



Derailing Truth

An Analysis of Post-Truth Rhetoric in Austria's Climate Politics

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Derailing Truth: An Analysis of Post-Truth Rhetoric in Austria's Climate Politics

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Abstract

There have been increasing concerns about the importance – or lack thereof – of truth in contemporary political discourse, often described as post-truth politics. This phenomenon is said to correlate with a myriad of issues Western societies seem to be facing currently: populism, ideological and affective polarization and threats to democracy, to name a few. Through a document analysis of parliamentary debates around climate action, truth contestation in Austrian climate politics was studied. The applied framework, established by Kluknavská and Eisele (2023), defines three content related dimensions (truth evaluation, truth creation and truth restoration) of post-truth rhetoric and two stylistic choices (appeals to emotion and negative tonality). The analysis shows that all of the parties represented in the Austrian parliament use truth-related claims to depict themselves as being closer to the truth than their political opponents, thereby fostering affective and ideological polarization. While the intention of these strategies was not evident, this analysis shows that Austrian parliamentarians are currently focused on refusing responsibility and discrediting their opponents in case of disagreement, rather than attempting to address climate change through democratic deliberation.

Keywords: Post-Truth, Truth-Contestation, Austria, Democracy, Polarization, Populism

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Abbreviations

APP	Austrian People's Party
CCCA	Climate Change Centre Austria
FPA	Freedom Party Austria
NEOS	New Austria and Liberal Forum
SDP	Social Democratic Party of Austria
S4F	Scientists for Future Austria

1. Introduction

The current political climate in many countries around the world seems to be defined by a rise in right-wing populism, with politicians fostering hate and resentment to garner support (Braun, 2019). The US, India and Turkey are only a few of the countries whose governments employ populist strategies to accumulate or hold on to power (Braun, 2019; Eldem, 2025). Furthermore, we seem to live in a world of post-truth politics, a world where truth has little impact on society's opinions and beliefs (Eldem, 2025; Laybats and Tredinnick, 2016), and politicians seem to have lost all shame when it comes to lying to the public (Hannon, 2023), the emergence of which is especially troubling for climate politics and governance (Fischer, 2019). The concept "post-truth" has been getting increasing attention since 2016, both in the media and in academia, due to the election of Donald Trump and the Brexit referendum (Fischer, 2019), which caused concerns about having entered a new era of mis- and disinformation (Egelhofer and Lecheler, 2019). While some scholars say the emergence of the academic field of post-truth is due to an increasing lack or distortion of truth in political discourse (Van Aelst et al, 2017; Wodak and Krzyżanowski, 2017; Ylä-Anttila, 2018), others claim that truth has never been a virtue in politics, nevertheless agreeing that post-truth is a contemporary phenomenon emerging in many countries around the world (Fischer, 2019).

These developments are considered troubling due to the influence of post-truth rhetoric on society at large. Academics note the detrimental effects of post-truth on democratic institutions and democracy overall (Fish, 2016; Waisbord, 2018; Suiter, 2016), as well as the accompanying loss of trust in those institutions (Kluknavská and Eisele, 2023; Rietdijk, 2024; Newman and Conrad, 2024). Furthermore, Rietdijk (2024) notes that post-truth and its arguments threaten the epistemic autonomy of their audience and are meant to distract, confuse and sow doubt about what and who are reliable sources of information. In addition to that, many scholars mention the similarities between populism and the post-truth phenomenon (Braun, 2019; Waisbord 2018), as both are challenging to allegedly malicious elites, traditional practices of determining truth, as well as established institutions concerned with truth-telling, including science and the media (Waisbord, 2018).

Austria is no exception to these global developments, with the far right populist party (Freedom Party Austria, FPA) receiving 28.85% of votes in the elections of 2024 (Parlament Österreich, 2024). Technically, the FPA was supposed to form a coalition with another party and lead the government due to their success in the election (Demčičák, 2025). However, they were unable to negotiate a coalition, therefore, the government is currently led by the second most powerful, center-right

Austrian People's Party (APP, 51 mandates) in coalition with the center-left SDP (Social Democratic Party of Austria, 41 mandates) and the center-left NEOS (The New Austria and Liberal Forum, 18 mandates) (Bundeskanzleramt Österreich, 2025). As a result, the Green Party (16 mandates) and the FPA (57 mandates) form the opposition to the ruling parties.

In total, right-leaning parties occupy 108 out of 183 seats in parliament as of right now. Right-wing politics in general is seen as an obstacle to climate change mitigation and adaptation (Lockwood, 2018), which, according to the general consensus of the scientific community (Fischer, 2019), would be necessary to avoid global catastrophes, such as an increase in extreme weather events and mass extinction (Gulzar et al, 2018). The most notable development in climate action in Austria recently is that as of February 2026 the budget for climate action and research for Austria was not only announced after massive delays, but also reduced - from 5 million Euros in previous years - to 2 million Euros (der Standard, 2026; die Presse, 2026). In response to these budget cuts Climate Change Centre Austria (CCCA) and Science for Future Austria (S4F) collaborated in writing an open letter to the current government, warning about a subtle defunding of climate action and research and dangerous developments comparable to those in the US (CCCA and S4F, 2026). They refer to the budget cuts as “grossly negligent political action in the face of known risks, foreseeable damage and certain consequential social and economic costs” (CCCA and S4F, 2026 [own translation]). At the time of publication, the open letter was signed by 660 researchers in Austria (CCCA and S4F, 2026), showing that Austrian academics are concerned about the future of climate action under the current government.

This simultaneous rise of populism and the post-truth phenomenon is concerning for the future of climate action and policy in Austria, as these phenomena are often accompanied by affective or ideological polarization and the erosion of the functionality of democracy (Fischer, 2019; Conrad et al, 2023). This thesis aims to explore and understand the post-truth phenomenon in Austrian climate politics by investigating the discursive strategies within truth related arguments to discredit opponents used by the members of the Austrian parliament. In addition to that, possible effects of the resulting political climate will be evaluated. The following research questions will be addressed:

- How did the parties represented in the Austrian parliament draw on truth contestation and truth related arguments in parliamentary debates about climate science and action after the previous elections (2024)?
- What are the possible effects of the parties'/parliamentarians' communication on Austria's climate action?

Rather than assigning labels to certain politicians or political parties, this study aims to provide an analysis of truth contestation and post-truth rhetoric in Austrian climate politics in order to gain a better understanding of the implications of the results of the past elections. It is not the intention to depict myself, as a researcher, and academia by extension as the arbiter of truth, deciding whether politicians are lying or distorting the truth for their own political gain, since untruthfulness has been a common phenomenon in politics for a long time (Arendt, 1972; Durnová, 2019; Arias-Maldonado, 2020). Instead, this study attempts to evaluate how the different parties have contributed to truth contestation in parliamentary debates after the elections of 2024, in order to determine the possible effects on society.

2. Theoretical Background and Framework

2.1 Post-Truth as an Academic Field of Study

There is a growing body of literature about post-truth, which, some suggest, is due to an increase of the relativization of truth in contemporary political discourse (Van Aelst et al, 2017; Wodak and Krzyżanowski, 2017; Ylä-Anttila, 2018). Moreover, post-truth is often researched in relation to populism and populist leaders (Braun, 2019) and Waisbord (2018, p.17) describes the relationship between the two as an “elective affinity”, due to shared characteristics between the two concepts, such as the anti-elite rhetoric. A large share of this emerging research is centered around the political climate in the US and Donald Trump specifically (e.g.: Kluknavská and Eisele, 2023; Rose, 2017; Rietdijk, 2024), who is said to be defining post-truth rhetoric (Fischer, 2019) or depicted as a prime example of post-truth communication (Kluknavská and Eisele, 2023). In addition to that, another prominent research topic within post-truth is the evaluation of specific authoritarian regimes and their employment of post-truth tactics and mechanisms to secure power (e.g. Eldem, 2025; Rietdijk, 2017). Notably less research is being done on post-truth rhetoric in the European context, even less when specifically looking at Austria.

Kluknavská and Eisele (2023) create a framework to analyze truth contestation in political communication, originally testing the framework by applying it to Trump’s tweets, which they say is arguably a relatively easy case. They do, however, suggest to apply this framework to other politicians, especially comparing populist and non-populist politicians (Kluknavská and Eisele, 2023). This study aims to address this gap in post-truth research by analyzing truth contestation and post-truth rhetoric in Austrian climate politics employed by the five parties that are currently represented in the parliament.

The following literature review consists of four sections. First, several commonly used definitions of post-truth will be laid out, as well as an explanation as to why they cannot provide a basis for the analysis done in this study. However, this is not to say that these definitions are wrong or bad, they are simply not helpful as grounds for a systematic analysis. Second, [Section 2.3](#) will address scholarly criticism of the term post-truth. Third, the exact parameters of what counts as post-truth rhetoric in regards to this specific thesis will be explained in [Section 2.4](#) in order to create a shared understanding of the concept. [Section 2.5](#) will argue why post-truth is a relevant field of study, regardless of the valid criticism it has received.

2.2 Different Understandings of Post-Truth

There are many different avenues to take when entering the realm of post-truth research, the choice of which partly depends on the definition of post-truth one applies. The use of the term post-truth is frowned upon by some scholars, partly due to its ambiguity and lack of consistent definition (Habgood-Coote, 2019; Rietdijk, 2024), which can cause confusion. This section will give an overview of scholarly understandings of post-truth.

