# Climate Governance in a Well-Ordered World
– An Analysis of Rawlsian Climate Justice and The Goal of Climate Action

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Abstract

The aspiration of normative theory to conceptualise climate justice is a contested endeavour. At best there are certain agreements about what constitutes distributional justice on a surface level, while it remains challenged whether such conceptualisation is helpful in the realisation of climate justice. This thesis sets out to derive the limitations of Rawls' Political liberalism as a theory of climate justice, and as a basis of achieving climate action (SDG 13). This is achieved through the utilisation of a conceptual analysis and dialectical reasoning based on communitarianism. In the process, the thesis disavows the benefits and drawbacks of Rawls' definition of justice as described in the theory of a well-ordered society. Rawls' perception of justice perpetuates injustices in the well-ordered society by focusing on a few metrics of distributional justice which is caused by Rawls' conception of public reasoning, the original position, the self, and rationality. The limitations of Rawls' theory result in that other concepts as defined by Rawls become infeasible, such as: autonomy, rights, and freedom. The justification of the well-ordered society also becomes questionable, as it does not result in the motivation for moral behaviour, and it undermines democracy. This threatens the stability of Rawls' ideal society. This is worsened by the conception of the primacy of justice over the good, neglecting the driving forces of the self and society. When applied to climate justice Rawls' Political liberalism results in an inability to include key actors, actions, a commitment to global agreements, and essential features of distributional justice. The latter is an outcome of the limitations of the original positions, public reasoning, methodological nationalism, methodological individualism, self-determination, and the definition of distributional justice. When Rawls' Political liberalism is applied to climate action, it becomes evident that it is an insufficient theory to achieve climate action. The lack of recognition of others and the monopoly of primary goods in Rawls' Political liberalism as reflected in the contemporary global basic structure could result in the unity of weaker states, NGOs, and intergovernmental organisations. The chain of equivalence between these actors may result in a convergence based on thick values in the strive for transnational climate justice, resulting in greater motivation and a more stable agreement than one based on Rawls' overlapping consensus. The achievement of an agreement is contingent on individuals having the material possibilities and a subjectivity suited for a hegemonic struggle for climate justice.

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Acronyms and abbreviations

Conferences of the Parties (COP),
European Union (EU)
Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
High Level Political Forum (HLPF)
International Governmental Organisation (IGO)
International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
Millennium Development Goal (MDG)
Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC)
National Voluntary Review (NVR)
Non-governmental Organisation (NGO)
Sustainable Development Goal (SDG)
United Nations (UN)
United Nations Framework on Climate Change
(UNFCCC)
Voluntary National Review (VNR)
World Metrological Office (WMO)

1. Justice, good and the achievement of climate justice

The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the reader to the topic of the thesis and the different research questions.

1.1. Non-ideal or ideal climate justice

This thesis sets out to add to the theoretical debate on whether Rawls' ideal theory of Political liberalism is sufficient in conceptualising and realising climate justice on the national, and international levels. This will be highlighted through an analysis of climate action (SDG 13), based on different conceptions of justice, good, and governance. The issue has never been more important because parts of the natural world sands on the brink of extinction due to climate change. To hinder address climate change requires the transformation of all industrialized activities (IPCC 2018, p. 8).

Each year, the possibility to deal with the effects of climate change decreases, and more severe mitigation and adaptation strategies becomes necessary (Mckinnon 2011, p. 1). The failure to act becomes comprehensible when considering that the values of modernity developed in low-population-density and low-technology societies that could use resources and land in an unlimited manner (Gardiner 2010, p. 12). In contemporary society these values are not sufficient for the task; they presuppose that responsibility is individual and easy to identify in time and space (Ibid.). Mitigation and adaption require values, actions, and principles that can deal with the fragmented agency, institutional inadequacy, skewed vulnerabilities, spatially disbursed effects, and causes (Gardiner & Weisbach 2016, p. 24).

It is becoming increasingly likely that the combined efforts of humanity will not reach the 2C target and expose future generations of catastrophes to different feedback mechanisms (Brandstedt 2019, p. 222). Billions lacking access to freshwater, dying coral reefs, desertification, food scarcity, fires, coastal erosions, and wars could become a reality (McKinnon 2011, p. 7). People are already suffering from premature deaths due to droughts, crop failures, and other

detrimental effects (Brandstedt 2019, p. 222). The politics of triage are becoming more present, our current institutions are insufficient as reflected in breakdowns in negotiations and commitments to climate change (Ibid.). Climate change is also given dismal weight in the eyes of the public (Calder & McKinnon 2011, p. 91). The only times when humanity has been successful in reducing the overall levels of GHGs have been during recessions, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and China's one-child policy (Karnein 2018, p. 949). Neither has there been any significant commitment to decreasing the vulnerabilities of the South or improved accountability mechanisms targeting the North (Okereke 2011, p. 122). Faced with these issues it is stipulated that a theory of justice should be able to answer how humanity is to achieve climate justice; describing how goods and the burdens of climate change should be distributed (Brandstedt 2019, p. 222).

In academic discussions of climate justice, the empirical reality is often lost (Brandstedt & Brülde 2019, p. 226). Theories and that which is the cause of injustice are argued to be happening in compossibility (Baxi 2016, p. 8). The metaphysical or theoretical through theories and justice as enacted through laws shape our view of the world (Ibid.). But scholars are divided along two camps; ideal or non-ideal theory is sufficient in conceptualising and realising climate justice (Brandstedt & Brülde 2019, p. 226). There are significant scholars on both sides. Ideal adherents include McKinnon (2011), Shue (2014), and Roser and Seidel (2017), while non-ideal theory supporters include Caney (2016), Brandstedt (2019), and Sayegh (2016). The discussions are not short of the theoretical storm (Gardiner, 2011), providing ambiguous non-pragmatic theories due to the lack of consideration of the issues and ethical consequences of different solutions. However, Maltais (2016) advocates that political theory is about overcoming the political inertia, and theories in climate justice literature often focus on single aspects of climate justice, instead of all relevant issues (Caney 2016).

As stated by Brandstedt (2019, p. 221) too long have scholars in the field of climate justice been preoccupied with developing ideal theories that neglect the relevant challenges. A theory of climate justice cannot only account for climate science, efficient policies, equality, or equity (Brandstedt & Brülde 2019, p. 227). It is neither only about deriving a normative account of actions for future generations nor the identification of principles that can create burden-sharing schemes between states (Maltais 2016, p. 2). All factors need to be accounted for to bring order to the chaos, and that includes the conditions which underlie the possibility of bringing about climate justice. It is necessary to rethink and politicise the previously depoliticised, solve conceptual concerns, engage with different narratives, social movements, and the fields of resistance (Baxi 2016, p. 8). These features are the overriding imperatives of social change and justice (Ibid.). This entails not falling

prey to abject submission, or the corruption of theories of justice due to their failure to analyse the unexamined assumptions that define global social change policies (Ibid, p. 10).

Climate policies are dependent on incorporating the socio-ethical convictions that underlie theories of justice (Baxi 2016, p. 10). This requires the integration of non-ideal and ideal theory to unground the reasons why injustices are continuing. An outcome is that policies and theories must stress what social structures and theories brought about climate injustice. Unfortunately, theories rarely engage with the complex social relations in their ethical models (Brincat 2015, p. 279), therefore this thesis will engage with how society should be structured, and social relations which underlie these structures. It is a topic that has been discussed for thousands of years, but contemporary political theory and the roots of modern theories of climate justice are dominated by the social contract theory developed by John Rawls' (Kymlicka 2001; Brincat 2015, p. 278). It has been advocated that the theory could be unhelpful because it focuses on societies or peoples instead of individuals (Ibid.). Climate change is also a global phenomenon that requires more than conventional distribution theories of justice (Caney In Gardiner 2010, p. 123). Neither does Rawls' responsibility or right-based notion interrogate the multifaceted social-relational dynamics involved in climate change (Brincat 2015, p. 278). An outcome is that Rawls' (1999) theory of a well-ordered society or the Laws of People possibly is insufficient in addressing the injustices that are a consequence of social and climate injustice.

Nonetheless, there are supporters of ideal theory, and a Rawls' framework of climate justice, including scholars such as: Hartzell (2007), McKinnon (2010), Kim (2019), Clements (2015), Bernstein (2015), and Kenehan (2015). Gardiner and Weisbach (2015, p. 231) suggest that conventional theories of climate justice and ethical arguments fail because they produce recommendations that violate basic feasibility constraints. They are not outliers in stipulating that Rawls' theory is inadequate. Other scholars also critique Rawls': Bell (2014), Brincat (2015) Pogge (2006), and Buchanan (2000). The reasons for critiquing Rawls' Political liberalism are plural, it provides a universal solution in a world that has different capabilities, geographies, and histories. An outcome is that Rawls' theory is too detached from policies, actors, and the facts of climate change. Another argument is that legitimacy in striving for climate justice may require a basic structure that can impose sacrifices to maintain the state, requiring citizens who perceive that the flourishing of the state matters in a non-instrumental way. Climate justice may also require a social unity that goes beyond rights, an idea of a shared fate, and trust in each other. There are currently too few studies on Rawls' approach to climate justice (Gardiner 2011, p. 131), and it strengthens the relevance of this thesis.

An additional issue for Rawls' theory is that climate justice is a question of how we ought to live, why it is wrong to pollute, and how we should relate to other forms of life (Gardiner 2010 et al, p. 12). Rawls' provides an ideal theory that does not relate to what choices people should make, once they know who they are and where they are in the world (Walzer In Sandel 1984, p. 205). The limitations of Rawls' well-ordered society are reflected in the debate between communitarian and liberal scholars on how society ought to be structured. In the thesis, the debate will be reflected by Rawls' (1998; 1999) theory of Political liberalism, while communitarianism is represented by several renowned communitarians: Macintyre (2007), Sandel (1984), and Walzer (1994). These two theories provide competing perspectives on governance: community or people. It results in different perspectives on how to address climate justice. This difference is important because to effectively tackle climate action requires an integrated, coherent, institutionalised, and multilevel approach of governance which both is adaptive and reflexive (Glass & Newig 2019, p. 4).

The debate between communitarians and liberals can be crystallized in striving to define what the primary value for society ought to be: justice or the good. The question concerning climate justice becomes whether a theory that focuses on justice can account for the issues with climate change or if it is necessary to depart from the politics of the common good. Moreover, climate justice requires action on a global level, and cooperation across borders (Gardiner et al 2010, p. 15). An outcome is that it necessitates an answer to whether it is sufficient with a basic structure of individual societies or if there is a need for a basic structure that is global and if their interconnection ought to look similar to Rawls' theories.

1.2. Is Political liberalism sufficient in conceptualising climate justice?

The challenges related to climate change are without comparison and require action on an unprecedented scale. In light of this, it is necessary to understand whether the existent theories of justice are sufficient in dealing with the global nature of climate justice. Gardiner and Weisbach (2016, p. 37) refer to this issue as the theoretical storm because of the inadequacy of modern theories: they are complacent, opaque, or even evasive in respect to climate change. Providing little, if any information on how institutions in the state or international community should be governed to solve questions interrelated to climate change. To conceptualise and derive the feasibility of Political liberalism there is a need for a two-level analysis, of whether Political liberalism is functional on the state and the global level. It is further necessary to

understand whether an ideal or non-ideal theory is better suited to govern actions in the achievement of climate justice and climate action.

To answer these questions, it is first necessary to understand the limitations of Rawls' well-ordered society. When the limitations are derived it provides the basis for discussing whether a well-ordered society is a sufficient theory to account for the issues related to climate justice as a global phenomenon. This is achieved through an internal and external critique of Rawls' well-ordered society. The external critique will be achieved by dialectical reasoning between a well-ordered society and communitarianism. These are the research questions of the thesis:

- *How ought the relationship between justice and the good be conceptualised in a well-ordered society?*

The second research question will be based on a similar methodology; however, the emphasis will be on the viability of Rawls' as conceptualising climate justice as a multilevel governance issue, utilising the case of climate action to highlight the non-ideal implications of Rawls' climate justice. The additional research question which this thesis attempts to answer is the following:

- *How feasible is Rawls' conception of justice in conceptualising climate justice and climate action as a multilevel governance issue?*

2. Background - Justice, the good and climate justice

The subsequent chapter aims to give the reader a background to the different fields of the thesis. The emphasis will be on ideas, fields, and theories that are important in the operationalisation of the research questions.

2.1. Justice

The content of justice matters because ideas of justice have justified genocide, wars, and other atrocities (Sen 2010, p. 34). A lot of writers have attempted to bring clarity to the concept. An important tradition of thinking of justice that has long been in existence arose out of the work of Thomas Hobbes in the seventeenth century and still echoes in the work of modern philosophers such as Immanuel Kant and John Rawls' (Sen, 2010. p. 5). The approach is referred to as transcendental institutionalism, which seeks to identify the just or right institutional arrangements of society. The practitioners attempt to identify social characteristics and behaviours that are inevitable, to find the perfect just structure. These theories are frequently based on the social contract (Ibid, p. 6).

However, other scholars took a different approach to justice, they strived to understand how humanity could move beyond perceived injustices. These practitioners focused on social realisations that could be achieved through behaviour and institutions (Sen, 2010, p. 8). Notable scholars belonging to this category are Adam Smith, the Marquis de Condorcet, Jeremy Bentham, Mary Wollstonecraft, Karl Marx, and John Stuart Mill. Their point of departure was based on social comparisons of societies that already existed, consequently, their theories can be referred to as realisation-focused comparisons. They engaged in an analysis of the societies that existed and included comparisons to derive what kind of justice existed and could emerge (Ibid.). These scholars perceived that transcendentalism overlooked that their theories were unavailable and unrealistic (Ibid, p. 9). These scholars thought that the necessary point of departure should be a choice among feasible solutions rather than abstract institutions or rules (Ibid.). These two

theoretical approaches are grounded in competing perspectives of reason which results in competing claims for why something is just (ibid, p. 14).

2.2. The well-ordered society

Humans come together for various reasons, their well-being and survival require communal effort (Walzer in Sandel 1984, p. 201). We also come together to share, divide, and exchange (Walzer 2008, p. 3). This requires principles that dictate how all goods are to be distributed, it could be the place in the economic order, political hierarchy, or reputation among fellow citizens that decides what an agent should receive (Ibid.). This is an ethical question because society could enable humans to move from their present situation to their true ends (Macintyre 1999, p. 65). What is engaged in when discussing the well-ordered society is the dichotomy of culture and nature: Man, as he could be, and man as a natural being. Different theories result in different conceptions of how society ought to be structured because of their conception of culture, social, and nature (Ibid.).

2.2.1. A well-ordered society for Liberals

Rawls' (1999, p.3) describes that the first virtue of social institutions is justice. This is an important statement because Rawls' perceives that laws or institutions must be adjusted if they are unjust, giving no weight to if they are well-arranged or efficient. Likewise, each person possesses an inviolability due to their claims of justice which is more important than the claims of society. Freedom cannot be replaced by the increase of goods shared by others, and the sacrifice of freedom of a few does not outweigh the increase of good by the many. A liberal society is one of equal rights or equal citizenship in where individuals and self-sufficient associations of persons recognise certain rules of conduct as binding and who in most part act following these rules (Ibid, p. 4). This, in turn, requires us to decide on a set of principles that dictate the social arrangements, enabling individuals to pursue their ends. Rawls' (Ibid.) describes these principles as a form of social justice which assigns rights and duties. They in turn define the distribution of burdens and social cooperation (Ibid.).

A well-ordered society is one that advances the good of its members through a public conception of justice (Rawls' 1999, p. 4). It is a society without an inherent conflict between good, justice, and rights (Ibid, p. 403). This is a society where everyone accepts and knows the principles of justice, and where the institutions satisfy these principles. This provides individuals with a common point of view which gives them guidance in their claims of justice. Rawls' (Ibid, p. 5) describes

that this scheme must be stable, it must be complied with and acted upon. This entails both social and economic arrangements. In practice, Rawls' (Ibid.) considers markets, property, production, and family in their wholeness because they define the rights and duties of humans. It determines the different positions in society or the initial chances in life. These are inevitable in a discussion of any basic structure of society, as they regulate the choice of political constitutions, economic and social systems. (Ibid, p. 7).

Rawls' (1999, pp. 9-12) point of departure is an ideal theory because free people, who are mutually disinterested, have equal liberty, and are rational would accept the principles in the original position. In this position, agents are unaware of our conception of the good, psychological propensities, social status, distribution of resources, strength, and the like. This results in humans being able to engage in rational deliberation in the construction of justice behind a veil of ignorance. This is argued to provide good grounds for reaching fair agreements. A consequence is that a well-ordered society arises from a sequence of hypothetical agreements and abides by the derived general rules. All free and equal persons would accept these principles under fair circumstances. All members are autonomous and the obligations they take on are self-imposed and based on reciprocity. (Ibid.)

