This provides the opportunity to view the neoliberal discourse on land tenure formalisation as a tool to 'manufacture consent' for the capitalist expansion, an ability first ascribed to the mass media by Chomsky and Herman (1988:1) as:

> a system for communicating messages and symbols to the general populace. It is their function to […] inculcate individuals with the values, beliefs, and codes of behaviour that will integrate them into the institutional structures of the larger society.

1.5 Research focus and purpose

The peasant experience of current land tenure formalisation in Africa is thus occurring in a socio-political context filled with historical instances of dispossession and in the presence of neoliberal discourse. Consequently, the villagers in Bugaga not only have to articulate their experience in terms of how the formalisation affects their life, but also have to relate, in their experience, to a neoliberal discourse communicating the benefits of the very formalisation affecting them.

By making this experience the subject of study, this thesis differs from the a-historic literature on the benefits of land tenure formalisation based on statistics (*e.g.* Byamugisha, 2013; Deininger, 2003), studies on the institutional management of land and the practical implications of formalisation (*e.g*. Hundsbæk Pedersen, 2013; Payne *et al.*, 2009; Platteau, 1996; Pinckney & Kimuyu, 1994), and other studies focusing on experience (*e.g*. Shipton, 2009; Taussig, 1980). Such studies have investigated the historical socio-political context of peasants and their experience of a mode of production in change, but in the absence of neoliberal discourse as a strong tool for manufacturing consent in relation to that ongoing change.

Consequently, this thesis describes the peasant experience of land tenure formalisation, viewed not just a process that alters the institutional organisation of land management,

[5] MKURABITA is the abbreviation of *Mpango wa Kurasimisha Rasilimali na Biashara za Wanyonge Tanzania* in Swahili which in English translates to *Property and Business Formalisation Project*.

but also as a vehicle of capitalist expansion, in a context of repeated and continuous dispossession and in the presence of a strong neoliberal discourse, as played out in Bugaga village, Tanzania.

The specific aim of this thesis was to explore the way in which the peasants in Bugaga village experience, and express, the changes brought to their village by a project to formalise the land tenure system through the introduction of individual titles to land. Taking the villagers' descriptions of their experience of land tenure formalisation in Bugaga as a narrative, this thesis drew on ideas of the function of ideology to analyse the general features of this narrative, in order to determine why the villagers talk about the changes in the way they do and in extension the implications this might have for the broader land tenure formalisation debate.

The following research questions guided the study:

1. What different narratives can be found in Bugaga in relation to land tenure formalisation?
2. What happens in the encounter between these narratives and the actual project activities?
3. What informs these narratives (*e.g*. political economy, history, global discourse) and why in this particular way?
4. What implications do the answers to the above questions have for the land tenure formalisation debate?

1.6 Thesis structure

After this first introductory chapter, *Chapter 2* introduces the concept of ideology and the ideological symptom that together comprise the theoretical framework used in analysis of the peasant experience. *Chapter 3* outlines the method through which the fieldwork and the analysis were carried out. *Chapter 4* describes the political economy of land in Tanzania and Bugaga and provides historical background to formalisation and dispossession in the country. *Chapter 5* describes the narrative produced by the villagers in Bugaga in relation to land tenure formalisation and *Chapter 6* analyses this narrative, the symptom, in terms of what informs it and how/why. *Chapter 7* presents conclusions regarding the cause of the symptom and the implications the findings might have for the general land tenure formalisation debate.

2. Ideology, consciousness and symptom

> The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas: i.e., the class which is the ruling *material* force of society is at the same time its ruling *intellectual* force. […] The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relations, grasped as ideas. *Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels*

Through this, Marx and Engels illustrate the very foundation of the concept of ideology as the expression of the current social and political structures as being the only possible, best and natural way to structure a society (Marx & Engels, 1998 [1832]:37). This shows how the concept of ideology is relevant in an analysis of the experience of Tanzanian peasants, since they are exposed to a project informed by ideology, the neoliberal ideology on land tenure formalisation expressing the formalisation of property rights after Western standards as the only possible, best and natural way to manage land. In this part of the thesis a framework is constructed based on three different views of what ideology is and how it operates, with Žižek's notion of the ideological symptom adopted as the organising concept to guide the analysis.

2.1 In ideology, all is not ideology

Before proceeding, however, it should be noted that the concept of ideology, in this sense, is dual. There is an ideology, *e.g.* neoliberal ideology, and then there is 'ideology as such'. Žižek (1989:139) explains this further by saying that:

> The crucial weakness of hitherto '(post-)structuralist' essays in the theory of ideology descending from the Althusserian theory of interpellation was to limit themselves […] to aim at grasping the efficiency of an ideology exclusively through the mechanism of imaginary and symbolic identification [which could wrongfully lead us to believe that] what is pertinent in the analysis of ideology is only the way it functions as a discourse.

From this, he develops his argument by saying that "in ideology, all is not ideology", meaning that there are some elements inherent to ideology as such and thus not dependent on the kind or type of ideology in question, be it neoliberalism or communism. His point is that there is more to the concept of ideology than its most immediate discursive logic and that there are two different levels at which ideology can be investigated: First, there is the discursive level, at which the logic of a particular ideology is articulated and preached to the subjects; and second, there is a deeper, more psychological, level constituted by the 'pre-ideological kernel of enjoyment'. This is the

level at which ideology operates within the consciousness of the subjects in their efforts understand, make sense of or 'enjoy' the implications of the discourse in question. I return to this matter of 'enjoyment' later, following a fuller description of ideology in order to fully grasp its implications.

2.2 Ideology and human consciousness

Essential to the understanding of ideology, and how it operates, is the notion of human consciousness. Marx argues that "the production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men – the language of real life". This first form of consciousness is thus of the immediate environment in which individuals find themselves and of the way in which they, through interaction and co-operation with other individuals, transform and modify this environment in order to produce their means of subsistence (Marx & Engels, 1998 [1832]:37, 42). Marx suggests that:

> Men have history because they must produce their life, and because they must produce it moreover in a certain way: this is determined by their physical organisation; their consciousness is determined in just the same way […] men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc., that is real, active men, as they are conditioned by a definite development of their productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these (Marx & Engels, 1998 [1832]:49, 42).

In other words, consciousness is bound to both the physical and the social relations of production. The consciousness of the individuals then develops as society evolves in terms of the extension of the division of labour, the separation of town and country, the development of the state and the realisation within the population that they are part of a society made up of other individuals to whom they need to relate in the course of their production (Marx & Engels, 1998 [1832]). Up to this point, consciousness only exists as practical consciousness related to the actual production by individuals. However, as the division of labour "materialises in its true sense", *i.e.* with the separation of material and mental labour...

> …consciousness can really flatter itself that it is something other than consciousness of existing practice, that it really represents something without representing something real; from now on consciousness is in a position to emancipate itself from the world and to proceed to the formation of "pure" theory, theology, philosophy [and] morality..." (Marx & Engels, 1998 [1832]:51).

It is here, when consciousness has developed to its full potential, in the inevitable contradiction between this consciousness, the productive forces and the state of society, that ideology comes into being to mask the reality that "enjoyment and labour,

production and consumption" are not divided equally amongst all members of society (Marx & Engels, 1998 [1832]:51).

2.3 Ideology as false consciousness

We thus find ourselves in a situation where the consciousness of individuals no longer correlates with the reality of their means of subsistence and is therefore susceptible to ideology. Instead, the subjects now have a sort of 'false consciousness', caused by the misrecognition that they themselves are the addressees of ruling class ideology (Žižek, 1989), that prevents them from seeing the reality of their own production, their "actual present economic limitations" (Marx & Engels, 1998 [1832]:41). Marx suggests that:

> If the conscious expression of the real relations of these individuals is illusory, if in their imagination they turn reality upside-down, then this in its turn is the result of their limited material mode of activity and their limited social relations arising from it (Marx & Engels, 1998 [1832]:41).

This means that the illusory, ideological, conception and expression of their material mode of activity is indeed the manifestation of their limited possibility to sustain their production. From this, we can start to discern a different interpretation of ideology, suggesting that ideology, to some extent, is accepted by the subjects of the ruling class ideas to help them cope with the brutality of their reality, of their "actual present economic limitations".

2.4 Ideology as self-medication

In his book *From Blessing to Violence*, Maurice Bloch (1986) develops the above and provides the opportunity to flip the coin that is ideology around and look at it from a different angle. He describes the circumcision rituals among the Merina people on Madagascar, through which it is believed that the child receives a blessing from the ancestors. He (1986:192) elaborates the significance of the circumcision ritual for the Merina as follows:

> Decent goes on forever because the ancestors are able to conquer the living, who are then able to conquer 'this life', which enables them to reproduce a new generation, which will then be conquered by the ancestors; the new generation will then conquer life; and so on. This is a homeostatic model where all will in the end be equal as ancestors. In such a model the child to be circumcised and even the women will, like elders, in the end become ancestors, which explains why the ritual is so satisfactory.

The implication is that through participating in this ritual, the Merina people "became able to see themselves in the ritual not only as conquered but also as conquerors; they

made their own humiliation their pride" (Bloch, 1986:192). Bloch (1986:193) then suggests that once these rituals were abolished by King Radama II, the Merina were…

> …deprived of the illusion of participation in their own oppression and had been left with the much more stark alternative of pure exploitation. Nothing could show better the ideological power of the ritual. In a sense, therefore, the ritual of circumcision when used as a royal ritual is the very opposite of what the theory of ideology would lead us to expect: that it was a mystification carried out by superiors on inferiors. Rather it was a collusion between inferiors and superiors, with the inferiors accepting the implications of their own subordination because their submission as Merina implied their ultimate domination and conquest of others.

This line of reasoning allows a modification of the Marxian conception of ideology as a mystifying force constructed by the ruling class, descending on the subjects from above and leaving them in a state of false consciousness, to a notion of ideology as something that also develops within subjects to deal with or understand the eventual discrepancy between their 'actual present economic limitations' and the ruling class ideas. In the case of the Merina, this is illustrated by the fact that by participating in the circumcision ritual allowed the exploited to see themselves as exploiters and thereby avoid the reality of their own exploitation.

2.5 Ideology as misrecognised reality

At this point, when the realm of ideological creation has been transferred, or perhaps extended, from the ruling class to its subjects, Žižek and his elaborations of the concept of ideology can be introduced into the discussion.

To explain his viewpoint on ideology, Žižek (1989) describes "the most elementary definition of ideology" as provided by Marx (1977 [1867]), *i.e.* "they do not know it, but they are doing it", from a different angle. In Žižek's opinion, Marx's definition of ideology suggests that the subjects might free themselves of their ideological chains and their oppression if they only realised what they are doing and that they are, in fact, doing it. However, he (1989:25) argues that:

> It is not just a question of seeing things (that is, social reality) as they 'really are', of throwing away the distorting spectacles of ideology; the main point is to see how the reality itself cannot produce itself without this so-called ideological mystification. The mask is not simply hiding the real state of things; the ideological distortion is written into its very essence.

Žižek's basic argument is that ideological mystification is located not in the *knowing* but in the *doing* of subjects, which, contrary to what the Marxian definition would suggest, means that the subjects do not have the possibility to break free from their ideological chains, since they take part in their very creation. He continues that:

> The point is not just that we must unmask the structural mechanism which is producing the effect of subject as ideological misrecognition, but that we must at the same time fully acknowledge this misrecognition as unavoidable – that is, we must accept a certain delusion as a condition for our historical activity, of assuming a role as agent of the historical process. […] In this perspective, the subject as such is constituted through a certain misrecognition: the process of ideological interpellation through which the subject 'recognises' itself as the addressee in the calling up of the ideological cause implies necessarily a certain short circuit (Žižek, 1989:xxv).

He (1989:27-28) exemplifies the above using Marx concept of commodity fetishism, *i.e*. that "money is in reality just an embodiment, a condensation, a materialisation of a network of social relations", even though people might view money as something with almost magical properties providing wealth and status. His argument is that people are well aware that there is indeed nothing magical about money at all, but still "in their social activity itself, in what they are doing, they are acting as if money, in its material reality, is the immediate embodiment of wealth as such".

Through this, Žižek modifies the definition of ideology provided by Marx to a definition of ideology stating that "they know very well how things are, but still they are doing it as if they did not know". So where Marx suggests that ideology manifests itself within the subject as a state of false consciousness, Žižek (1989:30) instead suggests that "the fundamental level of ideology […] is not that of an illusion masking the real state of things, but that of an (unconscious) fantasy structuring our social reality itself".

2.6 The ideological symptom

In his critique of the Marxian definition of ideology and in defining ideology as misrecognised reality rather than the false consciousness, Žižek (1989:25) identifies:

> … the paradox of a being [reality constituted by (unconscious) fantasy] which can reproduce itself only in so far as it is misrecognized and overlooked: the moment we see it 'as it really is', this being dissolves itself into nothingness, or more precisely, It changes into another kind of reality.

This last step is essential in understanding the connection between ideology and symptom, since the definition of this false or misrecognised reality would be almost the same definition as applied to the symptom. A symptom, Žižek (1989:16) argues, is namely:

> 'A formation whose very consistency implies certain non-knowledge on the part of the subject': the subject can 'enjoy his symptom' only in so far as its logic escapes him – the measure of the success of its interpretation is precisely its dissolution.

In other words, Žižek suggests that by finding the cause of the symptom one can find the cure and thus dissolve the symptom, just as reality constituted through

‘(unconscious) fantasy’ can only reproduce itself as long as the subjects living in it do not see it as it really is. If they do, the misrecognised reality will dissolve itself just as a symptom of a disease for which a cure has been found. This is where ideology can be investigated at the level of ‘enjoyment’, since it is working within the subject to mask the fact that beyond the discursive logic of ideology is ‘nothing’. It other words, it is working to mask the cause of the symptom to allow the subject to enjoy it.

Žižek (1989) argues that the process of finding the cause of a symptom is the same as that mapped out by Marx in his efforts to analyse ‘the secret behind the commodity-form’. In Marx view, to analyse the secret behind the commodity-form it is crucial to:

> Break the appearance according to which the value of a commodity depends on pure hazard – on an accidental interplay between supply and demand, for example. We must accomplish the crucial step of conceiving the hidden ‘meaning’ behind the commodity form, the signification ‘expressed’ by this form; we must penetrate the ‘secret’ of the value of commodities (Žižek, 1989:7-8).

However, according to Žižek this first step is not enough, since the secret of the commodity-form is no longer a secret but indeed established to be the expression of the compiled value of labour going into the production process of any commodity. Thus, when the secret behind the commodity form has been established, the analysis must be extended to ask why and how the value of commodities took the expression of the compiled value of labour in the first place (Žižek, 1989).

In a simplified manner, one could equally say that both Marx and Žižek want us to look at a certain symptom (a commodity-form) and understand not only what kind of disease (compiled value of labour) is creating it, but also how and why this disease makes the symptom appear in this particular way. This opens the way for a procedure whereby the subject of this thesis, the narrative created by the people in Bugaga village, can be analysed as a symptom of something in order to determine why and how this something makes the villagers construct their narratives in this particular way.

2.7 A framework for analysis of the peasant exerience

The three different notions of ideology presented by Marx, Bloch and Žižek regarding how and why ideology develops within subjects and subsequently how it manifests itself guided the analysis of the material in this thesis.

First, Marx’s notion of ideology emphasises the power of ruling class ideas in shaping the consciousness of subjects and the way they experience and express their reality.

Then Bloch, building on Marx, suggests that ideology is instead something that develops within subjects on a more psychological level to deal with the brutality of their reality. Finally, Žižek argues that ideology is so neatly woven into the fabric of reality that it is impossible to free oneself from it and, regardless of whether it comes from above or from within, it is still "an (unconscious) fantasy structuring our social reality".

Consequently, rather than picking one of these three standpoints on ideology to be true, their combined insights can be used to create a theoretical framework that operates in the intersection where these three standpoints on where and how ideology operates meet, which provides a dynamic way of analysing the subject. Žižek's notion of the ideological symptom functions as the organising concept of this theoretical framework, and of the following analysis, since it provides a practical way of looking at ideology in relation to the subject by allowing the local narrative to be investigated as a symptom, an ideological expression, of something.

The framing of the aim of this thesis work as an exploration of the peasant experience of land tenure formalisation, viewed not just a process that alters the institutional organisation of land management but also as a vehicle of capitalist expansion, in a context of repeated and continuous dispossession and in the presence of a strong neoliberal discourse, also makes relevant the ideas of Shipton (2009) and Taussig (1980) mapped in the previous section. This, in combination with the adherence to the different ideological definitions above, allows the search for the cause of the symptom to be carried out both in the dominating, neoliberal, discourse on land tenure formalisation and in the 'actual present economic limitations' in the village, to learn what informs the local narrative on land tenure formalisation, how and why in this way.

3. Method[ology]

> …as soon as we renounce fiction and illusion, we lose reality itself; the moment we subtract fictions from reality, reality itself loses its discursive-logical consistency. *Slavoj Žižek, 1993*

It appears that most writers who engage with ideology as a concept encounter the very same problem, how to deal with the mystifying aspect of ideology and the false consciousness it brings. Suggesting a state of false consciousness with individuals subjected to the mystifying force of ideology, whose expressed reality no longer correlates with their *real* reality, at once creates a dichotomy between *true* and *false* in general and between true and false consciousness in particular. This makes it necessary, also in this thesis work, to decide how to relate to this ‘reality’.

3.1 False consciousness and reality, critique and implications

Purvis and Hunt (1993:8) suggest that:

> The most immediate problem with Marx's invocation of the mystifying properties of ideology is that it relies upon a set of epistemological assumptions constructed around a 'truth'/'falsity' distinction. In its most extreme form this gives rise to the dubious notion of ‘false consciousnesses.

