The Elite Choice

– 'Unpacking the elite' in Mukungule Chiefdom, Zambia

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Abstract

Community-based natural resource management has been advocated for by many scholar and environmentalists to improve natural resources management, equity, and justice for local people. However, its implementation on the ground does not always reach the intended goal. This is because poor policies and institutions have led to undemocratic systems that empower elite control and capture. Studies perceive elites to be in full control of decision-making which is not the case. This study 'unpacks the elite' to gain new insight into how the mechanisms of elite control and capture operate. I use the concept of capital and the choice and recognition framework to build a foundation for studying how elite power is produced and exercised as a result of both the social context and institutional interventions. I used qualitative and quantitative methods in data collection to capture the life experiences of actors and ensure the reliability and validity of the study. The findings reveal elites use their capital to gain control of governing systems. In democratic systems, however, elites find it difficult to control and capture resources because engaged citizenship can hold them accountable. Elites are responsive to the public in circumstances where they risk losing or gaining symbolic capital. This means that elites are responsive to the pubic even in autocracies. Key policy changes are needed that considers the social and political context of the local community members in community-based initiatives.

Keywords: Elite control, Elite capture, Local democracy, Community-based natural resources management, Decentralisation

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Abbreviations

ADMADE	Administrative Management Design
CAMPFIRE	Communal Areas Management Programme for indigenous Resources
CBNRM	Community-Based Natural Resources Management
CBO	Community-Based Organisation
CLA	Community Liaison Assistant
COCOBA	Community Conservation Banks
CRB	Community Resources Board
DNPW	Department of National Parks and Wildlife
GMA	Game Management Area
HAC	Human-Animal Conflict
HWC	Human-Wildlife Conflict
LIRDP	Luangwa Integrated Resources Development Project
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NPWS	National Parks and Wildlife Service
USD	United States Dollar (currency)
PRA	Participatory Rural Appraisal
VAG	Village Action Group
ZAWA	Zambia Wildlife Authority
ZMW	Zambian Kwacha (currency)

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Over the years, there has been a challenge with the management of natural resource areas in Southern Africa. Countries have shifted from state managed areas to co-management between state and local community, and to Community-based natural resources management that is based on local community collective action (Mbewe, 2007). Community-based natural resources management (CBNRM) has been viewed by many scholars as a way to empower communities democratically to improve local natural resources management (Fabricius and Koch, 2004, Mulale et al., 2013, Lubilo, 2018). More effective and democratic governance of natural resources has the potential to promote gender equality and empowerment of women through participation; reduce inequality within countries; and promote protection, restoration and sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems halting biodiversity loss (Ribot, 2004).

These goals are achieved by promoting equity, participation, transparency, and accountability in the management of natural resources (Ribot, 2004). However, existing research shows that local elites often gain disproportionate control over governance processes, leading to inequitable outcomes and undermining effective natural resource governance (Ribot, 2004, Lubilo, 2018). Varying definitions have been given for elites but as Khan (2012) suggests these can be classified into two, which is, elites relative to the power and resources they possess and elites who occupy a dominant position within social relations.

A study on the factors leading to the empowerment of 'elites' over decision making processes is key to understanding CBNRM politics and social structure. Accordingly, this study will seek to answer two main questions, which is, how do 'elites' gain control over decision-making processes in the governance of community-based natural resources? And under what conditions are 'elites' responsive to the public in the governance of community-based natural resources? Local democracy requires key policy and institutions that lead to good governance and decision-making processes (Öjendal and Dellnäs, 2013). If this is absent it may lead to elite capture and/or undemocratic, inequitable, and unsustainable outcomes.

1.1 Research problem

Participatory Community-based natural resource management has been advocated for by many scholars and environmentalists to improve natural resource management, equity, and justice for local people (Ribot, 2002). Beard and Dasgupta (2006) observed that international development has increasingly favoured local planning over central planning hence the decentralisation movement around the world. However, its implementation on the ground does not always reach the

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intended goal. One of the criticisms that have emerged is that community-based initiatives allow the state to abandon its responsibility for community development by placing unfair demands of scarce resources of the poor (Beard, 2018). Even more so, local democratic leaders in some cases are not given discretionary powers that are required to make them accountable to their people (Ribot, 2013). When leaders are not accountable it is likely that elite control occurs making community-based natural resource management vulnerable to capture by local elites (Beard, 2018).