An outcome of individuals realising that they are equals is that they would acknowledge what is referred to as the equal liberty principle. It is a principle that assigns equality of basic rights and duties (Rawls' 1999, p. 13). This principle is implemented to assure procedural justice, it results in it being unnecessary to account for the variety of circumstances and positions of persons (Ibid, p. 76). While the second principle states that economic and social benefits should compensate everyone in society, but in particular the worst-off. All goods are to be distributed based on these principles. Rawls' (ibid, p. 54) describes these goods as primary goods, that every rational man is presumed to want, independent of what they are going to pursue in life. The principles are the following (Ibid, p. 13):

> 1. Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.
>
> 2. Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both:
>
> (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, and
> (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.

The second principle has an additional principle, which is referred to as fair equality of opportunity (Rawls' 1999, p. 63). It implies that all positions and offices are open under conditions of fair equality of opportunity. This is necessary for a well-ordered society because everyone would benefit from this arrangement, even though, some may be excluded. After all, those with superior talent may afford different positions. But it would also result in fewer individuals feeling unjustly treated. Rawls' (Ibid, p. 58) justifies the principles in the well-ordered society with Pareto optimality. This is important for Rawls' because distribution is justified if there exist no more efficient terms that could improve the circumstances of the worst-off. Individuals in the original position would accept this because it would result in the most efficient social and economic arrangements (Ibid.)

Rawls' (1999, pp. 49-56) defines public reasoning as reasoning in the public and it applies to matters of basic justice and constitutional essentials. Pragmatically public reason is grounded in the principles of justice. Justice is defined as a recognised point of view which all citizens can examine and derive whether their institutions are just. Reasonable persons in this setting are individuals who are willing to propose principles and standards as fair terms of cooperation given assurance that others will do so and that they are ready to discuss the proposals of others on fair terms. They also perceive that these individuals would accept the consequences of public reason in guiding how political power is exercised. (Ibid.) Liberty for Rawls' (Ibid, p. 177) is a functional concept that describes what it means to be a free agent, it entails the restrictions of those who are free in action and thought. The worth of freedom for an individual depends on their capacity to advance their ends, and basic liberties must be considered as a system due to their interdependence. When an individual has a primary good, it ought to let them come closer to achieving their ends (Ibid, p. 79). Primary goods can in general be described as rights, liberties, opportunities, income, and wealth. These are defined by the rules of the major institutions because these features provide the basic structure which enables a person to carry out their plans in life. This is referred to as a rational plan (Ibid, p. 104).

The principles are an attempt to mitigate the influence of social and natural fortune (Rawls' 1999, p, 63). An outcome is also that free-market arrangements must be set within a framework of political and legal institutions that regulates the economic and social conditions necessary for the principles. The market is a place where everyone can pursue their advantage, Rawls' assumes that the individual is an economic maximiser, but only to the extent of the efficiency principle (Ibid, p. 316). To achieve this Rawls' (Ibid, p. 293) describes that duty and obligations should be chosen in the original position, they are a part of the right. They define our institutional ties and how agents as individuals are bound to each other. The most

important one is the natural duty to support and further just institutions. Another major duty for Rawls' (1999, p. 297) is mutual respect which is afforded to an individual due to him being a moral being. It implies that individuals ought to be willing to see a situation from another individual's point of view and to give reasons for their actions concerning justice when others are affected.

In a well-ordered society, individuals seek to respect each other through understanding each other based on good fate which implies accounting for their good (Rawls' 1999, p. 297). This includes presenting good reasons for why an individual is constrained in their pursuit of the good and an eagerness to engage in small favors due to the awareness of other individuals' good and feelings. Agents also depend on others to come to their assistance, it is not only the help that is important but the sense of confidence and trust in other individuals' knowledge and intentions. Society is perceived as a cooperative adventure based on certain rules and voluntary restrictions of liberty that benefit everyone (Ibid, p. 301). A sound moral reason is supported by the derived principles, but they can be at heart with each other, and to avoid the latter requires reasoning regarding a full system, or all things considered (Ibid, p. 306). The justification of a system of justice depends on a form of majority rule which corresponds with equal liberty, and a constitution safeguards the system which in turn enables societies to make laws and policies (Ibid, p. 314).

When a well-ordered society is achieved, it is up to the individuals to realise their good with the primary goods that were chosen in the original position (Rawls' 1999, p. 347). The good of a person is determined by what they perceive to be the most rational plan of life, given favourable circumstances and it being consistent with the principles of justice. When considering a rational plan, it is a plan that would be chosen in full deliberative rationality, with full awareness of all relevant facts and considerations of the consequence (Ibid, p. 359). All judgments of value must be derived based on the rational plan of an individual, and it is dependent on rational deliberation which ought to occur until agents will not gain any more by deliberating (Ibid, p. 367). Rawls' (Ibid.) refers to his theory as thin because the original position is only concerned with securing the primary goods that enable individuals to construct their theory of the good. Justice or parts of justice such as liberty or opportunity is good because it falls in all individuals' rational plans to want them. After all, they enable the good (Ibid, p. 349). There are similarities of rational plans among individuals, and therefore it is possible to derive a standard of primary goods (Ibid, p. 353).

2.2.2. The laws of peoples

For Rawls' (1998, pp. 17-30) a well-ordered society was a realistic utopia constructed by constitutional democracy, citizens united under common sympathies and their moral nature. Rawls' also argues that it is an insufficient principle to deal with the relationship between different societies. There are different principles in different societies, an outcome is that all societies are granted internal sovereignty. Rawls' (Ibid.) emphasises peoples over states because it is people who can agree to laws and principles. It is also people fully prepared to grant respect and recognition of other peoples. While the interests of states do not allow them to act for the right reasons which can be discovered by peoples' conceptions of right and justice. Thus, when dealing with issues between states or peoples Rawls' (Ibid.) perceives that people ought to represent their people in a second-level original position to work out principles based on existing relations and political arrangements. Toleration is the basis, and so is public reasoning. Rawls' fundamental belief is that if a society is satisfied, it will form groups with other societies that are satisfied. There will be no reason to go to war with each other, to covert, to wield political power, or conquer greater territory. People will be able to fulfil their needs and economic interests through trade. (Ibid.)

The original position that would exist between people would be modelled as different parties from those societies who represent their peoples symmetrically which implies fairness (Rawls' 1998, p. 31). These parties are rational and depart from their basic structure which is a constitutional democracy. The parties are also are reasonable and continually search for reasons related to the fundamental interests of their citizenry. The basis of this theory is the well-ordered society or the original position in that society. An outcome is that there is a degree of reasonable pluralism among the parties that attend the original position with other peoples. The parties already have a system of values based on an overlapping consensus of reasonable doctrines which makes it more likely that there is a possibility to reach fair agreements in the second original position among different peoples. (Ibid.) What Rawls' (Ibid, p. 34) implies with a reasonable doctrine is that of a liberal society; that has no comprehensive conception of the good. These societies have a reasonable conception of political justice in where they strive to protect their independence and free culture; with different liberties to guarantee security, territory, and well-being of the citizenry. Peoples have a right to independence and self-determination, but that is not a protection against condemnation. Even if society boundaries may appear arbitrary from a historical view, governments should represent the people and take responsibility for the territory and the environment. In the absence of a world state, there must be boundaries to protect peoples. (Ibid.)

Rawls' (1998, pp. 43-59) conceives that the extension is setting up guidelines for organisations to assure mutual assistance. Three important areas would be trade, banking, and an organisation like the United Nations. When these institutions and laws are honoured for a longer period, they will create trust and confidence. The result is that peoples care for each other, and over time the acquirement of a sense of justice that inclines them to accept justice. This does not mean that it is an intolerant society, the idea is rather to assist all peoples in good standing. The basis for meeting other individuals' needs are rights, human rights, and liberties. (Ibid.) A decent hierarchical society is a bare minimum to engage in the original position between peoples (Ibid, p. 70). A decent societal system is guided by a common idea of justice and has representative bodies whose role in the hierarchy is to establish a procedure to look after the goods of society. Outlaw states are excluded, which entails states that are aggressive to the brink of being dangerous (Ibid.).

2.2.3. Communitarianism and the politics of the common good

Rawls' was inspired by Kant which resulted in him accepting that practical concepts are of more importance because humanity lives in a world where meaning is yet to arrive (Charles Taylor in Sandel 1984, p. 169). This reasoning enabled Kant to argue for practical concepts because it did not have to recourse to cognition, and an outcome was that the theories came to produce their reality. One could argue for this implies a sort of nihilism, but on the contrary, liberals perceive that the world is inhabited by subjects who can construct meaning. In contrast, communitarian scholars have a different kind of sociology, as advocated by Walzer (In Sandel 1984, p. 207) justice is based on the different circumstances of different communities and the self is constructed by the ends of the community and history.

Kymlicka (2001, p. 209) argues that Rawls' said little about the idea of community, an ideal that has many different definitions, but the main point is that the value of community is not emphasized sufficiently in liberal societies. Communitarianism emphasises the importance of shared understandings and practices in a society, resulting in a different perception of justice and rights. There are two main camps within communitarianism, one which perceives that justice arises in each society and the other perceive that justice needs to give more weight to the common good. A lot of communitarians perceive that justice is a historical and non-external critique of society. An outcome is that they often argue for the politics of the common good and challenge the idea of self-determination through an epistemological and sociological critique by claiming that the meaningful exercise of the self requires community. (Ibid.)

Aristoteles is often referenced as one of the first communitarians, who famously stated that humans are political animals, that need community to reach their highest

good (Hursthouse 1999, p. 199). For Aristoteles, the city-state was a unique political form in which alone the virtues of humans could be fully expressed (Macintyre 2007, p. 173). Being good must be embodied in every practice, and activity in the achievement of human functioning (Ibid, p. 174). When considering the city there are certain virtues of mind and character that could result in the realisation of their common good. Justice in this context is a virtue of giving each person what they deserve which is dependent on what results in desert. Morality and law were not something different from each other. The law was guided by virtues and the pursuit of the good. The good for Aristoteles was related both to the city-state, but also the universal due to his metaphysical biology or naturalism (Ibid.). Macintyre (2007, p. 175) rather sees the good as a social construction that exists in different traditions which can be intelligible or unintelligible in the advancement of the functioning of that culture as afforded by their environmental circumstances.

Another way of understanding communitarianism can be derived from Taylor's (In Sandel 1984, p. 177) conception of the work of Hegel. Taylor (Ibid.) perceives it to be an extension of Aristotele and an exploration of that what sustains a society. Hegel described concrete ethics and that society should be guided by those moral obligations that exist in a community. The agent has obligations that are based on that which exists, there is hence no gap between ought and is, there can be no obligation to create what does not exist which the Kantian notion holds. Hegel's philosophy can only be realised in the community, where obligations can be allocated and ideas can be realised (Ibid, p. 178). A well-ordered society is understanding that one is a part of the city and that it is the good (Ibid, p. 181). The final goal is something that exists here and now, which is shaped through the activity of the community. The state does not have an instrumental function, it is a part of the good, and so is the individual. Together they create an organism or a whole for Hegel. The state was the bearer of ontology and epistemology. It was the bearer of the structure of reality, that gave meaning to the members of the community. An outcome is that the citizenry ought to seek glory in public life. (Ibid.)

2.3. Climate justice

Climate justice is framed as a discussion of the commons or of how agents should account for the externalities caused by human activity in respect to Earth's atmospheric capacity (Baer In Gardiner et al 2010, p. 247). The failure of sharing and governing the *atmospheric commons* results in harm along different pathways, but it is foundational for all public goods, and what is strived to achieve is "climate stability for a life-supporting system (Ibid.). The pollution by one party to the

commons may result in a benefit, and harm for another due to the disparities in vulnerability. The bulk of GHGs in the world originated from industrialised nations, and relatively little has been caused by non-industrialised nations (Vanderheiden 2008, p. 45). Most philosophers have concluded that the industrialised states are responsible and should pay the burden of adaption and mitigation (Baer In Gardiner et al 2010, p. 220). It is also a question of equality, there is often a discussion of non-industrialised nations or developing nations because there are certain regions where people cannot feed themselves or manage their environments (Jamieson In Gardiner et al 2010, p. 263). It is important to note that climate change is not a problem, it is the consequences of climate change. As Gardiner and Weisbach (2016, pp. 10-14) describe it, if there is a need for action in respect to climate change, it is because agents have evaluated the ends, and their role in creating them. The evaluation gives ground for the accounting of the problems caused by climate change, and the necessary constraints of any solution (Ibid.).

When engaging in the theoretical discipline of climate justice it is a normative discussion of waging rights, costs, and benefits. It includes a consideration of how much, who, and when agents should mitigate or adapt to climate change (Brandstedt 2019, pp. 222-225). A normative theory of climate justice should include a set of principles for distributing goods and burdens of climate change mitigation. Non-ideal theories of climate justice focus on practically relevant tasks such as determining how ideals can and should be put into political practice. It seeks to isolate political problems that are complicated in the achievement of climate justice. Non-ideal theory departs from non-compliance, while as ideal theory assumes that all agents will comply to the extent it is reasonable. The difference between the theories can also be framed in terms of utopian and more realistic theories. The interdependence between them can be framed as non-ideal theory presupposes ideal theory because it achieves the latter and that agents utilise ideal theory to evaluate the options that non-ideal theory suggests. (Ibid.)

The possibility of solving climate justice through ideal theory is questionable due to the distance between reality and theory (Sayegh 2019, pp. 408-410). Ideal theory can be fact insensitive, meaning that it does not account for real-world circumstances. An example is that it assumes full compliance or is maximalist in seeking perfect justice. Ideal theory seeks to clarify the nature of values, institutions, and principles of justification by highlighting the trade-offs and measurability (Ibid.). This needs to reflect that climate agreements have been hard to enforce, suffer from withdrawals, have had a minor impact, included flexible mechanisms for the rich, and been beneficial for the strong (Singer In Gardiner 2010). Non-ideal theory instead seeks to be fact-sensitive, and departs from partial compliance, it is often minimalist in using a definition of justice to identify

thresholds of injustice comparatively (Sayegh 2019, pp. 408-411). Non-ideal theory can be summarised as being based on three different areas, non-compliance, realism, and transitional justice (Brandsted 2019, p. 223). It has been argued because climate justice is an urgent issue, and action cannot wait on the arrival of a fully specified ideal theory, instead, humans must act in accordance with what will achieve climate justice (Ibid.).

Non-ideal theory has certain challenges, such as: how to deal with non-compliers or if the burdens of non-compliers should be laden by compilers (Brandstedt 2019, pp. 224). Non-ideal issues that border to being ideal in negotiations are competing principles for assessing equity and fairness: per capita emissions, historical emissions, vulnerability, and wealth (Nasiritousi & Bäckstrand 2019, p. 22-42). Different states have widely different ideas of climate justice, and there is no global authority that can impose cooperation or reduce the inequalities in negotiations. Freeriding becomes a common issue which means that reciprocity and soft sanctioning becomes of essence. In negotiations, there are also different perceptions of which strategies are viable, and there has been continual conflict on who should bear the burden of mitigation. Since the international negotiations began there has been a rise of emissions by 31 per cent, and primarily in the emerging economies (Ibid.). It has been widely suggested by the Global South for negotiations to affirm their right to development, but continual research has highlighted that economic growth is correlated to GHGs (Kokotović et al 2019, p. 141) An outcome is that climate governance is complex, fragmented, lacks accountability, and transparency which has resulted in cooperation gaps and undermined the legitimacy of the existent climate regime (Ibid.).

The starting point for discussing principles that are used in ideal and non-ideal theory is John Locke - the first philosopher who discussed when and how much resources agents should consume (Singer in Gardiner 2010, p. 190). For Locke, it was appropriate to leave behind what another man would need to fulfil their good. When applied to climate change, is that it becomes appropriate to think of accountability in terms of when and if actors have left behind what is appropriate for others. This would entail historical principles, that do not merely look at the present situation when considering if a situation is just. Historical principles seek to understand how a situation came about, and an example is the polluter pays principle. It is based on the strict liability of those who have polluted historically. It is a form of retributive justice where the offenders are punished (Vanderheiden 2008, p. 68). While another approach that relies on historical principles would be restorative justice which tries to compensate those who have been treated unjustly (Ibid.).

In practice, there are issues with historical principles. Consider that the U.S advocated that the Kyoto protocol was unfair because it excluded developing countries (Vanderheim 2008, p. 65). The nations that were excluded are now the highest emitters, and they are growing faster than the global North. Even if 75 per cent of the emissions can be attributed to industrialised nations (Ibid, p. 73), but there is a major objection against the global North being responsible based on Dark Parfit's argument about intergenerational justice (Caney In Gardiner 2010, p. 128). Without the emissions that happened during industrialisation, these people would not have been born, and it would be impossible for these individuals to exist at all (Ibid.). The complexity of attributing responsibility of emissions results in it being important to consider complements to historical principles and a mean is time-slice principles (Singer in Gardiner 2010, p. 190). This implies considering developments and existing unequal distribution of resources. An account that derives that a lot of nations are contributing to survival emissions can seem more reasonable. Some nations cannot reduce their emissions, an outcome is that luxury emissions should be critiqued. This would mean that India's emissions are more justified than those of the U.S (Ibid.). What the development challenge highlight is that an equal per capita emission would not allow countries to expand their emissions beyond the 1990s (Sayegh 2017, p. 347). In being pragmatic India or China would not accept this approach because it would limit their right to develop. At the same time, it would neither be acceptable for these nations to have the same caps as the U.S since that would worsen the state of the atmosphere (Ibid.).