Bloch (1986:6) points out that embracing ideology as “a device whereby a ruling class imposes its ideas, values and image of reality on those whom it dominates”, as many Marxist scholars do, immediately also suggests that ideology is created by this ruling class to dominate its subjects. According to Bloch, this is a preposterous suggestion. He (1986) instead suggests that “if we see ideology as mystification, we have to face the fact that in most cases the power-holders are as mystified as anybody else”.

Scott (1999a) distinguishes between thick and thin false consciousness, where the former suggests that ideology indeed dominates subjects into believing in “the values that explain and justify their own subordination”, while the latter is constituted by a belief among subjects that the current social order is simply “natural and inevitable”. However, Scott (1999a) is not convinced by either of these concepts and instead suggests that the narratives produced by subjects differ depending on context. The narrative expressed in the public sphere will thus differ from those expressed in the home. By this he suggests that people are most certainly aware and able to resist ideological domination.

However, the conception of ideology mapped out by Scott (1999a) overlooks one crucial dimension of ideology. How can subjects have the power to resist ideological domination and still often fail to do so, as argued by Bloch (1986). To answer this question, Bloch turns to Durkheim (1912), arguing (1986:7) that he:

> [S]ees religion and ritual as ultimately determined by material conditions [he] sees ritual as the device by which the categories of understanding, organising our perception of nature and of society, are created and given their categorical, hence inevitable, and compulsive nature.

Ultimately, what is suggested in the above is that ideology, just as religion, is fundamentally created and reproduced in the course of our daily lives, in our struggle to sustain our means of subsistence. Hence, we might not even have the choice to resist ideological domination because it is invisible to us and thus indeed inevitable.

This leads the discussion back to Žižek (1989:30) who, if we consider ideology instead of religion and the daily activity of the subject instead of the ritual, is not so far from Durkheim (1912) in suggesting that "the fundamental level of ideology […] is not that of an illusion masking the real state of things, but that of an (unconscious) fantasy structuring our social reality itself.

Instead of talking about false consciousness, Žižek thus talks about fantasy and argues that reality itself ceases to exist if the component of fantasy is removed (Žižek, 1993:88). This brings me to the very core of what I wish to accomplish in this section of the thesis, which is to find a way to deal with the concept of reality in relation to a theoretical framework that harbours ideas implying that ideology is a cynical plot created by cunning leaders to mystify their real agenda of putting their subjects in a state of false consciousness.

However, the above provides an understanding that portrays ideology as something also blinding the ruling class and as something that is indeed interwoven with the creation of reality itself, thus avoiding the most immediate epistemological difficulty with ideology, that of false consciousness. The understanding of ideology as misrecognised reality furthermore provides the opportunity to investigate the subject, the symptom, both on a structural and on an individual level, since the individual story is part of the totality of the symptom for which the cause is being sought. Adhering to this idea of ideology creates the possibility to view the individual narrative as a part, a particular, of the whole, the general, narrative present in the field. In extension this opens up the

possibility to lean on a reconstructive hermeneutic methodology, enabling this study to investigate the local narrative through a critical lens and in agreement with epistemological realism.

The above allowed the analysis to extend beyond the immediate narrative produced by individuals, without discarding it as false, to look for a general narrative describing the changes brought about by land tenure formalisation and go beyond this narrative to find out why the villagers express their reality in a particular way (Jansson, 2013-12-04; Habermas, 1990).

3.2 Field work and research methods

It is argued by Marx and Engels, and by Purvis and Hunt (1993), that consciousness is first and foremost located in the lived experience. However, it is also suggested that language "is as old as consciousness [and that] language is practical, real consciousness" (Marx & Engels, 1998 [1832]:49). Given this and the fact that the aim of this thesis work was to investigate how people at village level in Tanzania are constructing their narrative around the current changes with respect to land ownership, and why they talk about it in a particular way, a qualitative in-field interview study was conducted over nine weeks in the village of Bugaga in Uvinza District, Kigoma Region, Tanzania.

Project design

In the initial stage of the work, rigorous reading of relevant secondary data, *i.e.* both topic-specific research and theoretical texts, was carried out to create a platform for the actual fieldwork that formed the core of the study. However, the research project was still of a more inductive character, since the aim was not to test the theories on which the research was founded but to explore the local narrative and then use the theoretical framework to explain the nature of the narrative.

Bugaga village was suitable as the location for this research project for two reasons. First, it is located in Uvinza, one of the districts in Tanzania included in the MKURABITA project. Second, Uvinza District, and Kigoma Region at large, have been less well explored than other areas in Tanzania exposed to the implementation of the Village Land Act, which makes this thesis an important contribution to collective knowledge on the status of land tenure formalisation in the country.

Table 1. *Design and timetable for the research project*

Phase	**1. Preparation**	**2. Fieldwork**	**3. Summarisation**
Dates	29 January-6 February	7 February-20 March	21-30 March
Location	Dar es Salaam, Morogoro Kigoma Town	Kigoma Town, Bugaga village	Dar es Salaam
Activity	Interviewing of field assistants at SUA, preparation of initial interview guides	Briefing field assistants on the nature and topic of the work and the research, field work in the village and interviews in Kigoma Town	Time to look over the material and prepare for the continued work with compiling and analysing the gathered data

The work in Tanzania was conducted in three phases (Table 1). The second phase of the project, *i.e.* the actual fieldwork, was divided into three periods in the village interspersed by periods for reflection and summarising the collected material in Kigoma Town. The first period in the village was used mainly to get acquainted with the surroundings and the people in Bugaga and to establish a procedure for sampling of informants. Since the sample was quite small no systematic procedure was possible, so instead I relied upon a 'non-probability sampling' approach.

Sampling of informants

According to Bernard (2011), non-probability sampling is best suited to research focused on more qualitative, in-depth, case studies. He lists three methods to sample informants within this approach: (1) purposive or judgement sampling; (2) convenience or haphazard sampling; and (3) snowball or respondent-driven sampling. A mixture of these were used to sample the informants in this study

Purposive or judgement sampling, i.e. the sampling of informants based on the kind of knowledge they can provide, was the overall sampling method used. Three categories of informants were targeted:

- People holding official positions within the village and district government with knowledge of MKURABITA and its procedure
- People who have lived for a long time in the village/area and have knowledge of changes regarding land in an historical perspective
- An acceptable variation of ordinary villagers (in terms of gender, age, social status/income).

Efforts were made to obtain as diverse a sample as possible in terms of gender, age, and social status in all the three groups listed above. However, since people in official

positions and villager elders are usually older males with high social standing, this was fully possible only when sampling ordinary villagers. The final sample is presented in Table 2 and described in more detail in Appendix I.

Informants in official positions, such as the chair of the village environmental committee and village elders, were easy to find and access through the official village channels, mostly through the Village Executive Officer. It soon emerged, however, that finding ordinary villagers who had no official role or position in the village was more difficult. Often, attempts to talk to such informants ended up with an introduction to yet another member of the village council, often male.

This led to a change in sampling of ordinary villagers. Instead of going through the official channels, my field assistant/interpreter and I started to use the two other methods presented by Bernard (2011). For example, when interviewing the man with the largest plot of land in the village, we used the *respondent-driven method* by asking him who else has a lot of land (*i.e.* who else is financially sound) in Bugaga and hoped he would directed us to someone in his social group. This technique proved very useful.

The *convenience or haphazard sampling* method proved efficient in identifying informants further away from the main road, and consequently also further away from the decision-making centre of the village. This method also proved more efficient in accessing female informants, who were difficult to access through the official channels if they were not members of the village council. We simply packed our things, walked away from the main road and asked people we met if they had time to sit down with us for a moment, either right then or later, at a more convenient time for them.

In total, the study resulted in interviews with 27 villagers and district officials (Table 2). In addition to these one-on-one interviews and small group interviews, five interviews were held with larger groups. These group interviews are not included in Table 2 but comprised:

- Members of Kigoma District Council
- Kigoma Rural District Land Surveyor and Kigoma District Town Planner
- Members from Uvinza District Council
- Members from Bugaga Village Council
- A group of pastoralists plus our local motorbike drivers, discussing land registration

Table 2. *Number of informants included in the study, subdivided by category and by gender*

	District Officials	Villagers in official positions	Village Elders	Regular villagers	Total number of informants
Male	1	4	4	8	17
Female	1	1	-	8	10
Total	2	5	4	16*	27**

* In interviews with more than one household member all informants were counted as separate informants
** Large group interviews not included

Interview guide

The first period in the village was also used to test and adapt an interview guide. The first interviews held in Bugaga were thus characterised by conversations about the village, how the villagers make a living, what is important to them in their life and if there had been any changes in the village recently. From this, I constructed a more suitable interview guide (see Appendix II) consisting of a set of five categories of questions:

1. Introductory information.
2. Mode and means of production.
3. Privatisation of land and MKURABITA/CCROs.
4. Efficiency, *i.e*. level of investment and engagement in agricultural production.
5. Commodification of land.

Category 1 was made up of questions about the informant and the household. *Category 2* contained more specific questions about the income-generating activities of the household and what resources they have and need to sustain their life. This category also has specific questions about how much land the informants have, how they obtained it and how they use it.

Category 3 questions concerned ownership of land and the introduction of CCROs in the village. The questions in this category were primarily aimed at obtaining information regarding how the villagers view their land and their right to their land, *e.g*. do they see themselves as owners or managers of their land, and has this been changed by the introduction of CCROs. The questions asked in this category often raised issues such as access to bank loans, increased tenure security, decreased conflicts over land and the fact that the CCROs aid in the process of inheriting land. *Category number 4* contained questions relating to the increase in agricultural output attributed to land formalisation at village level. The questions asked in this category concerned how the introduction of more formal ownership of land has affected the way in which the

villagers conduct their agriculture. For example, do they invest more in their land now than before?

Finally, the questions in *category number 5* sought information regarding how the villagers value their land, why land is important and in what ways. A topic often discussed in this category was whether land was important as a food production area or as a financial asset. Other issues raised were what happens when land is used as collateral for bank loans, why it is legitimate to sell land, and to whom.

Interviews, interpretation, transcription

Following Bernard (2011), semi-structured and deep interviews were the tools used to produce much of the material for this thesis. In addition, three focus group interviews were conducted, two with families and one with two teachers, to extract information regarding how people reason and construct their narratives regarding the ongoing changes in their village and how their different narratives relate to each other. More structured interviews were held with district and village officials in order to collect more technical data regarding the village and the MKURABITA project.

The length of the interviews varied from 1 to 2.5 hours (average 1.5 hours). The interview was always held at the informant's home place, workplace or other location selected by the informant, to make them as comfortable as possible in the interview situation. The informant was always informed about the purpose and nature of the interview and was left to decide if we would record the interview or not. All informants agreed to be recorded.

The semi-structured nature of the interviews allowed me to adapt to every specific interview situation and each specific informant. This meant that all interviews were slightly different from each other, that not all questions in the interview guide were asked of every informant, and that additional questions were asked when necessary.

Since I do not speak Swahili, an interpreter was present during all interviews. Given the many chances for misunderstandings when information is translated from Swahili to English, all interviews were recorded, transcribed and of course translated, to make the interpretation of the findings as accurate as possible. The purpose of the transcription was only to capture as much as possible of the stories told by the villagers, and not to perform any kind of textual analysis. Consequently, the transcription was not carried out

professionally, indicating pauses and changes in intonation and the like, but by my field assistant.

In the final presentation of the material and in this entire thesis, the name of the village and the names of all the people I met have been changed to protect the identity of my informants. All quotes are taken directly from the interview transcripts, but altered when necessary to represent idiomatic English.

Reflections on method

Regardless of the measures taken to generate valid data from the project design mapped out above, a few remarks need to be made on the final informant sample in terms of rapport, the time spent in the village and difficulties experienced due to the language barrier.

The category of ordinary villagers contained eight males and eight females, but the category of villagers in official positions included only one female. Since the holders of official positions are also villagers, and live in the village, this undoubtedly made the final sample included in this thesis male-dominated. This male domination stemmed mostly from communication difficulties regarding the kind of informants wanted for the study between me and my field assistant, and also between my field assistant and the people from the village who helped find informants.

I often requested to speak to a particular kind of informant and still, as mentioned above, ended up with a male member of the village council. This was mitigated partly by changing the sampling technique. Had this technique been employed sooner, both more women and more ordinary villagers in general would have been included, which would have been more suitable and more interesting given the purpose of this study. However, since the purpose of a diverse sample was not to compare differences in how *e.g.* men and women construct their narratives, but to generate a general narrative constructed by as many different individual narratives as possible, the eight women interviewed still provided valuable insights.

For example, it was obvious that the women interviewed possessed far less first-hand information about the MKURABITA project and the introduction of the CCROs than the men. Comments such as "*my brother told me about it*" or "*I do not know so much about that since these issues were discussed in the village offices*" were common. Not

surprisingly, similar patterns were observed on comparing the category of villagers in official positions with the category of *ordinary villagers.* Furthermore, within the category of ordinary villagers, it was obvious that the villagers who lived further away from the main road, who were usually poorer than the villagers who lived closer to the village centre, also had far less to say about the project and CCROs than those who lived closer to the village centre.

The combined factor of me being unable to speak Swahili and the somewhat limited time spent in the village also contributed to the character of the final material. It is fair to say that while one always observes things that happen around, even when not in an interview situation, everyday matters such as the conversations people have over breakfast tea are lost when one does not speak the language. I put great effort into explaining the importance of these everyday things people talk about to my field assistant and the importance of him noticing them and telling me about them, but still presumably missed much material.

Furthermore, it is difficult to connect to people on a personal level when one does not speak the same language, which makes it difficult to gain personal trust and make people feel comfortable enough to talk about personal matters. Since land is closely connected to the financial status of a family, and since the village politics revolve strongly around land, it was sometimes obvious that land is a sensitive matter and that I did not always get to the core of the issue. This was something I worked on improving during the entire time in the village and towards the end of the time in Bugaga the interviews became much better.

For example, my field assistant and I continually discussed the kind of information I wanted to gain from each set of questions in the interview guide, so that he would not simply translate my questions to the informant but also know what information I was after. This made it easier for him to elaborate on questions if they were not clear to the informant. We also listened to our interview recordings together and discussed what we could do better. I provided feedback regarding how he conducted the translation and he provided feedback on formulating questions so they would be clear to the informant.

The major change arising from this was that the original interview guide had fewer and vaguer questions in an attempt not to influence the informant’s response and to let the informant reflect and talk more freely. For example, the original guide had a question

saying “If you consider life in the village nowadays, can you tell us if this has always been the same or if something has happened in the village that has changed the way in which you make a living”, trying to get the villagers to mention *e.g.* whether MKURABITA has changed the way in which the villagers hold or own land, without me asking directly. However, this often only provided short closed answers.

When we simplified the questions and made them more direct, the informants started to talk more. For example, we asked this sequence of questions: (1) how do you know that your shamba belongs to you; (2) to whom does the land next to your shamba belong; (3) to whom does the land outside of the agricultural area belong?; (4) what about the land outside of this village, to whom does it belong?; and (5) someone told me that all land in Tanzania belongs to the President, what do you say about that? This way of asking questions often achieved answers touching upon MKURABITA and the introduction of CCROs, as well as larger issues of land use planning, large-scale investment and the wider political economy of land in East Africa.

In addition, we were constantly reminded of the need for communication in the village because even though we made many efforts to explain our purpose in the village, the villagers still had their own ideas of why we were there. According to the different stories we heard, we were: (1) there to invest in land; (2) there to find some kind of beacons left by the Germans indicating where to find minerals; (3) some kind of inspectors related to the recent land deal in the village; and (4) doctors examining people in the village for 500 Tanzanian shillings. Although this probably made villagers hesitant to fully open up to us, since they were suspicious about the real reason for our presence, it also illustrates quite well what was important to the villagers, which is indeed interesting given the purpose of this study.

3.3 Analytical approach

In analysis of the material collected, I drew inspiration from what Kvale and Brinkmann (2009) call “interview analysis as theoretical reading”, an approach they consider suitable for dealing with abundant theoretical and subject-specific knowledge of a subject. They (2009:236) write that:

> In several influential interview studies of the last decades, […] no elaborate analytic techniques were applied during the theoretical reading of the interviews to develop their rich meanings. This may perhaps suggest that the recourse to specific analytical tools becomes less important with theoretical knowledge of the subject matter of an investigation…

Applying a theoretical reading of the interview material collected thus meant that no systematic approach was deployed to guide the analysis. Instead, a method of repeated and thorough reading of the interviews, reflecting on them over and over again in relation to the theoretical framework, was used.

Nonetheless, some structure was brought into the analysis by using Žižek's (1989) idea of how to analyse the cause of a symptom. This allowed me to approach my interview material in a systematic manner by first identifying the narrative, then trying to find out what was influencing it, and finally why and how this something made the villagers construct their narratives in a particular way. I then carried out a four-step analysis, based on four different readings of the material.

The first reading was made in order to fully grasp the interview content and start to discern patterns or common traits in the interviews. Three categories or narratives were identified: a positive narrative, a negative narrative and a mixed narrative giving voice to the fact that the project failed in its implementation. Sometimes villagers were either positive or negative, but mostly they were both and changed their mind during the course of the interview, most often from positive to negative. *The second reading* then focused more on these common traits or categories in the narratives produced by the villagers in Bugaga. In these first two readings, I tried to read the material from a purely realist perspective, describing the local narrative as truthfully as possible.

In the *third reading* of the material, I looked at it from a more critical perspective, trying to get behind the immediate narrative to find out whether there was something informing the narrative produced by the villagers, and in that case what. This was done by reflecting on the material in relation to the political economy and history of the village and of Tanzania in general.

In the *fourth and final reading*, I reconnected the theoretical framework on ideology (see Chapter 2) to the material in a more practical sense to analyse why the local narrative, created by all the individual narratives, sounds the way it does and what function ideology has in its production and persistence. To bring additional structure to the analysis, I focused on the contingencies emerging from the clash between the different modes of production.