The actions and interactions elites take and have, play a vital role in influencing the political development and governance of communities. In democratic governance, there should be interlocking networks of communication and influence that allows access to central decision making for all (Osei, 2018). This means that if local people are unable to sanction their leaders through formal processes like elections or informal processes that consider one's reputation within the community (Fischer, 2016), it would result in poor participation from marginalised groups such as women and other socially disadvantaged individuals in the culturally thick communities[1]. Elites in non-democracies are more centralised in decision making and are recruited from a small social segment excluding anyone seen as an opponent leading to mistrust and lack of cooperation between those in power and those opposing (Osei, 2018). This could explain why Westholm (2016) observed that Women are usually underrepresented in natural resource management and have little influence over decision-making or office-bearing at community meetings worldwide.

Local elites which include politicians, monetary wealthy, and traditional leaders frequently dominate and frustrate decentralization and other community-based management initiatives by pursing their own political and material interests (Wilfahrt, 2018, Lubilo, 2018). Some studies have shown that this is due to poor institutions and policies while others have attributed elite domination to the legitimization of elites by state and international Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) because of an implicit assumption that elites share preference about local representation in decentralized governance. However, in decentralization elites have to maintain and reinforce their social status in their communities at the same time as they have to negotiate the distribution of scarce resources within the local government (Wilfahrt, 2018). This ultimately results in elite capture where the local government is rendered a zero-sum game as elites capture rewards for themselves and village (ibid).

Elites have been explored in many kinds of literature on local natural resource management, most scholars tend to focus on how dimensions of elite capture marginalize less powerful social groups. Less work has been done to understand who these elites are, their varying backgrounds and aspirations, and how they seek

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[1] Communities that mostly depend on informal institutions in their social structures.

to maintain their positions of power. Studies perceive elites to be in full control of decision making where they are responsive only to their local communities which may not be the whole picture. Elites are expected to also be responsive to the organisations that legitimize their authority like the state or international Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) to meet decentralization objective which creates a conflict of interest with local communities. Much has been said about elite capture and some of the dynamics that enable it as mentioned but by 'unpacking the elite' there is a possibility of gaining new insight into how these mechanisms operate.

1.2 Purpose of the study

The purpose of this study was to understand who the local elites are in Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) politics and social structure from a local perspective. This was done by exploring how elites gain control over decision-making processes in the democratic governance of community-based natural resources. Additionally, the study explored the conditions under which the elites are responsive to the public. In answering the two questions I was able to identify who the marginalized group is in the community which is the women. I answered the two main questions using the following sub questions.

- Who are elites in relation to identity and their background?
- How are decisions made in CBNRM?
- Whose interests do the decisions made benefit? And;
- How does the public interact with the elites in decision-making positions?

In line with Creswell (2014) on transformative worldview research, I link the political and social action from actors to understand who the elites in CBRNM are by finding out how they gain decision making power. For the development of the action agenda, I explore the conditions under which these elites are responsive to the public. Therefore, in designing the research it was essential that I study the lives and experiences of elites, the people they dominate, and institution that empower the elites either directly or indirectly. This would be beneficial for understanding the key policy and institutional changes needed in governance and decision-making processes which are essential elements of local democracy.

Greater knowledge of elites will help to reduce elite control and capture and help lead to policy mechanisms that have more democratic, equitable, and sustainable outcomes. A policy brief will be used to disseminate my findings and to make recommendations for policy makers in Zambia and for people working on CBNRM initiatives elsewhere in the world for the promotion of gender equality and empowerment of women through participation; reduce inequality within countries;

and promote protection, restoration and sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems halting biodiversity loss in line with the sustainable development goals (UNDP, 2019).