First of all, scholars in this field of research often refer to the definition provided by Oxford Dictionaries (e.g. Fischer, 2019; Waisbord, 2018), who named “post-truth” word of the year in 2016 due to political developments at the time and the resulting 2000% increase of the use of the term (Fischer, 2019). The Oxford Dictionaries (2016) defines post-truth as an adjective which is “relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief”. Another common definition connected to this understanding of post-truth is that the post-truth era is one in which statements only need to feel true – also referred to as “truthiness” - rather than being rooted in any kind of empirical evidence (Boler and Davis, 2018). While it is a common narrative that we live in a time where both politicians and citizens are increasingly unconcerned with objective facts (e.g.: Hannon, 2023; Rietdijk, 2024), this definition seems to be simplifying this phenomenon by blaming emotions alone for the political climate nowadays. Durnová (2019) problematizes that discourse on post-truth tends to use emotions as a scapegoat for undermining science, ignoring the fact that all knowledge is socially, culturally and emotionally embedded. Arguably this definition of post-truth reinforces the dichotomy between facts and emotions and is therefore not only problematic, but also insufficient to explain or understand the situation at hand.

Secondly, a characteristic often understood as a defining aspect of the post-truth era is an overall lack of truth in politics (Rietdijk, 2024; Duncombe, 2019; Fischer, 2019) or a refusal to believe proven facts (Hopkin and Rosamond, 2018), showing that varying definitions cast the blame on different parties: the speaker, who oftentimes implicitly has a nefarious agenda, or the audience, who is too easily fooled. Considering that lying and deception have existed in politics since its very beginning (Arendt, 1972; Hannon, 2023, Arias-Maldonado, 2020), this understanding of post-truth also seems insufficient to explain its emergence in recent times. Arias-Maldonado (2020) suggests to use the term post-factualism rather than post-truth, to reflect the loss of persuasive power of facts in today’s political discourse. As the framework used for the analysis in this thesis will illustrate more clearly, the aim of this analysis is to understand the use of truth-related arguments as a political strategy, rather than determining who is being

truthful or who is intentionally or unintentionally deceiving the public. In addition to that, in order to systematically evaluate a lack of truth, one must define what is true, which is not only beyond the scope of this thesis, but also epistemically and morally questionable (Hannon, 2023), as well as, according to some, impossible to achieve with certainty.

Thirdly, some scholars prefer to refer to the lack of truth in political discourse as an abundance of bullshit (Frankfurt, 2005), which shows slight differences to the definition described above. The main difference is that, while the definition above oftentimes implies an intention to deceive by the communicator, Frankfurt (2005) - and the many scholars drawing on his understanding of bullshit (e.g. Hopkin and Rosamond, 2018) – suggest that the bullshitter is not intentionally deceiving their audience, but rather exhibit a lack of concern for truth. Similarly to the previous understanding of post-truth, the intention - or lack thereof - behind any utterance cannot be determined with certainty, which is why this definition, while it may be accurate in describing the political climate nowadays, is rather unhelpful in providing grounds for a systematic analysis of post-truth rhetoric.

While there are certainly more definitions of post-truth, such as a lack of shared norms and processes to determine and verify truth claims used by Waisbord (2018), it is beyond the scope of this study to examine every single one. The following section will explore academic criticism of post-truth as a concept.

2.3 Academic Criticism of Post-Truth

The use of the term post-truth in and of itself is critiqued by scholars (e.g. Habgood-Coote, 2019) with some going as far as referring to it as “politically toxic” (Hannon, 2023, p.40). The following section will outline and address common critiques for the term “post-truth” found in scholarly articles.

2.3.1 Existence of “Objective” Truth

Many scholars critique the notion of the existence of a truly objective truth (e.g. Fischer, 2019), as well as the dichotomy between facts and emotions or beliefs perpetuated, in part, by academia (Durnová, 2019), which seems to be the underlying foundation of some post-truth research. Moreover, Durnová (2019) stresses the importance of critical inquiry about the objectivity of truth, along with an understanding that truth can be complex and non-singular, a social construct, as well as co-produced by values and emotions, which are reflected and reproduced in scientific discoveries. Furthermore, Fischer (2019) adds that any object within research has both physical and social meanings attached to it, varying in extent and importance, which constitute what is true. The social meanings of the object in question, Fischer (2019) states, can change and develop over time and are

influenced and shaped by social processes, implying that the truth attached to the object, too, develops and is therefore not a fixed concept. Similarly, Arias-Maldonado (2020, p.73) states that “truth is rarely ‘final’”, demonstrated by the fact that history is “a cemetery of once cherished truths”. However, while Fischer (2019) and Durnová (2019), along with many other scholars within social constructivism, support critical inquiry about the existence of a singular objective truth, they also agree that this should not result in the abandonment of science and its influence on policymaking altogether. Rather, Fischer (2019) argues, it is time to acknowledge and be transparent about the uncertainty of scientific discoveries and to understand the social dynamic of truth production in order to address science denial, which is often seen as a defining characteristic of the post-truth era.

2.3.2 Post-Truth creates an Unhelpful Divide

Another common criticism of using the term post-truth is that it is often done in a condescending manner to delegitimize divergent perspectives (Hannon, 2023). According to Braun (2019), much of post-truth discourse in academia is based on the underlying idea that citizens are stupid for believing lying politicians, while Hannon (2023) adds that there is often the implication that these individuals, who either lie or believe lies, simply do not care about the truth. Similarly, Braun (2019) argues that it is tempting for scholars to simplify contemporary epistemologically dysfunctional discourses by labeling them as post-truth, reinforcing a binary of “good” versus “evil”, firmly placing themselves on the right side of history. Additionally, Durnová (2019) states that the underlying assumption seems to be that academia and science should be the only arbiter of truth and people who base their beliefs on personal experience and emotions, rather than scientific “objective” facts, are deemed irrational.

Furthermore, Habgood-Coote (2019) argues that the term post-truth has been weaponized politically and used as propaganda by contributing to the narrative that we are facing an epistemic crisis and must return to better intellectual norms. He argues that this emphasis of objective truth and the proposed solution to this alleged epistemic crisis, employing critical thinking and living up to democratic values, is a conservative narrative, as it stresses values of enlightenment rather than a heterogeneity of voices and perspectives.

The oversimplification of post-truth rhetoric and the labeling of fellow citizens as stupid and having inadequate values is unhelpful, both for addressing post-truth (Braun, 2019) and for minimizing the divide between “the people” and academia (Hochschild, 2016; Durnová, 2019). Ironically, this gap is often exploited by populist leaders to turn the people against scientists, framing them as elites with a nefarious agenda (Fischer, 2019), therefore contributing to post-truth discourse by reducing trust in institutions traditionally concerned with truth-telling.

2.4 Aspects of Post-Truth: A Framework

Rather than abandoning the use of the term post-truth altogether, this study uses a framework that addresses the criticism the term has received. Instead of assessing whether or not the speaker is factually correct in what they say, this framework created by Kluknavská and Eisele (2023) is, as originally intended, used to determine how speakers make truth-related claims to establish their own credibility and legitimacy, often by attacking their opponent's. In the following, three content-related and two stylistic components of post-truth rhetoric will be explored in order to create a basis for the analysis of truth-contestation in Austria. The final paragraph within each subcategory indicates how the framework is operationalized for the purpose of this analysis.

2.4.1 Accusation of Deception

Firstly, the accusation of intentional deceit from either political opponents, the media, scientists or others is a key component of post-truth rhetoric (Eldem, 2025; Rietdijk, 2024; Waisbord, 2018). This strategy is supposed to make the accuser's statement feel truer than that of their opponent, despite a lack of evidence to support their claim (Kluknavská and Eisele, 2023; Sawyer, 2018). Moreover, commonly used strategies to discredit opponents within this category of post-truth rhetoric are the label "fake news", an accusation of sharing information for propagandistic purposes, rumors and conspiracy theories (Kluknavská and Eisele, 2023) or simply depicting them as paranoid, delusional or jealous (Rietdijk, 2024). In addition to that, the accusation of withholding or distorting the truth is often accompanied by defining a group of victims, such as voters, citizens or the accusers themselves (Kluknavská and Eisele, 2023; Eldem, 2025). Furthermore, politicians engaging in this rhetoric imply morally reprehensive intentions of the opponents in order to delegitimize their perspectives and the information they share (Kluknavská and Eisele, 2023).

The purpose of this category is not to fact-check and look at the evidence the accusers (claim to) have, but rather to focus on how these accusations are made and evaluating whether these claims would lead to confusion and loss of trust within the audience. It includes direct or indirect accusations of untruthfulness, deceit or manipulation, as well as defining the victims of manipulation, and attempts at discrediting opponents.

2.4.2 Creation of Own Reality

Secondly, people engaging in post-truth rhetoric tend to create their own reality in order to generate the illusion of being closer to the truth than their opponents, presenting their reality as unbiased (Kluknavská and Eisele, 2023; Eldem, 2025;

Waisbord, 2018). This is a commonly used strategy in populism: expert opinions are framed as elite discourse and therefore delegitimized as dishonest while populist leaders are “telling it like it is” (Waisbord, 2018, p.25), rejecting political correctness in favor of common sense (Waisbord, 2018; Ylä-Anttila, 2018). In addition to that, Rietdijk (2024) mentions the introduction of counternarratives in order to distract or confuse the audience as a mechanism within post-truth. She states that while the truth can be messy, complex and boring, these counternarratives are exciting and outrageous and can therefore gain traction quickly. Counternarratives are not meant to convince people, necessarily, but rather sow doubt and confusion, which can lead to the audience doubting their ability to get to the truth by themselves (Rietdijk, 2024). In addition to that, Rietdijk (2024) determines that the denial of proven facts are an important strategy within post-truth rhetoric.