Finally, situating my work in relation to a Marxist-oriented theoretical framework, the work by Shipton (2009) and Taussig (1980) and the more critical voices on land reform, I adopted a critical position. This naturally coloured the nature of the study in many ways, *e.g.* in the way interview guides were constructed, interviews were carried out and, in particular, in the way data were analysed and interpreted.

Kvale and Brinkmann (2009) argue that even though repeated theoretical readings of text enrich the analysis, "a theoretical reading of texts may, however, also imply biased interpretations, with the readers only noticing those aspects of the phenomena that can be seen through their theoretical lenses". I tried to mitigate this potential bias by conducting the first two readings of the material without my theoretical lens to keep the door open to other potential interpretations, letting the empirical material guide my analysis. It needs to be pointed out however that the results and conclusions of my analysis are based on my interpretation. As such it does not represent the ultimate or the only way to interpret the way in which the villagers in Bugaga experience land tenure formalisation or how ideology operates in relation to this process.

4. Between dispossession and formalisation in Bugaga

> [Land] is very important as you can never lose if you have land, no one can remove your land, land is fixed, and because of that the value of it cannot depreciate, as long as you have land, and if the climate allows, you can get something– *Fredrick Ngimba, villager in Bugaga*

On one of my first days in Bugaga my interpreter and I met Fredrick Ngimba, 28 years old and already a big tobacco cultivator and father of three. He is *Muha*, *i.e*. belongs to the *Waha* tribe native to this part of Tanzania. In the village there are also people from other tribes, such as *Wasukuma*, a pastoral people who live on the outskirts of the village with their cattle, immigrants from Rwanda and many people from Burundi, often employed as casual labour by the *Waha*. Fredrick is a Christian and worships at the Anglican Church in the village, but approximately half the villagers are Muslims.

According to Fredrick, the reason why land is so important is because in Bugaga most people are farmers who depend on the possibility to cultivate their land to feed their family. Some of the more wealthy farmers can manage to grow tobacco or run small businesses, as he does, but most people only cultivate for their own subsistence and sell what little they have left to get money to pay for school fees and other things they cannot grow or make themselves. Compared to the peasants of South America described by Taussig (1980) however, the villagers in Bugaga usually rely on a multitude of different sources of income in addition to agriculture, such as making and selling bricks for the building of houses, cutting and selling grass for roofs, making and selling charcoal, operating small restaurants in the village center, and so on.

4.1 The importance and value of land in Bugaga

As our interview approached its end, Fredrick asked if I wanted to visit his *shamba* so I could see the land we had been talking about for two hours. As we travelled east away from the village centre through the fields of Bugaga on his *bodaboda* (motorbike), he pointed out the different crops grown – beans, maize, tobacco, peanuts, bananas and cassava. It soon became clear how large the village is, since we travelled for almost 30 minutes before we reached his farm. Despite the vastness of the area we passed, all the fields were either under a crop or being prepared for planting.

At the farm we were greeted by his wife, mother and *vibarua*, the casual workers he employed to help him with tobacco cultivation. It was maize harvesting season and he sent one of his workers to fetch some for us. As we were waiting for the maize to be grilled, we continued our conversation. He explained that he had two plots of land, one he inherited from his father when he passed away and one he bought for himself when he was old enough to live on his own, aged 15.

I asked him how he knew where his land ended and that of his neighbour began, since to me it was just a one large area of maize. He pointed out a large tree in the distance as the boundary where his land ended on one side and a stone at the other end where it ended on the other, which is how they know their boundaries. In previous times, when his father first came to Bugaga, he claimed there was plenty of land available simply by "capturing", meaning identifying a spot where someone else's shamba ended and then clearing a plot and starting to cultivate there. The rule was simply that land you cultivated was land you could call your own.

Fredrick pointed out that the village is now full, however, and those needing more land have to buy it from someone else. Similar patterns have been observed elsewhere in Tanzania, *e.g*. Daley (2005b:543) showed that by the year 2000, all land in Kinyanambo Village, Iringa Region, was occupied and "land was therefore mostly available only through private transfers, with private market transactions now an integral part of local land tenure". Chimhowu and Woodhouse (2006) report that this is common nowadays for sub-Saharan Africa in general. Land sales are becoming more commercialised and informal or vernacular land and land rental markets exist in many places. The Kigoma District Land surveyor told me that land sales are common also in Bugaga, but that few are made through the official procedure stated in the Village Land Act[6].

Fredrick had recently bought an additional plot of land from a friend of his who is moving to Dar es Salaam. When I asked him to explain the purchase process he said that it was simply an agreement between them and then "*there were some few people who witnessed it*". He also explained that the price of a plot of land is determined by the level of investment made in it, *e.g*. a shamba with a perennial crop, like bananas, is

[6]According to the VLA, all land transfers should be registered in the village land registry and subsequently transferred to the District Office to keep track of what land belongs to whom. Each CCRO has a sheet attached to it where changes in ownership should be noted. Since few CCROs have been issued, the frequency of land transfers carried out in this way is very low, but the District Land surveyor claimed that even land with CCROs is not transferred in this way, but people still just trade among themselves, which soon will make the land registers obsolete. Similar conclusions were reached by Shipton (2009) in relation to the land titling process in Kenya.

more expensive than a plot with beans. I was curious about this and asked him the price of an empty shamba. He seemed puzzled by the question and concluded that you cannot pay for an empty shamba, "*if you buy an empty shamba, what do you expect to get?"* This indicates that it is not the land as such that is being paid for, but the developments made to it, since historically an empty shamba could be claimed for free.

The concept of buying land was not alien to Fredrick or, according to him, to the other villagers in Bugaga, but our discussion took an interesting turn when I asked him if it would be equally natural for him to sell land? He shook his head emphatically and said "*no one plays with land, land is not for sale without good reason"*. If someone sells land without a good reason, he continued, "*maybe he is half minded*" (crazy). All the villagers I met in Bugaga agreed that the only reason someone sells land is if they have decided to move elsewhere else or are in serious financial trouble.

In retrospect, this interview with Fredrick accurately reflected the attitude to land among the villagers in Bugaga and it became obvious over the coming weeks I spent in the village that land is indeed important and that the villagers cannot see how they could survive without it. Simultaneously, however, there was a growing urgency among the villagers I met that something is changing.

4.2 The enclosure of land and fear of dispossession in Bugaga

One early morning in the village I kept an appointment with Kishala Fadhil, a man in his fifties who lives together with his wives, how many they were was not clear, in a mud house close to the village main road, just behind the mosque. We sat outside his house and the entire family gathered around to watch. He agreed with Fredrick about the ways in which land is important, but said that recent developments in the area had made people reason in a different way. Nowadays, he said, "*people have started to recognise the importance of land because even the people from Europe they come and buy land in our village*".

Furthermore, he informed me that Bugaga now has both a Village Forest Reserve and a Government Forest Reserve (see Appendix III), restricting people from claiming land and cultivating in the forest. According to him this is a problem because the population of Bugaga is already around 20,000 and expanding, while the area of available land is getting smaller. He said that in their village, the government has leased a substantial plot of land to foreigners "*because if they lease the land to such a person they can get a*

lot of money per year". Kishala was also convinced that the government wants to sell also the land set aside as a forest reserve to Europeans and claimed "*the land in Bugaga would be enough for everyone if the government did not evict people from the forest*".

Further down the road from Kishala, in small compound of two mud houses, Michael Mgaya lives with his wife Jane and three adult daughters, one of whom, Rosemary, joined our discussion. They were all worried about the development described by Kishala. Jane started off by telling me that:

> For example, as you have heard the railway was privatised[7] and factories have been taken by someone but Nyerere never allowed such things, someone from abroad to come and benefit from our country, it is the children's heritage. These industries which produce products are not bad [to privatise], but the one who comes and privatises the factory then admires the land as well and wants to privatise it too. The people in the areas of Mpanda were beaten, they cultivated their crops and they are now being slashed because the place has been privatised by someone, people have been beaten to the extent of breaking their legs.

Michael claimed that this is the difference between the current government and that of *Mwalimu* Nyerere, First President of Tanzania. During the time of Nyerere, there was no such thing as selling land. Michael explained that "*people with money are the ones buying"* land from the government, usually foreigners, and "*the areas that are bought by the foreigners are very huge and cannot be bought by the local people*". He elaborated:

> For us low class Tanzanians, we think it is not good, it is very bad for the life of children like these ones [pointing at his daughters], because the future children will be servants of those big people who will come to buy land, they won't have their farming areas.
> It is a very bad thing; we think it is very bad to sell land!
> It pains us very much!
> It is a very bad thing!

Rosemary added that if there is no land you have to labour for someone else, and that is not good because:

> If you are working for another person you are like a slave and you will not benefit like you would if you were cultivating your own shamba. You won't fulfil your needs working for someone else as you would if you worked for yourself. Slavery….

Her father nodded while his daughter was talking and concurred: "*you are called a slave if you work for someone*". Then Jane interrupted her husband to explain:

> For example, one can employ you to cultivate an acre for 40000 Tsh, but that one [who employed you] will get more benefits from it than you who cultivated for him. But if you had cultivated by

[7] Here she uses the actual Swahili word for privatisation, or to privatise something, *kubinafsisha*, spontanilously.

yourself on your own acre, the benefits would be yours. So when you cultivate for someone, you get money, use it up and continue to beg.

My conversations with Kishala and the Mgaya family indicated the importance of land and the apprehension about casual labour articulated by Taussig's South American peasants. Furthermore the actual events currently taking place in Bugaga resemble the very process that transformed England, and much of Western Europe, from feudalism to capitalism.

During feudal times a few people owned the land and the majority were serfs or peasants working on this land as a way to earn their keep. Industrialisation and international trade in Europe, in particular increased demand for wool, initiated a process, at least in England, through which many of the peasants were evicted from the land in favour of turning land into pastures for sheep. Common land, previously accessible to peasants for their own subsistence, was enclosed and by the 18th century been decreed to be private property by the European elite (Marx, 1977 [1867]).

This usurping of common land and the following accumulation of capital and resources by the bourgeois in the form of private property resulted in the division of the population into one class owning the means of production and one class with nothing more left to sell but their own labour, just as the Mgaya family feared might happen in Bugaga. This process is referred to by Marx (1977 [1867]) as primitive accumulation and laid the foundation for the capitalist mode of production, at least in England.

In combination, the stories told by Kishala and the Mgaya family echo the story of common land enclosure in England and make it apparent that the process referred to by Marx (1977 [1818]) as primitive accumulation, the 'original sin' of capitalism, is perhaps still ongoing. This is argued by Harvey (2003) who rephrased the concept as 'Accumulation by Dispossession', thus denoting the continuing privatisation of the public domain at the expense of the general population.

In Bugaga, however, land was not enclosed to graze sheep to feed the growing demand for wool, but in 2007 a large plot of land that villagers considered to be part of their village was fenced off and leased by the Tanzanian government to a Belgian-Tanzanian investor, FELISA (*Farming for Energy for Better Livelihoods in Southern Africa*) to plant oil palm for biofuel production (Engström, 2013).

The process of alienating land in Bugaga started in 1999, when the regional commissioner of Kigoma Region was assigned the task of identifying unused land in his region to allocate for investment purposes[8]. The stories of what happened after land had been identified are many and varied, but the general theme is that district officials came to demarcate the village borders by taking GPS points and placing out beacons[9], together with a selected group of people from the village. The same process then resulted in a Village Land Certificate, showing the borders of the village (see Figure 1, Appendix III). The land that fell outside of the village borders to the east according to the map was allocated to the Land Bank (Engström, 2013).

The villagers claimed they lost a large plot of land to the Land Bank, since the village border to the east demarcated by the district officials was drawn along the Kanenge River, while the villagers claim the border has always been along the Ruchugi River (see Figure 1). This misunderstanding regarding the border is contagious and there is debate regarding whether the villagers were purposely misled by the district officials or not. The implications for the villagers of putting the border along the Kanenge River were severe, since the area between the rivers was large, around 7000 ha, and was considered to be an area for future expansion of the village. Furthermore, Kanenge is a seasonal river, while Ruchugi is permanent, and the new border cut the villagers off from using the latter during the dry season (Engström, 2013).

The 4258 ha of land leased to FELISA in 2007 was part of the land already set aside for the Land Bank in 1999. The purpose was to grow oil palm for local consumption, since this crop is already widely grown and used in the area (Hultman *et al.*, 2012), and to provide jobs for local communities. However, disagreement among FELISA management caused the Belgians to withdraw from the investment. To date the farm has not produced any oil palm and has instead planted around 50-100 ha of maize and sunflower (Engström, 2013). Currently, a new investment is underway on an additional 3250 ha of Land Bank land, to the north of Bugaga, by an American company called AgriSol, with the aim of including local farmers in large-scale modernised food production through plantation and outgrower farming (AgriSol, 2014).

[8]The current agriculture policy in Tanzania, *Kilimo Kwanza*, Swahili for putting agriculture first, has as one of its aims to facilitate the allocation of 18% of Tanzania's village land, which they call unused or unutilised land, for investment purposes. Such land is put in the National Land Bank administered by the Tanzania Investment Centre whose purpose is to allocate it to suitable investors (German *et al.*, 2011).
[9]A beacon is a concrete cylinder with a number corresponding to the GPS point where it is placed.

Thus other, yet similar, drivers than the commercial interest fuelling the enclosure of land during early capitalism fuel the enclosure of land and the eviction of rural populations in the present political economy. Bugaga is a good example of this, since within its boundaries land has been enclosed both for commercial purposes, oil palm production, and for conservation purposes, the establishment of the Forest Reserve. Accordingly, the land question today must be viewed in a context where, as Matondi *et al.* (2011:1) put it, "climate change, peak oil and rising food prices have made energy and food security the primary global political issues", with access to land being a central, if not the most important, feature.

4.3 The history of land tenure formalisation in Bugaga and Tanzania

On another day in Bugaga I met with Idi Athumani Nguzo, who is 47 years old, a former sub-village chairman and one of the few villagers who own his own tractor. When we arrived heavy rain started to fall and we took cover inside his house, seated in a small room in the back. Our conversation took a similar turn to that in previous interviews, with Idi telling me that the land in Bugaga is 'getting smaller'. When describing how this affects the villagers, however, he mentioned something interesting:

> A few years back the government came to conduct seminars in our village. They told us that now we can register our land and get certificates indicating that we are the owners of that land, in order to protect it from people who want to take it. This is a way for the government to prevent the alienation of villagers from their native land. Once you have a certificate you will know that you are the owner of that plot of land and no one can come and take it from you.

What Idi reffered to was Mkurabita, the project to formalise land tenure in Bugaga. This shows that the rationale behind the World Bank Report quoted in Chapter 1 of this thesis resonates all the way down to village level in Tanzania. It is mentioned by Borras *et al.* (2012) and Franco *et al.* (2013) that measures are being taken by various international development institutions to protect rural populations from eviction and dispossession and increase their tenure security through the formalisation of land tenure.

However, it needs to be pointed out that despite the focus on increasing tenure security for the rural poor, the current wave of land tenure formalisation is taking place within the context of the current global push for large-scale investments in agriculture and land. Stein and Cunningham (2015:5) state that:

> At the annual G8 meeting at Camp David in 2012 President Obama launched the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition with a heavy emphasis on attracting private investment into agriculture. […] As part of the New Alliance G8 has signed six Cooperation Frameworks with Burkina Faso,

Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique and Tanzania. Each framework includes a commitment to ease conditions for private companies to access land in cultivating areas in these countries. […] the key issue in attracting investment in the G8s view is inadequate land tenure law. […] Following this G8 placed the strengthening of property rights as a central focus of their 2013 agenda.

This G8 agreement laid the foundation for the most recent attempt at land tenure formalisation in Tanzania, *the Land Tenure Support Program*, financed by DFiD and partly by Sida and DANIDA, with the dual purpose of land tenure formalisation to secure the land rights of the rural population while at the same time identifying land available for investment (Locke *et al.*, 2014). Today, in sub-Saharan Africa alone, land reforms intended to change the premises for land tenure in one way or another are underway in more than 20 countries (Alden Wily, 2011).

From Colonialism to Socialism

In Africa in general and sub-Saharan Africa in particular, the formalisation of land tenure first began with colonisation (Larsson, 2006) and continued or intensified during the second half of the 20th Century in relation to independence from former colonial powers (Manji, 2006; Sundet, 2006). The introduction of a more formal way of governing land in what is present-day Tanzania was made by the Germans in 1895 through an Imperial Ordinance declaring all land in Tanzania not subjected to allocation by the Governor, to be "un-owned Crown Land, vested in the German Empire [unless…] proof of ownership could be shown" (Larsson, 2006:12).

When the British replaced the Germans as the colonial power in Tanzania, they too declared their own land tenure legislation, the Land Ordinance of 1923, which declared all land except freeholds acquired before the passing of the new law to be public land vested in the Governor of Great Britain on behalf of the people. The 1923 Ordinance categorised land tenure into two different types, deemed rights of occupancy and granted rights of occupancy[10]. The former granted the natives right to their land in accordance with their customary practices and the second granted foreigners, and investors, legal rights to land. However, it has been suggested that the *deemed rights of occupancy* never brought the same tenure security as the *granted rights of occupancy* (Larsson, 2006; Sundet, 2006).

[10] It needs to be noted that both of these early land legislations favoured access to land by the European settlers, not least because of formulations stating that all land is considered un-owned unless some sort of ownership can be proved. Needless to say, such proof of ownership was rare among the native Tanzanians at this time since, as noted in the introduction to this thesis, rights to land were obtained within the community based on kinship, often without written documents, hence making it easy for the settlers to alienate land from the natives while having the law on their side (Shipton, 2009; Sundet, 2006).

In 1961 Tanzania became an independent state under TANU and Mwalimu Julius Nyerere became the first President. The colonial land tenure system was inherited with one modification, all land in the country was nationalised and declared public land vested in the President (Myenzi, 2005). Soon, however, the way in which the people of Tanzania were organised in relation to their land would change dramatically through the passing of the Arusha Declaration in 1967, providing the government with a blueprint for how a socialist state should be built.