1.3 Focus of the study

In this study, I focused on the findings that most relate to my research problem and the purpose of the study to answer the two main questions I have proposed. In my fieldwork, however, I found further interesting issues on local democracy, community-based natural resources management, and the influence of civil society organisations and government on their governance. This information was collected in the many conversations I had with local community members during interviews and focus groups. At the end of this thesis, I have suggested some of the issues as topics for further studies.

1.4 Outline of the thesis

I have structured my thesis as follows. Chapter 2 gives the context of the study by providing information about the management of natural resources in Zambia focusing on wildlife management. It further gives a historical account of the governance structures and institutions and gives the current situation of the wildlife resources management. To conclude the chapter, I give a description of the study site.

In Chapter 3, I outline the conceptual framework which I have used to interpret my empirical data. I first give a description of elites, elite control, and elite capture. Then I introduce the concept of capital and institutional choice and recognition framework. Lastly, I link the concept of capital with the choice and recognition framework for the purpose of data analysis in this study. Following this will be my chapter 4 which explains my methodology giving my research design, methods I used for my data collection and lastly, the selection of the study site.

In chapter 5 I present my empirical findings. I first use my findings to answer the first three sub-questions and the first main question on how elites gain control over decision making processes. Chapter 5 also gives an answer to the last sub-question as well as the main question on the conditions under which elites are responsive to the public.

In chapter 6, there is a discussion of the findings using the conceptual framework and existing literature. Lastly, chapter 7 gives my conclusion by summarising my findings and further highlighting the contribution my study makes to existing knowledge. To conclude the chapter, I have given some suggestions for further research.

2.0 Context

This part provides contextual information about the management of natural resources in Zambia with a focus on wildlife resources. It gives the historical background of the governance structures, the institutions in place and the current situation of the management of wildlife resources. Lastly, it gives a description of the study site.

2.1 Historical background of governance in Game Management Areas

Zambia has 20 National parks and 34 Game Management Areas (GMAs) which are reserved for wildlife protection and amount to about 30% of Zambia's land (Zambia Tourism Agency, 2017). Zambia follows mainly two tenure systems which are leasehold tenure that is practiced on state land and customary tenure that is practiced on customary land. Under customary tenure land rights are controlled and allocated by traditional authorities and practices (Republic of Zambia, 2015). This means that they vary according to the traditional customs, social norms, and attitudes to land (ibid). Although the National parks sit on customary land, they are managed and protected by the state/government while the Game Management Areas also on customary land are managed both by the state and local communities. This is because the National Parks have been gazetted as protected areas (an area for conservation and protection of wildlife, ecological systems, and biological diversity) and therefore settlement is not allowed while the Game Management Areas are gazetted as buffer zones to the protected areas and so settlement is allowed (Government of Zambia, 2015).

The buffer zone allows for sustainable utilisation of wildlife resources in the area hence the co-management between the state and local communities. Accordingly, under the Zambia Wildlife Act of 1998 and 2015, the local communities form Community Resource Boards (CRBs) within the boundaries of their chiefdoms in the Game Management Areas. These CRBs provide an institutional structure that is legally binding for the management and conservation of wildlife resources. Additionally, they are a means of ensuring that benefits from the management of wildlife resources are available to the local communities encouraging the participation and responsibility of those communities (Government of Zambia, 2015).

Community-Based Natural Resources Management (CBNRM) initiatives in southern Africa were introduced in the 1980s as a strategy to ensure that wildlife resources were not decimated by local communities because of restrictions to access and use imposed by colonial powers (Fabricius and Koch, 2004, Lubilo, 2018). Accordingly, sustainable use projects were implemented such as Communal Areas

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Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) in Zimbabwe, Administrative Management Design for Game Management Areas (ADMADE), and Luangwa Integrated Resources Development Project (LIRDP) both in Zambia (Child, 1996, Fabricius and Koch, 2004, Lubilo and Child, 2010). These projects were among many others in different countries that aimed to increase community participation in natural resources management with improved use and access. Prior to the inception of CRBs, the ADMADE programme was implemented nationwide by the State's National Parks and Wildlife Service (NPWS) (Lubilo and Child, 2010). Unlike the CRB programme, the ADMADE was not legally recognised. Furthermore, unlike the LIRDP programme implemented only in South Luangwa ecosystem that gave 80% of revenues generated from wildlife resources to the local communities through Village Action Groups (VAGs), the ADMADE was managed top-down (ibid).