This category encompasses statements that outright state or imply that the speaker is providing the objective and singular truth, present personal opinions as facts or share counternarratives. Additionally, this category will include parties and party representatives contradicting themselves, as well as denying facts with an overwhelming consensus within the scientific community.

2.4.3 Demand to Restore Truth

Thirdly, a common factor of post-truth rhetoric is the demand to restore the truth or providing the truth – or rather, their version of it – to the people, as they proclaim it is being denied by the opponents, the media and other actors (Kluknavská and Eisele, 2023). As mentioned above, populists tend to reject traditional institutions of knowledge creation and rather value individual experience of the people, leading to a disregard for facts if these are contradicting with personal experience (Sengul, 2019). Similarly, people who engage post-truth rhetoric favor popular truths over scientific expertise, framing people who do refer to expertise in their argumentation as withholding the truth.

This category includes implications or assertions that opponents are hiding (aspects of) the truth and providing counter-knowledge and thereby “restoring” the truth.

2.4.4 Appeals to Emotions

A stylistic choice often applied within post-truth rhetoric is the emphasis of emotions and feelings (Oxford Dictionaries, 2016; Braun, 2019; Eldem, 2025; Fischer, 2019). While it has been established that emotionality in political discourse should not be the only defining characteristic for post-truth rhetoric, it is a common stylistic choice to appeal to the audience’s emotions when politicians evaluate the truthfulness of their opponents and is therefore an aspect that needs to be examined.

Using words with a strong emotional connotation, such as “betrayal”, or depicting circumstances as more tragic than they might actually be to get a reaction from people are examples of an emphasis on emotions. Politicians use this strategy to try to exacerbate the divide between elites and the people to discredit opponents, moralize the debate and stoke negative emotions for elites while fostering positive emotions, such as pride or loyalty, between their supporters (Kluknavská and Eisele, 2023), creating a sense of community and belonging.

Statements that focus on emotionalization of the debate, either by fostering hate, anger and resentment for political opponents or pride, loyalty or nostalgia for co-partisans are included in this category.

2.4.5 Negative Tonality

Lastly, a common characteristic for post-truth rhetoric is the negative tonality of the speaker, emphasizing negative developments and using somewhat apocalyptic language to convey a state of emergency (Kluknavská and Eisele, 2023; Eldem, 2025). Like many of the other characteristics, this stylistic choice is also common within populism. Moreover, a commonly used narrative within this category of post-truth rhetoric, according to Eldem (2025), is the creation of existential threats to the nation through factually questionable statements. The people are depicted as victims of external or internal threats, desperately in need of a savior, reinforcing an us-versus-them thinking in society by creating fear of the other and fostering belonging for one’s own social group (Eldem, 2025).

The subcategories belonging to this post-truth strategy are a moralizing tone, the use of apocalyptic language and the creation of external or internal threats.

2.4.6 Operationalization of Post-Truth Framework

This post-truth framework was created to analyze the use of accusations of lying and further highlight truth contestation in politics, originally applied by Kluknavská and Eisele (2023) in combination with claims analysis, which is not used in this study. Additionally, the framework was adapted for the purposes of my study by adding more subcategories for each post-truth component based on the literature review, summarized in Table 1.

As previously noted, statements nowadays often only need to feel true in order to gain traction with an audience, rather than needing to be supported by factual evidence (Boler and Davis, 2018). Hence, the purpose of this analysis is to highlight how confusing it is, both as a researcher and as a citizen or voter, to determine who is actually and factually correct when accusing others of deceit and/or malicious intent and who is doing so to distract from other issues or confuse the audience. It is not my intention to imply that everyone who accuses others of deception is doing

so to gain power or based on immoral grounds. Unfortunately, the framework cannot be used to identify the speaker’s intention, determining whether this confusion is caused strategically or whether the speaker feels a moral obligation to highlight other people’s attempts at deception.

It is important to add that only the presence of content-related post-truth components will be flagged as post-truth in this analysis, since both negative tonality when speaking about opponents and emotional arguments are quite common in political discourse, and are, on their own, not sufficient to indicate post-truth rhetoric. In addition to that, determining the stylistic choices of speakers requires reading between the lines and often relies on personal interpretation, making it subject to personal bias to a greater extent than the content-related dimensions. Therefore, the stylistic choices will add another layer to the analysis instead of being used to identify post-truth rhetoric.

Table 1. Post-truth rhetoric – analytical framework by Kluknavská and Eisele (2023) with minimal adaptations

Dimension	Post-Truth Component	Reasoning	Categories
Content	Truth Evaluation	opponents or other actors are trying to deceive and manipulate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Accusation of lying - Victims affected by lies - Discrediting critics
Content	Truth Creation	establish own closeness to the truth	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Creation of “objective” and real truth - “Telling it like it is” - Counternarratives - Denial of facts
Content	Truth Restoration	the truth is denied by opponents and other actors, it must be restored	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Creation of counter-knowledge - Truth hidden by opponents
Style	Emotionality		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Focus on positive emotions (pride, loyalty, nostalgia) - Focus on negative emotions (hate, anger, resentment)
Style	Tonality		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Moralizing tone - Apocalyptic language - Creation of external or internal threats

2.5 Post-Truth’s Correlating Phenomena

The following section will explore other troubling phenomena correlating with or caused by post-truth rhetoric in contemporary society, outlining the importance of

this research in current circumstances. Based on this, the potential effects of post-truth rhetoric in Austrian climate politics can be estimated.

2.5.1 Populism

A large portion of post-truth research in different political contexts, for example in Finland and Turkey (e.g.: Ylä-Anttila, 2018; Eldem, 2025), centres around its connection and correlation with populism, which does not necessarily mean that there is evidence of causation. Instead, the two share many similarities in terms of strategies applied ([Section 2.4](#)) and impacts, since both populism and post-truth rhetoric are said to be threats to democracy and democratic deliberation (Eldem, 2025; [Section 2.5.3](#)). According to Waisbord (2018) the need for conflict centred politics in populism necessitates a binary vision of politics, indicating that truth is anchored in social interests, as well as politically owned and produced (Waisbord, 2018). Facts are not seen as neutral entities that can be verified through a specific process, but rather a consistency of the system they were produced in and thereby divided from “actual truth”. Academia is therefore often renounced on grounds of only giving voice to the truth of “the elites”, which, to a populist, is different from the truth of “the people” (Kluknavská and Eisele, 2023). According to Durnová (2019) rejecting science, and thereby rejecting knowledge produced by people that are believed to have a privileged position, can give people a sense of empowerment. This style of politics exploits those who feel left behind from previous governments (Suiter, 2016), inspiring people to choose their own truth aligning with their ideology, which cannot be proven to be incorrect (Waisbord, 2018). According to Waisbord (2018), when a populist’s version of truth is challenged, they tend to believe that this is done because of the critics’ own ideology, rather than their commitment to facts.

2.5.2 Ideology and Polarization

As a social species, group identity and belonging are integral to our sense of self (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). Iyengar et al (2019) claim that individuals therefore often view themselves as representatives of specific socioeconomic or cultural categories rather than as someone who has a unique set of opinions and perspectives. Political parties often form based on these socioeconomic and cultural categories (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). These two factors - individuals basing their sense of self on socioeconomic and cultural categories and parties forming based on these categories - lead to party affiliation becoming an integral part of one's identity, resulting in a division between an in-group (co-partisans) and an out-group (opposing group) (Iyengar et al, 2019). The more significant party affiliation becomes for people's sense of identity, the bigger this divide gets. Furthermore, Iyengar et al (2019) claim that other social identities increasingly converge with ideology and partisanship in the US, leading to a decline of cross cutting identities (Mason, 2015). Since there are fewer conflicting ideas within the in-group, it

becomes easier for them to make generalized statements about the out-group (Iyengar et al, 2019).

These deeply entrenched social identities revolving around ideology and party affiliation can increase hostility between differing groups, leading to affective polarization. Iyengar et al (2019) define affective polarization as a general animosity between people who vote for different parties, arguing that affective polarization is "an outgrowth of partisan social identity" (Iyengar et al, 2019, p.130). This leads to opposing political groups attributing positive characteristics to co-partisans and to viewing the opposing group negatively (Iyengar et al, 2012). It should be noted that affective polarization is not necessarily rooted in ideological polarization, as affective polarization can increase while ideological differences decrease (Iyengar et al, 2019).

Moral sentiments theorists argue that the same mechanisms that, through evolution, enabled in-group cooperation prevents out-group cooperation (Haidt, 2012; Greene, 2013). Arias-Maldonado (2020) states that humans naturally seek to confirm pre-existing beliefs, which makes it harder to consider opposing perspectives. Survey data from the US shows that affective polarization affects social relationships, as people are more likely to build friendships or other types of relationships with like-minded individuals (Iyengar et al, 2019). This lack of social interactions between groups with differing identities may increase affective polarization, since it becomes easier to ascribe negative characteristics to the entire out-group when there are no close relationships with anyone from that group. Furthermore, there is no space for shared meaning-making, forming a vicious cycle that reinforces itself continuously.