From Socialism to Neoliberalism

One of the most prominent features of the Arusha Declaration was the *Ujamaa* village, where the people could come together to cultivate collectively. Nyerere's vision was that all the people in Tanzania should live in villages and that all villages in the country should operate according to socialist ideals. What started out as an encouragement to people to move together into these *Ujamaa* villages soon resulted in forced resettlements (Scott, 1999b; Hydén, 1980).

Mzee Saidi Mfaume, one of the village elders in Bugaga, said that Bugaga village was established during *Ujamaa*, but that:

> …I moved to this area that is now Bugaga already in 1968 with my family and at that time there was nothing here but bushes and animals. Before *Ujamaa*, we all lived scattered across the land here and there were no such things as villages or village chiefs, as we have now. No, back than we had the *Wami*.

Before *Ujamaa*, he explained, in the 1950s, the British Colonial administration, aided by the Wami, divided the area that is present-day Kigoma Region into different administrative units by drawing up borders based on the existing division of authority between the Wami in the area. In the Bugaga area, the *Mwami* was called Lubhere. Then in 1973, Mzee Saidi continued, *Ujamaa came to this part of the country.*

> At the very starting point of *Ujamaa*, we were no more than 15 people here but then the government started to bring more people from Kigoma and Kasulu with trucks, some people came willingly but others they were forced. I think we must have been around 200 people in Bugaga once it was finished.

Another village elder who remembers *Ujamaa* vividly is Mzee Machange. The good thing about *Ujamaa*, he recalled, was increased investment in public facilities like hospitals and schools. On the downside, however, managers of the collective farms envisioned by Nyerere to bring increased wealth to the people put the money they made in their own pockets, which eventually caused the villagers of Bugaga to abandon the

communal way for more individual farming. Expanding his argument about the direction of agricultural development after *Ujamaa*, he said that…

> ...the big difference now compared to before is that nowadays you can sell your crops and get money. During that time of *Ujamaa* no one cultivated crops just to sell but then came President Al-Hassan Mwinyi[11] and opened up our country to external traders who could come here and buy our produce, because of that I could get money to build my house.

Although Daley (2005a) stated that the commercialisation of agriculture and the increase in prevalence of cash crops in Tanzania has been accelerating since the 1950s, the analysis by Mzee Machange is still quite striking as the combined effects of the failure of *Ujamaa*, severe droughts and changes in the global economic market soon led to Tanzania, like many other African countries, having to participate in the Structural Adjustment Programs of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. As a precondition for assistance from these programmes, a massive liberalisation of the Tanzanian economy was initiated in 1986, which also changed the direction of land reform in the country and globally (Larsson, 2006; Myenzi, 2005; Hoogvelt, 2001).

4.4 The concept of neoliberalism

Wallerstein (2004) argues that in parallel to the African independence process during the 1960s, there was also a paradigm shift in international politics as a result of increased economic stagnation in the West, which by 1968 had led to the adoption of a neoliberal agenda by the majority of Western economies. By 1980 the neoliberal agenda had spread to the African continent, mainly through the World Bank and the IMF and their Structural Adjustment Programs (Harrison, 2010).

The rationale for introducing a neoliberal agenda to the African continent, Harrison (2010) argues, came from the 1981 World Bank report on '*Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda to Action*', which portrayed African states as being stuck in 'development malaise' and economic stagnation that could only be solved through 'domestic policy and institutional reform' after Western standards of market liberalisation. Harvey (2005:2) describes neoliberalism as:

> [A] theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate for such practices […] It must also set up those […] legal structures and functions required to secure private property rights and to guarantee, by force if need be, the proper functioning of the markets. Furthermore, if markets do not exist (in areas such as

[11] President of Tanzania between 1985 and 1995

land, water, education, health care, social security, or environmental pollution) then they must be created, by state action if necessary. But beyond these tasks the state should not venture.

In this sense, neoliberalism is an economic doctrine, to use the words of Harrison (2010), prescribing privatisation and a free market as the best way to maximise the welfare of both the individual and the nation. However, Harrison (2010:32) argues that apart from viewing it as an economic doctrine one could equally view neoliberalism as:

> A discourse [that] aims to change the way (certain) people think about development by providing a different 'grammar' concerning social change and economic management [or] as a class project [that] works on the state and the economy to realign a balance of power between a capitalist class and the working classes.

This prompts Harrison (2010:32) to instead define neoliberalism as 'social engineering', developing an understanding of neoliberalism as a much broader force affecting "not only the economic sphere but also the state, the state's relations with society, and society itself". Neoliberalism is thus something shaping not only the practical aspects of society through reforms aimed at 'rolling back' the state and freeing up the market, but also something shaping the discourse, ideology and beliefs of the people living in societies subjected to neoliberal reform and the people governing them. For any idea or thought to reach the dominant position in society that neoliberalism has achieved, Harvey (2005:5) argues:

> [A] conceptual apparatus has to be advanced that appeals to our institutions and instincts, to our values and to our desires, as well as to the possibilities inherent in the social world we inhabit. If successful, this conceptual apparatus becomes so embedded in common sense as to be taken for granted and not open to question. The founding figures of neoliberal thought took political ideals of human dignity and individual freedom as fundamental, as 'the central values of civilization'. In doing so they chose wisely, for these are indeed compelling and seductive ideas.

In the following, neoliberalism is thus considered as a blueprint for the way in which economic, policy and legislative reforms are orchestrated, in the case of land tenure formalisation, to change the premises for how people relate to each other and to the wider society. Furthermore, it is viewed as a force of social engineering that affects the way in which people make sense of the world, as an ideological apparatus for manufacturing consent, along the lines argued by Chomsky and Herman (1988).

4.5 Implications of neoliberalism for land tenure formalisation

Bernstein (2002), Manji (2006) and Lipton (2009a) claim that the end of the 1970s, and the birth of neoliberalism, also marked the end of what they call 'developmentalism', in which the state had a central role as "guardian and manager of 'national' development,

with a range of policies and institutional means deployed to realize state-led agricultural and rural development" (Bernstein, 2002:442). Bernstein (2002:444) argues further that:

> the moment of developmentalism incorporated the last significant examples of redistributive land reform in a period initiated by the French Revolution, and with its most intense struggles over (peasant) landed property concentrated between, say, 1910 and the 1970s.

Consequently, Bernstein (2002) suggests that the end of developmentalism as the guiding light for development in the 1970s made way for the return of a classic bourgeois view on land and property rights inherent to the time of transition from feudalism to capitalism, in which agrarian reform should be:

> …engineered (and ordered) by an enlightened state [that] allows/encourages the (capitalist) development (modernization) of farming. [In this view full] private property rights in land, and deriving from them the full commoditization of land (active markets in land), [are seen] as necessary conditions of efficient resource/factor allocation in agricultural production for competitive markets […] Historic obstacles to the realization of this vision of (capitalist) agricultural progress can include both parasitic landed property and peasant farming (Bernstein, 2002:434).

The current support of this approach to land reform in our present time is further emphasised by Bernstein (2002:448) referring to a report by IFAD (2001:75) stating that previous land reforms "have been unduly confiscatory, statist or top-down. 'New wave' land reform, which is decentralized, market friendly and involves civil society action or consensus is sometimes feasible and consistent with just and durable property rights".

The current wave of land tenure formalisation is thus built upon neoclassical economic ideas about the importance of private property rights for a functioning market and economic growth, as argued by *e.g.* Demsetz (1967), Feder and Nishio (1998) and De Soto (2000). Property rights over a resource provide the right to: (1) utilise the resource privately and prohibit others from doing so; (2) harvest the yield that investments to or upon the resource bring; (3) transfer the property rights for the resource to another individual, including the right to collateralise it. Based on this argument, land tenure formalisation is said by its proponents to bring:

1. Increased tenure security that in extension will motivate farmers to invest more in their land.
2. Decreases in land-related conflicts as a result of clearly demarcated and documented borders that ultimately increase tenure security and thus also the level of agricultural investment.
3. The formalisation of land as an asset will provide the opportunity for land owners to use land as collateral for various types of credit, which they can use to develop their agriculture or develop various businesses.
4. Formalisation will make it easier, and facilitate, land transfers that in extension will lead, with the assistance of the market, to land being concentrated to the most able cultivators.

5. Formalisation will simplify processes in land rental markets and land inheritance.
6. Formalisation of land will provide a database of land in the nation which will make land management more transparent and make it easier to identify land available for investment.
7. Ultimately, the above will result in poverty reduction and economic growth, both on a national and on a global level and achieve the 'shared prosperity' so sought after by the World Bank.[12]

However, as indicated in Chapter 1, research shows that these benefits rarely materialise and indeed Stein and Cunningham (2015:8) claim that:

> Unequal power dynamics in market transactions can transform formalization from a protective force to a means of dispossession. If titling augments the ability to sell it also allows for a manifestation of the types of vulnerabilities, susceptibility and coercion that can lead to rapid landlessness and the exacerbation of the quotidian struggles of the rural poor […] The very act of formalization can become an instrument of the total or partial alienation of land rights or in some cases the bestowing of land rights to entrench the dispossession associated with land grabbing

Ironically, the dual aim of increased economic growth and increased tenure security as a result of land tenure formalisation therefore includes the oxymoron that land tenure formalisation could equally lead to dispossession of peasants, since the formalisation process simplifies the process of land transfers and enables the creation of a market in land and the use of land as collateral, much like the process of accumulation by dispossession described by Harvey (2003).

4.6 The Village Land Act and MKURABITA

The current wave of land tenure formalisation in Tanzania has been shaped against this background. Initiated by its participation in the Structural Adjustment Programs of the World Bank, Tanzania started to make its way towards present-day land legislation. However, it was not until 1995 that any real changes happened in respect of the land tenure system in the country, when a new land policy was adopted. In 1999 the land policy resulted in the current land laws, the Land Act No. 4 and the Village Land Act No. 5 (Myenzi, 2005).

Under the new legislation, all land is still vested in the President on behalf of the people. It is important to note that therefore no individual or company can own land in its true sense in Tanzania, but only obtain lease and usufruct rights to land. The Village Land Act governs village land and stipulates that in any village with a registered Village Land Certificate (VLC), the village authority can issue individual land titles (CCROs) to

[12] The above list of benefits from land tenure formalisation is based on the collective insights of those who are positive towards land tenure formalisation in Africa after Western standards: Byamugisha (2013), Deininger (2003), Feder and Nishio (1998) but also of those who remain sceptical: Stein (2014-11-06), Lipton (2009b), Manji (2006) Griffith-Charles (2004) and Platteau (1996).

their villagers for an indefinite period of time, granting them usufruct rights to their land. The CCRO currently does not require the payment of tax, only a one-time application fee paid by the villager (Deininger *et al.*, 2012).

In her analysis of the VLA, Alden Wily (2003) identifies its four general aims: (1) to secure land tenure for rural villagers; (2) to facilitate a market in land; (3) to decrease conflicts over land; and to (4) decentralise and improve village land management. It is further argued by Hundsbæk Pedersen (2010) that the VLA is not of a redistributive nature and only seeks to recognise and register rights and claims to land as they are on the ground.

Since the VLA came into force in 2001, many attempts have been made at its implementation, with varying degrees of success. A report by the UK-based Overseas Development Institute (ODI) concluded that various projects and programmes aimed at implementation have not been coordinated across the country, making the process splintered and uneven (Locke *et al.*, 2014). Other studies (Hundsbæk Pedersen, 2013; Wallin Fernqvist, 2012; Larsson, 2006) show that although some efforts have been made in terms of land dispute settlement through establishing Village Land Tribunals, the process has been slow and few CCROs have been issued, often due to technical, financial and communication-related constraints.

MKURABITA

In November 2011, MKURABITA came to Kigoma Region and Bugaga to implement the Village Land Act. It was first launched in 2003 as a joint partnership between the Government of Tanzania, the Government of Norway and the Peruvian Institute of Liberty and Democracy, chaired by Hernando De Soto, but is currently financed solely by the Tanzanian Government (URT, 2013; Sundet, 2006).

The foundation of MKURABITA and the main argument made by De Soto, as illustrated in his 2000 book *The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else*, is that capitalism fails everywhere but in the West because of lack of access to formal property rights, and the subsequent enabling of access to loans, among the people of ‘everywhere else’, which makes them unable to produce capital and keeps them in poverty.

This argument set the tone for implementation of the VLA also in Kigoma Region and the goal of making it possible to use land as collateral for bank loans is clearly evident in the MKURABITA project process. The District Officials I met in Kigoma, David and Nancy, who had been involved in the land tenure formalisation process in Bugaga village, told me individually on separate occasions that the purpose of MKURABITA was to make sure that…

> …an individual in the village can have a certificate of customary right of occupancy, so that at the end of the day, if they have that document, they can go to the bank and access a loan (David).

…and that demarcating their land will help the villagers because then…

> …they can sell their farm lands and/or after getting the land certificate it will help them [the villagers] to get loans from the bank to develop their farms or take their children to school (Nancy).

They also told me that with bank loans, villagers could increase their agricultural production and that the CCROs are important since they make the villagers the legal owners of their land; "*it brings the land to the people*", as Nancy put it, which is good, because "*everyone has the right to own land and demarcate it*". This would also increase tenure security, reduce land-related conflicts and help in cases of inheritance disputes because everyone would know their boundaries.

When MKURABITA first came to Bugaga[13] the officials held an initial meeting with the village council to educate them about the benefits of land tenure formalisation, as mentioned above. Based on the information obtained at that meeting, the village council accepted the project. Then two people from each *Kitongoji* were selected or nominated to participate in the village survey team. The survey team ultimately consisted of around 13 people and included village elders, members of the environmental council and ordinary villagers. Their task was, together with the district officials, to pass through the village and verify all its boundaries, of both the village and the Village Land Use Plan, and thus identify all the important resources in the village. Then the team went to each *Kitongoji* and educated the people about the importance of getting a CCRO.

After these initial days in the village, three members of the survey team were selected and appointed assistant surveyors. They were taught the process of demarcating individual plots of land using hand-held GPS, and how to collect the information

[13] It needs to be pointed out that the above story about how Mkurabita was carried out in Bugaga is based on all the collected information I have gotten about it from different sources in Bugaga and Kigoma. Consequently it does not represent *the ultimate truth* about how things were done, but rather constitute a plausible version of what happened.

necessary to produce a CCRO. Together with the district officials, in the following months they demarcated around 800 plots of land in Bugaga, for which around 400 CCROs have been finalised and distributed to the villagers. This is not very many in a village with a total of 2400 households with generally one or two plots of land, sometimes more. Then the project budget ran out and the district team left the village. The three assistant land surveyors were left with the task of demarcating land on demand by the villagers.

5. The dual experience of land tenure formalisation

> Mkurabita is seeking to establish a legal and institutional framework which can facilitate effective formalization of extra legal real estate and business assets. Mkurabita is designed to empower owners of the formalized assets to use them in accessing capital and other socio economic opportunities available in the expanded market economy.
> *Mkurabita.go.tz, 2015*

Chapter 4 described all the ingredients making up the discursive and ideological cocktail that is land tenure formalisation. On the one hand there is the local context, with a history of repeated and continuous dispossession, in which land is valued because it provides the family with food, shelter and security in times of need, and where land is not something readily sold. On the other hand, inserted into this local context through land tenure formalisation, there is the neoliberal logic, clearly illustrated by the quotation from the MKURABITA website above, in which the commodification of land is the cornerstone. The following sections explore the peasant experience of land tenure formalisation in more detail by looking at the way in which people in Bugaga experience, and express, the changes brought to their village by MKURABITA.

5.2 The embracing of the formalisation

On my very first day of interviewing in Bugaga I met Naomy Kichao, a divorced single mother of three and member of the village council. As we sat outside her grass-roofed house, she told me that "*the government brought this issue of CCROs and the villagers received it in a good way*". Naomy, like many other villagers, claimed that the CCRO has given her an increased sense of security and an assurance that the land is now legally hers:

> Since I got my CCRO I have got an assurance that the land is under my possession. That is the benefit that I have realised, that the land is legally mine. I think people have seen the positive impact of this programme [and by giving them] the right to own the land, you have also increased the status of the land.

This was confirmed by Idi Athumani Nguzo, who said that:

> According to my understanding I knew that MKURABITA were coming to demarcate the land and offer certificates to make us the owner our shamba [and] to own land is good because I think the government has a good plan that is why they are making us own land.

The vast majority of the people I met in Bugaga, rich or poor, members of the official village institutions or not, agreed that the CCROs have brought a stronger sense of ownership. But why is this important?

We can invest more in our land now and access loans at the bank

First, it appears that the assurance that the land is legally theirs motivated the villagers to put more effort into their agriculture and gave them a sense of freedom to use their land as they please. Rosemary Mgaya said:

> If you have the certificate you can be free in using your land in any way you want because no one can come to ask you, I mean, you get freedom with that land.

Her mother concurred:

> …once you are able to demarcate your shamba you will be able to do whatever you want and it will depend on the way you will struggle and put more effort in cultivation.

Some told me that they now dare to plant more expensive perennial crops, since they know the land will remain theirs, while others said that now they can practise shifting cultivation on their plots, since they do not have to worry someone else will come and take it if they leave it for a season or two. Mzee Suleiman Ntiba was convinced that CCROs "*have assured farmers their right towards land ownership and hence increased efforts in the agricultural sector*".

Hussein Mntambo, Ward Representative in the ward to which Bugaga belongs, connected the level of investment in land to the possibility to get bank loans. He said that of course villagers could manage their land in a good way "*without a CCRO, but with it you increase the value of your farm and use it to access a loan from any financial institution*", and thus invest more in your land.