A solution can be granted by the UNFCC, which proposed a hybrid standard of justice that accounted for both history, equity, and capabilities (Vanderheiden 2008, p. 74). A capability approach promotes efficiency because these nations would achieve the greatest results at the lowest costs. In only accounting for casual responsibility, it exempts all developing countries. Capabilities may change this because if it is cheaper for some countries because they can access better natural resources and technology it implies that they still ought to contribute. What needs to be considered is the difference between the initial economic, natural, and technological inequality between nations. The UNFCC model was in practice considered to be unfair because of the account of differentiated responsibilities which mainly focused on the possibility of industrialised nations to reduce their emissions (Ibid, p. 12). An outcome is that the binary distinction between developing and developed is perceived to be insufficient to deal with carbon budgets; all countries need to contribute (Sayegh 2017, p. 349).

Utilising principles as a means of solving climate change has come with a moral notion, and an ecocentric way is to consider that breaches of justice are a breach of the rights of nature (Vanderheiden 2008, p. 241). An anthropocentric way is

instrumental rights which claims that ecological sustainability is a meta-capability that is necessary for all other capabilities (Holland 2012). Another notion is provided by Caney (In Gardiner 2010, p. 135-7) who develops a theory of human rights to prescribe precautionary actions to prevent harm of future generations, in terms of them not falling below a certain level of rights. When the right to develop is relevant in respect to human rights, recall that there is a difference between survival and luxury emissions or as Shue (In Gardiner 2010, p. 243) describes it the basic right to subsistence.

There is a surprising lack of consensus when it comes to theories of climate change due to the many different moral notions that underlie different conceptions, the many drawbacks of each theory, and because theory is perceived to be far from reality (Kim 2019, p. 161). In practice most ethical theories of climate justice produce recommendations that violate basic feasibility constraints, suffering from internal problems and systematic issues (Gardiner & Weisbach 2015, p. 232). McKinnon (2019) describes it as either ethics is too distant from policy which makes it irrelevant or it is too close which makes it disappear. An outcome is that a reflective equilibrium of ideal and non-ideal theory is important because it seeks to integrate the theories to make them more relevant (Sayegh 2019, p. 312).

2.3.1. In the pursuit of climate action

The Paris Agreement was signed by 190 countries with the central objective to keep temperatures below a rise of 2C (Nasiritousi & Bäckstrand 2019, p. 22). The Paris Agreement have achieved a broad base of participation among the countries of the world, the Paris climate agreement still failed to achieve an adequate collective ambition of individual NDCs (Mehling et al 2019). The Paris agreement includes 95 per cent of all global emissions, but the pledges are a failure because the gap between scientific findings and effective policy measures is predicted to increase by 3°C (Nasiritousi & Bäckstrand 2019, pp. 22, 30).

In the backdrop of the COP-17 a form of radical civic environmentalism arose, where groups worldwide started to unite under the banner of climate justice (Bäckstrand & Lövbrand 2019, p. 524-528). This generated a critique of the global capitalist order due to the commodification and instrumental perception of nature; this came with the realisation among organisations that there was a great disparity between the North and South in debt, poverty, and trade. There was a demand for a new world order which assets peoples' control and sovereignty. An outcome has been increased critic of the scientism of the COPs, as they call for short-term fixes, and it has been advocated that the agreement failed to reflect structural injustices (Ibid.) Several political battles need to be settled, and it is not certain whether the

agreement will result in the necessary changes to achieve the 1,5°C or 2°C goals (Ibid.).

An additional is the SDGs (Nasiritousi & Bäckstrand 2019, pp. 39). The SDGs may enhance the possibility to achieve the Paris Agreement, it provides synergies, more ambitious climate action, and builds a stronger relationship between different actors (Ibid, p. 40). The SDGs replaced the MDGs and strived to overcome the limitations of their forbearers (Gillespie 2008, p. 186). The SDGs focus on the environment, politics, cooperation, and gender equality to a greater extent (Ibid.). The imprecise nature of the concept resulted in a focus on metrics, and the widespread recognition of the environmental harm opened the policy arena for an agreement (Ibid.). The SDGs have still received criticism for not being transformational, not showing how economic or political structures can be disconnected from environmental degradation or the unequal relations between the North and South (Esquivel 2016, p. 12).

In this thesis, the goal of climate action (SDG 13) is utilised: Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impact (UN 2020). It commits states to take action to combat climate change and its impact (Lofts et al 2017, p. 1). It is a goal that is reflected in the UNFCC and the Paris Agreement. Since 2016 a total of 168 countries have presented their VNRs, and 35 explicit measures to link the goals to their national budgets (UN 2019, p. 9). According to the UN (Ibid.) the indicators for climate action are belong to the most severely underdeveloped category. Climate action is a goal that will not be met (Ibid, p. 10). In general, only 22 of 71 environmental targets are on track, and no country is on track to meet all the Goals by 2030 (Ibid, p. 12). The adoption of Agenda 2030 comes with several challenges because it requires action on several governance levels and across several sectors (Oosterhof, 2018, p. 2). This in turn requires adjusting governance structures, decision-making processes, and installing mechanisms that mainstream the SDGs (Ibid.) That is why it is relevant to utilize Rawls' theory of justice, it both describes how the national and international ought to be structured to provide for the citizenry. It is relevant to discuss questions of justice concerning climate action because of the many implications of mitigation and adaption for societies. In the processes, the feasibility of Rawls' theory as a theory of climate justice and the structure of society becomes evident in the light of achieving climate action.

2.3.2. Non-ideal challenges of climate change

To achieve a warming level below that of 2°C all combined emissions cannot reach one trillion tonnes of GHGs (Okereke 2011, p. 111). As of 2011 half of these trillion had already been released, it is anticipated that the full budget will be

reached by 2040. But it will take approximately 100 years for 60-90 per cent of the effects of climate change to set in (Maltais 2016, p. 1). The premises of warming is already in place, the effects will eventually set in, it might not be today or tomorrow, but it will happen (Shue in Gardiner et al 2010, p. 203). The temperature will rise because of what humanity has done and will do in the short and medium-term. Even if emissions stopped tomorrow which is unlikely, there will be a change in the climate. Humanity is continuing to add GHGs much faster than it is sequestered. There will be a rise in temperature for years to come (Ibid.).

Gardiner and Weisbach (2016, p. 15) utilise the perfect moral storm as a metaphor to describe why climate change is an ethical problem. It is not one storm it is the combination of several storms. The basis of the basic storm is the *spatial dispersion of effects and causes* (Gardiner & Weisbach 2016, p. 15). The effects are not always felt in the intermediate surrounding, they are dispersed throughout the earth. Climate change is neither caused by one agent, there is a plenitude of causes that are historical and related to a lot of actors which results in a *fragmentation of agency* which worsens the ability to respond. The issue of agency is often modelled based on the Tragedy of the commons or Prisoners' dilemma, and it is worsened by *institutional inadequacy* (Gardiner and Weisbach 2016, p. 17). There is not a possibility for institutions to enforce sanctions and there is a lack of effective international governance. The possibility of achieving climate justice is worsened because of the inequality in the world, caused by colonialism, imperialism, war, greed, stupidity, and unequal development (Karnein 2018, p. 953).

International negotiations and the means to solve climate change are worsened by *skewed vulnerabilities* in the world (Gardiner & Weisbach 2016, p. 20). It is the global South that is more vulnerable to climate change, but they cannot hold the industrialised nations accountable. This is also reflected in climate negotiations, the group of participants is limited and fixed (Kortemäki 2017, pp. 320-334). This is justified based on the global coverage of the meetings by all national governments. The negotiation reflects a western line of thought in their structure and hierarchies. They often lack representation of those affected, while states are considered the most eligible actors. Weaker states often have fewer delegates, fewer resources, and are excluded from the backroom meetings. The lack of participation by those affected by climate change also causes an issue in terms of misrecognition when the agenda is driven by the stronger states (Ibid.). Climate negotiations reflect unequal power structures, it mirrors that the developing world has been used as a resource for the developed world (Okereke 2011, p. 122).

Another important factor to comprehend is that climate change is an ethical question because there is *uncertainty* about the magnitude and distribution of

climate impacts (Gardiner & Weisbach 2016, p. 20). Even if there is a scientific consensus on climate change in contemporary society, climate policy is not seen as a top priority and most individuals remain unwilling to change their lifestyles (McKinnon 2011, p. 8). During the initiation of the UNFCCC, it was widely thought that there was a possibility to reduce the injustice and inequity through combating climate change (Okereke 2011, p. 131). In practice, negotiations require the cooperation of different actors who have different market conditions and business models (Maltais 2016). The good of climate justice is widely dispersed, while the beneficiaries of the existing structure are strategically positioned. The agents in these positions are also highly organised, well-resourced, and able to obstruct politics. These individuals often exist in developed nations, and they have high per-capita emissions (Ibid.).

Besides, Gardiner and Weisbach (2016, p. 24) claim that there is an *intergenerational storm* because human-induced climate change is a lagged phenomenon. Climate processing takes a long time, and GHGs stay in the atmosphere, they continue to have climatic effects for up to a thousand years. Resulting in the tyranny of the contemporary, the contemporary generation shapes the life of future generations (ibid, p. 27). It results in a different kind of Prisoners Dilemma which is called the Pure Intergenerational Problem: not every generation will prefer to act responsibly in respect to future generations, they would rather act to achieve their interests. It is even harder if not impossible to enforce mechanisms to assure compliance and cooperation across time. Each generation may pass on the issue of climate change, making it worse, and making the costs of adaption mitigation higher (Ibid.). The previous storms largely focused on human animals, and the *ecological storm* describes how climate change also has implications for animals, ecosystems, and plants (Ibid, p. 32). At times, the narrow anthropocentric focus is caused by perceiving nature as biological resources or ecosystem services. Neglecting that nature may be interconnected to individuals flourishing and have an intrinsic value. This storm is also affected by the *fragmentation of agency* because agency is perceived as strictly human, while nature is perceived to be a passive victim. The non-human world also behaves and reacts. This implies that there is some level of *institutional inadequacy* in terms of institutions being blind to accommodate that which is non-human. (Ibid.)

Shue (2014) describes the current situation as a political deadlock, where agents must engage in incremental improvements to challenge the status quo. To achieve change would require that strong states take the lead, and largescale investments in low-carbon technologies (Maltias 2016). It is 25 countries that are responsible for 75 per cent of GHG, and to a large degree needs to make massive changes. It is a wicked political problem that has resulted in a pessimistic bias about the prospects

of climate politics (Ibid.). All in all, Gardiner and Weisbach (2016, p. 40) believe that these storms result in a convergence that may result in moral corruption which includes distraction, complacency, unreasonable doubt, delusions, and hypocrisy. This can be witnessed in the widespread distrust of scientific consensus on climate change, as well as the selective focus on certain issues, strategies, and theories (Ibid.).

3. Methodology

The following chapter introduces the methodology behind this thesis, giving the reader a shorter introduction to the research design, and the different methods that are used in the thesis.

3.1. Politics, theory, and climate justice

Social science generally seeks to uncover, explain and understand empirical facts, while political philosophers or political theorists aim to determine what agents ought to do with that information (Mcdermott in Leopold & Stears 2008, p. 11). There are questions which no empirical facts can dictate, there could be an infinity of information on climate change, but it is always normative elements that inform policies. The most important questions are how we ought to live, what kinds of societies we want, and how we should relate to all forms of life (Gardiner 2010 et al, p. 12). These are ethical questions that require an analysis beyond efficiency, and the question is also what values caused climate change. This calls for us to rethink current values, and construct policies that are based on more suitable values. Ethics is a part of any policy which targets climate change because policies are essentially the enforcement of values (Gardiner & Weisbach 2015, p. 47). When experts or politicians make judgments they do so based on certain values (Ibid.).

The goals in either agreement in previous parts of the chapter are normative, and they are often portrayed differently by different actors (Gardiner & Weisbach 2016, p. 50). The idea of a goal of 2°C came about by discussing a means to decrease the long-term climatic variation. This is problematic considering that island states will disappear and that a lot of people may die because of the goal. Likewise, the implementation of an agreement is also an ethical question because it involves actions that may have consequences for humans, nature, or non-human animals. Utilising the word scientific or policy does not generate a legitimate or morally sound approach. They may obscure the consequences of an action as seen above, and an outcome is that it is of importance to use ethics to explore values and policies. (Ibid.)

3.2. A research design suited to conceptualise justice

The point of departure of the research design is an idea analysis, and the rudimentary idea is to describe, analyse, test, and scrutinise different political and philosophical arguments (Beckman 2005, p. 12). It enables the researcher to enter a role as an equal debater to test and develop different ideas concerning an idea or an argument (Ibid.). In this study, the author tries to describe, explain, and test Rawls' well-ordered society as well as concept of laws of people in comparison to climate justice. Trying an idea in a different context may provide new ideas, understandings, perspectives, or critique of an idea (ibid.). An idea-centered analysis has drawbacks because the reader engages with the material through their language, cultural and social lenses (Ibid, p. 21). An outcome is that this analysis attempts to be precise in the description of the concepts that are utilised to provide a thesis that is replicable and valid. Explaining the background and ideas of a text is of the essence because texts are often a reflection of a given time (Ibid, p. 14). An outcome is a text might not be as intelligible if understood using contemporary lenses. Even if the thesis acknowledges the historical nature of ideas that are put forward, the focus is the contemporary consequences of ideas (Ibid.).

The overall focus of the research design is to highlight whether Rawls' theory of justice or his Political liberalism is adequate in conceptualising climate justice. In the process, the research integrates non-ideal and ideal theory. A consequence is that the thesis undertakes in the exploration of on a methodological level is trying to integrate non-ideal and ideal theory in a reflective equilibrium (Sayegh 2019, p. 413). The intent is to show that by analysing an ongoing injustice based on more abstract principles of a well-ordered society. Both theories are utilised to revise our beliefs about ideal principles and non-ideal solutions through exploring the coherence between them in non-ideal circumstances of climate justice (Ibid.). It is contradictory to Rawls' (1999, p. 216) because it is not a one-way stream, non-ideal theory can also critique the relevance of ideal theory. An outcome is that non-ideal circumstances can show the relevance of ideal theory by providing insights into practical political problems that may challenge the premises of an ideal theory. Miller (In Leopold & Stears 2008, p. 42) argues that political philosophy is a venture which is fact-dependant, and that the validity depends on facts about humans and our societies. It ought to be grounded in that which is ideal to give practical guidance to citizens.

3.3. Methods of analysing justice

In an idea-centered analysis, it is important to understand what concepts imply and their relationships (Beckman 2005, p. 38). Two methods are utilised to understand the meaning of concepts: an internal and external critique. The internal critique utilises concepts and values that exist in the texts to highlight paradoxes or limitations of different claims. An outcome is that it cannot be ignored by the defenders of a text since it is based on their premises and arguments (Ibid, p. 77). Vagueness or impreciseness of concept is the basis of the internal critique, and it is derived through a concept analysis. It is used to construct and develop different concepts (Kipper, 2012, pp. 9-10). In this case, a selection of material based on Rawls' Political liberalism as defined in his most prominent work. It examines the hierarchy between the different concepts that embody the theory. A concept is an idea that is constructed by certain premises, which is a set of claims that forms the basis of an argument. A premise can be acceptable if the premise is justified or true (ibid, p. 4). When analysing a concept, it is examined to show whether the argument or parts of the premises are true or justified. Finally driving how the concept should be structured or if there are more accurate definitions or better premises (Ibid.).

The internal and external critique are forms of non-formal argumentation analysis, which is a method where the text is tried, critiqued, and reconstructed (Baggini & Fosl 2010, p, 99). This does not entail that all premises in a text are distinguished because they are evident or because at times defining one premise requires that all premises be justified which results in an extensive or perpetual process. A result is that one often interprets arguments based on the principle of charity; one is faithful to the idea of the author (ibid.). The latter is noticeable in this thesis, it is not possible to define all concepts that are utilised. To create greater depth in the analysis an external critique based on dialectical reasoning is implemented with communitarianism as the point of departure. Dialectical reasoning is utilised to discover and disclose new insights (Ibid, p. 50). This includes showing the different incoherencies, falsehoods, absurd implications, and logical implications of an idea (ibid, p. 49).

3.4. Reasoning through semantics, epistemology, and ontology

Each conception of moral philosophy comes with its ideas of reasons, motives, intentions, and actions concerning the real world (Macintyre (2007, p. 27). Consequently, it is necessary to understand the basis of how judgments about reality can be critically evaluated and justified (Grenholm 2014, p. 21-27). The thesis uses

two very different theories that are based on constructivism which comes with different conceptions of semantics, epistemology, and ontology.