There are different opinions on the relationship between post-truth and affective polarization within the scientific community. Research indicates that knowledge that is not aligned with or even threatens partisan ideology is usually disregarded or rejected, as it is assumed that it is biased in its own way (e.g. Arias-Maldonado, 2020; Waisbord, 2018). According to Fischer (2019), laypersons, especially in situations where knowledge is uncertain, tend to decide what to believe based on the social process behind truth production, meaning they decide based on who is presenting the knowledge and what social group they belong to.

Social groups therefore affect what knowledge is accepted as true and what is rejected, as both social groups and accepted knowledge are based on shared meaning and feeling, which are not open to democratic deliberation. Rietdijk (2024) and Arias-Maldonado (2020) argue that those communities produce their own truths, the content of which matter less than the feelings attached to them, and automatically distrust people outside of their group. Arias-Maldonado (2020) suggests that post-truth is therefore simply a symptom of the human condition of being unable to objectively perceive reality, as the idealized use of reason is hindered by a range of psychological and emotional factors. Similarly, van Aelst (2017) argues that polarization has caused a prioritization of information that is aligned with ideology rather than factually correct. McIntyre (2018) states that post-truth is not a lack of truth but rather, in a post-truth world, facts are secondary to

political opinions. Conrad et al (2023) argue that post-truth has shaped political discourse to a point where identity affirmation and epistemic polarization are prioritized over evidence based reasoning and democratic deliberation. There seems to be no clear answer about which – post-truth rhetoric or polarization – came first and fostered the other, however the two concepts are understood to correlate and affect each other. Either way, a political arena characterized by affective polarization and identity affirmation rather than evidence based reasoning does not tend to be conducive of constructive democratic deliberation (Eldem, 2025).

2.5.3 Threats to Democracy and Democratic Deliberation

Many scholars have expressed concerns about the foundation of deliberative democracies crumbling beneath the current climate of mis- and disinformation, as well as propaganda, in politics (e.g. Durnová, 2019; Lerma-Mayer, 2025; Arias-Maldonado, 2020). Waisbord (2018) states that populism in its essence goes against many cornerstones of democracy, such as the demand for transparency and accountability, public access to information, the need for fact-based and reasoned debate, trust in institutions, the search for consensus and the centrality of deliberation. These cornerstones are also affected by the emergence of post-truth.

Firstly, transparency and public access to information are hindered by politicians being dishonest or accusing each other of being untruthful, therefore making it difficult for the audience to determine who can be trusted. According to Rietdijk (2024), post-truth rhetoric is similar to a type of emotional manipulation referred to as gaslighting, which is intended to make its victim doubt their own judgement as well as their perception of reality. As a result of gaslighting, victims tend to become increasingly dependent on the manipulator to provide a sense of security and strong leadership, since it leaves people isolated and losing trust in their own ability to determine the truth (Rietdijk, 2024). Secondly, a fact-based and reasoned debate would require an agreement on the process of verifying truth claims and what counts as a fact, which is not given in post-truth politics according to Waisbord (2018). The effects of ideology and polarization on the acceptance or rejection knowledge and facts, which also affects the possibility of fact-based debates, is elaborated on in [Chapter 2.5.2](#). Thirdly, post-truth erodes trust in institutions traditionally concerned with truth-telling, as well as governmental institutions (Boler and Davis, 2018). Lastly, reconciling different interests by reaching a consensus or a viable compromise through deliberation is one of the main responsibilities of a parliament (Ilie, 2006). A government based on democratic deliberation is widely considered the most legitimate form of governance, according to Ilie (2016). Moser (2016) adds that deliberation can foster understanding and empathy, increase willingness to compromise and change attitudes, which would be crucial for reaching a compromise to solve complex societal problems. However, Ilie (2006; 2016) also states that a major incentive for members of parliament to engage in debates is the opportunity to use language strategically to gain more power and establish their own credibility, as well as affecting public opinion. Abusive or accusatory language, she argues, is used by parliamentarians to undermine the opponent's moral profile while promoting their

own. In addition to that, she states that the collaborative work parliamentarians engage in establishes political alliances between different parties.

According to Foucault (2008), the pledge to act on truth is what makes politicians' power legitimate. If that truth is questioned and contested, the politicians' power could be delegitimized in the eyes of the audience. Ilie (2016) states that because of the increased transparency and visibility of parliamentary debates, as they are publicly available on the internet and often shared on several media sites, their impact on voter's perceptions have increased, further exacerbating the negative consequences outlined above.

While most researchers view post-truth as a threat to a functional democracy, Fischer (2019) argues that post-truth is a symptom of a post-democratic decline when referring to the situation in the US. An in-depth analysis of the evolution of democracies throughout time would be needed to prove a "decline" of democracy. However, there seems to be a consensus within research on contemporary politics that the post-truth phenomenon is hindering democratic deliberation and thereby threatening the functionality of democracy and the parliament.

3. Methodology

3.1 Data Collection

This study follows an interpretative qualitative design that is based on document analysis, using an established framework as a basis for thematic analysis. To answer the research questions I conducted archival research to find transcripts of parliamentary debates concerning climate action or policy suggestions addressing environmental issues, which are available on the website of the Austrian parliament. By looking for key themes within climate change discourse, such as renewable energy, warming temperatures and increased extreme weather events, I identified climate-related content (summarized in Table 2). The government elected in September of 2024 was sworn in on the 24th of October 2024 (Parlament Österreich, 2024), which marks the beginning of the data collection. All of the transcripts from that point onwards, up until the 25th of February 2026, which is when the data collection process started, were scanned for environmental or climate related discussions and subsequently selected based on relevance to the subject at hand. In this case, discussions about climate politics were handpicked for analysis. A total of 10 documents, which vary in length and topics, were identified as relevant to this study. The transcripts contained 19 relevant sections including a total of 283 speeches by different members of parliament belonging to one of the five major parties, as well as interruptions and interjections by other members of parliament, which often include accusations of untruthfulness or deception and are therefore highly relevant to this study.

3.2 Data Analysis

The transcripts were analyzed using thematic coding and analysis. Thematic analysis is, according to Robson (2002) a generic approach, which is quite flexible and not necessarily linked to a specific theory. Due to its flexibility, a major disadvantage of this type of analysis is that there are many potential focus points within the data (Robson, 2002), which can be overwhelming to a novice researcher. In order to address that disadvantage, a predetermined framework (Table 1) was used, which was established by Kluknavská and Eisele (2023) and slightly adapted for the purpose of this study, to guide the initial coding. This framework is well-situated in the literature on post-truth and covers the most important aspects of post truth found during the research process. In order to stay consistent in the coding, a codebook as described by Creswell and Creswell (2018) was used, clearly defining codes, as well as providing examples of when to use and not to use each code. The coding software NVivo was used, with every overarching category of the post-truth framework, as well as the various subcategories, as codes. In addition to that, every

party represented a separate code to simplify the collection of results at the end. The coding process itself followed the suggestions for thematic coding from both Creswell and Creswell (2018) and Robson (2002). Firstly, the collected data was organized and prepared for analysis by thoroughly reading the transcripts, as suggested by Creswell and Creswell (2018) and Robson (2002). Secondly, the framework by Kluknavská and Eisele (2023) (Table 1) was used as a starting point while also being open to find other themes, which led to the creation of several subcategories to the subcategory “discrediting critics” to provide a better understanding of the grounds for discrediting opponents. The coding process includes personal interpretation and reading between the lines, as well as looking for explicitly stated themes. At this point, I was cautious to avoid misinterpretation due to my potential personal bias. To address this issue, I kept a field diary to make sure my interpretations could be traced back to the data, as Creswell and Creswell (2018) recommend. Thirdly, this process was repeated for several datasets, with every transcript counting as a separate dataset, to then cluster codes into coherent and overarching themes, as suggested by Creswell and Creswell (2018). Lastly, all of the data was analyzed several times to ensure the consistency of codes, as well as allowing for re-coding if necessary, as both Robson (2002) and Creswell and Creswell (2018) recommend. Following the identification and clustering of the different themes within the established framework, the rhetorical practices within these categories were analyzed to provide grounds for the interpretation of the data. The preferred strategies of the different parties were analyzed and compared to understand the pervasiveness of post-truth rhetoric in Austrian climate politics.

3.3 Data Interpretation

The analysis and the coding helped provide the necessary understanding of post-truth rhetoric in Austrian politics to guide the interpretation and discussion. By keeping a field diary, I was able to note themes and impressions of the general political environment in regards to climate mitigation in Austria. Moreover, these impressions guided the interpretation of the data and made it possible to connect the findings to the literature on post-truth overall and enabled me to narrow down my literature review to discuss the most relevant possible causes and effects of post-truth for the case of Austria in particular. The results are presented by first giving an overall impression of the use of post-truth rhetoric in the Austrian parliament, followed by an in-depth description about every party’s use of post-truth strategies. These results are interpreted and connected to the wider literature on post-truth in [Section 5](#).

3.4 Reflections on Methodological Choices and Resulting Limitations

Initially, other data sources were explored to answer the research questions. In particular, I planned to study social media posts by the different parties, since it is commonly believed that the digital revolution of communication, including the rise of social media, has caused or at least correlates with the rise of mis- and disinformation in modern day society (Egelhofer and Lecheler, 2019; Laybats and Tredinnick, 2016). However, during the data collection process, it came to my attention that most of the accusations of untruthfulness made on social media were related to other parties breaking promises made during the election, which was not the intended focus of this study. Additionally, a large portion of the social media posts of the different parties were excerpts of parliamentary debates. Therefore, the transcripts of parliamentary debates could provide context and more detail to the social media posts and were chosen for analysis. While this does exclude an important arena for post-truth arguments in general, I argue that due to the large overlap between data sources and the provided context from the transcripts the research process became both easier and more comprehensive.