Similar views were expressed by Harieth, a secondary school teacher in Bugaga whom we met together with her colleague, Halima Hamza, in the principal's office during a break. Halima is originally from Tanga and is only in Bugaga to work, while Harieth was born in Kasulu, a few hours away from Bugaga. Harieth said that she and her husband have a CCRO for their plot and according to her:

> It is a good idea [to demarcate shambas] because they [the district officials] say if you have permanent crops in your plots you will be able to access loans from financial institutions.

Asked why she thinks it is a good idea to get a loan from the bank, she replied:

Life in the village is very difficult, so they [the villagers] want loans to be able to at least implement their projects or start a business, just to start a business you need like five million Tanzanian shillings, it is very difficult to get this amount of money and the only and last alternative is to find a loan from the bank

This aspect of increased investment in land as a result of land demarcation and issuance of CCROs became clear when I met with Nancy, one of the Mkurabita District Officials, in her office in Kigoma Town. As we talked about the benefits the people have seen from the project, she said she was sure they have seen benefits but that they will see much more benefits "*once they use their certificates to get loans from banks*". According to her, "*it is a good thing*" to use the CCRO as collateral for a loan:

For example, if you get a loan you can buy a tractor which means you can cultivate a larger area than when using a hand hoe. Because of this you will get more produce from the land and you will be able to pay back the money to the bank and the remaining money can help you with other family issues.

The demarcation of land will reduce land conflicts

The potential of CCROs to increase villagers' confidence that the land they cultivate is really theirs was also connected by the villagers to the fact that the CCROs will reduce land-related conflicts, since no one can question the right of a farmer to their land or claim that land, if he or she has a CCRO. Grace Msasa is 25 years old, has three children and lives together with her mother, who has a CCRO. She said that having a certificate is good:

…because there are those people who you stay with in the same farming area, during cultivation they increase the size of their shamba by taking a small piece from someone else and this results in conflicts. For now, where they have demarcated it becomes hard to steal from another person.

Fredrick Ngimba, who took me to see his shamba, added that the CCRO also helped in inheritance conflicts, since with MKURABITA a formal procedure for buying and selling land was introduced and now no one can claim a plot of land without showing the certificate as evidence. To illustrate this, he told a story:

There was one elder who had a shamba with no certificate. Before he died he sold the land to someone else, outside the family, and then after his death the son of that man who died started to rise up and said that *this is our shamba* and then that one who bought it said *no! It's mine*, then the son said *if it is yours then bring a certificate*, now there was a big conflict!

The CCROs are thus seen as possibly helping in conflict resolution in the village, both by most of the villagers I met and by the district officials implementing the project. Many held the conviction that since the CCROs came to Bugaga, land-related conflicts have decreased.

The demarcation of land will protect against loss of land

There is also another source of insecurity the villagers hope the CCROs will help them with: intrusion onto their land by *people from outside*. Here they are not talking about someone taking a piece of someone else's shamba, but large-scale loss of land for the village and its people. Who these people from outside might be varied from one account to another; as people from other districts or villages looking for land in Bugaga, *Wazungu* or people from other, more developed, African countries.

Joseph Msangi is in his mid-sixties, a former member of the village council, and lives together with his brother and his wife in a beautifully painted red house with blue and green decorations, just next to the main road, almost at the border to the adjacent village. He has been in the village a long time and told us that times are changing. Before, people only cultivated to feed their stomachs, but then agriculture started to become a business. He himself started to cultivate cotton as a cash crop in 1979, but has now shifted to tobacco because the market is better. He said that it is important to have a certificate because these days land is considered capital, which could result in "*an increase in people who are rich leaving their region*" to come to Bugaga to cultivate. This he stressed could mean that that:

> …those with high capital once they come in the village and they find land that is not demarcated, it is very easy for them to claim a big plot of land because they are rich. For example, as long as there is demarcation and if it happens that an investor[14] wants to come into the village, as long as the villagers know their boundaries it will be very easy for them to accept the investor to come and begin his activities and then when his time is up and he has completed his business then he may go again in line with the agreement.

Mgassa Mahimbo, chairman of the Village Environmental Council, widened the perspective further by saying that he thinks the government decided to come with this project:

> …out of fear for our neighbouring countries like Kenya and others to come and invade our land because they have used up all their land. I think the government has suspected something on land and I think it is because our neighbouring countries are more developed than us, even their citizens are more educated than us, so the government has decided on this project to avoid discrimination once these foreigners will come to invade our land.

[14]The concept of *investor* is frequently used by the villagers not only to denote an actual investor, but also people in general who come from outside to benefit somehow from what the village has to offer.

Similar statements were made by Nancy, one of the district officials implementing the project, and it is clear that her words have reached the villagers, since Idi Athumani Nguzo told me that when the district officials came to Bugaga:

> … they took the example of these whites that they may come, or this East Africa Community, they can come to take our land. After entering into this Community, maybe people from these countries have no land therefore any time after the union they will come in our country to look for land, therefore if the land is not demarcated legally it will be taken simply because in our country the land is plenty. Since my plot is demarcated now I'm identified legally.

5.3 The confusion in relation to formalisation

The generally positive attitude among the villagers faded a little on looking beyond the initial positive statements about the project and its benefits, when a more multifaceted picture emerged. The promised loans are not materialising, very few shambas have been demarcated, the certificates are too expensive and the certificates for the shambas that have been demarcated are not being returned by the district office to the villagers, not to mention what is really the case with the level of land conflicts in the village.

We get neither our CCROs nor loans at the bank

In the early stages of the project the district survey team and the trained village survey team demarcated shambas in a systematic manner. Then the project budget for MKURABITA ran out, so if the villagers wanted to demarcate their plots they had to contact the village government themselves. It would then call the district surveyors to demarcate the plots or have the village survey team collect the survey equipment from the office in Kigoma Town. This resulted in that the application fee for a CCRO, which during the initial phase was only around 3000 Tsh (1.7 USD), increasing to around 50000 Tsh (29.7 USD), an amount many villagers cannot pay.

As a result, few shambas have been demarcated since the initial phase of the project and Harieth, the secondary school teacher, pointed out that initially "*we perceived the project as good, but the time they spent here in the village was not enough because at that little time they managed to demarcate few shambas*". The number of demarcated plots still remains at around 800 and only about 400 certificates have been finalised and distributed to the villagers. This is not a very impressive figure given that Bugaga has a population of 20,000, comprising a total of 2400 households with at least one or two plots of land.

The promised loans have not become a reality for the villagers in Bugaga, even for those who actually managed to obtain a CCRO. When I met with Emmanuel Kihaule, neighbour to both Naomy Kichao and Fredrick Ngimba, and chairman of the village development committee, he complained that:

> Initially it was known that you could use it [the CCRO] as collateral to access a loan in the bank or when you go to financial institutions, but nowadays it is different. You can go there and then they say we cannot support you even with a certificate. Me I think that the banks have just decided to continue with the way they used to, and they don't trust people from the village.

In light of this statement, I was curious to know how Nancy and David at the District office could be so certain about the possibility of loans. When I asked them if the people in Bugaga had been able to obtain loans using their CCROs as collateral Nancy replied that she could not recall anyone getting such a loan at the bank. David said that of course it is possible to get a loan, but he had not heard of anyone actually getting one, "*perhaps someone in another district*". Nancy said that the CCROs are not accepted as collateral because of:

> … Bank's insecurity but these certificates have the same value as other certificates. In my opinion… I advise farmers to grow long-term crops like palm trees, coconut trees or coffee trees or fruit trees which increase the land value more than the annual crops which most of the farmers prefer to grow.

We continued our discussion but she soon returned to the issue of loans again. It seemed important to her to stress that one of the benefits of the CCROs is the possibility to get a loan. This time our conversation centred around other financial institutions available in the rural parts of Tanzania, like SACCOS and VICOBA, who offer possibilities for villagers to join together in groups to save and borrow money. I asked her if services like that are available in Bugaga and she said that they are, but the difference is that:

> …if you can afford to get a loan [at the bank] by yourself you can take it as an individual, but if you cannot it is better to go as a group as you will be helping one another to pay it back.

Nancy thus made it obvious that while she wanted to believe that the CCROs, and the subsequent possibility to access a loan, will help the poor villagers in Bugaga to raise their standard of living, a need illustrated well by Harieth above, she knew that it is not as simple as just going to the bank to access a loan; it will still depend on the financial ability of the individual.

What is the difference between demarcated and undemarcated land?

When Yanda and I were taking an evening walk through one of the areas further away from the main road and the village centre, we came upon Vincent Leonard, 28, his wife and their newborn baby sitting outside their small, small grass-roofed mud house enjoying the last minutes of sunshine. We were invited to sit down and talk to them. Vincent told us that it is much better to have a plot of land with a CCRO because you are confirmed as the owner of that land. I asked him why it is important to own land, but he had trouble identifying why and simply repeated his previous answer: "*It is like this, that one with certificate is the one which I can say you have full ownership of*".

The Mgaya family, who first told me that a certificate will 'give you freedom to use your land as you please', also had difficulties in pinpointing what the difference really is between demarcated and undemarcated land. Since they have not yet demarcated their land, I was curious to know what kind of freedom they considered themselves to have in relation to their land. Jane replied that they can use the land in any way they want; a certificate would not change that. Michael added that "*there would be no any changes*" in terms of freedom to use the land.

When I discussed this matter with Harieth and Halima Hamza at Bugaga Secondary School, they had the same difficulty in specifying why it is important to be the owner of land, and what the difference really is before and after a plot of land has been demarcated. When I asked them how they know that someone owns a piece of land, Harieth replied that "*the one who has bought the plot is the owner of the plot, if you buy and are able to get a certificate, you will be the owner of that land. That is what the district officials said*". We continued to talk and I was curious to know who owned land without a certificate. She replied that "*you own it, but you are not the owner until you have a certificate*".

We didn't have so many land conflicts to start with

It was thus the case that many villagers, not only Vincent, had trouble specifying why it is important to own land. A common response was that it is good because no one can take your land if you are the owner. However, when I asked Vincent if it is common in Bugaga for people to lose land to other villagers, he told me something interesting:

No one steal the shamba of others because everyone knows where he/she cultivates. If someone has decided to go to cultivate to the shamba of others you know that guy is a thief. It has never happened

because everyone knows his/her neighbour. They know their borders even if they got their land by staking a claim [i.e. even if they have not demarcated their land].

Vincent was not alone in holding this opinion. Mzee Masawe expressed the same thoughts when he said that the MKURABITA officials told them that:

…if you will not demarcate your plots one day you will be in conflict with your neighbour, but since I have started to cultivate I have had no conflicts with my neighbours why would I have one today? It is about 10 years now that I have stayed with my neighbours but no conflicts, why would a conflict start now?

Mgassa Mahimbo is another who remains sceptical about the claimed benefit of land conflict reduction, since:

…there was not any land conflict [to start with] It was their [the district officials'] ideas based on their experience.

Opinions among the district officials themselves also differed. David said that the reason they picked Bugaga to be part of MKURABITA in the first place was that it had so many land conflicts that needed to be solved. Nancy, on the other hand, said they chose Bugaga because of its proximity to a larger nearby town, as they needed electricity for their camp. She also said that it was not the task of MKURABITA to solve conflicts at all, but only to demarcate shambas where there were no conflicts in the first place, while those with conflicts were left to solve it to the best of their ability first, if they wanted to demarcate.

Nicolas Pius, former Chair of the Village Land Tribunal, reported that the level of land conflicts in Bugaga has not really changed over the past years. What has changed, however, is the level of land conflicts solved in the village. He said that the VLA and its Village and Ward Land Tribunals have made it is much cheaper for the villagers to access legal help on land matters, whereas before they had to go straight to the District Court or even the Regional Court to solve their conflicts.

5.4 The rejection of formalisation

All of a sudden, the picture painted in the initial stages of my study started to crumble, as none of the benefits promoted by the global discourse, or by the district officials, seemed to be materialising for the villagers in Bugaga. Instead, a different picture started to take shape and the diffuse urgency I could feel during my early interviews in Bugaga became clearer.

Demarcation will enable the government to give away our land

In contrast to the statements above, that the demarcation and registration of land and the subsequent issuance of CCROs will protect the villagers' land from the "*people from outside*", it emerged that the majority of my informants were instead afraid that demarcation might facilitate access to land by people from outside.

Over the years there have been repeated attempts at demarcating different parts and borders of the village and at least two of these have resulted in land losses for the village. First, the demarcation of the village borders for the Village Land Certificate resulted in the allocation of land to the National Land Bank and subsequently to a foreign investor, and then the Village Land Use Plan (VLUP) restricted the villagers' possibility to claim land where they pleased. Emmanuel Kihaule shared his insights on this subject:

> Once the Village Council said to divide the land [the division of land for the VLUP] the villagers perceived that maybe there is somebody behind who has forced them to divide the land. This they based on the fact that included in the Land Use Plan was an open land which will remain for future expansion. This, the villagers perceived as an attempt or a plan to leave the land to later be taken by those ones who they think is behind the division of land, without the villagers seeing it coming. After the plan of demarcating the village borders [the demarcation for the VLC] came these people FELISA and took the land which before was the village of Bugaga. They came through that way again of demarcating the land, now again when they came to implement the issue of Land Use Plan the people of Bugaga thought again it will be the same as FELISA.

Grace Msasa shared this apprehension about the demarcation of land and stated that this is also true if you consider the general feelings towards MKURABITA in the village:

> When they came to demarcate there were many who feared and thought they had come to demarcate land so that they can rob the land from them since there are those whose land was not demarcated.

Naomy Kichao, who after her initial positive statements about the benefits of legal ownership of land, said that "*what remains to be seen now is when the rich people are coming to buy land in an area in the village where there are no CCROs*".

It is here, in the fact that not all land in Bugaga was demarcated during MKURABITA, together with the fact that the project failed to bring the benefits it promised, that the mistrust among the villagers towards the land tenure formalisation process appears. Idi Athumani Nguzo, who told me that he thought the government had a good plan, told me later on during our interview that:

> During the first phase, which was supported by the government, we contributed a small amount of money but this time if you want to demarcate you have to contribute more money... So up to this time... I don't know this time what will happen to those acres which were not demarcated, or what is wrong? Maybe it is a trick to get people's money, or their land...?

Mzee Suleiman Ntiba, who himself is certain that the project will bring good things to the village, told me that at the outset…

> …it was a joyful feeling with great expectations on achievements, but due to late coming of certificates now people have started to misunderstand. Now people are claiming that MKURABITA was a deception system to collect money from us and generate their own benefits without considering us because they have left with our money and no certificates are provided.

Other villagers were more straightforward with their mistrust. Mzee Masawe was upset about the project and elaborated on his thoughts on land conflicts by comparing MKURABITA to *Ujamaa*. He explained why the current issue of demanding people to have these certificates is bad:

> [During *Ujamaa*] at least people did not lose anything, everyone was going with his or her properties, during *Ujamaa* people were allowed to move with their properties. But what they are doing this time is different, nowadays you can hear that we need certificates, the area I cultivated for three years can you say it is not mine until I show you a certificate? This is the problem. If some comes to your house, what do you expect? While you are the one who built that house... When the land officers came to those who had not demarcated their land and didn't have CCROs they wanted money. If their purpose was to serve the people why couldn't they demarcate for free? If you don't pay money[15] they say this is not your land while you have been with that land for a long period of time. Therefore they came to steal our money with the slogan of land certificate. They were educated like you, they were very clever, they were saying that if you don't demarcate your plots one day you will be in conflict with your neighbour while they are the ones who will create that loop of invading land to cause conflict among people. I think they will direct people to come and take our land! Why are they demarcating our land? Maybe they want to identify undemarcated areas so that they can direct people to come and take it. If I have used my shamba for 10 years, do I need to demarcate? That is not fair!

This outrage over the demarcation of land and the idea that the villagers now need some sort of evidence that they own *their* land is symptomatic of the general difficulties the villagers I met had in conceptualising what the difference between demarcated and undemarcated land really is.

[15] It needs to be noted here that what Mzee Masawe refers to is the payment of the CCRO application fee of 3000/50,000 Tanzanian shillings

6. Finding the cause of the symptom

> An ideology is really 'holding us' only when we do not feel any opposition between it and reality – that is when the ideology succeeds in determining the mode of our everyday experience of reality itself.
> *Slavoj Žižek, 1994*

After studying the political economy and history of land in Bugaga and Tanzania and after listening to the villagers' stories about how MKURABITA has affected them and the way they are organised in relation to their land, the next step was to find out what informs the local narrative on land tenure formalisation, and why in this particular way. What is to be accomplished in this section of the thesis is thus to find the cause of the symptom and why it makes the symptom appear the way it does.

By way of guidance, it needs to be pointed out that what is to be found is not the cause of any symptom, but that of an ideological symptom. But how does one start to look for such a thing? By suggesting that an "ideology is really 'holding us' only when we do not feel any opposition between it and reality", Žižek (1994:327) offers the possibility to bring this quite abstract search for cause of the symptom down to earth by allowing a connection to Taussig (1980). He argues in relation to the experience of proletarianisation among South American peasants, that as long as the peasant mode of production is not entirely subsumed by the capitalist mode of production, acts of resistance or expressions of apprehension towards the capitalist expansion will be present in communities subjected to it.

The search for the cause of the symptom thus starts here, in the meeting between the capitalist and the peasant modes of production, *i.e.* in the meeting between the neoliberal discourse on land and the local context in which the villagers experience the land tenure formalisation. In the following I first briefly identify the components informing the different aspects of the local narrative, then deepen the analysis by focusing on those instances where the tension between the neoliberal discourse and the local context is most evident.

6.1 What informs the local narrative?

Taken together, the stories told by the people I met in Bugaga provide a divided narrative of what land tenure formalisation has brought. There were positive aspects of

the narrative, in which the villagers embraced the land tenure formalisation, then general criticism of the practical failure of the project to meet its promises and ultimately a more deep-seated fear that the demarcation of land might facilitate land loss.