There are different ways to derive how arguments are reasonable which reflects these diverging traditions, however, in this thesis, different criteria will be utilised to derive whether an argument is reasonable. A criterion that will be utilised is feasibility which means that the sustainability of the arguments is tried based on certain ideas or criteria (Beckman 2005, p. 71). This is reflected in the conceptualisation of climate justice and the dialectic reasoning based on communitarianism. In this thesis, Gardiner's (2011) concept of moral storms is utilised, as parameters of feasibility. Indicating whether Rawls' theory can handle different non-ideal issues. Caney (2016, p. 11) suggests that the inner merits of a theory are insufficient, and it is rather necessary to show the feasibility of politics based on contemporary structures. The dialectical reasoning utilises the criteria to show the limitations and strengths of Rawls' Political liberalism. Another criterion that is reflected in the thesis is incoherence which highlights how a conclusion cannot be derived from a collection of premises (Beckman 2005, p. 71). The criteria that are utilised can be summarised along with the criteria of soundness which requires that structure and the premises of the arguments are true (ibid, p. 15).

As advocated by Sen (2010, p. 41) ethical questions involve a complex mixture of beliefs. It is about valuing these beliefs; it involves elements of what philosophers refer to as impartiality and objectivity which have become essential parts of justice (Ibid. p. 42). Objectivity in this context means that there are sufficient reasons to mutually agree on a conception of justice. There are different ways of arriving at objectivity which indicates that the criteria of soundness can be relative to epistemological and ontological assumptions (Ibid.). An example is that Greenholm (2014, p. 79) highlights that Rawls' equilibrium is that moral intuitions are not reliable sources of moral knowledge, it suggests that a conviction or value can confirm itself. Rawls' departs from Kantian constructivism, which assumes rational deliberation is an ideal principle through which agents can create moral knowledge (Ibid, p. 257). While the politics of the common good reflects an epistemology and ontology where values and norms are human constructions that are a part of the larger social and historical process (Taylor in Sandel 1984, p. 169). Greenholm (2014, p. 179) argues that Macintyre's (2008) communitarianism results in ethical relativism. Importantly, these different perspectives result in different perceptions of what is just and good. The point of this thesis is not to discuss epistemology, but it describes the limitations of epistemological and ontological conceptions in their extension as theories of good and justice.

4. Results – Rawls', climate action and climate justice

The purpose of the following chapter is to present the main findings of this thesis. The first part of the chapter contains the dialectical analysis of a well-ordered society, and thereafter the second chapter aims to highlight the consequences of Rawls' Political liberalism as means of conceptualising climate justice as a multilevel phenomenon.

4.1. The justification of the well-ordered society

This part of the chapter will give the reader an overview of the shortcoming of Rawls' theory. Starting with Sen's (2010, p. 99) critique, one major critique is that the well-ordered society does not account for the real behaviour that institutions create, nor does it account for the situated behaviour of individuals before the original position. The outcome of the original position is an agreement on how the institutions ought to function, and Rawls' (1999, p. 75) argues that a fair procedure contributes to justice. This does not acknowledge that what also matters are the consequences of the institutions on our lives (Sen 2010, p. 84). An outcome is that it fails to account for the historical nature of institutions, behaviour, and culture. Rawls' theory results in that agents are seeking institutions that create justice rather than creating institutions that realise justice (Ibid, p. 82).

Rawls' failure to account for the importance of behaviour and institutions can be traced to the original position. It is counterintuitive, as it seeks citizens to be egoist, while simultaneously orienting the participant towards choosing principles in a manner that is good for all (Habermas 1996, p. 113). From the onset, Rawls' separates the good of individual from the collective. In practice, the benefits of depriving individuals of their situated selves are relative to the potential gains. Individuals find themselves in a society in which both norms and principles are forced upon them (Ibid, p. 128). These individuals are forced to act on principles that have lost their meaning to promote the preservation of political stability. In the process, other values, such as thick values or comprehensive doctrines are disregarded because institutions are bound by public reasoning. Neither is it evident

why justice is the best foundation for public reasoning. It is questionable whether it is possible to determine the content of public reason through deliberation in the first place and if it rather reflects values and ideas in each society.

The well-ordered society is governed by one conception of justice and all citizens perceive that it is the best society (Kogelmann, 2017, p. 9). An outcome is that it is a unifying model that excludes deliberation as a means of arriving at a consensus of justice (Ibid.). In Rawls' model, those who have other perspectives of justice are excluded and that includes everyone considering that none can return to the original position. This, in turn, threatens the stability of the well-ordered society because institutions become coercive to good and justice. The issue is as argued by Habermas (1995, p. 110), that Rawls' failed in securing an impartial judgment in the original position. It is necessary to make a greater distinction between the justification and acceptance of justice as fairness. The well-ordered society could be justified to persons in the original position on moral grounds, but the legitimacy will depend on the consequences for the citizenry. Procedural legitimacy does not imply consent to the authority of the well-ordered state. Rawls' tries to ensure the latter by giving liberal basic rights primacy over democratic principles, but individuals are excluded from the decision-making in the process.

Moreover, rationality in terms of rational plans as stipulated by Rawls' (1999, p. 365) results in that the private becomes an egoistic strife which enables the rule-based maximisation. Michael Sandel (1984, p. 160) describes it as liberals being forced to accept a utilitarian conception of the good because of the need to distinguish between private and public, or that which is good from justice. The issue with public reasoning is that when the basic structure is chosen the institutions are supposed to act on a different principle of justice because they cannot account for the specific primary goods of everyone, they act on a general conception of those goods. The institutions are forced to act on a form of utilitarianism. The goal becomes to bring about a state that maximises preferences or rational plans within the limits of justice which is contrary to Rawls' deontological justification of the original position. The additional shortcoming is that the ideas in the original position do not come from the deliberation it-self. These values pre-exist the deliberation, and Rawls' fails to acknowledge that there is no social magic that can make language or ideas neutral. The utilisation of language and ideas depend on social conditions and it is a form of authority and power (Mcnay In Leopold & Sterner 2018, p. 102).

This idea of deliberation in the original position is parochial because it decreases the deliberative possibilities of individuals because they are acting based on *enlightened self-interest* (Mcnay In Leopold & Sterner 2018, p. 102). The

possibility of overlapping thick conceptions is set aside to relate to each other on thin conceptions. That which is good is separated from that which is justice in the processes, but what is valid for individuals is bound up with that which is particular or good. Justice demands a conception of that which is good, and a principle that is derived from the thin is going to lose any legitimacy due to the exclusion of good (Ibid.). The additional issue is that Rawls' constructed a complete or maximalist theory of justice, in which individuals do not need to consider the effects of their behaviour outside of the principles of justice. Individuals may further not necessarily abandon their self-interest because they have agreed on the social contract, meaning that it does not account for what motivates behaviour (Ibid. 79).

Habermas (1996, p. 112) derives that it is hard for enlightened individuals to derive goods that are suited for highest-order interests. Rawls' neglects morality through minimising justice to two principles of justice, reasoning about justice gets minimised to discussions of what is mutually beneficial (Sen 2010, p. 139). The question of morality or that which is important based on our comprehensive doctrines are excluded, and what remains is a discussion of distributional justice. Society is not to remove all inequalities, but only those which disadvantage the worst-off. As argued by Kymlicka (2001, p. 136): why would a mutual aid theory be viewed as a method of moral justification, it is strange because it does not account for moral behaviour.

To conclude, this section of the thesis has highlighted some of the shortcomings of the original position as reflected in Rawls' theory of justice. These limitations are relevant when considering climate justice. Firstly, it results in few reasons to engage or solve the moral storm of spatial dispersion of effects and causes in the national and international. Engaging in the intra- or intergenerational questions of justice requires moral guidance cross-territories, but Rawls' theory focuses on ideal institutions on a national level. This further increases the skewed vulnerabilities or results in a lack of recognition of others needs. The institutions are also just instead of being manifestations of justice, which implies that their actions are just, but the setting in which they exist could be highly unjustified. Neither would these institutions act on the contextual reasons for injustice or account for these factors because the principals are general.

Consequently, these factors result in institutional inadequacy because the principles of the institutions do not consider the contextual circumstances. The latter is problematic because distributional justice implies that Rawls' form of good would be given independently on knowing what the consequences would be for the individual or the collective. Rawls' good does not necessarily actualize the good and receiving the means to justice does not equal justice or the good. This furthers

the moral storm of skewed vulnerabilities because Rawls does not consider that a given position in society may require more goods than because certain individuals may be more deprived, and basic rights may be insufficient to assure a good life for all social groups in a world under the threat of climate change.

4.1.1. Legitimacy, authority and the good in a well-ordered society

The following section will expand on the previous arguments on the issues with the well-ordered society and justice by focusing on the behaviour that the institutions in the well-ordered society produce. The central tenants are that the well-ordered society is organised around contradictory elements; endowments and self-interests which are driven by rational plans that are contradictory to mutual respect, obligation, duties, and the principles of justice. This can be summarised as Rawls' conception of reason and rationality are contradictory. Rawls' (1999, p. 11) claims that the basis of a well-ordered society is sovereignty of the individual, who in turn will limit their self-interest because of the benefits they receive. Rawls' argues that public reasoning, rules, and education should hinder the pursuit of self-interest or rationality which is synonymous with the good. The issue is that the latter does not imply that the authority is justified, nor that the citizens perceive that it is legitimate to sacrifice their good for justice. Rawls fails to acknowledge that the good of the individual may be bound to justice and the good in society.

Rawls' (1999, p. 238) is advocating for the pursuit of a self-reinforcing system to maintain public confidence in the well-ordered society. In Rawls' (1998, p. 15) later work this becomes more apparent when he argues that social and political institutions must guide citizens to acquire an appropriate sense of justice. Mouffe (2005, p. 225) advocates that Rawls' conception of a reasonable person is a political person who only accepts liberalism. The definition servers to discriminate towards other world views in the political and it becomes a self-reinforcing public arena that the original position dictates. Mouffe (Ibid, p. 226) claims that there is nothing political left in Rawls' society. Natural duties and obligations seem inconsistent with advocating that no one can force principles on an individual and that the individual can choose freely. An outcome is that individuals are not free in choosing justice. As stated by Deneen (2018, p. 58) the individual is continually disembodied in a liberal society which in turn reinforces the state as its author. Rawls' is unwilling to state that society produces the conception of the good because of his strong belief in freedom, however, his argument seems to imply that the state should shape the individual to an extent where it is the author of individuals good.

Rawls' (1999, p. 11) political society gives the individual their political values. As highlighted by Habermas (1996, p. 130) Rawls' only treats the public sphere as distinguished from other spheres because it consists of political values for him. The definition is limiting because the exercise of political power takes place in almost all parts of society. An outcome is that values that are perceived as reasonable and justified will influence other spheres, such as the conception of the good. Yet, Rawls' (1999, p. 347) advocates that individuals should choose their rational plans, but these plans must be chosen within the parameters of justice. An outcome is that good of the people is managed. The political is depoliticized and becomes a means to hide the normative dimensions of governance which only are justifications of justice.

In practice, Rawls' (1999, p. 77) constructs a duty-oriented society in which socio-economical inequalities are to be to everyone's advantage. But it is the incentive of rationality that motivates individuals, and it results in inequality because it is an individualistic pursuit (Sen 2010, p. 63). The issue is not only the definition of rationality but that agents do not only seek primary goods (Ibid p. 205). Rationality and the pursuit of other goods take place in the private, and it is not regulated if it does have implications on the political. An outcome is that a large part of society is left unregulated. This enables monopolies or the dominance of certain goods, but this also applies to primary goods, but the criteria for utilizing primary good are higher because they need to fulfil the principles of justice. The issue with Rawls' (1999, p. 414) conception of primary goods is his limited conception of Aristotelianism. The issue is that Aristoteles perceived that there were different virtues based on different practices, thus, to flourish one societal sector may require a certain virtue and possibly a specific psychological profile. A consequence is that what an agent needs depends on their role and their society. Distributional justice is more complicated than simply providing for the least advantaged, and not considering this will result in an unfunctional society.

The definition of public reason or reasonable pluralism results in an unattractive sociology and unequal distribution of primary goods (Munro 2006, p. 173). Rawls' (1999, p. 86) argues for redressing the undeserved natural or social fortune. Even if people receive a fair distribution of primary goods, it is unsure whether individuals can covert primary goods into the good (Sen 2010, p. 66). It also becomes puzzling whether rights should be conceived as the good because there is a chasm between acting and the possession of the good or a right (Habermas 1996, p. 116). Neither does it seem that there is a connection between legal and factual equality (Ibid.). By not accounting for the possibilities of an individual there is a chance that individuals will have fewer opportunities and will be deprived socio-economically. They could also be excluded from the political sphere due to their diverging

perception of reason (Munro 2006, p. 169). The possible disenfranchisement of minorities, rural populations, and those less endowed become understandable because they may not be able to convert primary goods or want the same primary goods.

The process of acquiring primary goods may also have certain issues. In Rawls' society endowments becomes what Waltzer (2008, pp. 10-14) refers to as dominant. Those who are endowed are not limited to their intrinsic meaning, they can shape the meanings of all spheres of justice in their image. They can shape politics for malicious intent if it is in line with the principles of justice. The equal opportunity principle is insufficient because it does not account for the consequences of the endowed in their pursuits in the public. The difference principle justifies the accumulation by the endowed, if it improves the situation of the worst-off or does not make it worse (Cohen, 1992 p. 266). Cohen (Ibid, p. 270) derives that if inequality does not bring worse circumstances for the worst-off it could still systematically add people just above the circumstances of the worst-off.

Rawls' theory of distribution has several additional issues. Consider two individuals, X and Y who may be equally endowed and have access to the same liberties. X decides to pursue something which does not result in any increased income and becomes a part of the worst-off in that society. It is conspicuous to claim that Y should give money to X because Y is better off. Y preferred money and X preferred leisure, but it could also be the case that Y simply was lucky. X may be a nurse or occupy any other role that is perceived to be vital to the functioning of society and still not receive enough to have a good life. X could have selected a better action by not working for primary goods and had a better life in the process. Y might also do better by leaving behind the strive for money or goods because the basis of accumulation goods may be exploitation. There is something wrong here with the difference principle, partly because it is not accounting for ambitions, desert, luck or choices.

Consequently, there are other conceptions of reasoning that Rawls' excludes in his conception of justice. This results in neglecting certain conceptions of the good life while promoting other conceptions of a good life. A complete theory of justice ought to achieve endowment- and ambition-sensitivity. Re-distributing resources will solve material issues, but feelings of being derived from social status will not change (Kymlicka, 2001, p, 189). Walzer (1994, p. 21) claims that Rawls' distributional justice is a thick theory because any theory that is trying to decide how goods ought to be distributed will displays characteristics of a maximalist theory. Goods depend on social meaning, and they will depend on cultural references that are historically dependant through complex social interactions.

Rawls' may define his theory as universal, but when analysed it reveals its circumstantial character as a theory that distributes goods in the achievement of certain careers. To focus on a few dimensions of life results in a frighteningly thin society, that is what occurs in the well-ordered society because it utilises a few metrics in a society that has a multitude of conceptions of a good life (Ibid.).

To conclude, the moral storms of spatial distribution and skewed vulnerabilities are worsened because of Rawls' definition of distributional justice. It does not consider the plurality of perceptions of the good life, the primacy of the individual results in the possibility to systematically exploit those who do not belong to the worst-off and it does not recgonize the different needs of individuals based on their good. Considering that a lof individuals have yet to feel the impact of climate change, and that those who feel it may not be liberal cultures, it provides few reasons to engage in climate action on their behalf. An outcome is that Rawls' theory does not recgonize all relevant intragenerational issues connected to climate justice. Thus, the spatial distribution would be acceptable and the skewed vulnerabilities if the actions that are taken do not worsen these issues. However, these individuals may never achieve their good or have a decent life. This fragments agency because justice does not imply acting in the achievement of improving the good of different communities across the world nor in the future. Rawls' justice further provides a certain conception of distributional justice which might not be compatible with other cultures, and it may justify the hierarchies in these cultures based on endowments. Neither does it deal with inequality beyond that of the public, meaning that questions beyond political values hold little importance to Rawls', even though, it may have a significant impact on justice and the good of individuals.

4.1.2. A critique of the self

Marx (Estlund 1998, p. 100) argued that liberal politics and rights gave primacy to a non-communal perception of a person and thereby condone as well as encourage egoistic behaviour. Liberalism fails to deal with things beyond legal structures, and likewise, the difference principle seems to induce individuals to be selfish maximisers, if they do so in a way that is beneficial for the worst-off. The idea of fraternity seems to be quite inconsistent with this idea. Acting out the Kantian imperative means acting independently of the contingencies and accidents of the world (Rawls' 1999, p 225). The latter includes the community. This account does not acknowledge that a definition of a just society needs to acknowledge our commonality as humans through attitudes and dispositions (Sandel 1984, p. 167). Rawls' (1998, p. 15) realised that a conception of a well-ordered society needs to be based on ongoing political and social arrangements, but by adopting the Kantian

position Rawls fails to acknowledge this through advocating for the original position.