The study is limited by solely focusing on climate politics. The post-truth phenomenon seems to be all-encompassing and pervasive through many different political topics, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, which is the focus of a lot of research. The choice of themes limits the conclusions to a very specific aspect of politics and only assumptions can be made about the overall political climate. Unfortunately, however, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to analyze all political discourse happening in Austria.

Additionally, the choice of the framework limits the study. No conclusions can be drawn on whether there is an actual lack of truth in Austrian politics, as many commonly used definitions of post-truth state (Rietdijk, 2024; Duncombe, 2019; Fischer, 2019). Since it is frequently noted that politics has never been an arena defined by truth (Arendt, 1972; Durnová, 2019; Arias-Maldonado, 2020), it seems fruitful to examine how truth-related claims are made by politicians to undermine political opponents instead, which this framework has allowed me to do. Furthermore, this framework addresses the valid criticism the term post-truth has gotten, such as the assumption of the existence of a singular truth and the blame that is frequently put on citizens for believing supposedly evident lies, while still addressing the most important aspects of post-truth politics from the literature. Rather than attempting to fact-check every single statement, I aim to highlight how confusing it is to be the audience of these parliamentary debates.

Furthermore, the chosen timeframe affected the results of the study. The data collection started right after the new government was formed, creating a divide between the ruling and oppositional parties, which possibly affected the amount and type of post-truth rhetoric used in parliamentary debates. Likely, choosing to analyze parliamentary debates right before the election or in the middle of the legislative term would have brought different results. The effects of this choice permeate the results and were considered in the interpretation of the data.

Lastly, in interpretative studies it is necessary for the researcher to be reflexive about their own personal bias when analyzing the data. As someone who studied environmental science for their entire academic career, I am somewhat partial to parties that aim to actively prioritize climate mitigation. In order to address the effects of this personal bias, I used a field diary to reflect about my personal background and how it could affect this analysis. Throughout the coding process it came to my attention that my partiality to parties that attempt to address climate change was somewhat negated by their use of post-truth rhetoric in parliamentary debates, making me very critical of any and all parties represented in the Austrian parliament.

4. Results

This chapter presents the results and analysis of the gathered data. Table 2 provides an overview of the topics and policies concerning climate and environmental action discussed in parliament, as well as an indication of how the different parties voted on the suggested policy. The purpose of this table is to provide an understanding of the context of the results, it is not a result in itself. Furthermore, the voting does not indicate the level of disagreement between the members of parliament. Especially the Green Party and the FPA sometimes voted the same, while expressing opposing reasonings behind their decision. First, an overall impression of the parliamentary debates and the parliamentarians use of post-truth rhetoric will be provided. Additionally, an in-depth description of each party's favored post-truth strategies will be given.

Table 2. Discussion Topics and the parties' stances

Topics	Details	Government Parties			Opposition	
		APP	SDP	NEOS	Green	FPA
Budget Cuts for Climate Action	reduction of climate budget from 5 to 2 million Euros	+	+	+	-	+
Removal CO2 Taxes	FPA petitioned to have CO2 taxes removed completely	-	-	-	-	+
Law against Destruction of New Goods	law against the destruction of unused and sent-back items	+	+	+	-	-
Electricity Policy Changes	several changes made to current policies to lower electricity costs	+	+	+	+	-
Russian Gas Dependency	FPA wants Russian gas for cheaper electricity prices	-	-	-	-	+
Lobautunnel	a tunnel originally planned in the 70s is now suggested to be built through a nature reserve	+	+	~	-	+
Deposit Return Scheme	there is room for improvement but it is working, FPA claims it is too complex and lacks transparency	+	+	+	+	-
No to Nuclear Energy Greenwashing	based on a petition, Austrian government has no legal authority since the policy in question concerns EU laws	+	+	+	+	+

Climate Report	no direct policy suggestions, discussion about the current state	x	x	x	x	x
Circular Economy	removal of legal hindrances to reusing what is considered waste	+	+	+	-	+
Law against Food Waste	waste of resources while prices are high	+	+	+	+	+

4.1 Overview

A large portion of post-truth rhetoric in the Austrian parliament in the observed time period stemmed from being at blamed for the current state of Austria - which was widely regarded as a disaster - and the resulting denial of the accused party. While the APP and the Green Party formed the previous government, they were not the only ones being blamed for the crises in Austria. The SDP and NEOS, for example, received a part of the blame for the budget crisis since they were in the regional government in Vienna, where allegedly most of the budget deficit came from. Furthermore, the FPA is currently represented in five regional governments and was criticized for allegedly governing purely for their own self-interest and neglecting the people. This is exemplified by one of their members giving herself a pay raise of 10.000 Euros per year, while cutting nurses' salaries, among many other instances of cutting public funding. All of the parties in parliament generally countered this blame with some form of an accusation of misrepresenting facts, lying or manipulating the public. These accusations of untruthfulness are made with varying degrees of subtlety and hostility, ranging from statements such as "that is an interesting discrepancy in your story" or sarcastically stating "well this is an informed person" to "[that is] basically a conspiracy theory à la FPA".

Apart from that, accusations of untruthfulness were often based on differing predictions of the effects of the discussed policy or strategy on the economy, the environment and the people. Even though these predictions were most commonly based on the speaker's mere assumptions, they were expressed and rejected rather confidently. One of the few examples of a party claiming to know the effect of a policy based on scientific studies was the Green Party stating that academic studies showed that adding roads in areas with a lot of traffic would only increase the amount of cars. The other parties, in response, accused them of being untruthful, rejecting or ignoring the cited studies, claiming that adding more roads would be the only way to solve traffic issues in that area based on their own assumptions.

Generally speaking, there did not seem to be much debate surrounding the facts about climate change among the members of parliament, which was somewhat surprising due to the amount of research about post-truth in regard to climate denial.

One notable exception were some members of the FPA, who expressed that while they believe in climate change, they doubt the human impact on accelerating climate change, since it has always existed. It is, however, unclear whether all 57 members of parliament from the FPA share those views.

Despite the general agreement on the existence of climate change and the importance of nature, debates surrounding these topics seemed to spark a lot of conflict. The parties in parliament all claimed to have a similar – if not the same – conception of what constituted a good society: economic growth, wealthy citizens, a strong industrial sector, low inflation, low prices and an intact or beautiful environment. However, differing priorities and differing opinions on the best way to address an issue led to debates lasting into the morning hours, which at times even became quite hostile and disrespectful. Most commonly named as the reason for rejecting ambitious climate policies was the economy, since Austria has been in a recession for three years in a row. Besides waiting for better times financially, a common narrative was that Austria needs to invest in innovation and better technological advancements before implementing new policies or mitigation strategies.

It is possible to request a so-called “actual correction” during parliamentary debates, which allows for another speaker to be inserted in the planned schedule to correct the previous speaker, formally stating that they were not telling the truth. However, this was a rather rare occurrence in these debates. Accusations of lying and manipulation made outside of these “actual corrections” were rarely expressed directly in the Austrian parliament, since that is generally frowned upon and would result in a “call to order” in which the presiding president of the parliament, who is supposed to be impartial, would ask the accuser to take it back. Rather than stopping these accusations from being made, however, this resulted in an increase in creativity while making the accusation, such as phrasing it as “that is untrue” rather than “you are lying”, or relying on implications of untruthfulness. One member of parliament even stated “If I didn’t know I would receive a call to order for using the word ‘lie’, I would probably say it’s a blatant lie, but I’ll say: It’s simply outrageous! It is untrue!”, finding a way to accuse someone of lying but avoiding accountability. In addition to that, intentionality behind being untruthful was rarely stated or implied, potentially also as a result of these rules. Furthermore, many of these accusations were made during other people’s speaking time by yelling and interrupting speeches.

Another aspect that was notable, even though it is not connected to post-truth rhetoric, was that while all parties are allowed to make policy suggestions or suggestions for policy changes or amendments, these were rarely accepted if they were not presented by the ruling parties. Although this behavior is not included in

the framework, it seems to represent the parties' attitudes towards political opponents and their suggestions, painting a fuller picture of the political climate in climate politics in Austria.

Overall, it can be said that Austrian parliamentarians heavily relied on casting blame and finger-pointing, occurring exclusively between governing parties and their opposition for both the previous and the current government, which led to an omnipresent negative tonality, often accompanied by appeals to emotions. These post-truth elements were so frequent, in fact, that it was rare to encounter a speech that did not include a single one of the categories of the post-truth framework. This environment of constant accusations of blame, untruthfulness and deception can be very confusing for citizens, since politicians are discussing policies of up to several hundred pages of legal jargon, the effects of which are most likely beyond the understanding of the average citizen.

4.2 Austrian People's Party and their Use of Post-Truth Rhetoric

The Austrian People's Party (APP) gave a total of 67 speeches in the observed time frame, including speeches from their appointed ministers. Despite being the strongest party in the previous government and appointing the Minister for Finance in the previous legislative term, the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the NEOS did not blame the APP for the current budget crisis. Therefore, the APP mainly accused the current opposition, consisting of the Green Party and the Freedom Party Austria (FPA), of lying. Instead of taking responsibility for the various crises Austria is facing, the APP tended to cite their efforts to avoid these crises during the previous and the current legislative term. In addition to the accusations of lying, another one of their favored post-truth strategies was to discredit their opponents. The Green Party was often accused of only acting based on their ideology rather than factual evidence, as well as being ignorant of facts. One member of the APP even directly stated their belief that the Green Party was in cahoots with various well-respected universities to manipulate studies regarding the impacts of the tunnel and surrounding streets that are supposed to be constructed in a nature reserve close to Vienna. Efforts to discredit the FPA were based on accusations of being selfish and spreading or believing fake news.