The embracing of land tenure formalisation

I would like to start the search for what informs the local narrative by looking at the positive statements made by the villagers, bearing in mind the birth of land tenure formalisation and the positioning of the right to own land as private property emerging during the French Revolution and the English Civil War, and ultimately the fact that the right to property is now regarded as an 'inalienable right' by the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

It is furthermore suitable to make a connection to the understanding of neoliberalism as the current blueprint for how economic, policy and legislative reforms are orchestrated, including land tenure formalisation, and as a force of social engineering that affects the way in which people make sense of the world. Furthermore, neoliberalism has managed to reach its prominent position since it harbours "political ideals of human dignity and individual freedom [portrayed] as fundamental, as 'the central values of civilization'" (Harvey, 2005:5). This ideological apparatus for manufacturing consent is the vehicle that brought land tenure formalisation to Bugaga village.

It is clear when looking at the positive statements in relation to MKURABITA that the neoliberal discourse on the perks of land tenure formalisation had reached the villagers[16]. Apart from embracing the promoted benefits of formalisation as such, the positioning of the individual's personal right to private property and their subsequent right to decide how to make use of their land was reflected both at village and district levels in the study area. Nancy at the District Land Office even said that "*everyone has the right to own land and demarcate it*" and many of my informants said that they

[16] It should be noted that in this thesis work, it is me who put emphasis on the fact that the land tenure formalisation and Mkurabita bring the neoliberal discourse down to village level where it influence the villagers' experience of the same. It is not necessarily the case that this is the way the villagers perceive it. Seen in the light of previous attempts at implementing top-down projects and programs, such as Ujamaa or more contemporary projects such as REDD (the United Nations collaborative initiative on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation), it has to be considered that to the villagers Mkurabita is just another project coming to the village from above. This might also impact on the way the villagers react to the project as such and might also be something influencing their experience of it, since the villagers are used to being 'educated' into accepting various projects and programs.

would have a greater sense of freedom in relation to their land and their agriculture once the land is demarcated.

These ideals are also clearly articulated in the *efficiency component* of the land tenure formalisation discourse, which in turn, as illustrated by Weber (2001 [1930]) in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, reflects the adherence within the general capitalist mode of production to the virtue of being industrious. This aspect is obvious in my informants embracing the ability of land formalisation to increase efforts in the agricultural sector. However, it should be noted that this sense of being a good organised worker was also well incorporated into the rhetoric of *Ujamaa*. Transcripts from that time studied by Schneider (2014) in his detailed analysis of its implementation show how the officials implementing Nyerere's socialist vision often portrayed the villagers as lazy, backward and ignorant beings that needed education from the experts to modernise both themselves and their agricultural practices in order to increase productivity.

It is also important to note the connection between the efficiency component and the *collateral component*, since this connection was made by the villagers, the district officials and the general discourse on formalisation. This is well illustrated in the example given by Nancy at the District Office, that once you can get a loan, you can buy a tractor and increase your production. This also links to the more general trend, as illustrated by the push for intensified agricultural investments by *e.g*. the G8, both in Tanzania and globally, to increase the commercialisation of agriculture.

It is quite clear at this point that the global discourse on the benefits of land tenure formalisation has been transposed all the way down to village level and that the general argument behind it is indeed known, and embraced, by the villagers. Overall, the villagers believe that if they demarcate their land, they will be the legal owner of that land. Once they are the legal owner they can manage their land as they please without interference.

Furthermore, they are convinced that demarcation will decrease the level of land-related conflicts, both between neighbours and in cases of inheritance disputes, since everyone will know their boundaries. In extension, this increased tenure security would motivate them to put more effort into their agriculture, since they know they will reap the full benefits of the investments they make to that land. Finally, they believe formalisation

will increase the value of the land and make it possible for them to use it as collateral to access more funds to further intensify their agriculture.

The apprehension about land tenure formalisation

While the villagers' embracing of the land tenure formalisation seems to be built upon the promised benefits promoted by MKURABITA, the apprehension about the project seems to come from deeper within the consciousness of the villagers. Rather than deeming the project useless simply based on its inability to realise the promoted benefits, the villagers of Bugaga took their criticism one step further by implying there is indeed an alternative motive, that of taking their land. Looking at the history of land in Bugaga and in Tanzania, it can be seen that this is not a farfetched conclusion. Starting with colonisation, land in the village has been subjected to demarcation and division of those in power, be it the *Wami*, colonial officers, the government or foreign investors, often with dispossession as a result.

Although the villagers talked fondly of *Ujamaa* and of Nyerere, the history books tell a story of brutal, often forced, resettlement of the people in the name of socialism. According to Schneider (2014:123), it was a common experience during *Ujamaa* for district surveyors to make villagers demolish their houses and rebuild them again a few feet away, just to make the houses stand in straight lines as envisioned by Nyerere. On passing through the village of Bugaga there is visible evidence of such a process: a vision of yellow brick houses organised in straight lines just along the main road, resembling neither the traditional or the contemporary way of organising a residential area, which is more often comprises a couple of buildings facing each other around a small yard.

The many demarcations of the various borders of the village during more recent times have also resulted in alienation of land from the villagers: first the demarcation of the village borders for the creation of the VLC ultimately resulted in transfer of land to the Land Bank and FELISA. Then the creation of the government forest reserve restricted people from cultivating in the forest, and finally came the creation of the VLUP. It is thus not a great leap for the villagers to draw the conclusion that the latest demarcation will result in some kind of alienation of land.

It is interesting to note that while the general position within the global discourse on land tenure formalisation is that it will bring tenure security and prevent land grabbing, there is a growing body of literature pointing to the exact opposite. For example, Grandia (2013) claims that the introduction of a formal land tenure system in Guatemala through market-assisted land reform, as done in Tanzania, has not increased tenure security:

> [Instead] a third to half of smallholders who participated in land survey and titling projects […] are now selling (or being forced to sell) their plots to African-palm planters, cattle ranchers, narco traffickers and other investors.

Borras *et al.* (2012) tell the same story about São Paulo, Brazil, where people have decided to lease their titled land to sugar cane companies with hopes of getting employment on big farms and a chance of a better life. Similar conclusions can be drawn from other countries around the globe where the formalisation of property rights to land has been carried out in relation to investments of different kinds.

This is along the lines of the argument put forward by Stein and Cunningham (2015) that the formalisation of land in itself could lead to dispossession, since it simplifies the process of land transfers and enables the creation of a market in land, including land rental markets, together with the potential loss of land as a result of default repayments on loans obtained using land as collateral.

Thus the apprehension among the villagers in Bugaga, which is in fact confirmed by current research, about the land tenure formalisation is not plucked from thin air but informed by their collective knowledge regarding the general outcome of demarcation exercises. Their positive utterances in relation to the formalisation process are instead informed by the neoliberal discourse on the perks of private property rights.

6.2 Analytical knowledge as the base for apprehension

At this point one could ask whether the question regarding what informs the local narrative has been answered and the cause of the symptom has been identified. It could perhaps be concluded that in a context of increased pressure on land, the villagers accept land tenure formalisation since it offers them the security they need to protect themselves from losing their land. However, there seems to be more to this than meets the eye.

The paragraphs above reveal that there is a difference in how people organise themselves in relation to their land in the West compared with the Global South. They also show that these different ways of land management reflect two different modes of production: the capitalist mode of production, where land is held and managed as private property, and the peasant mode of production, where it is not. MKURABITA can thus not be seen simply as a process seeking to alter the institutional organisation of land management, but also has to be regarded as a vehicle that brings the capitalist mode of production, through the neoliberal discourse and its ideals, to a context where the peasant mode of production is still dominant.

In the following I attempt to illustrate that, embedded within the story told to me by the villagers in Bugaga in relation to the land tenure formalisation, there is also a story of a mode of production in change. I focus on those instances in the local narrative where the tensions between the neoliberal discourse on land tenure formalisation and the local context were most evident: (1) the changing value and the commodification of land; (2) the changing nature of land ownership; and (3) the alienation of land and the potential proletarianisation of the villagers in Bugaga. I explore these three points of tension in more detail before continuing to the final analysis of the local narrative in relation to the different concepts of ideology presented in Chapter 2.

The changing value of land and its commodification

A good point to start is by exploring the value of land expressed by the neoliberal discourse and by returning to the ideas of MKURABITA's founding father, Hernando De Soto. While it is argued by Chimhowu and Woodhouse (2006:363) that De Soto shares with his critics the idea that secure property rights to land is an important component in the battle against poverty, and while also he recognises that land tenure formalisation through titling has not always been to the benefit of the poor:

> …the purpose he attributes to legal recognition of property rights for the poor […] is not to protect [their] ownership […] of assets such as land in order to safeguard their continued access to, and use of, those resources. Rather, the primary purpose is to enable the capitalization of the property of the poor, to allow its exchange value to be realized in the form of credit. Although much less emphasized, this purpose also involves assets such as land becoming fungible (e.g. by sale) and forfeit.

In this view, land is truly capital and a commodity. In previous chapters it was however noted that the villagers in Bugaga also talk of land as capital. Is this simply an adoption of the view of land and of the vocabulary within MKURABITA or is there more to it?

According to De Soto (2000:63), inherent to the concept of capital is its ability to produce more capital. Houses, for example, once

> …endowed with representational existence [once demarcated as private property] these houses [or lands] can now lead a parallel life, doing *economic* things they could not have done before […] The genius of the West was to have created a system that allowed people to grasp with the mind values that human eyes could never see and to manipulate things that hands could never touch.

Perhaps the concept of land as capital portrayed by De Soto is not very far away from the view the villagers have of their land, since they consider that the value of land lies not in the land as such, but in what it can provide, *e.g*. a place to build a house or grow crops for food.

In his efforts to describe 'the mystery of capital', De Soto (2000:43) refers to Marx in saying that "a table could be made of something material, like wood, but as soon as it steps forth as a commodity, it is changed into something transcendent", He continues that "this essential meaning of capital has been lost to history". The mystery of capital is thus to be found in the misrecognition that money is the embodiment of capital, that capital and money are in fact the same thing. This mystery, De Soto (2000:44) argues, "dissipates as soon as you stop thinking of "capital" as a synonym for "money saved and invested". Nonetheless, he continues that:

> It is hard to estimate the total value of a collection of very different types, such as machinery, buildings, and land, without resorting to money. After all, that is why money was invented; it provides a standard index to measure the value of things so that we can exchange dissimilar assets.

Ironically, what De Soto is saying is that masked by commodity fetishism, money has become the one single expression, and the equivalent, of capital. This is where the view of land among the people of Bugaga departs from the view of land portrayed in the neoliberal discourse. In their world, money is not the concept used to express the value of their land. In fact, to them the value of land is expressed by the compiled value of the efforts, let us call it labour just to get a neat package, put into developing that land by the people occupying it. They have no other illusion. This is illustrated well by Fredrick Ngimba, who could not imagine spending money on an empty shamba.

In his description of what separates a peasant from a capitalist mode of production, a system dominated by the use-value of things from a system dominated by the exchange-value of things, Taussig (1980:29) states that in the capitalist mode of production, factors of production such as land and labour "are organised in markets and are dealt with as commodities", whereas in the peasant mode of production, they are not.

Referring to Polanyi (1957:72), Taussig (1980:29) explains that in a system dominated by the use-value of things:

> …the postulate that anything bought and sold must have been produced for sale is empathically untrue […] Labor is only another name for human activity which goes with life itself, which in turn is not produced for sale but for entirely different reasons […] the commodity definition of labor, land, and money is entirely fictitious.

This is well illustrated by the general objection to the act of selling land among the people I met in Bugaga: only someone in serious trouble would sell land, or in fact anyone selling land was considered crazy and selling land just to make money was a preposterous suggestion. Michael Mgaya, the man I met together with his wife Jane and their daughter Rosemary, told me another interesting thing in relation to the act of selling land:

> No, I would not call it selling [land] to someone, I just give away an area for you to cultivate, like when you come here now, I could give you a part of my shamba, so if I asked you for 2000 Tanzanian Shillings, does that mean I have sold it to you? No, it is just an appreciation for good thing done. We Tanzanians don't sell, it just a tip.

Two things can thus be concluded: (1) in Bugaga the value of land is not expressed in terms of money, while within the neoliberal discourse it is; and (2) in Bugaga land is not sold, or used in any other way, just to make money, so land is not a commodity, while this is the main function of land within the neoliberal discourse. The point I want to make is not that the practice of selling land is alien to the people in Bugaga as such, or that people do not sell land, because they do. What I would like to suggest is rather that embedded in the conception among the villagers of what the value of land is, and in the action of selling land, is a different logic from that prevailing in the neoliberal discourse.

The changing nature of land ownership

Having discussed how the value of land differs between the neoliberal discourse and the local context in which it is inserted, in this case through the land tenure formalisation, it is evident that this might have implications for the way in which the villagers make sense of the concept of ownership. In fact, one can discern a similar logic to that presented by Shipton (1992), in relation to the apprehension among the Luo that "if land were titled as privately alienable property, access right acquired through work, kinship, and local citizenship stood to be challenged by rights acquired through [money] alone".

Let us elaborate the argument by returning briefly to Mzee Masawe, who articulated clear distaste for the land tenure formalisation:

> This is the problem. If someone comes to your house, what do you expect? While you are the one who built that house... When the land officers came to those who had not demarcated their land and didn't have CCROs they wanted money. If their purpose was to serve the people why couldn't they demarcate for free? If you don't pay money they say this is not your land while you have been with that land for long period of time.

These words reveal two important aspects: (1) that the act of paying for land is not what makes you the owner; and (2) that what makes you the owner (of a house) is the act of constructing that house. Fredrick Ngimba reasoned similarly in his explanation of traditional land ownership structures in Bugaga, namely that the work you put into your land decides its value, and also seems to make you its owner.

Naturally, the act of transferring ownership of land to someone else has to be seen in relation to this line of argument. I would like to suggest that when the villagers buy land, they do not buy the land as such, but rather compensate the seller, by money or other means, for the efforts he or she put into that land, and though doing that they become the new owner. This way to denote ownership differs from that in the neoliberal discourse, as is evident in the statement made by Harieth regarding who can call himself the owner of a shamba:

> The one who has bought the plot is the owner of the plot, if you buy and are able to get a certificate, you will be the owner of that land. That is what the district officials said. [If you have a shamba with no CCRO you still] own it, but you are not the owner until you have a certificate.

This illustrates that the difficulty the villagers in Bugaga had in comprehending the difference between a demarcated and an undemarcated plot of land was in fact difficulty in grasping the abstract ability of money, and demarcation, to somehow strengthen the claim an individual had to their land, compared with the claim made by a physical presence on that land.

It can thus be concluded that the view of land within the neoliberal discourse, as goods to be sold like any other, where land, 'endowed with representational existence' through demarcation, and traded by way of contract and monetary transactions in some abstract market place, is in stark contrast to the view of land among the villagers in Bugaga, where what makes one the owner of land is rather an ability to physically claim that land in time and space.

The alienation of land and the potential proletarianisation of the villagers

So far one crucial aspect of the land tenure formalisation narrative has however been neglected: the emphasis the villagers put on the ability of a CCRO to prevent others from taking their land. After telling me that it is a good thing to be the owner of your land, and subsequently trying to explain to me why this is good, almost all of the villagers ended up by saying that it is good because when you are the owner of the land, no one can take it from you. While some villagers talked about protecting the land from their neighbours, or extended family, the most evident entity from which people wanted to protect their land was *people from outside,* aided or not by the government.

It is obvious at this point that the most compelling selling argument for the land tenure formalisation project is not to be found in its ability to demarcate land as private property to enable its further creation of capital, in its ability to enable the villagers to increase or make more efficient their agricultural production, or in its ability to decrease land-related conflicts in the village. Instead, it is to be found in an entirely different place: in the fact that the CCROs will protect the villagers from large-scale land loss. It is obvious, then, that land tenure formalisation appears to the villagers as a cure for the urgency they feel that their land is shrinking.

However, the inability of the formalisation project to realise its promised benefits, or demarcate all the land in the village, soon turned this initial hope into the strongest criticism of the project. The ultimate conclusion reached by the majority of the villagers, informed by the recent alienation of land in the village, is that the project intentionally demarcated a small area of the village in order to take what was left undemarcated. The above has three interesting implications for the present analysis: (1) the villagers sense growing accumulation of land by those in power; (2) they realise that this might mean they will have to work as labourers on the alienated land; and (3) they believe land tenure formalisation to be a key factor in this process.

It is important to note, however, that while the general land tenure formalisation discourse emphasises the transfer of land to the most efficient user as a result of the creation of a market in land, a factor noted *e.g.* by Stein and Cunningham (2015) as having the potential to dispossess the rural population of their land, this is not the connection made by the villagers. Nonetheless, in their collective consciousness, they have still managed to draw the conclusion that the demarcation of land might result in

land being alienated and transferred to someone else. Even if this apprehension was informed by the fact that not all land was demarcated, their conclusion, that MKURABITA came to take their land, is nevertheless the same.

The villagers in Bugaga also made the connection that the demarcation of land harbours within its aim their potential dispossession and proletarianisation. This is an aspect of the land tenure formalisation not addressed by the general discourse. The emphasis is strongly on the creation of a market in land, but the fact that this inevitably means that there will be a growing class of people who have no land is overlooked, although recognised by the villagers as a potential outcome. There is a growing body of literature, mainly in relation to large-scale investments in land, which addresses this issue. Peters (2013:548-549), refers to White *et al.* (2012) saying that:

> Contemporary forms of agrarian transition … expel people from agriculture without absorbing their labour in manufactures or elsewhere in the economy, thus making them surplus 'to capital's requirements for labour.

The statement that "contemporary forms of agrarian transition… expel people from agriculture", *i.e.* turn farmers into labourers, is of most interest in the present analysis, since it is not difficult to see how horrifying this potential proletarianisation is to the villagers in Bugaga. This was exceptionally well illustrated in the comparison made by the Mgaya family between wage labour and slavery, but it was a common opinion among the people I met that wage labour was not a prestigious thing and, just like selling land, working as a *kibarua* for someone else is a last resort.