Communitarian scholars perceive that it is necessary to sustain the different common goods of society (Kymlicka 2001, p 212). The idea of Rawls' (1999, p. 225) that agents can act independently of the continencies of the world is as a result questionable. The unencumbered self has a promising vision of liberating the self from nature and the sanctions of social roles (Sandel 1984, p. 170). Nevertheless, individuals can make mistakes in their value judgments, and if that is the case it could be *someone's* responsibility to discourage individuals from making mistakes that hurt the common or their good. The idea for Rawls' is that the state does not provide the ends of people rather the means to pursue different ends. This is also why Rawls' refers to his theory as thin, it promotes the interests of the members of the community, as opposed to a thick conception of the good in the community. Rawls' (1999, p. 23) goes so far as to claim that an individual must adopt a plan that maximises their satisfaction. Individuals need liberty to find their good and should endorse a neutral state which does not justify conceptions of the good life. What is paradoxical about this claim is that Rawls' idealisation of the political values in the original position results in a self that is defined by pre-existing values to assure autonomy. An outcome is that it is an encumbered self.

Rawls' (1999, p. 184) claims that there is no objective way of waging rational plans, and rationally is an obligation to serve justice. An outcome is that justice and the good always are at odds. Rawls' conception of the good or rationality is created out of wants and desires which means that there is no reason to suppose that there are any more valid or worthy desires (Sandel (1984, p. 159). This results in a self that cannot be guided by anything besides their emotions and the claims of justice. There is evidence for the contrary. That it is, or ought to be the good that evaluates and regulate an individual's wants and desires. The way for Rawls' to solve this is to create a hierarchy between the concepts, controlling the desires through the totalitarianism of the good by justice. The issue is whether individuals perceive that the good is worth more than justice or if justice does not secure their good. As argued in the previous chapter Rawls' does not account for the different conceptions of the good in his conception of justice, and an outcome is that Rawls' political system is unlikely to be stable.

The secondary question is how the separation between good and justice is to be achieved, it can appear impossible to step away from affections or loyalties. Everyone has circumstances to bear because of their social identity. Rawls' self needs to be political, engaged, active, sovereign over a distributive discussion with respect and regard to the shared body of citizens and collective (Walzer 1994, p.

35). While in the private, the individual is rather a rational maximiser, radically autonomous, calculating, a risk-taker, who make all decisions alone with the impersonal coordination of the market (Ibid.). The self seems to be a highly demanding and very normative position, and it relies on an ideal of rationality which may be hard to achieve. These actors are alienated from their political environments, and their moral autonomy is decreased because they are not in control of their morality (Forst 2017, p. 12).

Thus, the additional issue for Rawls' is that he argues for a thin value, and adhering to thin values over a long time may have an eroding effect on society and the self. As portrayed by Sandel (1984, p. 171) the deontological self is a self-stripped of all possible attachment, less liberated and disempowered. Justice can destroy our narrative and in turn the perception of the self through disengaging us from all traditions. It is also necessary to engage in continual deliberation to become good social critics. It is only through engagement in society agents can discover, critique, reaffirm, and emulate values. The issue is as highlighted by Etzioni (2011, p. 110) that the community continually shapes individuals, and agents take on a lot of roles in the private. Rawls' (1988, p. 51) acknowledges the importance of deliberation as well, but his deliberation presupposes narrow and untenable ideas of both identity and subjectivity which both assume a conformist social order.

It possible that no agent would accept Rawls' separation of good and justice because they are not acting as one united self. Walzer (1994, p. 84) describes the self as divided. The divided self is defined according to responsibilities, skills, qualifications, and entitlements. But also, by identities through the social which is reflected in politics, gender, nation, religion, or family. It is divided among its ideals, values, and principles. All roles further receive desert for different actions. The original position as guided by egoism is hence unfit to choose our highest-order interest because that would entail us knowing our good in all different roles. Without knowing our ends, it will be impossible to make an intelligible choice of principles. To truly give individuals desert would require a thick conception of the self, and for the difference principle to be successful it requires a very thick understanding of the worst-off. Otherwise, distributing primary goods would be meaningless because it would not enable the good. It would require a system that could account for the competing conceptions of the self.

There may also be conflicts in the hierarchy of distribution of primary goods between different conceptions of the self. Consider Macintyre's (In Sandel 1984, p. 127) argument for the conception of the self as a narrative that links our births to our deaths. Human behaviour presupposes a setting in which it can become, but that requires reflection in respect to the situation if it is to be comprehensible. Macintyre

(In Sandel 1984, p. 145) suggests that agents often exist within traditions that are embodied by certain goods and histories. The good supervenes through previous traditions that a community has internalised. This does not imply that agents are dealing with one kind of history, several traditions may interact, and agents need to evaluate their beliefs upon all traditions. If agents are to make sense of actions, it is necessary to understand how to characterise a behaviour correctly over a long period. Understanding behaviour requires an understanding of intentions, beliefs, and settings. Without these factors, behaviour becomes unintelligible (Ibid, p. 131).

Macintyre (In Sandel 1984, p. 131) enables us to distinguish between an intelligible or unintelligible action, but this can also be applied to a conception of the self. One can act upon the communal life, however, to truly comprehend what it means to be situated and to achieve autonomy requires an understanding of the traditions that shaped the community. This is a critique of the situated self and unencumbered self. The unencumbered self acts upon feelings or unintelligible behaviours are inherited for unknown reasons because agents can never return to the original position. While the situated self, acts on an inherited conception of the good without justified reasons. Agents move between different influences over time and that which is situated changes. A narrative conception of the self can bring order to a divided self by creating a psychological continuity (Macintyre 2007, p. 251). An action can be intelligible in a narrative because it contributes to a goal or various goals.

Rawls' (1999, p. 365) conception of the good is not that different form a narrative conception of the good. A rational plan reflects contemporary and future desires. But the past influences these rational plans, the collective good and there are different plans for different roles. It is not as straightforward as choosing a role, and even if an agent wants a primary good in either role it does not mean that it is good. The divided selves furnish society with its moral definitions and secure universality in that culture (Macintyre 2007, p. 36). When Rawls' constructs the self as an individual it becomes the basis of right and wrong in society. Rawls' self is constructed as an emotivist self (Ibid, p. 37), a self that cannot pass judgment on others because there are no rational criteria to do so. The issue with an emotivist depiction of moral agency is when we compare it to an engineer, physician, or therapist they are judged upon their knowledge (Ibid.). While the emotivist self is judged according to their preferences or limited criteria of "political" justice. It is a position of pluralism of the good which ignores the historical, political, and sociological implications of the good.

To conclude, practices can change over a lifetime, and so can the role of an individual in society. Individuals are encumbered, but with that knowledge, comes the possibility to revise aims, ambitions, and desires. This implies a denial of a

completely unencumbered self. Rawls' definition marginalises conceptions of the self because it is linked to public reasoning which decreases agents' autonomy, individualism which results in that the collective good is not accounted for, nor is the history which comes with different traditions, and the multitude of competing selves. If we consider climate change as something that is caused by values and behaviour it requires reflexivity to motivate different selves. The same applies to morality and political values they must be circumstantial to the challenges of different communities; they need to regulate the private as well as consider the interplay with the public and together these factors need to consider the good to have an impact regarding the different conceptions of the self. The achievement of the good, climate justice, and autonomy become dependent on perfectionist policies and a non-neutral state. Consequently, distributional justice is dependent on considering the different conceptions of the self, otherwise, it will not cater to the specific needs of individuals nor their rational plans.

4.1.3. A critique of justice

Political liberalism has undermined the democratic ideal of equality and sovereignty (Mouffe 2018, p. 12). The issue is that liberalism and democracy tend to contain conflicting elements. As of recently, the liberal element won, and this has resulted in a society where citizens have been deprived of the possibility to exercise their rights and in a post-democratic society (Ibid.). Rawls' tried to affirm their connection in a well-ordered society by creating a demos dedicated to Political liberalism. Rawls' approach is insufficient due to the limitations of his principles of justice. Utilising Walzer's (2008, p. 12) idea of dominance the political is based on an unfair or even suppression of those not being elites. Rawls' principles are not a sufficient justification for the public, they further undermine autonomy, the good, and freedom of individuals in liberal societies.

Rawls' Political liberalism was an attempt to find a universal theory of justice, but if humans are contextual and communal beings it could be misguided (Sandel 1984, p. 167). Macintyre (2007, p. 109) argues that the social sciences have failed in providing universal generalisations, and all claims of universality in terms of human laws have failed. Thus far, the social sciences have not been able to account for trivial contingencies, the imperfection of information, the indefinite reflexivity of actors, and the unpredictability of innovations when considering human behaviour. An outcome is that Rawls' moral psychology, ideas of democracy, governance, and economics as reflected in the well-ordered society are unlikely to function across societies. These concepts depend on whether the communal structure supports these values. What the critique of Political liberalism highlights is not a debate of whether individuals believe in liberal equality, rather an empirical question of its

adequacy in helping individuals overcome their disadvantages (Kymlicka 2001, p. 156).

Rawls' theory hinges on the citizenry accepting justice as the justification of a well-ordered society or the advantages that justice brings about. Liberal peoples are not united due to a common history, language, or culture that would rarely be satisfied due to the homogeneity of backgrounds of the citizenry (Rawls' 1998, p. 25). They are rather united by common sympathies and a desire for democratic governance. This implies an overlapping consensus of compressive doctrines. Rawls' (Ibid. p. 16) assumes that it is not necessary to have religious, philosophical, or moral unity for social unity. The issue with Rawls' conception is that it is a guaranteed political consensus because citizens with different perceptions are excluded due to the conception of public reasoning (Habermas 1996, p. 122). Young (1995, p. 184) claims that Rawls' fails to account for how values and commitments are played out against a set of practices and institutions. Neither does Rawls' fully account for that no human departs from a single set of coherent doctrines. An outcome of the magnitude of the minimal in Rawls' theory results in that the thickness of society is excluded and ends up reinforcing the existent thick hierarchy (Ibid.).

Kogelmann (2017 p. 16) perceives that social unity may be possible in Rawls' vision of a well-ordered society, even if agents do not share the same end there is still a degree of shared ends. Shared values and a political standard have benefits. The issue is that there are different expectations of political decision-making and public reasoning. Rawls' justice as an overlapping consensus could enable the unification of humans, but only for shorter periods. There may be cause for friendliness and agreement, but this is just a minimalistic consensus (Walzer 1994, p. 1). Minimalism is liberated from the entrenched or thickness of history, culture, religion, and politics. Rawls' might argue that his public reasoning is pure because it is thin, but reason always starts from the thick values and resonates with certain ideas. There is simply no room for other conceptions in Rawls' political vision; that which is thin is thick (Ibid.). An outcome is that citizens with other values will not perceive Rawls' justification as legitimate.

Rawls' conception of reason is not that different from the good and can be interpreted as morally true or as what derives what is morally valid (Habermas 1996, p. 123). Yet, it is too far from the actual good of the citizenry. But including the good will not hinder all conflicts, but it could decrease them if it includes the right schemes for deliberation. It necessitates a willingness to engage in conversations, to speak, to understand, and to respond to the opinions of others. Independent of public reason, citizens will act as if their conception of good has weight. If two groups do not want to stay together a shared standard of reason will

suffice to keep them together. This suggests that social unity requires something that goes deeper than shared political principles. The issue is that Rawls' public reasoning becomes instrumental to that which is intrinsic, but without any idea of what is intrinsic, it is questionable whether primary goods or public reason losses its meaning due to neither being factually related to the good.

The issue with the good is Rawls' hierarchy between justice and good. Rationality as defined by Rawls' is a limited conception of the good because it fails to acknowledge the connection between justice, rational plans, and the common good. Seeing the good as an individualistic pursuit neglects the interconnection of different conceptions of the good. Even if justice hinders the decay of the state, it does not necessarily result in individuals seeking the co-benefits that could be achieved by them working together or that their rational plans could be a collective rather individualistic good. Taylor (In Sandel 1984, p. 169) perceives that the emphasis on the public results in that the liberal state could have an issue with sustaining legitimacy because social functioning may require imposing sanctions or sacrifices in the private. That is further why the foundation for a sacrifice or collective action requires perceiving that a common form of life as valuable, this requires the citizenry to understand why the principles of justice were chosen and values beyond public reason.

In effect, Political liberalism has led to a legitimacy crisis where the public and belief in politics is weakened, which enables the possibility of social change (Shoikhedbrod 2018, p. 172). This is occurring in a society where individuals owe nothing to each other besides formal justice, what is witnessed is social change tied to a choice and ambition-sensitive system, driven by mutual distrust, trickery, and plundering (Ibid.). All interaction in the private becomes based on economic structures instead of justice (Sayers 2007, p. 97). But the private does not enable the harmonisation of ends, it rather results in conflicts because of the atomised approach of the good (Ibid.). Agents are driven to defend themselves rather than to deliberate rationally together in the achievement of a good society (Macintyre 2008, p. 3). As portrayed by Geres (in Ibid, p. 54) rights cannot be higher than the economic structure. Rawls (1998, p. 127) strives to achieve the latter through his property-owning democracy, arguing that democracies ought to control the ownership of capital and wealth. Yet, the principles of justice are insufficient because of their limited scope of distributive justice. It is not a system of equal recognition, that would imply deeper respect for the good, and a strive for the development of all individuals and the satisfaction of their needs (Shoikhedbrod 2018, p. 116).

Rawls' (1998, p. 24) constitutional democracy becomes authoritarian in its dominance of political power. Instead of giving the citizenry the possibility to deliberate on the legitimacy of the public reason he omits this standard. The outcome is that antagonism arises which may undermine the political stability of the well-ordered state. Mouffe's (2018) critique of Political liberalism is as a result applicable to Rawls' theory because of the emphasis on law, separation of power, and individual freedom. The over-emphasis on these factors results in a definition of justice that undermines democracy and equality. Rawls' principles of equal opportunity and difference as a foundation of a well-ordered society justify contemporary society if it does not worsen the fate of the worst-off. In practice, Rawls' methodological individualism creates individuals' who feel little reason to help other individuals in achieving their good. Society becomes a contest between individuals who can utilise the principles of justice to their benefit, instead of a pursuit of the common good or solutions that enable individuals overlapping goods.

To conclude, Rawls' justice does not seem to result in unity, poor motivation, nor does it assure stability or legitimacy. Justice as defined by Rawls' provides little motivation to care for other individuals, and when applied to climate justice, it would only imply actions that make life better for the worst-off. However, his conception of justice results in the politics of the endowed. An exclusive definition of public reason and the justification of endowments acting in the public results in that when those without power are omitted, meaning that certain interests and conception of the good are excluded. Instead of excluding them, it may be important that conflicts take place, allowing different individuals to put forward their claims. Recognizing the plurality of goods and taking actions that represent the divided selves. This would in turn enable a less fragmented agency in the strive for climate justice. Justice, as defined by Rawls', is neither instrumental to the good because the good is undefined, and it remains to be deliberated which will cause conflicts due to the feelings of exclusion from a public that values certain conceptions of the good.

The following section will summarize some of the main benefits of the good over Rawls' conception of justice when conceptualising climate justice:
- Rawls' Justice is constructed in the original position, resulting in it being too far from the values and realities of peoples', while the communitarian good represents peoples' actual values and norms. As a foundation of institutions or moral behaviour, it results in that justice does not account for what people perceive to be justice, while the good represents peoples' real behaviour and values. The good would result in a strive for constructing a conception of climate justice that reflects institutions and rules that individuals perceive to be important in guiding society. A conception based

on the good has a greater chance of motivating action for climate justice. Likewise, justice is not necessarily instrumental nor intrinsic to the good, meaning that it provides little reason for individuals to engage in the political and climate justice. It further excludes a lot of individuals who do not have liberal values and an outcome is that it could be more likely to exclude those having different values than the global North. This furthers the skewed vulnerabilities in the world and the unequal spatial distribution of the impact of climate change. The exclusion may further result in conflict and dissent which fragments agency, instead of enabling a constructive dialogue between the different conceptions of the political in discussions of climate justice.

- Distribution based on Rawls' justice does not account for the different good of individuals, it instead forces individuals to interact in a system that might not benefit their good. While as a distribution based on the good would acknowledge that people require different goods based on their roles and selves in society. Society itself might be dependant on these resources being distributed based on selves and roles. Rawls' justice further strengthens the skewed vulnerabilities and unequal distribution because of what kind of basic liberties, the needs of individuals are contextual and bound by culture. Thus, the distribution of emissions based on Rawls' would not account for the contextual nature of the world. Only distributing basic liberties would assure the good for those who are well-endowed which systematically benefits the rich global North, while systematically enabling the more vulnerable and Global South to get a lower standard if they do not belong to the worst-off.