Under the ADMADE, a Revolving Fund with revenues collected from safari hunting fees (50%) and safari hunting concession fees (100%) in GMAs was set up at the NPWS headquarter (Mbewe, 2007). The other 50% of the trophy hunting fees were retained in central government revenues (ibid). The programme had sub-authority committees in local communities with the traditional chiefs[2] as chairpersons and senior headmen as committee members. These committees were for liaison purposes and implementation of community projects (Lubilo and Child, 2010). However, this structure gave the traditional chiefs more power because of the control they had on the wildlife revenue resulting in little to no financial transparency and elite capture (Mbewe, 2007, Lubilo and Child, 2010). It did not encourage community participation but instead created distrust and outrage in the local communities (Child, 2004).

The failures of the ADMADE program led to the transformation of the NPWS into a parastatal organisation called the Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA) established under the Zambia Wildlife Act of 1998 ending the programme (Mbewe, 2007). CRBs were registered under the ZAWA which saw the removal of traditional chiefs as chairpersons. This was because they are said to have played a role in the misappropriation of funds in the ADMADE and LIRDP (Child, 2004, Lubilo and Child, 2010). The chiefs were instead installed as patrons of the CRBs to offer advice of community development and wildlife resource management. This role

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[2] In pre-colonial times the traditional Chiefs on behalf of the community had authority over wildlife and other natural resources in the Chiefdom. They would regulate the hunting and prevent illegal wildlife harvesting as well as punish wrongdoers. During the colonial times Chiefs lost this authority with the introduction of formal institutions. This led to increased illegal and commercial hunting of wild animals that prompted the CBNRM initiatives. The ADMADE and LIRDP were introduced to remedy the new problem by giving back power to the traditional authorities. Mbewe (2007) gives further details on the role of traditional leaders in CBNRM.

came with 5% of the community's share of the hunting revenues and was meant to remove Chief from administrative roles while keeping them satisfied (ibid).

2.2 Community Resource Boards structure

The Community Resource Boards (CRBs) are made up of the traditional Chief (patron), up to ten board members chosen from the local community, and one council representative (Government of Zambia, 2015). The board employs a qualified secretariat to assist with the administration and is also responsible for employing village scouts to work with the Wildlife Police Officers employed by the State. The additional difference between the ADMADE and the CRB programme besides the removal of chiefs as chairpersons and the legal background was the formation of VAGs representing Household groups. Household groups (100-200 households) form a 10-20 members VAG committee which is the basis of CRBs (Mbewe, 2007, Zambia Wildlife Authority, 2014).

The 'democratically' elected VAG chairperson usually becomes the representative on the CRB. Elections are held every 3 years and according to election guidelines the VAG elections have to be announced throughout the GMA by the electoral committee at least two weeks before voting (Zambia Wildlife Authority, 2014). This should be done through public announcements, meetings and any other means as the norm in the traditional system. The eligibility of nominees is verified by election officials in liaison with the traditional Chief, local headmen, and headwomen through a 'screening process' (ibid).

After votes are cast the candidate with the most votes becomes the VAG chairperson and the runner-up becomes the vice chairperson. The rest of the VAG positions such as secretary, treasurer, natural resource coordinator, community development coordinator, women's coordinator, and ordinary members are filled by an in-house election (selection amongst themselves). Like-wise after the Chairpersons of the VAGs form the CRB, they have another in-house election to fill-up positions, this time including the position of the Chairperson (Zambia Wildlife Authority, 2014).