Emmanuel Kihaule, the chairman of the Village Development Committee, told me that he used to cultivate tobacco using casual labourers (*vibarua*) from Burundi, but nowadays they have been restricted by immigration officers from entering Tanzania. Because of this, he can no longer afford to cultivate tobacco and has resorted to cultivating only three acres of beans and maize on his 16.5 acres of land. As a result, he sometimes has to work as a *kibarua* on the land of others in the village, something he is not very happy about.

This returns us to the concept of the commodification of the factors of production, and a realisation that to sell one's labour could indeed be as painful as selling one's land. Taussig (1980:37) states that in peasant societies:

> the fetishism that is found […] arises from the sense of organic unity between persons and their products, and this stands in stark contrast to the fetishism of commodities in capitalist societies, which result from the split between persons and the things that they produce and exchange.

Once again we can reflect on the difference in the importance of money expressed by the neoliberal discourse and the villagers in Bugaga. If money is not the concept used to express the value of land, it follows logically that the concept of selling one's labour, one's compiled work efforts, and getting money as compensation is strange. This is illustrated well by Taussig (1980) in his description of how the peasants in South America considered the money made from wage labour to be barren. Similar statements were made in Bugaga, for instance by Jane in the Mgaya family, that when you are a wage labourer "*you cultivate for someone, you get money, use it up and continue to beg*", indicating that the money earned in this way would not amount to anything.

The above indicates that the villagers in Bugaga connect the changes with respect to land to potential changes with respect to labour. Apart from the fact that there are apparent differences in the view of land and also in the view of ownership to land between the neoliberal discourse and the local context, there is also tension in the different views on work and labour. The narrative presented to me by the villagers in Bugaga is consequently much more than a narrative on the practical implications of MKURABITA; it is a narrative describing a mode of production in change.

It is thereby possible to build on the conclusion from the previous section that while the positive utterances in relation to the formalisation process are informed by the neoliberal discourse on the perks of private property rights, the apprehension about it is informed by collective knowledge regarding the general outcome of demarcation exercises, by adding that it is clear that the strongest apprehension and confusion regarding the land tenure formalisation appear in those instances where the different values and idealise of the neoliberal discourse and the local context clash. Within their collective knowledge, the villagers in Bugaga thus possess analytical knowledge that contradicts the rosy picture of land tenure formalisation painted by MKURABITA.

6.3 Defining the cause of the symptom

The above described the local narrative present in Bugaga, *i.e.* villagers' own experiences of land tenure formalisation. This narrative proved to be made up of both positive and negative statements by the villagers regarding the changes brought to them by MKURABITA. The positive statements were found to be informed by the neoliberal

discourse on land tenure formalisation, while the apprehension and confusion was informed by the general history of land and dispossession in the village. However, the apprehension was also found to be an articulation of a realisation among the villagers that land tenure formalisation might change their mode of production in fundamental ways. This is the symptom for which the cause is sought in this section of the thesis.

This is also where the true paradox emerges and the crucial question is thus why, although the villagers possess analytical knowledge that contradicts the picture of land tenure formalisation painted by MKURABITA and the neoliberal discourse, the villagers do not deem the project useless, but still embrace it. In the following, this paradox will be explored further in relation to the theoretical framework on ideology, in order to establish the cause of the symptom and why it makes the symptom appear in this particular way.

A symptom of false consciousness?

A good point at which to start the analysis is in the positive part of the local narrative, at the discursive level of ideology, by remembering that neoliberalism is:

> [A] theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets and free trade (Harvey, 2005:2).

Within this definition is the general argument of land tenure formalisation that if the villagers in Bugaga demarcate their land as private property and subject it to commodification and trade in the market, they will ultimately advance their standard of living. However, preceding chapters have revealed that in their minds, the villagers seem to know that this is not true, yet they accept it. Referring to Kafka's *Trial* and the relentless efforts of the character K to understand his sentence, for a crime of which he is unaware, Žižek offers a suggestion on how this can be. He (1989:36) refers to the conversation K has with the priest:

> 'I do not agree with that point of view' said K., shaking his head, 'for if one accepts it, one must accept as true everything the door-keeper says. But you yourself have sufficiently proved how impossible it is to do that. 'No', said the priest, 'it is not necessary to accept everything as true, one must only accept it as necessary'.

One can explore this further by returning to Marx & Engels (1998 [1832]:99), since they make similar remarks in *The German Ideology* when they propose that:

Since the state is the form in which the individuals of a ruling class assert their common interest, and in which the whole civil society of an epoch is epitomised, it follows that all common institutions are set up with the help of the state and are given a political form. Hence the illusion that the law is based on the will, and indeed will divorced from its real basis – on *free* will.

It is not difficult to extend this analogy to the present case. Just as K, grappling with the fact that he has been given a sentence for a crime of which he was unaware, accepts his fate on the basis that it is not necessary to believe that the law is true, just that it is necessary, the villagers in Bugaga similarly objected to many aspects of the land tenure formalisation as untrue, as it contradicts the practices within their mode of production. Nevertheless, they accepted the project as good simply because someone told them so, with statements such as "*that is what the district officials said*", "*that is what they told us*" or "*the government has a good plan that is why they are making us own the land*".

It is thereby easy to follow the discursive logic of the neoliberal discourse down to village level where acceptance of the project on the point of legal ownership, and its benefits, seems to be based on the general discourse on land tenure formalisation: the government said it is good to be the legal owner of land and, since the government is based in the general will, the free will, of the population, it has its best interests in mind.

Another example is that the villagers clearly demonstrated that selling land is not something undertaken lightly, while at the same time embracing the part of the neoliberal narrative that promises them that if they demarcate their land, they can use it to access a loan. They embraced a discourse that has as its purpose that assets such as land should become fungible and subject to forfeiture, which is not far from the concept of selling land. Could this perhaps be a case of what Marx called false consciousness and a symptom of the fact that the villagers have been blinded by the ruling class ideas?

A symptom of the actual present economic limitations

I would like to argue that this is not the case, because attributing the embracing of neoliberal ideology among the villagers simply to false consciousness only fully explores the subject on the discursive level of ideology and not on the level of enjoyment. Consider, however, Marx's suggestion that:

If the conscious expression of the real relations of these individuals is illusory, if in their imagination they turn reality upside-down, then this in its turn is the result of their limited material mode of activity and their limited social relations arising from it (Marx & Engels, 1998 [1832]:41).

The clue here is in the depiction of false consciousness as an expression of the limited material mode of activity of the subject. Harriet, the secondary school teacher I interviewed in the village, said that life in the village is very difficult and that to advance in life the only and last alternative is to get a loan from the bank.

This brings an understanding of ideology closer to that of Bloch (1986) as something that also develops within subjects to deal with or understand the eventual discrepancy between their 'actual present economic limitations' and the ruling class ideas, in this case the neoliberal discourse. In this perspective, the embracing of the land tenure formalisation seems to stem from the fact that life in the village is difficult and MKURABITA offers a possibility to make life easier. However, this does not explain why the narrative is divided.

A symptom of misrecognised reality

Having come far enough in understanding to fully grasp the quite abstract notion of 'enjoyment', I now move to considering the level of enjoyment and the function of ideology in masking the fact that beyond the discursive logic of an(y) ideology is nothing, and the subsequent attempt by the subjects, in this case the villagers, to fill this nothing with meaning, so they can enjoy it.

It is clear to the villagers in Bugaga that MKURABITA has failed to realise its promises, that behind the discursive logic of land tenure formalisation there is indeed 'nothing'. This causes a great deal of distress among the villagers, since they realise their initial belief that formalisation might protect them from dispossession might not materialise. The embracing of the neoliberal logic of land tenure formalisation could perhaps therefore be seen as an attempt by the villagers to ascribe some meaning to a project that otherwise most certainly would bring nothing more than dispossession, regardless of the many instances illustrated by the villagers in which the contradiction between this logic and their context is apparent.

I would like to suggest that the key to understanding the divided nature of the narrative is not in considering the embracing, but rather in the apprehension and confusion, among the villagers in trying to understand the point of the land tenure formalisation, and their subsequent attempt to fill this entity of land tenure formalisation with some kind of meaning so they can 'enjoy' it.

Marx and Engels (1998 [1832]:100-101) claim that law being based on free will is an illusion since:

> In practice, the [right of use and of disposal of property such as land] has very definite economic limitations for the owner of that private property if he does not wish to see his property and hence his [right of use and of disposal] pass into other hands, since actually the thing, considered merely with reference to his will, is not at thing at all, but only becomes anything, true property, in intercourse, and independently of the law. […] This juridical illusion, which reduces law to the mere will, necessarily leads, in the further development of property relations, to the position that a man may have a legal title to a thing without really having the thing. If for instance, the income from a piece of land disappears owing to competition, then the proprietor has certainly his legal title to it along with the [right of use and of disposal]. But he can do nothing with it: he owns nothing as a landed proprietor if he has not enough capital elsewhere to cultivate his land.

Based on this, the confusion among the villagers regarding the differences between demarcated and undemarcated land, and regarding what is really embedded within the concept of the value of land, becomes clear: they see the obscurity in the concept of ownership and value base simply on the law or the market, since they know that both depend on how the land is managed or developed, yet they embrace the project on the grounds that it will make them the legal owner of the land.

One can start to discern the logic behind this what Marx calls 'judicial illusion' by focusing on the apprehension and the fear articulated in relation to the land tenure formalisation; the fact that the villagers, based on previous knowledge, believe that the demarcation of land will ultimately result in dispossession. The point I want to make is well illustrated by Žižek in his (1989:30) suggestion that the fundamental level of ideology can be found in the statement that "they know very well how things are, but still they are doing it as if they did not know". This could equally be extrapolated to the present case, expressed as: the villagers know very well that demarcation often leads to loss of land, yet they embrace it as a solution to their problem, as if they did not know.

What emerges from this is a logic suggesting that the villagers seem to accept 'the law', *i.e.* the neoliberal discourse, as a way to understand this strange being of land tenure formalisation rather than accepting the land tenure formalisation simply because the law tells them to. The ideological level of enjoyment plays out in the fact that villagers seem to accept the land tenure formalisation, although they can see that behind the promises made by the neoliberal discourse there is nothing, as the solution to the insecurity they feel, as a way to understand the concept of land tenure formalisation, and through that, enjoy it.

This quite abstract line of reasoning can be explained and made easier to understand by deploying the concept of interpellation. In the definition provided by Althusser (1994), interpellation is the process through which ideology communicated through discourse, hails or calls an individual to its cause and thus constitutes the individual as an ideological subject. In the present case, it would be the way in which the neoliberal discourse makes the villagers believe they can indeed benefit from land tenure formalisation in the way suggested by the neoliberal discourse. However, Žižek (1989:139) argues that:

> The crucial weakness of hitherto '(post-)structuralist' essays in the theory of ideology descending from the Althusserian theory of interpellation was to limit themselves […] to aim at grasping the efficiency of an ideology exclusively through the mechanism of imaginary and symbolic identification [which wrongfully could lead us to believe that] what is pertinent in the analysis of ideology is only the way it functions as a discourse.

As regards level of enjoyment, the definition provided by Altuhsser is thus not enough, since according to Žižek it explains only the part of ideology that is compelling on a discursive level. To elaborate:

Althusser (1994:129) argues, much like Bloch (1986), that "it is essential to realize that both he who is writing these lines and the reader who reads them are themselves subjects, and therefore ideological subjects". Bearing in mind that ideological creation is also an activity of the subjects, either as a way to cope with reality or as a way to enjoy reality, a way to make relevant Althusser's concept of interpellation on Žižek's terms can perhaps be found.

If accepting the explanation provided by Althusser (1994) that ideology has the ability to "interpellate individuals as ideological subjects", together with the fact that both the preacher and the crowd are ideological subjects and that also subjects engage in ideological creation, can it not be argued that individuals might have the potential to interpellate themselves as ideological subjects? Viewing the function of ideology in this way perhaps leads to the conclusion that ideological interpellation is a process which operates both on the discursive level of ideology and on the level of enjoyment. This would explain the divided narrative of land tenure formalisation, the simultaneous embrace and rejection of the land tenure formalisation, the cause of the symptom, in the following way:

Discursive level:

1. Due to repeated and continued instances of dispossession, the villagers in Bugaga feel insecure in relation to their continued access to land.
2. Along comes MKURABITA with the neoliberal discourse on land tenure formalisation and the many benefits that arise from it.
3. The villagers accept themselves as the addressees of the neoliberal discourse and believe that they can benefit from land tenure formalisation in the way suggested, and embrace the neoliberal discourse on the basis that it will make them the owner of their land, since that would mean no one can take it.
4. The villagers have been interpellated as ideological subjects, on a discursive level.

Level of enjoyment

1. The villagers start to realise that the benefits said to come from formalisation might not materialise.
2. This causes the villagers to realise that perhaps there was indeed nothing behind the neoliberal discourse after all, that they were not the addressees of the neoliberal discourse, since they can see clearly the differences between the discourse and their 'actual present economic limitations'.
3. In order to make sense of, or 'enjoy', the land tenure formalisation anyway, although realising that it indeed might lead to dispossession just as previous demarcation exercises, the villagers embrace the neoliberal discourse on the basis that it will make them the owner of their land, since that would mean no one can take it.
4. The villagers have interpellated themselves as ideological subjects, on the level of enjoyment.

7. Concluding discussion

> [A symptom is] a formation whose very consistency implies certain non-knowledge on the part of the subject': the subject can 'enjoy his symptom' only in so far as its logic escapes him – the measure of the success of its interpretation is precisely its dissolution - *Slavoj Žižek*

Some conclusions can now be drawn regarding the cause of the symptom that is the dual experience of land tenure formalisation among Tanzanian peasants. The implication of the analysis in the previous chapter is that in their effort to understand the logic of the land tenure formalisation, an entity that opposes many of the fundamental values present in the village, and assign to it some sort of meaning, the villagers embrace the neoliberal discourse and the formalisation of land as a way to increase their tenure security, even if they know the potential outcome might well be dispossession.

7.1 The ideological symptom of tenure insecurity

This shows that peasants' experience is situated in the middle of their socio-political context, a context filled with historical instances of dispossession, and the neoliberal discourse. Thus the villagers in Bugaga not only have to articulate their experience in terms of how the formalisation affects their life, but also have to relate, in their experience, to a neoliberal discourse communicating the benefits of the very formalisation affecting them.

As such, the neoliberal discourse, the apparatus for manufacturing consent, aids the villagers in the discursive creation of their narrative. The implication is that they embrace it not because they are blinded by it, but because in the course of their daily activities they need to assign meaning to an otherwise pointless project in a context of increased dispossession and pressure on land. The extreme thirst for increased tenure security among the villagers cannot be neglected, however, and has to be viewed as a *sine qua non* that would not exist without an extreme sense of insecurity. The ultimate implication must be that their embracing of the land tenure formalisation in the local narrative depends on the fear articulated in relation to the same and that the local narrative on land tenure formalisation is an ideological symptom of tenure insecurity.

This means that a project which came to the village to increase the level of tenure security by offering the villagers the possibility to demarcate their land as a way to

protect themselves has failed in this respect and has instead increased the level of insecurity among the villagers and the fear that someone will take their land and that they, as a consequence, might have to resort to wage labour. Ironically, this leads to the fact that the project has increased tenure insecurity rather than provided more tenure security. This, in extension, legitimises the project on the basis of its own failure, and what has been created is thus a sort of vicious circle, always portraying land tenure formalisation and demarcation of land as the solution.

7.2 Statistics, experience and neoliberal discourse

The above has to be set in relation to the context mapped in Chapter 1 in relation to statistics, experience and the neoliberal discourse. This thesis described the peasant experience of land tenure formalisation, viewed not just a process that alters the institutional organisation of land management but also as a vehicle of capitalist expansion, in a context of repeated and continuous dispossession and in the presence of a strong neoliberal discourse. What does this approach reveal that a purely statistical or experience-based study would have kept concealed?

First, statistics. It is statistics and numbers that promote land tenure formalisation as the key to provide the villagers in Bugaga with tenure security, with *e.g*. the World Bank report – *Securing Africa's Land for Shared Prosperity: A Program to Scale up Reforms and Investment* – providing an example of this:

> With support from the World Bank, the process of surveying and registering village land [that is only the village borders not individual plots] in Tanzania was accelerated in line with the Village Land Act 1999 […] As of early 2012, more than 11,000 out of 12,000 villages had been surveyed out of which 7,000 had been registered. The average cost of surveying and registration is US$500 per village (Byamugisha, 2013:57).

Based on this, the report concludes that "Sub-Saharan Africa's most advanced communal land registry program is in Tanzania, which has registered 60% of its communal lands" (Byamugisha, 2013:57), and has thus come closer to 'shared prosperity'.

However, based on Thompson's (1963) suggestion that statistics never tell the whole story, in this thesis villagers' experience associated with demarcation of the village borders in Bugaga is described. Rather than giving the villagers a sense of increased security, or prosperity for that matter, the 'advanced communal land registry programme' instead resulted in a process that appropriated a large piece of land the

villagers considered to be theirs. A brutal experience, I was told, in which people were "*chased away like animals*".

As a result, the people in Bugaga feel that the land in the village is no longer enough to sustain the growing population and they fear they might be dispossessed of their possibility to sustain their livelihoods. This has caused them to connect demarcation in general with dispossession of land, with the implication that the experience of demarcation of individual plots raises fears of potential land loss. This is far from the picture painted by the general statistics on the outcome of land tenure formalisation.

This shows the relevance of focusing on experience, with the addition that this experience is experienced in the presence of a strong neoliberal discourse. In a similar situation to that of the peasants portrayed by Taussig (1980) or Shipton (2009), the villagers in Bugaga would have experienced the changes with respect to land, the changes with respect to their mode of production, in a context where the neoliberal apparatus for manufacturing consent had not been present.