- Rawls' focuses on the individual or methodological individualism, it results in that the rights of an individual triumph the good of a lot of individuals. In the case of high GHGs, it is acceptable to systematically add GHGs if it does not worsen the situations for individuals in the worst-off position in society. The focus on individuals further neglects how different conceptions of good are connected which fragments agency and their motivation. Neither does Rawls provide any criteria for the good, meaning that there are no more worthy pursuits of the good and in cases where those who do not belong to the worst-off remain unaffected it does matter what one does. Furthermore, the well-ordered society focuses on society, not the world, an outcome is that a lot of individuals are excluded from the political, neither are they included in the analyses of the consequences of an action or decision-making if there not a part of that society.

4.2. The limitations of political liberal climate justice

In the Laws of People, Rawls' (1998) claims that peoples ought to engage in fair cooperation with other peoples' utilising a second original position. Central to this view is people, but how we differentiate between peoples' and states' are hard to comprehend. People occupy territories, and national boundaries are as a result given significance. Borders grant peoples' internal sovereignty to people who can reasonably agree to laws and principles (Ibid, p. 28). As understood today, most borders are arbitrary, and there are injustices connected to how the territories came about. Consequently, boundaries are insufficient in creating the necessary means for justice, solitary, legitimacy, or stability. The argument of peoples also excludes the feelings of minorities and those valuing other things than liberal-democratic principles or public reasoning.

Rawls' theory is different from his contemporaries because of the concern with how individuals with different conceptions of good could cooperate, while his contemporaries focused on the moral sociology of individual duties as well as rights across borders (Jameison In Gardiner et al 2010, p. 275). It is not necessary to choose between either view because there are even more diverse groupings or identities that may enhance the idea of justice across borders (Sen 2010, p. 142). It could be religion, language, ethnicity, gender, political beliefs, or profession (Ibid.). The injustices a society can spread across the world have effectively resulted in that neighbourhoods exist across the world; should those belonging to a favoured category only be included in discussions of justice?.

There are multiple reasons for justice, and Rawls' (1998, p. 40) stipulates this as well, there are many reasonable political conceptions, and Political liberalism is one of them. Political liberalism over-emphasises peoples', and it does not have any historical principles, neglecting the aggregate effect of GHGs and the colonial history of the North in hoarding wealth and people from across the world (Pogge 2006, p. 6). Just because an action is just in the national it does not imply that it is just based on present, future, or past injustices elsewhere (Forst 2001, p. 163). When we discuss distribution, climate justice, or equity there is a need to account for these features. A just basic structure in the nation is not enough. There are different approaches towards transnational governance. The position was taken by Rawls' resembles the statist camp, it is grounded in nationality and conceives that liberalism cannot be coherently extended to the international level (Kenehan 2015, p. 309).

The position taken regarding the role of the state or people in transnational governance is important because it results in different obligations toward non-nationals (Kenehan 2015, p. 309). The well-ordered society of Rawls' leaves little

room for addressing that the basic structure of a given society influences all countries, and non-nationals. Theories of climate justice need to include states as an actor because they are responsible for the majority of all GHGs, and over 90 per cent of oil and gas reserves are owned by states (Maltias 2016, p. 6). It has been argued that individuals are the ultimate unit of concern, and the autonomy of states is not as strong as perceived (Forst 2001, p. 164). There are global schemes of trade and justice between nations. In the original position, Rawls' attempts to remove the arbitrariness that may influence our thinking and it is a major motivation for Rawls' (Sen 2010, p. 132). Therein lay the issue, the original position does not include individuals beyond a given border, and deliberations occur among a chosen group, whose members are perceived to live in that society (Ibid, p. 127).

There is also a question of whether nationality is special enough to generate moral obligations that cannot be attributed to non-nationals (Kenehan 2015, p. 310). Rawls' theory belongs to the middle ground which is sufficientarian: it provides greater partiality to fellow nationals, but still, imply that national have moral duties to non-nationals. It is important because Rawls' is the middle ground between cosmopolitanism and those focusing on nationality and partiality. Kenehan (Ibid, p. 310) argues that it has some practical advantage, the statistic position demands too little, and it is only defensible to adapt when a situation threatens the nation itself. While the cosmopolitan theory demand too much (Ibid.). An equally problematic aspect for every cosmopolitan framework is the sovereignty of states can run counter to any international standard (Vanderheim 2008, p. 84). Since GHGs have a spill-over effect, it becomes an issue for climate justice to deal with the sovereignty of states. Likewise, continual reports have stated that it is the inequity between states that is the cause of climate injustices (Ibid, p. 252).

Pogge (2006, p. 2) stipulates that Rawls' appeals to Kant in critiquing cosmopolitanism, arguing that a world monarch would be highly unstable and ineffective due to the divergent perceptions of peoples. Rawls' accounts for attributes in the contemporary world and tries to create cooperative and political arrangements (Kenehan 2015, p. 311). Pogge (2006, p. 2) further argues that his theory departs from methodological individualism, and it is in a way counterintuitive to the well-ordered society because it does not provide any means to value political borders. To frame the issue in another way, climate policy is largely about our preferences and vulnerabilities (Shue In Gardiner 2010 et al, p. 146), by focusing on liberal and decent states a lot of people that experience harm or vulnerabilities are excluded. An outcome is that people are disrespected and those groups which dependant on the environment may be excluded from the public because they are more likely to belong to the periphery (Brincat 2015, p. 302). An outcome is that those who are vulnerable would be misrecognised, and these

individuals' autonomy would continue to be threatened. Rawls' Political liberalism worsens the institutional inadequacy because those who have claims for climate justice are excluded.

An additional issue with Rawls' interaction with different peoples' is the high standard for interaction or intervention due to people's perceived self-determination. It is also caused by the lack of reasons for assistance and a focus on volunteerism. Pogge (2006, p. 14) argues that volunteerism could have an impact or it could have none. It completely depends on the global structure (Ibid.). Considering that Rawls' well-ordered society is driven by methodological individualism, and a lack of willingness to engage for the common good, there are good reasons for supposing that volunteerism is insufficient which fragments agency. Bell (2004, p. 143) stipulates that climate change is a commons problem, not that of individual societies because it is not caused or located within a single territory. A shortcoming of Rawls' theory is that has no means to value the commons of the atmosphere.

A counterargument to cosmopolitanism is that justice on a global level stretches the moral community too thin (Etzioni, 2011, p. 109). It is not only the lack of infrastructure to deal with climate change, it goes beyond that. Humans do not have the psychological aptitude to account for those beyond the community (Ibid.). Likewise, disputes can only be solved from within political societies because it is therein, we can adjust our preferences to a society's maximalist morality (Walzter 1994, p. 48). The idea is in line with statists who advocate that the weak and dispersed forms of cooperation in the international does not enable a strong conception of distributive justice (Forst 2001, p. 162). Neither is it attractive, it could become a system that lacks a neutral starting point resulting in ethnocentrism, or that individuals will be perceived as a part of a machinery of production and distribution without political participation (Ibid.). But there are still widely accepted ideas, such as that the current distribution of economic goods is an injustice (Vanderheim 2008, p. 98). Rawls' justifies economic inequalities between both decent and liberal societies (Pogge 2006, p. 10). Pogge (Ibid, p. 16) argues that Rawls' needs a principle for adjusting and assessing the global order. Rawls' society increases the skewed vulnerabilities by not accounting for the injustices between peoples.

In detail, Pogge (2006, p. 16) argues that the duty to assist is Rawls' attempt to achieve a more just global basic structure. It should be acknowledged that there are benefits with the duty to assist, it calls for securing basic needs and human rights (Kenehan 2015, p. 318). Yet, as highlighted by Pogge (2006, p. 10) the duty to assist only applies to liberal and decent states. Climate change is likely to have a

greater effect on outlaw or absolutist states because they do not have the means to adapt and are more likely to be part of the Global South which is going to experience greater climate harm. It is only in this setting where human rights may be applicable and could be a motivation for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, that is until liberal or decent states are threatened which may be further in the future. This provides few reasons for precautionary action or to act on the moral storm referred to as uncertainty.

The additional issue with the duty to assist is that it demands too little (Gardiner 2011, p. 143). Bell (2004, p. 144) claims that the criteria of assistance are too high, resulting in a low degree of solidary between peoples, especially people who have no state. The problem of climate change is largely one of intersubjectivity between the Global North and South (Brincat 2015, p. 279). The North is less vulnerable, has more power, and has contributed to the issue to a greater extent. An outcome is that skewed vulnerabilities and spatial dispersion of effects and causes seem to be worsened. Gardiner (2011, p. 143) perceived that the duty to assist does not deal with the threats to different goods or cultures which means that people can be harmed without recourse. The duty to assist only implies a duty to preserve liberal peoples, neglecting people who are not afforded these privileges. This furthers the moral storm of institutional inadequacy because of the failure to respond to the vulnerabilities of states that are not liberal, decent, or peoples' that do not have a state.

Buchanan's (2000, p. 703) argumentation clarifies Rawls' institutional inadequacy. Rawls' derived his idea of the Law of Peoples from a Westphalian perception of the world. The treaty of Westphalia solidified the importance of the state as a global actor, as a sovereign of their territory. It resulted in the perception that states are subjects of international law and that they are treated as a united actor which denied the existence of distinct people (Ibid.). Rawls' theory lacks a distributional principle between states, and it is also why Rawls describes the idea of the state as shaping its well-orderedness. Having a well-ordered state does not in any way reduce the possibility of being seriously disadvantaged by the global basic structure due to the interconnection of the world (Ibid.). Even if the citizenry wanted to change their interaction with people, they are locked into a particular system due to their well-ordered society (Pogge 2006, p. 11). An outcome of Buchanan's (2000) reasoning is that is questionable whether Rawls' perception of Laws of People is sufficient in a world where there is a global basic structure. Buchanan (Ibid, p. 708) argues that there are powerful reasons to choose a global basic structure that does not impede society's capacity to achieve its perception of justice.

Hertzell (2007, p. 15) provides a different perspective, a global duty can be generated out of the domestic duty of caring for nature because the integrity of the local environment depends on the global. The issue is that Hartzell tries to achieve the latter without modifying the theory, which means that interpretation is not coherent with Rawls' idea of self-determination. Another argument against Hartzell is provided by Gardiner (2011, p. 137) who argues that if you are above a threshold level and your territory remains stable it provides no incentive to act on a global level. The distribution of resources should not worsen the situation for the worst-off, but it could exacerbate the situation for those who do not belong to the worst-off. Both Hertzell (2007), Preston (2004), and Buchanan (2000) conceive that Rawls' distribution principles do not properly address international distributive justice and suggest that the laws between people should resemble a well-ordered society. Even if the duties in a well-ordered society were extended to the global it would result in different but similar issues. It would not account for different perceptions of the good, vulnerabilities of peoples' and it would coerce individuals in a more diverse setting. It would provide little motivation for moral behaviour between individuals, a distributional principle that benefits elites, decreases the autonomy and freedom of citizens.

Utilising Fraser's (2005, p. 245) terminology Rawls' theory of the state and transnational justice is affirming the innuendo of Westphalia, in a world where injustices no longer only are connected to states. The transformative approach or post-Westphalian principles would require a theory that overcomes the misframing of injustices across and beyond border (Ibid.). What this thesis has highlighted is that Rawls fails to include all who are affected by climate change. Rawls' theory results in meta-political misrepresentation, where states and transnational elites would monopolise the frame-setting which in turn denies a voice to those who are harmed in the process of injustices. Further hindering those who are harmed from making democratic demands, excluding these actors from making demands on how and what policies are to be implemented.

To conclude, an explanation of why Rawls' fails to address justice on a global level is that he tries to maintain the conception of peoples at all costs (Gardiner 2011, p. 141). An additional issue is Rawls' methodological nationalism and the failure to engage with environmental concerns. As advocated by Forst (2001, p. 161), the whole world is a context of justice, it becomes insufficient to only focus on states or peoples. Gardiner (2011, p. 139) suggests that Rawls' Political liberalism could become viable if it included non-ideal elements and considered what kind of circumstances would be necessary for his theory to function. It becomes evident that the original position decreases the possible actors who can be considered to have an equal moral status which results in the infeasibility of Rawls' theory

concerning harms and vulnerabilities. It excludes actors that are central to the question of climate justice and provides few reasons to act to achieve climate justice due to methodological nationalism. When the well-ordered society is implemented it would in all likeliness perpetuate these injustices on a global level.

4.2.1. Beyond Rawls' conception of justice

The challenge for Rawls' theory of justice can be extended to include the context of environmental burdens and benefits (Caney In Gardiner et al 2010, p. 123). Should the environment be valued due to the impact it has on primary goods such as income, wealth, liberties, opportunities, and social bases of self-respect (Deneen 2018, p. 42). Nussbaum (2012, p. 489) describes it as an anthropocentric scholar, stating theories must realise the interplay of environmental goals with the causal support of all other human capabilities. Therefore, a question that needs to be answered is whether Rawls' theory provides agents with sufficient reasons to value the environment and act collectively on behalf of climate justice.

Rawls' (1999, p. 223) stipulates that a well-ordered society ought to create conditions where direct harm from environmental degradation is decreased. The original position acknowledges the environment (Ibid, p. 175), and it does so through the just savings principle. We are to save the resources that are necessary for future generations to have a just basic structure, but we do not know how much to save because we do not know what generation we are a part of. What one generation requires for just institutions differ, and this makes it harder to choose sufficient principles. The additional issue is that even if the principle calls for saving for future generations it focuses on the domestic, and that neglects that climate change is a global commons problem. It is neither a duty to sustain the resources for other peoples. An outcome is that the vulnerabilities of others are excluded and that it is a minimalistic principle that does not demand that much from a given people. Preston (2004, p. 75) perceives that it would be better if we knew if we belonged to the current generation, it would result in greater moral responsibility. An extension would be to consider that agents would not know what species they are a part of to avoid speciesism.

Jamieson (In Gardiner et al 2010, p. 315) claims that Kantian theories are insufficient in dealing with climate change because they focus on the individual. Such focus neglects the global which results in contract theories having severe difficulties in addressing climate justice and accounting for the value of "externalities" or nature. The additional issue is that the original position excludes the primary moral considerations of those who are not parties to the deliberation. Rawls' (1999, p. 443) acknowledges that animals cannot arise to the criteria of equality and they do not deserve the protection of its outcome. Those who will be

most severely affected by climate change are parties that cannot take part in the deliberation. Either because they are future generations, non-human animals, infants, ecological entities, or distant people.

The anthropocentrism of liberalism arose a long time ago due to the perception of humans as being above nature (Deneen 2018, p. 42). Nature was conceived as an independent object which is separate from humans. This gave rise to the conquest of the natural world, but on a deeper level, it sought to transform both the world and humans (Ibid.). The unencumbered self that arose is a self that is freed from nature, and it gives us no grounds for carrying for nature. This inadequacy is worsened by the conception of culture and time in the original position (Ibid, pp. 64-70). Enabling deliberation independent of the contingencies of past, present, and future (Deneen 2018, p. 68). Culture is dismissed because it would threaten the possibility of deliberation, but culture would provide the conventions of how to interact, and value nature. Time is important because climate change and environmental degradation are aggregated effects that occurs over time. It is questionable whether we can protect the good of individuals without being bound to time, culture, and nature.

Deliberation in the original position is idealised, agents will evaluate the truth based on their doctrine, and the consequence is that reasonableness will not sway them (Preston 2004, p. 80). When agents try to understand climate justice, they will depart from their local understanding, but when political deliberation occurs in the second original position, they are not engaging in local issues. They would utilise the same pseudo-environments based on stereotypes to interpret the world (Lippmann 1909, p. 15). An outcome is that Rawls' is insufficient in dealing with parochialism because agents would only consider their interests in the second original position which undermines the pursuit of climate justice if it largely is about recognizing others and their vulnerabilities.

Rawls' rejection of comprehensive doctrines results in that a component of what guides individuals' lives is excluded. As argued by Mckinnon (2011, p. 17), any political solution to the problems of climate change must draw on an ecological theory of the good. This requires us to consider values beyond the political and Nicholas Stern (In Gardiner 2010, p. 84) states that it is necessary to perceive climate change as a moral problem. Otherwise it ends up being a discussion of how experts can solve it for humanity which neglects the normative consequences of any solution. Mackinnon (2011, p. 11) perceives that it is a job for non-ideal theory to value nature, however, other ideal theories manage to include the means to value non-human animals and the environment.

Kim (2019) tries to salvage Rawls' by reforming the basic structure in the second original position to address non-compliance. Kim (Ibid.) suggestion relies on adding a principle:

> Peoples are not to impair the environmental background conditions of justice under which each liberal or decent people can maintain a just or decent basic structure over generations.