Even though the CRB programme has a seemingly democratic approach, it apparently still is has a top-down management structure. For example, the Zambia Wildlife Authority used to collect 100% of the safari hunting and concession fees generated in the GMAs and later disburses 50% of the hunting fees to the CRB with 5% going to the Traditional Chief (Mbewe, 2007, Lubilo and Child, 2010). The

community only gets 20% of the concession fees[3] (ibid). In 2015 the functions of the ZAWA where transferred to the Ministry of Tourism and Arts under the Department of National Parks and Wildlife (DNPW) in accordance with the Zambia Wildlife Act No. 14 of 2015 because of its [ZAWA] bureaucratic dependence on revenues from GMAs, and failure to pay staff salaries (Ministry of Tourism and Arts, 2017). This move back to the government has still kept the CRB programme but now the revenues from wildlife resources are taken to central government revenues before being disbursed to local communities and not in totality. This indicates a partial devolution of fiscal power to the local governing bodies.

Together, the government and local community protect the wildlife resources of the Game Management Areas and share the benefits that are derived from the natural resources (Mbewe, 2007, Lubilo and Child, 2010). Like many other CBNRM initiatives, the Zambian CRBs adopted a local democracy model where leaders are elected by local communities to act as their representatives in the management of wildlife resources. Even so, many scholars have criticized CBNRM citing poor representations of local communities, poor distribution of benefits to resources users, poor policies, weak institutions, and elite control and capture among others (Fabricius and Koch, 2004, Ribot, 2004, Child, 2004, Lubilo, 2018). I carried out my study in Mukungule Game Management Area which is part of the North Luangwa Ecosystem. I give a description of the study site in the next part.

2.3 The study site

This part describes the study site. I have kept the real name of the Game Management Area and Village Action Groups for this study but in order to maintain the anonymity of the respondents will not reveal the three (3) Village Action groups where the data was collected. The Mukungule GMA is located on the western boundary of the North Luangwa National Park in Mpika District of the Muchinga province (Zambia Wildlife Authority, 2004a). The GMA is named after the Mukungule Chiefdom that is found there. It is one of the buffer zones that surround the North Luangwa in addition to the Munyamadzi, and Musalangu GMAs (Zambia Wildlife Authority, 2004b).

The Mukungule GMA has a tropical climate in a high rainfall ecological zone with an annual rainfall of approximately 900mm and above. It has three seasons which are the hot-wet season (November to April), cool-dry season (May to

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[3] There currently a debate on whether local communities should continue to receive 20% of the hunting concession fees. The sharing of these fees emerged in 2004 in an agreement between the parastatal ZAWA and the community. Its was never legally formalised. After the transformation of ZAWA into the Government DNPW in 2015, the funds are being collected in the Central Treasury. In 2017 the Ministry of Finance stopped the disbursement of the concession fees because it does not have a legal backing (Source: Norther Region CRB Association Meeting Report held 18th March 2019)

August), and hot-dry season (September to November) (Zambia Wildlife Authority, 2004a). Local people are primarily crop famers producing Maize, sweet potatoes, finger millet and cassava among other crops. They sometimes have combined livelihood strategies such as livestock production (chickens, goats, pigs, rabbits, guinea fowls, doves, and ducks), vegetable gardens, natural resource utilization (fishing, mushroom picking, weaving, carving) and employment in the adjust park and safari camps (Zambia Wildlife Authority, 2004a). However, the livelihoods are threatened by wild animals that cause crop damage/loss and livestock predation.

The local tribes of the Chiefdom are Bisa and Bemba who originated from the Luba tribe in the Democratic Republic of Congo formally Kola. There are 10 Village Action Groups which are Mukungule, Chipundu, Kaluba, Kashaita, Katibunga, Mwansabamba, Kakoko, Nkomba, Chishala, and Chobela (ibid). The Community Resource Board was established in April 2004.

3.0 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter outlines the conceptual framework which I have used to understand how elites gain control over decision-making processes and under what conditions the elites are responsive to the public. In order to identify who the elites are in the CBNRM process, it is important to have a working definition of the term 'elite' to be able to recognise individuals or groups that fit the description. This has been done in (3.1). Section (3.2) further talks about elite control and capture to understand elites. I discuss Bourdieu's concept of symbolic capital as the overlooked factor which elites use to get in to advantageous situations in (3.3). I then discuss the choice and recognition framework (Ribot et al., 2008, Ribot, 2013) to bring out its effects on local democracy and empowerment of elites (3.4). Lastly, in (3.5) I link the symbolic capital concept with the choice and recognition framework for the purpose of analysis in this study.