Taussig (1980:20) writes of the Bakweri of west Cameroon that the Bakweri workers employed on the German or British banana plantations were considered by the community as "members of a new witchcraft association". Within the plantation economy of west Cameroon there thus appeared a system whereby members of the family were 'sacrificed' to become zombies working on the plantations, as a way to provide the rest of the family with income.

Then, "when the Bakweri village undertook to cultivate bananas cooperatively […] this witchcraft stopped". However, as a result of decreased banana prices the Bakweri elders became wary that the villagers might once again wander off to look for work as casual labour elsewhere and cautioned that if they did "the "Frenchmen" would employ them as zombies in the construction of the new harbour".

It is clear from the stories of the Luo, the Bakweri and South American peasants that their experience of the expansion of the capitalist mode of production is only one of rejection. To them, the concept of private land ownership or wage labour is simply bad, evil and dangerous, and their articulation of the change brought to them has to be seen, perhaps most of all in the Bakweri story, as resistance, as argued by Taussig (1980).

This picture differs remarkably from that painted by the villagers in Bugaga, since they embraced the land tenure formalisation. This must be ascribed to the fact that their experience occurred in the presence of a strong neoliberal discourse, which 'forced' them to articulate this very experience through the same discourse and subsequently caused them to embrace, at least on a discursive level, a project that they would perhaps have rejected had there not been a discourse present. However, one must consider what would have happened had there not been such an urgent sense of tenure insecurity in the first place, and realise the possibility of the neoliberal discourse to capitalise on this insecurity and thus succeed in its appearance to the villagers as the solution to their problems, including on the level of enjoyment.

It is obvious from the compiled knowledge in this thesis on the general development in Tanzania that the capitalist mode of production is establishing itself, with or without the land tenure formalisation. The land tenure formalisation, and the neoliberal discourse, provide a concrete instance against which the villagers can articulate their more deep-rooted fear or apprehension of MKURABITA and the demarcation of land, in relation to the fact that their analytical knowledge tells them it might change their life, their mode of production, in more fundamental ways than articulated in the discourse as such. Paradoxically enough, the same discourse provides them with a vocabulary through which they can construct their embracing of the land tenure formalisation on the basis that it will make them the owner of their land, so that no one can take it.

What this focus on experience in the presence of a strong neoliberal discourse reveals is thus how the peasant experience of land tenure formalisation is shaped both by the history of dispossession and neoliberal discourse. It shows that the neoliberal discourse is accepted at the discursive level but that in their interaction with the activities of MKURABITA, the villagers experience the opposition between the neoliberal discourse and their context. This has the implication that the villagers fear the project might lead to dispossession, which in extension, as established in the theoretical framework, ultimately causes the villagers to accept the project on the level of enjoyment. Ultimately this creates a situation where the villagers both embrace and reject the land tenure formalisation and the neoliberal discourse.

7.3 Implications for the land tenure formalisation debate

Throughout this thesis, there are analogies along the line of argument so neatly constructed by Polanyi in the introduction of this thesis, *e.g.* in the peasant experience of land tenure formalisation articulated as fear that it might ultimately separate them from the means of production and subsequently turn them into labourers, and in villagers' aversion to the commodification of land.

However, the thesis also showed that the line of argument constructed by De Soto, the neoliberal logic of private property rights so embedded within Western ideals of individual freedom, has been transposed down to village level in Tanzania. This is apparent in the villagers' embracing of a more private structure of land ownership and in their embracing of the collateralisation of land as a way to access loans.

While writing this thesis I often wondered what Polanyi and De Soto would talk about if they had a chance to meet, since the aim of De Soto to formalise the assets of the global poor and by doing so separate them from their means of production is the opposite of Polanyi's aim. One would assume they could agree on the importance of access to land for the rural poor but that their discussion, just as the general debate on land tenure formalisation, would soon boil down to "what kinds of land rights should be secured, by what means, and for whom".

Chimhowu and Woodhouse (2006:17) argue that it is problematic that the debate on land tenure formalisation has become so polarised between views promoting land titling after Western standards and views that instead argue for the profitability of customary ways, because it might have the implication that "critical exploration of empirical and theoretical argument is liable to be subordinated to promoting idealized models of society and economy".

I do not attempt to take a stand regarding whether private or customary ways of holding land are better. However, I agree that secure access to land is of paramount importance for the rural poor and below raise a few questions, points of concern and subjects for further research, based on my findings and on the current form of land tenure formalisation sweeping across the African continent.

Tenure security for whom?

I would like to start by reflecting on tenure security in relation to the strong emphasis on land tenure formalisation as the key to success both for smallholder farmers and large-scale investors, based on my findings.

The full magnitude of this issue cannot be discussed here[17] but I would like to highlight its relevance for the Tanzanian case, because of the dual focus in *Kilimo Kwanza* and in the current agreement between Tanzania and G8, *The Land Tenure Support Program*, partially financed by Sida, on the identification of unused village land for investment as a component in the land tenure formalisation process. The bizarre result is a global development community that on one hand sets out to protect rural populations from land grabbing through the formalisation of land tenure, while on the other hand facilitating large-scale investment in land through the formalisation of land tenure. This lack of consistency regarding the true purpose of land tenure formalisation obviously translates down to village level, where it defeats its own purpose.

From this point of view it is interesting to note that since all land in Tanzania belongs to the government, the government has the right to take any land, with or without CCRO, into its possession given this is in the interests of the general population. It is consequently the case that as far as tenure security is concerned, a CCRO can only fully protect the villagers if they have a conflict or a disagreement with a fellow villager, and provides little protection if the government decides it wants to build a road, a school or establish a plantation (URT, 1999)[18]. This conclusion makes even more understandable the apprehension among the villagers of the potential implications of MKURABITA.

What about the commodification of labour?

My second question or point of concern relates to the fear among the villagers in Bugaga that the enclosure and demarcation of land could ultimately turn them into wage workers. The possibility of this becoming a reality is raised by White *et al.* (2012) who argue that "Contemporary forms of agrarian transition … expel people from agriculture".

[17] See Stein and Cunningham (2015) for futher elaborations on this subject.
[18] The VLA however stipulates that if the government wants to take such land, it has to compensate the villagers accordingly (URT, 1999). It is however clear from the many resettlements of various communities in Tanzania that this aspect is not fully met (Engström, 2013).

It is interesting to note that although this possibility is raised both in critical literature and by the villagers, it is absent from the general writings on the outcomes of land tenure formalisation. This is curious given the clearly articulated goal of the commodification of land within the same writings. If the goal is to create a market in land, in order to transfer land to the most able user, where are the villagers who sell their land supposed to go?

This makes relevant a connection between land tenure formalisation and the current global push for large-scale investments in agriculture and land. The major argument for large-scale investment in land is that it will be a win-win for investors and villagers alike, investors make money and villagers get jobs, either on plantations or as contract farmers (Oya, 2012). This was the plan with FELISA, the oil palm plantation in Bugaga, and is the plan of AgriSol, which is now establishing in the area. This perhaps indicates where the people who sell their land to the more efficient users are supposed to go: Just as the peasants of Industrial Revolution England were dispossessed of their land and put in factories, the villagers dispossessed of their land may be supposed to become plantation workers.

However, in their inability to get their businesses running, and most of all, in their inability to actually create jobs for the farmers from whom they have taken the land, the case of FELISA reflects the trend of large-scale agricultural investments in Tanzania and Africa in general (Peters, 2013; White *et al.*, 2012). It is even argued by Peters (2013) that "the most dire conclusion [from studies of large-scale investments in land] is that the labour of millions of farmers and other rural residents in the targeted areas is 'surplus' to the new forms of land use", *i.e*. people are dispossessed from their land with no alternative source of income.

Conversely, in relation to the aim of land tenure formalisation to transfer land to the most able user, and thus create "a landed and a landless class", Shipton (2009:144) suggests from his case of the formalisation process in Kenya that:

> What they [the people behind the Swynnerton Plan] neglected was that Kenya did not – and would not – have industries to absorb all those newly land-poor or landless people. Nor, the [Swynnerton] report also failed to foretell, would other parts of the world be eager to absorb many of these African people as migrants. No one where it mattered seems to have been thinking ahead that far.

Since the report on the Swynnerton Plan in 1954 much has happened in the world, but the plausibility of proletarianisation, and subsequently how to deal with this in an

economy where there is little in terms of industries to absorb potential workers released as a result of land tenure formalisation, is still missing from the general literature on land tenure formalisation produced by institutions such as the World Bank or the G8.

Land tenure formalisation, is it even possible?

In the introduction to this thesis, I highlighted the continued importance of land tenure formalisation on the international agenda using a passage from a World Bank report entitled: *Securing Africa's Land for Shared Prosperity: A Program to Scale up Reforms and Investment.* I also marked the importance of the first passage of the title, increased security. I now draw attention to the sub-title in this concluding discussion. The report states:

> For countries to boost governance, improved approaches and comprehensive policy reforms will need to be scaled up **across the continent**. This book suggests building a scaling-up program with 10 elements [e.g. improving tenure security over individual lands through systematic titling and redistribution of land through willing seller-willing buyer approaches, i.e. the creation of a market in land]. The program is intended to step up comprehensive policy reforms and investments in land administration and to accelerate share and sustained growth for poverty reduction. The program is estimated to cost **US$4.5 billion** over **10 years**. (Byamugisha, 2013:4, emphasis added).

This quote is interesting in relation to the ongoing land tenure formalisation in Tanzania. My field work showed that in Bugaga, a village with 2400 households, only 800 plots have been demarcated and no more than 400 certificates distributed. Field work I conducted for my Bachelor's thesis (Wallin Fernqvist, 2012) in four villages in Babati District in 2012 revealed similar patterns. For example, in one village with a population of 4338 people and 701 households, 1605 plots had been demarcated but only 100 certificates had been finalised and distributed to the villagers. The same pattern was identified by Byamugisha (2013) as true for Tanzania in general.

My findings show that the reasons for this vary. Sometimes it is due to technical constraints and problems getting the equipment to produce the actual CCROs, such as computers, lamination machines and GPS units, to work. More often, however, the certificates pile up at the district or village offices because neither villagers nor village officials deem them important enough to make the effort to enquire about them, which says something about the actual need for the CCROs at village level.

Two conclusions are possible. First, projects of this kind are difficult, time-consuming and expensive to implement, even if they are intended to be low-cost and systematic. Second, the piecemeal success in implementation is diminished further by the low level

of interest among villagers for the finalised certificates. How then, one might ask, is the World Bank supposed to title all rural land in Africa in 10 years, when MKURABITA has had 3.5 years and has not even completed one village? This is a pertinent question since the process has been ongoing in Tanzania since 2001 and still, as estimated by Byamugisha (2013), only 200,000 shambas out of approximately 25 million have been demarcated.

A more fundamental question is: If fully implemented, would projects of this kind bring the claimed benefits? It is argued by Shipton (2009:155) that any effort to formalise land tenure through land titling, to give farmers access to credit by mortgaging their land so they can increase their production and ultimately increase the economic growth of the nation…

> …presumes that the mortgage system actually works [in rural Africa] – which is to presume that the land titling system (as well as the financial system) works in the first place. And that would be a lot to say.

These words are well worth considering given the amount of money currently going into projects to formalise land tenure across Africa. Full implementation seems to be difficult to achieve at village level and, even if full implementation is achieved, studies seem to show that benefits are unlikely to materialise anyway (*e.g*. Wallin Fernqvist, 2012; Payne *et al.*, 2009; Shipton, 2009; Griffith-Charles, 2004). Either way, the villagers stand to lose. Poor implementation brings insecurity and confusion, and full implementation along the lines of the general argument on land tenure formalisation could mean dispossession and proletarianisation, and with it increased insecurity.

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Appendix I – List of informants

Date	Location	Position/description	Age	Social status	Sex
140210	Kigoma	Introduction meeting at Kigoma District Offices, including Human Resource Officer, Agricultural and Extension Officer, Natural Resource officer and land officer			
140210	Kigoma	Meeting with Kigoma Land Officer and Town Planner			
140213	Bugaga	Bugaga Village Council Meeting			
140213	Uvinza	Meeting with Uvinza District Land Officer/MKURABITA Officer			Male
140215	Bugaga	Member of village council	40	Divorced	Female
140215	Bugaga	Member of village council, chair of village development committee	38	Married	Male
140217	Bugaga	Non, meaning no official position	27	Married	Male
140219	Bugaga	Ward Representative	56	Married	Male
140219	Bugaga	Member of Village council and village environmental committee	66	Married	Male
140226	Bugaga	Village elder	~80	Married	Male
140226	Bugaga	Village elder	82	Married	Male
140227	Bugaga	Non	~55	Married	Female
140228	Bugaga	Non	21	Single	Male
140228	Bugaga	Non	20	Single	Female
140228	Bugaga	Non	34	Married	Female

Date	Location	Position/description	Age	Social status	Sex
140301	Bugaga	Village elder, member of village environmental committee	~80	Married	Male
140303	Bugaga	Non	25	Single mother (never married)	Female
140304	Bugaga	Non	~80	Divorced and widowed	Female
140304	Bugaga	Meeting with a group of pastoralists (Wasukuma), and our local motorbike drivers, discussing land registration			
140305	Bugaga	Non	38	Divorced	Female
140310	Kigoma	District Official Mkurabita			Female
140312	Bugaga	non	33	Married	Male
140312	Bugaga	Former chair of Village Land Tribunal	---	---	Male
140313	Bugaga	Non	65	Married	Male
140313	Bugaga	Non	55	Married	Female
140313	Bugaga	Non	20	Single	Female
140313	Bugaga	Non	46	Married	Male
140314	Bugaga	Member of Village council and chair of village environmental committee	41	Married	Male
140314	Bugaga	Non	50	Married	Male
140317	Bugaga	Non	74	Married	Male
140317	Bugaga	Non	30	Married	Male

Appendix II - Interview guide

1. Mode and means of production

- Name, age, clan, tribe
- How many members in your household?
- Geographical location in the village, *e.g*. Kitongoji
- Are you part of any village committee or organisation?
- Were you born in Bugaga?
- If yes, for how long has your family lived here?
- If no, for how long have you been in the village?
- Where did you move from, why?

2. Mode and means of production

- What are the main income generating activities in the household?
- Who in your household does what and why?
- To sustain your life, the activities mentioned above, what do you need? *e.g*. agricultural input, money, labour *etc*…
- Can you access the things you need?

- How much land do you have?
- Is that farmland (shamba), residential land, or both?
- Where in the village is your shamba located, is it one big piece or is it spread out?
- Do you have land in any other place than Bugaga?
- How did you acquire the land you have, when, why in this particular way?
- Have you always had this amount of land or has it changed or varied, why?
- Do the different members of your family have different plots?
- Do you rent land from someone or do you rent land to someone? From/to whom, why?

- Do you cultivate all your land, why/why not?
- If no, is someone else cultivating that land? What does that arrangement look like?
- What are you cultivating?
- Why have you chosen these crops?
- Do different members from the family cultivate different things, why?
- Do you have casual labour?
- If yes, during how long/many periods of the year?
- If no, are you sometimes taking work as a casual labour

- What do you do with the crops you have harvested? Eat/sell/both?
- When you have set aside what you need for consumption and next seasons planting, what do you do with the surplus crops or the money you get from selling those crops?
- What do you do with the money you have left, if any?
- For what purposes do you need money?
- Do you provide any services to other villagers? What?
- Have there been any big changes in the village recently?

3. Privatisation of land and MKURABITA

- Would you say you own, rent or manage your shamba?
- Who owns/manages/rents the land located outside of the shamba area?
- Does different kind of land belong to different people? Describe.
- How do you know that the land you use is your land?
- Have there been any major changes with respect to land in recent times?
- As I have been here in the village, I have heard about some kind of project to identify the borders of the shambas, have you heard about this?
- Is yes, can you tell me about it/what have you heard about it?
- What do you think about it
- What is/was the purpose of demarcation/the project?
- Have you demarcated your shamba?

- If yes, or if indicating that they have not yet but want to, why?
- What benefits have you seen so far?
- What benefits do you hope for in the future?
- Has the demarcation affected you in any way?
- Has the demarcation affected the village at large in anyway?
- Has the demarcation affected your relationship to your neighbours in any way?
- As I have been here in the village I have been told that all land belong to the President, what are your thoughts on that?

4. Efficiency

- Has the demarcation of land affected or changed your agriculture in any way?
- Do you plant different crops since you demarcated?
- Have you changed your inputs, fertiliser, pesticides etc… why?
- Do you hire more or less labour compared to before demarcation? Why?
- Do you plant a larger or a smaller piece of your shamba now than before demarcation?
- Do you spend more or less time on your agriculture if you compare to before? Why?
- Do you think other villagers have changed in the same way as you?

5. Commodification

- In what way/s is land important to you?
- For what different purposes can you use land?
- Can you use it for other purposes than agriculture/pasture/residence, *i.e*. can you think of any other benefits that come from land other than what the land itself can offer?
- Do people buy and sell land in Bugaga?
- Why do people buy land?
- Why do people sell land?
- Can anyone sell/buy land, how would you go about such an affair?
- Could you imagine selling your land? Why/why not?
- If you did sell your land, what would you do instead?
- Is there any difference between buying and selling land and buying and selling other items, e.g. kitchenware? Why/why not?
- Do people, or you, have more or less land now than before, and why?
- Has the distribution of land within the village/sub-village changed, how and why?

Appendix III – Maps and figures



Figure 1.*Map of Bugaga Village as prepared for the Village Land Certificate, photograph by author in Bugaga Village Office. On the map, the name of the village is altered from its original name and names of adjacent villages and reserves are removed.*



Figure 2.*Village Land Certificate with an overlay of the Village Land Use Plan as created by one of the members of the Village Environmental Committee, photograph, and design, by author in Bugaga Village. On the map, the name of the village is altered from its original name and names of adjacent villages and reserves are removed.*