4.3 Social Democratic Party and their Use of Post-Truth Rhetoric

Similarly to the APP, the SDP only targeted oppositional parties with their accusations of untruthfulness in their 57 speeches. Their favored post-truth strategy was accusations of lying, which were mainly in response to being blamed for the

current financial crisis by the Green Party. In addition to that, the SDP often accused the Green Party of lying when the two parties disagreed on the possible effects of the discussed policy. Another favored strategy was to discredit their critics. The Green Party was discredited on the basis of only acting on ideology and often exaggerating facts about climate change. In addition to that, the SDP often corrected speakers of the Green Party subtly, phrasing the accusation of untruthfulness as “you seem to have forgotten, that actually...”. The FPA, on the other hand, was often accused of malicious intentions, based on claims that they only serve themselves in the regional governments where they are in power, and suggesting that the FPA was known for dishonest arguments. Furthermore, the SDP spent a large portion of their speeches blaming the Green Party for the various economic crises Austria is facing and emphasizing that the SDP had nothing to do with them and should therefore not be blamed.

4.4 New Austria and Liberal Forum and their Use of Post-Truth Rhetoric

The members of the NEOS gave a total of 41 speeches and, much like the other governing parties, focused on the opposition when making accusations of untruthfulness and providing counter knowledge, which were their favored post-truth strategies. The NEOS, much like the other coalition members, blamed the Green Party for being for the state of the country, even though the APP had been the more powerful party in the previous coalition and appointed the Minister for Finance. Furthermore, parliamentarians representing NEOS during the previous legislative term agreed to the budget that was set, which they now blamed for the economic crises. The strategy of counter knowledge was mainly applied by the NEOS to correct speakers from the FPA or the Green Party, specifically as a response to being blamed for certain developments or to differing assumptions on the effects of the proposed policy.

4.5 Green Party and their Use of Post-Truth Rhetoric

The main post-truth strategies employed in the 53 speeches of the Green Party were providing counter knowledge and accusations of lying. They did not seem to have a specific target for their accusations, they were aimed at all parties at least to some extent. Many of the Green Party’s accusations were in defense of other parties blaming them for the current crises in Austria and, similar to the other parties, a lot of corrections were made in the light of policy effect predictions by other speakers. The majority of their accusations of untruthfulness were made by Leonore Gewessler, the current party leader and former minister responsible for climate action, among other areas. As the previous minister for climate action she was blamed for using too much of the state’s money on funding the energy transition

and other climate mitigation projects, even though all parties had previously agreed to the budget.

Furthermore, the party's biggest disagreement with the other parties was the tunnel project in the nature reserve (see Table 2), which was the topic of three separate urgent requests for deliberation of the Green Party, leading to a lot of use of post-truth strategies on either side of the argument. The Green Party commissioned a study evaluating four possible solutions, including expanding public transport services, for that specific area. That study showed that building the tunnel through the nature reserve and constructing connecting highways in the area was both the least cost-efficient and most environmentally destructive solution to the problem at hand. All of these studies were either rejected or ignored by the other parties during the discussion.

The changes made to the existing electricity policy (see Table 2) required a majority of two thirds, which led to the government parties collaborating with the Green Party to negotiate a compromise of the differing interests. Despite working on this policy together, the Green Party was quite hostile towards the governing parties in their speeches concerning these policy changes.

4.6 Freedom Party Austria and their Use of Post-Truth Rhetoric

Without a quantitative analysis of the data, it is difficult to determine the extent of each party's use of post-truth rhetoric, yet it was still noticeable that the FPA, in their 65 speeches, relied on all of these tactics more heavily than any other party. While claiming to care about the environment and nature, they also referred to any sort of climate action as "climate-" or "eco-communism" and a "betrayal" of the people, the industry and the economy of Austria, referring to those in favor of climate action as "fanatics". One of their main arguments for not believing in anthropogenic climate change is that climate change has always existed and that the climate cannot be "destroyed", making climate mitigation measures unnecessary. Moreover, one of the speakers claimed that reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 90% by 2040 would lead to reducing the country's economic performance and prosperity by 90%, making the EU the "laughing stock of the world" since other countries, specifically the US and China, do not subjugate themselves to emission targets and can therefore have a prosperous society while the EU crumbles. Their argument continues with the claim that the only countries currently fulfilling EU emission targets are Somalia and Congo, stating that we will "end up like them" if we continue on this path. The parliamentarians from the FPA fraction claim that climate action is to blame for most of the issues Austria is currently facing, including, but not limited to, the state debt and budget crisis, inflation and high

energy prices. Furthermore, they stated that the Green Party is an “ideologically blinded minority”, who are not to blame for current crises since they “actually believe this nonsense”, despite all of the other parties showing attempts at mitigating climate change. They did, however, also imply that the study on the Lobautunnel (see Table 2) provided by the Green Party was not to be trusted, since the universities conducting the studies were funded by the Green Party or organizations associated with the Green Party, stating “he who pays the piper calls the tune”.

While they still blame the Green Party for supposedly cowing the APP into supporting climate action, they mostly blame the APP for being in cahoots with “the communists” of the European People’s Party, specifically Ursula von der Leyen, and thereby betraying Austrian citizens. Furthermore, the FPA claimed that Austria had “sacrificed a large part of sovereignty at the altar of European centralism”, often implying or outright stating that the EU was crippling the national economy and industry with pesky laws about climate mitigation and environmental action. The members of the FPA made all of these claims with absolute certainty, often implying or stating that others were unable or unwilling to see the truth. These instances were coded as “telling it like it is” or “counter knowledge”, since they often made these claims by contradicting someone else, which were their favored strategies. However, they employed other strategies within the post-truth framework to similar extents. For example, they also often attempted to discredit the APP, by claiming that they were corrupt, engaging in political patronage and only cared about being in power, as well as holding on to their positions in the ministry and as chancellor. Ironically, they often stated this while calling for re-elections so their party leader could finally become chancellor.

The FPA was often accused of only disagreeing for disagreement’s sake, especially during the debate about the newly implemented deposit return scheme (see Table 2). Before its implementation the FPA brought forward a policy suggestion to introduce this very scheme, which, at the time, was not accepted by the ruling government. Now that it has been introduced, however, the FPA has changed their mind and is now against this system, as they claim it is taking money out of people’s pockets and too complex for citizens to understand. Furthermore, they tended to disagree with other speakers even if they voted the same way as the party of said speaker.

5. Discussion

The following section connects the findings of the Austrian case of post-truth politics to the academic field of post-truth. It follows the same structure as [Section 2.5](#), discussing the connection of post-truth rhetoric to populism, polarization and democratic deliberation, situating the Austrian case in the wider literature. [Section 5.4](#) will focus on possible motivations and intentions of parliamentarians to employ post-truth rhetoric. Lastly, [Section 5.5](#) considers possible impacts of this political climate on Austria's climate action plans.

5.1 Populism

A large share of the research on post-truth based on different political contexts, for example in Finland and Turkey (e.g.: Ylä-Anttila, 2018; Eldem, 2025), connects these strategies directly to populist leaders and parties suggesting a strong connection between the two. However, the literature that solely focuses on the affinity between post-truth and populism employs definitions of post-truth denoting a lack of possibility for truth creation or a lack of truth overall (e.g. Waisbord, 2018; Eldem, 2025). The FPA – a known populist party – is the only one in the Austrian parliament to reject a consensus of the scientific community on anthropogenic climate change (Fischer, 2019). This implies that they reject scientific processes and methods as a suitable means for truth production and verification of truth claims overall, while other parties do not seem to share that view. Applying Waisbord's (2018) definition of post-truth – the lack of shared norms to verify truth claims – for the purpose of this analysis would therefore have led to different results in terms of the connection between populist parties and post-truth rhetoric.

This study employs a different definition, however, focusing on the speaker's attempt to solidify their own closeness to truth by attacking their opponent's. While the FPA used post-truth rhetoric most frequently out of all parties in parliament, the other parties engaged in those tactics enough to assume that, at least in Austria, post-truth rhetoric is omnipresent in climate politics, rather than only attributable to populist leaders.

Therefore, the rise of populism in Austria does not seem to have been caused by the use of post-truth rhetoric. Suiter's (2016) claim that populism exploits those who feel left behind by previous governments provides an alternative explanation for the rise of populism in Austria. The country has been experiencing severe economic crises in the past years and Austrian citizens are suffering from the inflation and resulting increase in prices, which may have led them to believe that a change in government would solve their issues.

The exploitation of a social constructivist approach to truth – that truths are partial and embedded in the social context of their production – is commonly associated with populism (Waisbord, 2018). In the Austrian case, however, all of the parties represented in parliament frequently implied or stated that their version of the truth was the only “objective” truth out there. Their opponents are said to be either misguided in their assumptions due to their ideology or actively trying to manipulate citizens with their statements. The only party who engaged in the classic anti-elite rhetoric associated with populism (Waisbord, 2018) was the Freedom Party of Austria, suggesting that not all parties can be categorized as populists.