The principle is contrary to Rawls' (1998, p. 178) because it depends on agents knowing the natural resources in an area. It also requires them to understand what generation they belong to, and to know the basic structure of each generation. The critique that is afforded to the just savings principle is applicable here as well. Kim (2019) also incurs Sen's (2010) critique of Rawls' because neither manages the real behaviour nor the behaviour that the institutions are producing and excludes outlaw as well as absolutist states. An outcome is that the principle fails to handle the main issues of the original position in terms of its methodological nationalism, lack of recognition of vulnerabilities, methodological individualism, and rational deliberation.

Another strategy is provided by Hartzell (2007, p. 12), caring for peoples' imposes certain limitations on utilising the atmospheric capacity. This or the previous idea do not fully engage with climate change being a social injustice and they exclude actor if they do not belong to liberal or decent peoples'. As stated by Gardiner (2011, p. 137), Rawls' does not provide feasible arguments for protecting the environment, the incentive is not strong enough and it does not give any clear action guidance. Brincat (2015, p. 282) perceives that Rawls' theory results in a divided and incoherent program for climate justice. It fails to address the causes of environmental degradation by not addressing social, class, cultural, and underlying symbolic issues with distributive justice (Ibid.).

To conclude, Rawlsian constructivism is ill-equipped to deal with the issues that climate change presents (Gardiner & Weisbach 2016, p. 37). It is complacent, opaque, or even evasive concerning climate justice. Rawls' fulfils all moral storms, and to avoid this critique, it would call for radically different premises in the original position. Gardiner (2011, p. 138) concludes that Rawls' must include normative and sufficient arguments for why we are to value climate stability. As described by Sayegh (2017, p. 351), distributional principles do not pay attention to the harms that the distributions cause. If Rawls' theory is to be viable it must be extended and altered (Kim 2019, p. 163). It would be a theory with a different conception of the good, justice, democracy, reasoning, deliberation, and moral status. Based on a different epistemology and ontology that incorporate non-human nature, culture and time.

4.2.2. Climate justice as a stick figure of the good

The well-ordered society nor the Laws of People do not provide sufficient reasons to engage in climate justice. It is necessary to move beyond rights and methodological individualism to achieve climate justice. Most states or peoples have gone from striving for the common good to achieving individual freedom or securing individuals' rights (Mouffe 2018). The outcome is that citizens focus on themselves and are unwilling to act for their state, and the state is powerless in imposing the necessary transformative actions for climate justice (Calder & McKinnon 2011, p. 94). An outcome is that Rawls methodological individualism or emphasis on individual results in it being harder to motivate states, peoples, and individuals to strive for climate justice. Motivation hinges on individuals perceiving that their autonomy is connected to others, and that the common good is of importance.

Shue (In Gardiner 2010 et al, p. 110) argues that the right-based approach has a limited scope of why we ought to achieve equity and equality. An example is that giving an individual more survival emission does not necessarily entail a better life. The same issue can be afforded to human rights, it is a minimalistic or a thin conception of justice. If we consider a just distribution of goods, they may not solve climate justice because that is only a part of the injustice which animals and humans experience. Liberal theories may ask for the rich to transfer wealth to non-industrialised nations (Gardiner & Weisbach 2015, p. 207). But to deal with inequality and climate change may require different policies (Ibid.). It leads us to question whether global social and climate justice ought to be solved through the same theories of justice (Baxi 2016, p. 11).

Distributing survival emissions or human rights are neither robust egalitarian positions. They do not amount to what a society nor different selves needs to function, it seems to undermine the real question of how we are supposed to live, and what kind of societies we should have beyond a minimalistic standpoint. Neither does it deal with recognition nor deeper questions of social justice, but it could provide the individual with the means of self-determination which could result in less domination (Frost 2017, p. 5). But as stated by Shue (In Gardiner et al 2010, p. 106), what we can do with a set amount of GHGs differentiates immensely. Fraser (1995, p. 74) argues that recognition of others may promote group differentiation, while redistributing goods affirms the differences between groups instead of changing the underlining structure that resulted in the injustice.

Rights cannot protect the environment because they neglect the relations that would result in the achievement of the protection of the environment (Brincat 2015, p. 299). Rights and liberties are an individualistic conceptions rather than a social

good, an outcome is that they do not acknowledge that freedom and autonomy are dependent on other individuals. Climate injustice is a social pathology connected to a lack of recognition of individuals, but also of the collective autonomy and good (Brincat 2015, p. 299). To account for the South would entail a more extensive notion than rights which accounts for all causes of social injustice(Ibid, p. 280).

Attaining climate justice based on the well-ordered society or The Laws of People is a stick figure which fails to address the more challenging questions based on the thick conceptions of recognition and distribution. The critique is also applicable to Rawls' consensus of doctrines. Humanity could be united over the idea of fighting the enemy: Climate Change. Everyone understands the abstraction. It could bring states or individuals to the discussion, but the departure of the discussion would not be Political liberalism, and there would not be a shared form of reasoning. Mouffe (2005, p. 224) asserts that Rawls' does not argue for an overlapping consensus, but rather a constitutional consensus due to it being based on public reasoning and reasonable persons. As argued by Calder (2015, p. 530) all negotiations are normative and depend on different conceptions of the good. An outcome is that it may be possible to arrive at a consensus on our thick values. A discussion on thin results in that states or peoples is discussing stick figures rather than what is important. The thin solution as presented may sound highly attractive, but it sounds attractive precisely because it is a stick figure.

Rawls' denies the possibility of achieving a different kind of consensus than one based on Political liberalism because his perception of justice requires a community to have close interpersonal ties (Brincat 2015, p. 284). But it is possible to envision a consensus being based on different premises. Two premises could be the good and a convergence on injustice. Injustices may provide the basis of a similar moral intuition in the global basic structure (Etzioni 2011, p. 115). A convergence cannot be based on a shared reason because of the different perceptions of the good in different communities. As stated by Habermas (1996, p. 122) the justification of a theory or a discourse should not be based on that theory alone, but rather on competing worldviews. This is more in common with the intelligible criteria of public justification (Vallier 2016), a reason is intelligible if members of a public perceive that a policy is justified according to their evaluative standard.

Rawls' conception is contradictory to the existing global basic structure because it is working towards adaption/mitigation strategies (Brincat 2015, p. 280). Procedural justice provides a part of the puzzle in terms of facilitating the coordination of interests and the possibility for cooperation (Brandstedt & Brülde 2019, p. 788). It can create norms of interaction and enable the determination of rights, demands, and obligations. It may create an arena for action or justice-based

norms that are fair, and legitimate (Ibid.). Inspiration can be derived from Habermas' (1996, p. 117) conception of discourse ethics, in that it is an inclusive and non-coercive rational dialogue that ought to strive to move beyond the structural constraints of individuals. Bernstein (2015, p. 128) perceives that a thick consensus could be functional if it is justified based on the common good of states. This kind of public reasoning implies a convergence where the agents try to offer proposals that can be accepted because they do not undermine other agents and are justified based on the common good between different comprehensive doctrines (Ibid.). Etzioni (2011, p. 110) argues that moral dialogues are possible, and result in reformulated normative understandings.

It is almost universally recognised that public justification requires one common justificatory reason (Gaus & Vallier 2009, p. 52). The issue is that in the global structure there are very different perceptions. Public justification must therefore be plural. Applying Political liberalism on an international level would be unjustified, decrease the autonomy of the participants, and be anti-democratic due to the many diverse cultures. Achieving pluralism entails convergence based on different reasons, and that the arguments are intelligible based on public knowledge. This needs to be combined with a minimalist proviso to assure recognition of other actors and their good. This increases the possibility of the creation of an intersubjectivity that includes all forms of the good life without violating the autonomy of individuals or collectives. It is partly through recognition individuals could gain a better understanding of different traditions and their autonomy.

Recognition results in justice being more than a formalistic notion or about redistribution. It would rather about be achieving the good based on convincing justifications based on sub-environments. Mutuality is important for individuals' autonomy, and it also results in a higher or more extensive conception of the good life (Brincat 2015, p. 295). In negotiations agents will have to come to terms with their difference, there can be irreconcilable differences without conflict, if agents recognise each other's differences and make sacrifices to assure the autonomy of others' good. There is an attempt to critique false justifications and uncover social contradictions and relations of power.

To conclude, climate justice ought to be an endeavour of creating symmetrical relations of recognition to disclose different injustices and the lack of autonomy of the other (Brincat 2015, p. 295). As argued by Pickering (2019, p. 8) participation in environmental affairs largely reflects the participants' opinions. To construct a minimal perception of climate justice requires an honest discussion of the thick which necessitates a convergence instead of a consensus. This would enable agents to consider what is necessary to achieve climate justice based on their different

reasons. A part of the processes would have to be based on procedural justice, enforcing minimalistic demands of autonomy for all participants to enable them to engage. The process would entail the recognition and realisation of the normative worth of the other. Thereafter, agents can ascribe what would be a fair distribution, and disclose what would achieve autonomy for everyone. It is only then that agents can discuss how we are to act, and how we are to achieve climate justice.

4.2.3. The self and the achievement of a convergence

There is a wide number of suggestions for achieving climate justice (Maltais 2016), but they do not acknowledge that there is a lack of basic and global structure to support these solutions. As suggested by Ostrom (2010) when considering the problem of the commons there is not a sufficiently shared value between states due to disparities in interests, comprehensions of the world, and histories. The ecological question could be at the centre of our society but would require a Gramscian intellectual and moral reform. Such a reform offers an attractive vision of a future democratic society that may entice several sectors, but as argued by Bohman (2007, p. 271), democracy only makes sense if it can promote justice. Launching a counter-hegemonic struggle against the liberal model could provide a means of expanding a radical democratic collective will (Mouffe 2018, p. 34). The movement for climate justice is to a large extent a movement like the left, there is a chain of equivalence on a meta-level. Both approaches entail the idea of people, but that does not entail homogeneity or nationalism, it is rather a unity of different heterogeneous demands of plurality.

Non-ideal scholars have long argued that it is necessary to account for the political inertia (Maltias 2016), which requires certain structural conditions for a theory of justice to be applicable. Radical democracy as suggested by Mouffe (2018, p. 25) is a means to overcome Political liberalism. The political principles of liberty and equality are attractive for any climate regime because they may be a good basis for achieving climate justice. Mouffe (Ibid.) postulates that these values never were put into practice, it may be possible to create a populist movement based on these values on the left. Yet, climate justice is more complex than challenging inequality. It could be harder for individuals to identify or feel the affective dimensions of climate justice, especially if they belong to the North, it is also an aggregate effect, and it is future actors that will experience the majority of the harms. Climate justice may require a completely different value system and necessitates more abstract elements in guiding our everyday morality.

The affective elements of climate justice require us to reshape the values of freedom and equality (Brincat 2015). The issue is that societies are left with pseudo-

environments or the sensations of ebb and flow of that which is politicised. Historically, it is social institutions that have given individuals their values, but liberalism has sought to free us from them (Deneen 2018, p. 71). Mouffe (2018, p. 27) argues in a similar spirit that to effectively launch a hegemonic struggle there is a need to challenge our ingrained institutions and subjectivity. Methodological individualism has resulted in it being harder to value the collective good, enforcing what Macintyre (2007, p. 37) refers to as the emotivist self. A self that only abides by their good, and the only struggle that can be achieved is one that is beneficial to the self. Baxi (2016, p. 13) describes that we have created a self that is constituted by a pervasive commodification of life, disposed to the actions of the market and politics.

We may have arrived at passive or political nihilism (Baxi 2016, p. 13). The issue for climate justice is that most people do not perceive that it is wrong to engage in climate unfriendly actions (Katrin 2014, p. 950). Rawls' (1999, p. 414) is correct in arguing for moral behaviour, but does not engage with the cognitive dimensions of everyday life which influences climate justice. The political identification with environmentally destructive parties becomes normal when our affective dimensions are aligned with self-interest. Most humans know about climate change, and yet they are not supportive of the necessary changes needed to solve the problem (Katrin (2014, p. 950). For Mouffe (2018, p. 40) the way forward for the left is to construct a different kind of people who are open to a hegemony based on a different subjectivity. Similar reasoning can be applied to climate justice, requiring the construction of a subjectivity suited for climate justice.

Rawls' self is not connected to any peoples' good due to focus on rational plans. This also results in a diverse individual perceptions of domination and exploitation. Consequently, climate justice would have to start as a local struggle because of the divided self that arises out of the articulation of localized positions. But climate justice is a part of a wider social contradiction that forms the inequality, lack of democratic global governance, and patterns of distribution (Brincat 2015, p. 279). The politics of the common good should take precedence over justice in this process, creating a self with an intersubjectivity suited for the common good and recognition of the mutuality of different communites. Mouffe (ibid.) depicts that it is possible to unity based on an anti-essentialist identity around a discursive political project, by recognising the needs and vulnerabilities of others it may be possible to construct climate justice as an inclusive project.

4.3. The limitations of Rawls' theory of justice and climate action

This thesis has outlined the limitations of Rawls' theories in aspiring for climate justice. If we consider the current governance approach toward Agenda 2030, it has moved from why and what towards how (Brandstedt & Brülde 2019, p. 785). It is a move from multilateral governance to state governance. What we are witnessing has evident similarities to the Laws of The People. Agenda 2030 and Rawls' theory is founded on voluntary cooperation based on the sovereignty of the state, and it excludes non-governmental actors. There is a commitment to a general goal, something which could be expected in the second original position. The goal respects the sovereignty of the state, public reason, and gives the state the possibility to implement different strategies based on their capabilities and interests. Any additional actions outside would be based on voluntary cooperation which also is in line with Rawls' perception of the role of the state and interaction between peoples.

Climate governance requires a complex structure that spans from the global to the national and sub-national, relying on actions with the assistance of all relevant actors on these levels (Di Gregorio et al (2019, p. 64). Sucess requires local implementation, across the private that is coordinated by the state (Salvia et al 2019, p. 842). The success of implementing climate action heavily depends on local knowledge (Uitto et al 2017, p. 26). However, states are still important in providing incentives, decreasing barriers, and long-term finance (Ibid.). An analysis of major institutions has shown that transformative processes to achieve Agenda 2030 can be set in motion, but it requires legal and regulatory amendments in markets and behaviour (Di Gregorio et al 2019, p. 66). Even if NGOs and LGOs are important, evidence points towards that national governments are of importance in multi-level action (Ibid, p. 72).

The issue lies in that the majority of states have focused on top-down approaches that do not provide innovative actions and local priorities (Oosterhof 2018, p. 12). States are not managing to create the necessary institutional arrangements or systematic plans(UN 2020, p. 26). Countries often lack political expediency, awareness, and commitment to climate action(Ibid, p. 20). Resulting in that certain goals are being mainstreamed and that there is a greater emphasis on social and economic goals than environmental goals (Forestier & Kim, 2020, p. 1271). The measurements required to implement climate action are counterintuitive to Rawls', it requires contextual solutions and a singular form of reasoning decreases the possibility of contextual solutions. The values and motivation of these actors will also highly depend on theories of the good rather than political values. Rawls' state-

centred or people-oriented conception of government results in states becoming monolithic entities that defend justice. Rawls' conception of the state would not enable it to guide the implementation of climate action because of the definition of the political reason excludes acting beyond that which assures the well-being of the worst-off and human right breaches in other liberal or decent states.

Another issue is the suffientarianism or partiality to non-nationals and other countries. The latter becomes evident in considering climate fiance in achieving climate action. An example is that a duty to assist would not entail helping developing countries with their finance in achieving climate action. A practical example is Chile, to achieve their NDCs they need to receive 84 per cent of their capital from international finance (Louman 2019, p. 428). As of 2019, only $10,2 billion out of the annual 100 billion had been donated to the UNFCC climate fund (Ibid.). Most developing countries are dependent on external funding to achieve climate action (Forestier & Kim 2020, p. 1273). It was realised already as of 2015 that states provided too little funding, and it highlighted the need for private actors to finance climate action (Uitto et al 2017, p. 6). This reflects Rawls' idea of volunteerism, but it also reflects how volunteerism or the private sphere can undermine the self-determination of states if finance is given conditionally. An outcome is that a lack of regulation of the global basic structure has a major influence on the implementation of climate action and it is also an argument for why Rawls' theory of justice is insufficient in dealing with intergenerational justice in the pursuit of climate action.

Consequently, even if we reach an overlapping consensus base on the secondary position there is not a way to assure countries compliance. There is neither a moral incentive for the state to intervene and act for other states in the pursuit of climate justice. As highlighted by Bexell (In Kalfagianni et al 2019, p. 20) SDGs attempted to be more inclusive in their construction than the MDGs, yet, there were severe power structures that influenced the deliberation in the opposite direction. The UN (Ibid, p. 76) highlights that the scenario in which we are headed is shaped by a lack of investments and a business-as-usual pathway that will result in shortcomings in the realisation of all environmental goals. The UN (Ibid, p. 106) declares that effective pathways to care for the atmosphere are dependent on a feeling of mutual responsibility. Rawls' perception of the state does not assure feelings of mutuality if contemporary liberal or decent states remain unthreatened.