3.1 Defining the elites

In this section, I will explain the terms and aspects of the study in order to outline the scope of the study. I begin by first defining the 'elite' then move on to the resources they have access or control. Lastly, I define elite control and elite capture though this is discussed further in the next chapter.

It is difficult to find a universally accepted definition for the term 'elite'. There is no consensus on the definition and scholars on elites seldom define the term further adding to the disunity (Osei, 2018, Khan, 2012). Some articles have taken the Marxist way of thinking seeing elites as those who occupy dominant positions within social relations. Osei (2018) uses such an approach stating that elites are "persons who are able, by virtue of their strategic positions in powerful organisations and movements, to affect political outcomes regularly and substantially" (ibid, 2018:21). In contrast, the Weberian thinking focuses on class thinking of elites relative to the power and resources they have. In both thinkings, elites are seen as those with power and resources and the contrast comes on whether to look at the individual control over these resources or instead focus on structural relations that gives power to specific positions (Khan, 2012). This study focuses on the latter and so will define the 'elite' as an individual or group of individuals occupying a position/s that gives them access and control or possession of resources that advantages them (ibid). 'Local elites' will, therefore, be defined as locally based individuals or groups the fit in the definition given above with disproportionate access and control to resource, that is, social, political, economic, cultural, and knowledge capital/power (Dasgupta and Beard, 2007).

Understanding the resources that elites have access to or control is important to understand who the elites are, and how they gain control over decision making

processes. Resources as highlighted earlier include social, political, economic, cultural, and knowledge capital which must have convertible value (Inglis and Thorpe, 2012). This means that obtaining such capital is not enough, one must be able to use the capital and only then does the capital become valuable. This means that depending on the localities some capital will be more valuable and others will not because of the social processes of that area (Khan, 2012). Once the elites have resources or capital that has the transferable value they are able to gain or retain control of positions of power. This is can be defined as elite control.

Elite control should not be confused with elite capture which is defined as "the process by which these individuals [elites] dominate and corrupt community-level planning and governance" (Dasgupta and Beard, 2007:230). This means that elites can have power without being corrupt but instead contribute their efforts towards community development and governance (ibid). Local elites who have strong social ties with community member both within and outside the village are less likely to benefit themselves at the expense of others but when the social ties are weak they face few sanctions and so are likely to capitalise on individual opportunities to capture any rewards for themselves or for those closest to them (Wilfahrt, 2018). The next part explores in detail the criticisms of CBNRM with a focus on elite capture and control.

3.2 Elite control and capture

Local democracy has positive effects on natural resource management because it is able to utilize local knowledge in its decision making processes and include multiple local voices (Ribot, 2004, Mulale et al., 2013). Implementation in the form of institutions and policy is an important factor in ensuring the positive outcome. For example, Saito-Jensen et al. (2010) recommend that safe guards be put in place to prevent further marginalization in communities because of existing social structures. The safe guards implied are institutions and policies that ensure minimum social standards, promote direct democracy, devolve power to other committee members besides the chairperson, and contact with equity-promoting third parties like NGOs (ibid). Failure to do so will not only frustrate the positive outcome but will result in negative effects such as elite capture. Elite capture occurs when individuals or organisations obtain benefits or advantages at the expense of others because of their dominant position (Ribot, 2004, Beard and Phakphian, 2009, Sindzingre, 2010, Saito-Jensen et al., 2010, Lubilo, 2018). As stated earlier, this must be differentiated from elite control where elites are seen to only dominate democratic processes without the capturing of resources.

Elite control has been considered by some scholars to be an inevitable outcome for development and community wellbeing because developing countries have uneducated and culturally 'backward' communities (Mansuri and Rao, 2004, Khan,

2008). This according to them means that elite control as a necessary evil has a possible outcome where resources and benefits are distributed equitably among marginalized groups. However, this type of local democratic governance is not sustainable because it is likely that elite capture will occur depending on the benevolence or malevolence of the elites (Dasgupta and Beard, 2007, Osei, 2018). The goal of local governance is to promote accountability to local communities in order to strengthen all local actors as opposed to a few (Khanal, 2007).