5.2 Ideology and Polarization

The claims of Fischer (2019) and Arias-Maldonado (2020), who suggest that knowledge that is not aligned with personal belief, bias or ideology is most commonly rejected or questioned, seem to be confirmed by this analysis. The parliamentarians tended to believe in facts that supported their personal agenda and policy goals, rejecting science, facts or statements that would prove them wrong. For example, the research presented by the Green Party, which showed that the tunnel and connecting highways through the nature reserve was the least cost-effective and environmentally friendly of four possible solutions to traffic issues in the area, was questioned by both the APP and the FPA. Both parties accused the Green Party of influencing the results of the study, questioning the integrity of research done by two very well-respected Austrian universities. It is unclear whether they believed their own accusations of untruthfulness to be accurate and therefore chose to believe facts aligned with their ideology, or whether the accusations were an attempt at discrediting the Green Party and garner support for their own policy suggestion. The APP and the FPA – whether intentionally or unintentionally – encouraged science denial based on incompatibility with personal ideology, by stating that preferred research results can and have been bought from these two universities. Academia and the truths it produces can and should be examined critically (Durnová, 2019), especially when the funding comes from actors with a vested interest in the results. However, in this case the validity of the results were not critically examined, but rather immediately discredited solely on the basis of their funding. This decreases trust in these institutions and could lead to society at large questioning the integrity of any research the universities have produced in the past and will produce in the future.

Generally, disagreement was voiced when the statement made was not in favor of the speaker’s policy suggestion and most often performed by questioning or outright rejecting the truth of said statement. Furthermore, disagreement, and the following accusation of untruthfulness, was often accompanied by anger and hostility on both ends of the discussion, suggesting that ideological affirmation is

valued highly by parliamentarians. Interestingly, the parties seemed to believe that ideology and facts were completely separate in theory, indicated by their frequent accusations of acting based on ideology as opposed to acting on factual evidence. It is quite ironic that all parties tended to only accept the truth of statements that agreed with their own policy suggestion, and therefore with their ideological conception of a good society. Further evidence of parliamentarians, especially those of the coalition, basing their decision-making on their ideological conception of a good society, rather than careful democratic deliberation, was the fact that they predominantly voted in favor of policies of their own or their political allies (see Table 2). Another possibility is that the rejection of policies brought by opposing parties was done as a form of political posturing and presenting a united front so shortly after forming the coalition. As Ilie (2006) argues, collaboration is often used in parliament to establish political alliances. The opposing parties often showed hostility and voiced disagreement even voting in favor of suggestions of the governing parties. This further suggests that the Green Party and the FPA wanted to use these debates to differentiate themselves from the ruling parties, making it known that they were still representing the interests of the social groups of their voters. Analyzing transcripts of parliamentary debates during another timeframe, especially in a time with upcoming elections, could have led to different results, as political alliances would then have to be renegotiated.

It is difficult to assess whether polarization was a consequence or correlating issue of post-truth rhetoric in Austrian society based on the analyzed data, since it only encompasses statements of politicians. However, it was clear that members of all five parties sought to discredit their opponents by associating negative characteristics with them. It is unclear whether they believed their own statements to be true, therefore showing signs of affective polarization at least within the parliament, or whether this was a strategy simply to gain the support of a potential audience. The general hostility and anger during these debates, especially between opposing parties and the government, suggests that there is animosity between the different parties, which is the defining characteristic of affective polarization according to Iyengar et al (2019). Even when working on a policy suggestion together, having negotiated and compromised in meetings outside of parliamentary debates, the Green Party and the governing parties showed hostility towards each other in parliament. This confirms that affective polarization can increase even with little ideological difference, as Iyengar et al (2019) suggest.

The fact that members of the coalition never accused each other of untruthfulness or lying indicates that the use of post-truth rhetoric was tied to political posturing and presenting opponents in a negative light, which could foster affective polarization. Since the analysis does not look into voters' perceptions of the discredited politicians, it is unclear whether these statements have a lasting effect

on polarization in the country. However, Ilie (2016) argues that with increasing public access to parliamentary debates, the impact they have on the audience's beliefs increases as well. Since these debates are highly publicized, it can be assumed that the way parliamentarians handle disagreements and generally interact with each other does foster affective polarization in society. The effects of this type of post-truth rhetoric in parliament and affective polarization in Austrian society should be studied further to establish whether there is evidence of correlation or causation.

Assuming that in these debates either the accuser or the accused was telling the truth and assuming there even was one truth to be told, it would be near impossible to determine that truth in most cases. Some of the accusations happened in response to things that had allegedly occurred or had been said by specific people, in which case fact-checking could technically help to provide some clarity. However, even as a researcher spending all working hours on this subject, I struggled with knowing who was telling the truth. This shows that voters, most of whom have a full time job and/or other responsibilities, would probably not have the resources to spend time on trying to find out who was being truthful in these debates. It makes sense that this political climate leads citizens to believe whoever follows a similar ideology or whoever is most trusted due to their social standing. While other definitions of post-truth sometimes imply that citizens are to blame for believing lying politicians (Hannon, 2023), this analysis shows that – at least in the Austrian case – it is close to impossible to know who is actually telling the truth. Placing the blame on the audience rather than the speaker who is actively perpetuating post-truth rhetoric is problematic and unhelpful, as Braun (2019) rightfully points out. It is hardly the citizens' fault that the parliamentarians choose to debate in the way they do, since none of the parties seem to bring forward politicians that do not engage in post-truth rhetoric and thereby leave citizens without an alternative. Furthermore, the sheer amount of truth-related claims made in the Austrian parliament does not, as Frankfurt (2005) suggests, imply a lack of importance of truth, but rather the willingness of politicians to abuse truth claims to undermine the opposition and thereby foster affective polarization.

5.3 Democracy and Democratic Deliberation

The parliament is supposed to be a political arena where, through careful and democratic deliberation, the best or most suitable solution to the problem in question is found by reaching a consensus or compromise (Ilie, 2006). There seemed to be quite little deliberation happening during the debates around different policy suggestions for climate mitigation and environmental protection. Rather, the different parties made policy suggestions that were deliberated and formulated beforehand, which were then presented in parliament and followed by a discussion

characterized by accusations of untruthfulness and attempts at discrediting opponents. Entering debates and democratic deliberation necessitate the participants to be open to change their mind when presented with a superior argument, which did not seem to be the case in Austrian climate politics in the observed time frame. Instead, it seemed as if the members of parliament had formed their opinions and beliefs prior to the discussion, leading to attempts at convincing the audience that the speaker's own party was correct and whoever disagreed was simply wrong. This political climate is not indicative of deliberation, but rather shows attempts of convincing the audience that the speaker's own suggestion is the best one and therefore, their own party should be voted for in the future. Affective polarization makes deliberation more difficult (Eldem, 2025), which might be one of the reasons for this lack of deliberation. It seems that the main goal of parliamentary politicians is to get reelected, as Ilie (2006; 2016) states, parliamentary debates are used as a tool to solidify power and undermine opponents. While it is the parliament's primary responsibility to deliberate on possible solutions to society's issues, it is questionable whether the political system is set up to foster deliberation.

Furthermore, the parliamentarians do not provide a good example for citizens of how to handle disagreement in a healthy way. They often not only became angry and hostile, but they also do not seem to be able to even engage with disagreement without attempting to discredit either the statement itself or the person making it. Yelling out accusations of untruthfulness during another person's speaking time is unprofessional and should not represent the standards for political debate. Even though not interrupting others as they speak would seem like an obvious guideline for proper etiquette, it seems that these interruptions have been completely normalized in parliamentary debates. This could either lead to the audience being disillusioned, as the people who are supposed to lead the country cannot even follow common conversational norms, or to the normalization of this behavior in wider society.

The question about whether this situation is a symptom of a post-democratic decline, as Fischer (2019) suggests is the case in the US, or whether it is a threat to functional democracy, however, remains unanswered. The amount and extent of post-truth rhetoric present in the debates surrounding climate action in the Austrian parliament is not indicative or conducive of a functioning democracy. Several of the cornerstones of democracies are threatened, such as the demand for transparency and accountability public access to information (Rietdijk, 2024), the need for fact-based and reasoned debate (Waisbord, 2018; Arias-Maldonado, 2020), trust in institutions (Boler and Davis, 2018), the search for consensus and the centrality of deliberation (Ilie, 2006; 2016).

5.4 Exploring of Explanations

One of the big remaining questions is why the politicians use post-truth rhetoric to such an extent and how it has gotten to this point. As mentioned previously, it is not possible to find out what their intentions are by simply analyzing their statements. It is, however, possible to hypothesize.

Firstly, it is possible that the parliamentarians feel very strongly about their opinions and the facts they are – allegedly – basing these on. They might feel a strong moral obligation to tell the truth and make sure that others adhere to their standards of truthfulness. Despite the myriad of negative consequences for the political climate in Austria, this would mean that there is no malicious intent in making these accusations, but rather strong feelings about integrity and moral obligations.

Secondly, it is a possibility that the parliamentarians primarily use post-truth rhetoric in defense. Since it was shown that a large portion of post-truth rhetoric was used to defend against being blamed for the economic crisis, this is likely to be a part of the explanation. Instead of admitting responsibility for potential mistakes that led to the current situation in Austria, it might feel wise to instead discredit the opponents – or their statements – in order to avoid being blamed by the Austrian population. Being the first party to admit to actually making mistakes seems difficult, especially if it is not expected that others will follow suit. To voters, it might seem that, since they are the only ones admitting it, they must be the only ones at fault. If this were true, it would mean that all parties care more about being reelected than about taking responsibility for the country they are supposed to run and the population they are supposed to take care of.