Rawls' (1998, p. 10) perceives that we ought to choose principles that are reasonable from a liberal point of view. The well-ordered society and the Laws of People do not consider the real motivation of action, it is to idealised, it does not account for the influence of rational plans on the public and international

interaction. If people are raised as methodological indvidualists they will act as so in the public, meaning that they may accept an agreement, but not act according to the agreement, and neither would Rawls' people accept a climate agreement if it is not beneficial for their people. There is a lack of solidarity, Rawls' people do not realize the interconnection between their good and others. Nor does the theory provide a strong moral foundation for accounting for skewed vulnerabilities, intergenerational justice nor non-human animals. In negotiations of Agenda 2030, a lot of countries belonging to the Global South were excluded (Kortemäki 2017, pp. 320-334). Endowements controlled the negotiations, and that is why injustices in real life need to be considered.

The UN has activily tried to solve the issue of non-action and non-commitment through a reconstruction of the UN (Bäckstrand & Lövbrand 2019, p. 524). The shift of the UN has resulted in that the idea of fair burdens was abandoned due to the stalemate and conflicts it had caused. The abandonment of the why and what resulted in that the individual actions of states being left without sanctions, and the questions which gave rise to the debate of climate justice are left unresolved. But Agenda 2030 is enforced by states, there is no need for a prisoners' dilemma, as it directly enables freeriding and there is no need for the North to pay the South for injustices. Climate action is also undermined by the private, industries with counterintuitive ideas that have been successful in hindering policies and strategies for climate action on both an national and international level (Vesa et al 2020, p. 4). An outcome is that the public needs to regulate the private which is counterintuitive to Rawls'. The mobility of actors necessitates a global structure because of the different ways organisations and corporations can detour climate justice. An outcome is that both strong states and companies can have a major influence.

However, international organisations have greater importance and autonomy than what has been believed (Hickmann et al 2019, p. 4). International organisations are not only technocratic organisations, but they can also pursue decisions outside the control of governments; they are part of policymaking (Hickmann et al 2019, p. 14). The idea to focus on voluntary standards is a process that was guided and strengthened by international organisations (Ibid, p. 5). Neglecting the basic global structure results in giving both corporations and IGOs more autonomy than what is believed. By not confronting this issue it leaves states and individuals with less influence. Voluntterism might have been necessary for commitment, but it will be based on the commitment of the endowed. Increasing the possibility of misframing. The voice of those who suffer injustices have less possibility to influence climate action and it increases the democratic deficit in states.

Rawls' (1998, p. 38) believed that the UN should have some authority to express the condemnation of unjust domestic institutions. Liberal peoples seek to conserve their liberties and as previously stated many societies' primary goods depend on growth through emissions. An outcome is that it becomes important for Rawls' people to challenge climate action. However, this may result in a value conflict because in the private individuals could value climate action. The issue with not regulating the private lies is that people and states may fall victims to hegemony through neutralisation (Mouffe 2018, p. 23). In which states, IGOs, and corporations recuperate climate action in the existing system or demoralises the claims of the climate justice movement or climate action through power structures (Brincat 2015, p. 300). Without a stronger global structure than that of Rawls, it may result in states losing their sovereignty and that climate action never will be achieved.

It becomes understandable if IGOs have sought to create room for action. Placing a focus on how instead of why and what could be a strategy which emphasises soft power as means to undermine the hegemonic power of the state. When we think of climate action and how to enforce it, we become trapped in the dichotomy of action and legitimacy (Bexell In Kalfagianni et al 2019, p. 17). Moral question foregoes, and it is caused by an overburdened focus on substantive legitimacy which implies that coherence with the content of rules and policies in society (Ibid, p. 18). The issue is that Agenda 2030 is based on overlapping consensus. But all actors have a differentiating perception of what climate action or climate justice ought to entail and their reasons for committing to climate action. It comes down to the agents only being united by a common enemy – climate change.

To conclude, Rawls' continues the majority of moral storms concerning climate action. Agency is fragmented through Rawls' providing few reasons for actors to care for each other, neither the just savings principle nor duty to assist provide enough motivation to act for other states or individuals. Justifying an unfair distribution on a global level and furthering the skewed vulnerabilities between peoples'. The institutional inadequacy is also evident considering that the emphasis on people neglects individuals, companies, collectives, and IGOs influence on the global basic structure. The interests of those of the endowed are reflected because the dismal scope of justice. Neither does it consider the multiple levels of governance that are necessary for climate action to be successful, and it enables the detournement of climate justice because of the emphasis on the state rather than other actors and their good. These factor results that the spatial dispersion of climate change is not recognized. An outcome is that Rawls' theory of justice is insufficient as a theory of climate justice and governance in the achievement of climate action.

5. Discussion – Climate justice and the good in a state-centred world

The results have depicted the limitations of Rawls' conception of justice and the well-ordered society as a basic and global structure in conceptualising climate justice. This section will summarise and add new insights on the research questions.

5.1. A critique of Rawls' conception of justice and the well-ordered society

The results highlighted the shortcomings of Rawls' theory of a well-ordered society and justice by pointing out that these concepts do not engage with important dimensions of justice, agency, freedom, autonomy, legitimacy, and the good. Rawls' does not account for the consequences of his institutions or how his theory aligns with our current institutions, behaviour, or the good. Thus, Rawls theory of distribution fails to account for humans as contextual beings. The fundamental flaw lies in that the premises of the original position are counterintuitive in being based on enlightened self-interest. It deprives individuals of their circumstances and paradoxically requests them to choose values that are beneficial for their good. The deliberation in the original position becomes shaped by language, ideas, and power which creates different authorities that are unjustified based on the autonomy and good of the participants in each society. The political is pre-defined which may be considered anti-democratic. How society is to be governed becomes a form of management based on justice rather than the active participation of the citizenry.

The additional issue with Rawls' theory of justice when considering morality is that it is minimised to procedural justice, and anything beyond that is acceptable if it is in line with the principles of justice. The principles of justice become synonymous with morality. The extent of mutuality depends on the private which Rawls' neglects to provide any criteria, besides public reasoning. Mutual self-interest is insufficient if we consider that different agents require different goods and that agents are driven by selfish rational plans which would result in constant conflict with the pursuit of climate action, justice, and the good. The connection between the collective good and individuals' flourishing is neglected in the process.

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The issues with Rawls' lack of reflection of the good is that it also results in that society reinforces a certain good which is beneficial for the good of elites and will enable the endowed with control. The separation of public and private results in a thin theory but neglects the interconnection between different spheres and how the thin will result in a very thick society. The focus on the distribution of primary goods may contribute to inequality because it neglects the conversion to an individual's good. Rawls' distributional principles neither reflect ambitions, luck, choices, conception of the self, the societal good for the majority, reduced capabilities, harms, alienation, or social status. The usefulness of primary goods is questionable if what they are to achieve remains undefined. Justice may not even be instrumental to the good.

The separation of the good and reason is also inherently problematic. Public reasoning becomes instrumental to rationality, but rationality remains to be defined and is not regulated. How could we further value what action is more unjust or just? The issue with Rawls' relativist perception of the good or rationality is that it does not give us any guidance as to whether there are better or worse conceptions of the good. This ignores the fact that certain perceptions of good may undermine the very structure which created that good, increase climate injustices, and be counterproductive to climate action. Individuals will still act as if their good had meaning, and as if that there are more valid perceptions of good that are reflected in the law or where they enact their beliefs about justice.

Furthermore, Rawls' justice results in individuals seeing the good as careers instead of something that exists across time or exists in peoples' communal values. The individualistic conception of the good is precisely why the liberal self is attractive, but that neglects that it is impossible to escape society and that doing so is neither enticing. Autonomy or an enlighted-self could instead arise out of the education and deliberation of the plentitude of selves, making them intelligible based on different traditions and our narrative as well as practices. Experiencing different conceptions of the good results in humans challenging their subjectivity. This would result in a discussion of how rationality can be integrated into public reasoning and a less exclusive conception of public reasoning. If deliberation is to be meaningful it must be done severely encumbered. Retrofitting distributional justice and primary goods to fit our different conceptions of selves as defined by culture, nature, and time.

The additional issue with Rawls' institutions is the emphasis on sustaining institutions rather than considering what matters for the participants and their willingness to engage in a system. The legitimacy of the system may depend on individuals' possibility to relate to discourses in the system and to perceive that it

adheres or enables their conception of the good. Pluralism may depend on their being dissent and discussions. The deliberation itself may assure stability, if individuals are provided proficient arguments against their ideas. Ignoring the latter results in a system of dominance and monopoly of political power which will result in disentrancement and undermine democracy. Autonomy and the stability of society become dependent on the possibility to critique, and the ability to choose better principles suited for the good.

To conclude, Rawls' rational plans result in an individualistic conception of the good, that excludes the common good and the historical nature of the good. This results in a conception of climate justice which only benefits certain groups, neglects the vulnerabilities of those not belonging to the worst-off, and results in few reasons to engage in moral behaviour which are beneficial for other groups when considering climate justice. It also justifies the global structure and the inequalities between different parts of the world because of the lack of reasons for carrying for other states that are non-liberal and those belonging to other groups. The emphasis is on the individual rather than increasing the good of the many goods. An outcome is that Rawls' conception of justice results in inequality, a non-neutral state, and individuals who factually perceive their good as disconnected from the political as well others in society. This culminates in the instability of Rawls' well-ordered society in achieving the good of individuals, climate justice, climate action nor does the well-ordered society achieve freedom, autonomy, or a politically justified system.

5.2. Rawls', the good and climate justice

Rawls' emphasis on the self-determination of peoples is problematic because giving nationals a higher value than non-nationals and can seem unjustified. In a globalised world where peoples are connected through trade, politics, and where there is mobility between peoples. Although, the special value of nationals becomes understandable in considerations of people's shared values, psychological aptitudes, and the consequences of complete cosmopolitanism. The implication, when applied to climate justice based on Rawls' conception, is that there are few reasons for states to reduce inequality and GHG emissions. Climate justice requires global cooperation, and climate change is an aggregate effect this requires people to cooperate independently of the special considerations of the community. Consequently, this furthers the skewed vulnerabilities, institutional inadequacy, and fragments action as a theory of climate governance.

Moreover, the internal factors of states that cause injustices are legitimate because Rawls' theory relies on a low degree of solidarity of peoples and provides few

reasons to engage in behaviour that is beneficial for future generations, non-human animals, the environment, or the vulnerable. Again, worsening the ecological and the intergenerational storm. The separation of justice and good through rational deliberation without time, nature, and culture omits the reasons for carrying for these actors. Public reason also excludes both parties and politics which would pursue these agents' good. An outcome is that those who hold political power, meaning those endowed, can continue to utilise their power to undermine climate justice. What can be derived is that Rawls' theory of transnational justice and well-ordered society enables little insight into why the inequality in the world is a moral issue, why it is wrong to emit GHGs, and how humans ought to live.

To conclude, it becomes evident that for those striving for climate justice there is a need for different principles than that of Rawls'. His theory is ill-equipped to deal with the challenges of climate change and climate justice. Rawls' theory fulfils the criteria of the theoretical storm, moral corruption, and fails to give a proper answer to most of the moral storms. It is complacent, opaque, and evasive to most challenges of climate justice as well as climate action.

5.3. A convergence of justice and good

Rawls' methodological individualism and the extension which is the emphasis on rights are infeasible as both ideal and non-ideal solutions to climate justice. As an ideal theory, it neglects the interconnection between different conceptions of the good, that the good might be achieved over generations and that having a right or justice is not equal to the achievement of the good. When applied to climate justice it is not proficient for the rich to distribute capital, that would be moral corruption. Rawls' institutions are inadequate and fragments agency in terms of the moral storms because it is not a robust egalitarian position to increase access to rights or give a few more resources to an individual because that does not account for the thick circumstances that enable a good life.

Moreover, the minimalism of rights could enable everyone to partake in the abstraction of the good life, but any agreement or theory of distribution based on these premises will be minimalistic and it will not assure what different actors need for a good life. An outcome is that the goal of negotiations has a greater chance to be successful if they are based on the agents' thick conceptions. It is also a more plausible solution because there is not a universal standard of reasoning, thus, a consensus as argued by Rawls' is infeasible and again a form of institutional inadequacy. Due to the diverse conception of the good in the world a convergence on what is valuable is a less idealised standard of political justification. The realisation of divergent conceptions of the good may enable complex equality

through distributional principles and reflect cultures different skewed vulnerabilities.

However, a convergence on climate justice requires another kind of subjectivity based on the recognition and willingness to create solidarity on an international level and the recognition of different selves. Thus, enabling us to understand how the spatial dispersion of effects and causes have an unequal impact. Rawls' political theory is insufficient in the construction of a subjectivity that is suited for the unequal spatial dispersion because the theory does not focus on the recognition of others or the interconnection between the good of peoples, non-human animals, the vulnerable, or future generations. An emphasis on liberty and equality may create chains of equivalence between different actors. But the extent of this equivalence is questionable because climate justice requires more complicated affective and discursive dimensions than that of social justice. Mainstreaming the intersubjectivity around social justice could be successful because individuals are more willing to make sacrifices if it is for social equality. It is also possible that this can be an anti-essentialist project which signifies how the public should be an arena for justice rather than an elitist venture.

The trend in the international community is to move away from a consensus or convergence. Negotiations have moved from why and what towards how. There are inherent benefits with this strategy in the achievement of climate action, if there are states who can enforce compliance, guidance, and maintain action within the state. But questions of transnational justice could be neglected. The social dimensions of climate justice could receive less attention because mitigating climate change is constructed as crucial. The issues are like the issues with Rawls' justice, as it is constructed as a domestic issue and transnational justice is limited to not influencing other states or maintaining justice among one's people.

Even if there is a convergence on climate action the self-determination of states and corporations hinders effective climate action or collective action. The shortcoming of Rawls' is that both the private and public need to be regulated because the international arena is dominated by certain goods which dictate the agenda of climate justice. An example is that the global North dominates capital, and it is required for the South to adapt. Forums for climate change have become a means for the global South to question the global North's monopoly of capital because it is perceived as unjust. It also becomes a means of challenging the framing of climate justice as a transnational issue rather than national as conceptualized by Rawls'.
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To conclude, achieving climate justice requires us to move beyond rights and methodological individualism because it is neither an attractive ideal nor feasible means for climate action. There is a need for greater pluralism in the strive for climate justice which requires a convergence rather than a consensus as postulated by Rawls' for an agreement to be politically justified. This in turn enables a more comprehensive climate justice movement that is motivated due to the inherent benefits due to recognition of their conception of the good rather than that which is minimal or human rights. International negotiations as reflected in the achievement of climate action are currently heading in a different direction which results in a greater possibility that climate justice may become detoured and that the transnational aspects of climate justice will be neglected.

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Popular science summary

The thesis sets out to add to the theoretical debate on whether Rawls' ideal theory of Political liberalism is sufficient in conceptualising and realising climate justice on the national, and international levels. This will be highlighted through an analysis of climate action (SDG 13), based on different conceptions of justice, good, and governance. A theory of climate justice cannot only account for climate science, efficient policies, equality, or equity. It is necessary to rethink and politicise the previously depoliticised, solve conceptual concerns, engage with different narratives, social movements, and the fields of resistance. In the case of Rawls' ideal theory, his perception of responsibility or right-based notion does not interrogate the multifaceted social-relational dynamics involved in climate change. The foundation of Rawls' theory does not account for language, ideas, nor power. In practice, Rawls' theory of a well-ordered society or the Laws of People becomes insufficient in addressing the injustices that are a consequence of social and climate injustice. Rawls' theory falls short because it produces recommendations that violate basic feasibility constraints, climate justice is a question of how we ought to live, why it is wrong to pollute, and how we should relate to other forms of life. Rawls' provides an ideal theory that does not relate to what choices people should make, once they know who they are and where they are in the world. It is a universal theory in a world that has different capabilities, geographies, values, cultures, and histories. The well-ordered society becomes undemocratic, favours liberal societies, nationalistic as well as beneficial for those who are endowed. An outcome is that Rawls' theory is too detached from policies, actors, the uneven vulnerabilities related to climate change, and injustices in the world. Neither does it adequately address the needs of non-human animals, nature, the common good nor future generations. This furthers skewed vulnerabilities, institutional inadequacy, and fragments action for other groups. Based on these premises Rawls' theory fails to address several questions related to transnational justice, moral behaviour, the importance of the good, and climate action.

Acknowledgements

I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor for inspiring me on this intellectual journey. From Marx to Rawls'. My supervisor has shown patience and inspired me. I wish there were more time, that would enable me to gain further insights and develop my thesis and reasoning further. There is a world of literature waiting to be read and explored. I am grateful to have been guided by someone with extensive knowledge of the academic world – which I long to explore further.

Lastly, I would like to express my gratitude to my friends who have taken their time to listen to my countless and irrefutably rampant ideas. Additional gratitude is given to those of my friends who decided to take the time to read my thesis.

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