To describe developing countries as uneducated and culturally backwards, additionally, fails to acknowledge and appreciate that communities are governed by both formal and informal institutions. Informal institutions are flexible 'rules' based on an education acquired through experience within a society usually unwritten (Mulale et al., 2013). While formal institutions are less flexible written rules that aim to safe guard rights in a society (ibid). For example, in pre-colonial Zambia communities had a working system of traditions, beliefs, taboos, and regulations for managing natural resources governed by traditional leaders (Mbewe, 2007, Lubilo and Child 2010) whom under the formal institutions today would be regarded as elites. The introduction of formal institutions to a society with informal institutions changes the social relationships and interactions that exist (Otto, 2013). Therefore, rather than call local communities uneducated or culturally backwards, it is better to learn and understand the informal institutional systems in place.

The literature on elite capture reveals that communities are able to resist elites or make more responsive in two ways. Firstly, elite capture is not permanent as it can be remedied by the formalization of interaction calling for transparency and accountability to the local communities. In their study, Saito-Jensen et al. (2010) reveal that by formalizing interactions marginalised groups are able to form alliances with one another to resist oppression. In order to help marginalized groups the formalization of structures through strong institutions and policies enable them to justify demands of rights to equal decision-making powers and benefits from natural resources (Saito-Jensen et al., 2010). However, marginalized groups will only benefit from formalized structures if they come together as a unified front against the perceived elites as can be observed in the case-studies by Saito-Jensen et al. (2010) and Lund and Saito-Jensen (2013). Alternatively, solidarity may be used by elites to stay in positions of power through democratic means. For example, elites may use monetary or cultural capital to get support in electoral processes from groups. This can be done by promising to reward communities with benefits from resources if they elect them or may threaten to withhold resources if they do not elect them especially in impoverished communities (Conroy-Krutz, 2018).

Secondly, communities resist or make elites more responsive by disobeying regulations, rules or by-laws enforced in their communities. Marginalized groups will do this to protest their exclusion from the benefits of natural resources as a result of elite capture (Lubilo, 2018). This type of action calls for re-organisation of

the management structures and even policies by either the elites themselves or other organisations such as the state or international NGOs to ensure that management goals are met.

From the literature reviewed it can be observed that management of the natural resources is based on concepts which are inadequately socially informed and do not fully reflect the complex, diverse, specific nature of institutional formation (Cleaver, 2002). There is more than one solution to the management of common property or common pool resources as can be observed from (Ostrom, 1990, Cleaver, 2002, Acheson, 2011). With reference to elite control and capture, this means that the management should be taken on a case by case basis taking caution as policies and formal institutions are implemented. There is a need to have a perspective of decision making that integrates political, economic, and social contexts (Peterson, 2010).

3.3 Concept of capital

According to Khan (2012) in order to study elites, it is important to study the control they have over resources as well as the value of those resources and distribution in the local communities. Using Bourdieu (1993)'s concept of symbolic capital, I identify how the elites have access to and control of resources. I did this with an interest to find out why certain individuals or groups occupy higher positions than others in a given field, in this case, the field of natural resource management in the game management area. Bourdieu describes three types of capital namely economic capital, social capital, and cultural capital (Inglis and Thorpe, 2012).

Economic capital also described as physical capital is the monetary resource an individual or group have at their disposal (Ojha et al., 2009, Inglis and Thorpe, 2012). Elites can use this capital to get in to positions of power where they are able to influence and control decisions in their favour. Additionally, they can use this capital to stay in positions of power. The CRB leadership is in-charge of community finances that come from wildlife hunting and tourism and so board members are in a position to utilise that money to acquire other resources or forms of capital. This can be through legitimate or corrupt means.

Social capital is the social network of relations an individual or group has with other people (Inglis and Thorpe, 2012). Social capital is not only dependent on the number of people in the network but also the type of people (ibid). This means that in order to have high social capital an elite should have networks with the higher class even if they are few than have many connections to the lower-class people. These social ties facilitate information transfers and help to coordinate action or to produce consistent modes of action (Khan, 2012). Elites in CBNRM have the advantage of having information to get them in to positions of power such as election dates or CRB members' requirements and duties. Furthermore, because of

shared understandings produced through common experiences with local communities are able to respond to community needs in order to stay in positions of power.