Similarly, a likely explanation is that one party started throwing around accusations of untruthfulness and others felt the need to protect their image by discrediting the person making the statement or making their own accusation. It seems to be a vicious cycle reinforced by every party and once it is started, it is very difficult to get out of it.

Lastly, a more sinister explanation for this kind of behavior would be that the politicians are actively trying to undermine the legitimacy of other parties' power. As Foucault (2008) stated, the pledge to act on truth is what legitimizes power. Questioning that truth could be a strategic avenue of picturing their opponents in a negative light, purposefully eroding their opponent's right to authority and fostering affective polarization to gain votes. The fact that coalition members did not accuse each other of untruthfulness seems to confirm that, at least in part, they were trying to legitimize their own power by discrediting their opponents. Ilie (2006; 2016) states that parliamentary debates are used strategically to acquire power and

question the legitimacy of their opponent's power, even suggesting that this is a major incentive for politicians to engage in these debates in the first place. That would suggest that post-truth rhetoric is employed specifically with the goal of undermining the competition.

Unfortunately, it is impossible to tell which one of these hypotheses is accurate, although based on Ilie's (2006; 2016) contributions it can be assumed that the use of post-truth rhetoric is at least partly strategic. It seems that this behavior has been completely normalized in parliamentary debates and that the politicians themselves do not question these strategies. The use of post-truth rhetoric seems to be a vicious cycle, perpetuating itself and making it difficult for parliamentarians to resist. In reality, it is likely that each party has multiple different reasons for employing post-truth rhetoric, some of which might only be present subconsciously.

5.5 Possible Impacts on Climate Action

All in all, the political climate within climate politics specifically does not seem to be very productive. Instead of focusing on discussing possible solutions to the problems Austria is facing, it seems to be more important to politicians to avoid responsibility for causing said problems. The debates often went in circles of casting blame and accusations of misrepresenting facts, rather than deliberations on how to solve the problems at hand.

The ministry of finance, appointed by the APP, announcing budget cuts of 60% for climate action shows that the current coalition has different priorities than mitigating climate change. While the CCCA and the S4F (2026) suggested that the developments in Austrian climate policy were comparable to the US, the current government at least expressed concern for the environment and most members in parliament did not question the scientific consensus on anthropogenic climate change. However, the common narrative is that by saving the economy and investing in innovation and technological advancements, one also saves the climate and the environment. Most of the accepted policies and policy changes are from the ruling parties, none of which are famous for their ambitious climate policies. This shows that climate mitigation is currently not a priority for the government, instead they focus on strengthening the industrial sector to restore the economy, thereby supporting the status quo. This partly confirms the fears expressed in the open letter by the CCCA and the S4F (2026), who warn that the process of subtly defunding of climate action has begun.

6. Conclusion

This analysis shows that post-truth rhetoric is pervasive and omnipresent in Austrian climate politics, since only few speeches did not contain a single strategy represented in the framework.

While post-truth rhetoric was a rather popular strategy for the populist party in parliament, they were by far not the only party engaging in it. All parties claimed that they alone were providing the truth that others were unwilling to see or say, which can be confusing for the audience.

In addition to that, there were clear signs of affective polarization within the parliament, assuming that parliamentarians were honest in their estimations of other party members' character when discrediting their opponents. If they were not honest, however, and instead attempted to discredit their opponents solely based on their lust for power and garnering votes for their own party, it would imply that they are trying to actively foster affective polarization in society for their own political gain. Unfortunately, this study cannot provide answers as to which one of these explanations is accurate.

Furthermore, it can be said that this political climate, which is characterized by post-truth rhetoric, is not conducive or indicative of functioning democratic deliberation, but rather of affective polarization. It was shown that disagreement in the Austrian parliament, at least when it comes to debates around climate action, is handled in a way that prioritizes discrediting opponents, rather than making attempts at understanding the other side of the argument. It would be interesting to conduct this analysis for different time frames to determine whether there has been a decline in democratic deliberation in recent years or whether the political climate has always looked like this.

While this analysis solely focused on climate politics, it would be quite surprising if the hostility towards oppositional parties did not translate to debates about other topics. Hostility and disdain for oppositional parties was still present when the parties were in agreement, which would suggest that not even non-controversial topics would be free from affective polarization, which, in turn, would affect the parliamentarians' ability to deliberate constructively. This analysis either shows that climate change is a particular divisive topic that inspires parliamentarians to prioritize actively undermining their opponents over democratic deliberation or it depicts the overall political climate in Austria. A comparative analysis between climate action debates and other political debates would be necessary to explore whether there are specific topics in parliament that elicit post-truth rhetoric or whether this is an omnipresent phenomenon in the Austrian parliament.

Affective polarization, populism, post-truth rhetoric and a post-democratic decline seem to form a vicious cycle that perpetuates and reinforces itself. It almost seems inevitable for politicians to engage in this cycle in this political climate, since they might fear it would harm their reputation if they did not defend themselves when faced with these accusations. They might not even consider their behavior problematic, since members of all parties use these strategies. Maybe, however, they know exactly what they are doing, are aware of the negative consequences on society and still use these strategies to either hold onto or gain power. Unfortunately, this analysis does not prove whether parliamentarians engaging in post-truth rhetoric do so with sinister intentions or whether they feel they have no other choice. As people with positions of power who have an obligation to their people they should be aware that their behavior has real consequences in society, which should outweigh their desire to stay in power and therefore inspire them to at least attempt to contribute to democratic deliberation with their speeches.

Generally, it should be noted that the choice of this specific framework had an immense impact on the results, as well as my own previous assumptions about post-truth. The framework has allowed me to show how parliamentarians use truth-related claims to discredit political opponents and sow doubt in society about what the truth is. To address this issue, it is not helpful, as other definitions of post-truth imply, to blame citizens for believing the lies of politicians, not fact-checking enough or basing their decisions on emotional arguments and hoping they will change accordingly. Not even the awareness of different post-truth strategies is helpful in this case, since all parties in parliament made use of them, leaving citizens without any alternatives. Unfortunately, this study does not provide answers as to how post-truth can be addressed. It seems like as long as parliamentarians are more concerned about being reelected than solving the problems in Austria they will prioritize undermining their opponents over constructively deliberating possible solutions.

In conclusion, the current government seems focused on restoring the status quo rather than trying to mitigate climate change, by cutting public funding for and delaying climate action. There is little space for careful democratic deliberation between all of these accusations of untruthfulness and attempts at discrediting political opponents. Austrian scholars are concerned about the future of climate action in the country and this analysis seems to substantiate that fear.

AI-Disclosure

No AI tools were used during the process of researching or writing this thesis.

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Popular science summary – What is the Truth?

News outlets, media, academia, friends and family all seem to agree on one thing: these are turbulent times. With the election of Donald Trump, the Covid 19 pandemic and the accompanying rise of “fake news”, it seems that politics nowadays are defined by lies and conspiracy theories rather than facts and evidence based reasoning. This can be very confusing for the population. Politicians, journalists and scientists alike claim that they are the only ones telling the truth and all problems could be solved if only people believed them. Who can be trusted? Who is a reliable source of information? What is the truth? These questions have been central to discussions around climate action and other political debates.

The purpose of this thesis is to highlight how this confusion can be driven, in part, by the political climate in Austria. This study looks into claims by the current members of parliament related to truth within debates about climate action: accusing others of being untruthful, claiming to be the only one providing the truth and attempting to discredit political opponents to make them seem less trustworthy are all strategies often used to establish the speaker, or their affiliated party, as the only one who should be trusted.

The results show that there is little agreement within the parliament on what is true. Political opponents not only accuse each other of being untruthful and deceptive, but also of being at fault for the economic crisis currently plaguing Austria. None of the parties take responsibility for the part they have played in these negative developments, while simultaneously trying to claim sole responsibility for positive developments. Disagreement on these issues, as well as general debates around climate policies, is primarily handled through politicians making accusations of distorting facts with no regard for the negative consequences for the population. Previous research shows that this political climate can lead to barriers to democratic deliberation, polarization, loss of trust in governmental institutions and decision-making based on ideology.

While the intention behind these accusations of untruthfulness remain unclear, it can be assumed that they are used at least somewhat strategically, potentially even exacerbating polarization on purpose to gain more power. Regardless, the parliamentarians using these strategies should be aware that their actions have consequences for the very people they have been given the privilege of leading. Climate change is already affecting the Austrian population and it seems the current members of the parliament are too busy pointing fingers at others and refusing to take responsibility to have constructive debates on how to deal with this issue.

Appendix

Table of included documents (meeting number count starting with the formation of the new government on 24th of October 2024) (Parlament Österreich, 2026)

Meeting Number	Date (dd.mm.yyyy)	Relevant Subsections
#13	26.03.2025	Aktuelle Stunde; TOP 7; Dringliche Anfrage
#17	24.04.2025	TOP 2-3; Dringliche Anfrage; TOP 6
#32	16.06.2025 – 18.06.2025	TOP 1-3
#37	10.07.2025	Kurze Debatte über eine Anfragebeantwortung; TOP 1; TOP 2; TOP 17
#39	11.07.2025	Fragestunde
#41	24.09.2025 – 25.09.2025	Aktuelle Europastunde
#44	15.10.2025	TOP 3; TOP 4; TOP 6-7
#48	22.10.2025	Dringliche Anfrage
#57	11.12.2025	TOP 24-25
#61	16.12.2025	TOP 1

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