Cultural capital is identified in three states, which are, the embodied state that is the socially recognised prestige attached to an individual or group's practices; the objectified state which is the amount of knowledge about cultural issues like art, books or machines; and the institutionised state which is the academic qualification an individual or group possesses (Bourdieu, 1993, Ojha, 2008, Inglis and Thorpe, 2012). Using culture as a resource the elite are able to form a stratified group marking themselves and are able to recognise one another through this classification enabling them to distribute opportunities to themselves and others on the basis of the display of chosen attributes (Khan, 2012). Through this, the elite are able to protect their status and draw boundaries to exclude others.

The success or failure of the elite to gain control over decision making processes depends on whether the type of capital they have is relevant in the local community they are found in. This means that if the local community is capitalist then the elite with high economic capital will be successful and if the community instead is traditional then those with high social or cultural capital will be successful (Inglis and Thorpe, 2012). The local community must be able to recognise the capital possessed by the elite and they should attach value and prestige towards the recognised capital. The capital is then said to have symbolic value and it is then called symbolic capital (Ojha, 2008). Symbolic capital which is the resource of reputation has been defined as "a form of power that is not perceived as power but as legitimate demands for recognition, deference, obedience, or services" (Swarts 1997:42). This means that symbolic capital is important for producing the elite in the local community. As a result of the symbolic capital, the elite are placed in positions of influence where they are able to accumulate more capital. This symbolic interaction allows those with high levels of relevant capital to stay in positions of power because those with low levels of capital do not see the need to challenge them. Therefore, the elite with high levels of relevant capital will have an advantage in decision-making. Elites continue to enjoy unchallenged privileges in accessing resources and power which they there use to dominate social interactions (Ojha et al., 2009).

Recognition plays a major role in the production and reproduction of elites. Next, I introduce the choice and recognition framework to bring out how institutions and organisations play a central role in supporting elites and link the framework to the concept of capital.

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3.4 Institutional Choice and recognition

Community-based natural resources management has democratic decentralisation as its focal point where the Government transfers powers to actors and institutions to lower hierarchies in the system (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999). The transferring of power involves making actors autonomous by allowing them a field in which they are free to make their own decisions (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999, Larson and Ribot, 2004). Governments and local departments that work with democratic community-based organisations are choosing powers to transfer, the means by which to transfer the powers and the local individuals and institutions to receive the powers in these decentralisation efforts (Ribot, 2013).

The support given to local authorities by government and international agencies can produce, privilege, and strengthen local elites in that they legitimise the elites by enforcing their behaviour, accountability relations, and beliefs on to the local community members (Ribot et al., 2008). This means that when a policy 'recognises' an institution (formal or informal) or local authority it gives it the autonomy to act through the transfer of power. If that power is given to a democratic authority that is accountable and responsive, then there is a possibility of the local authority being representative of the community which promotes citizenship and creates a meaningful public domain. Alternatively, if it is given to an autocratic authority which is unaccountable and not responsive to the needs of the community then it will not be representative which will diminish citizenship and reduce the public domain (Ribot, 2013).

The choice of community-based organisations and local authorities by Government and/or international agencies is a form of recognition or acknowledgement (Ribot et al., 2008). By way of choice, the government and international agencies are exercising agency and so have the responsibility for a decision that they make and in doing so must proceed with caution on the authorities they choose to recognise. As was explained in the previous section individuals and organisations are seeking recognition for the capital they possess from others in the same field. This recognition in the sense of acknowledgement is part of the process of gaining and maintaining authority (Markell, 2000, Ribot, 2013). Choice and recognition strengthen the chosen local authorities [or elites] with resources or capitals hence creating and reproducing elites that shapes representation, citizenship and the public domain of local democracy (Ribot, 2013).

3.4.1 Representation

Because local institutions are formed on the basis of local democracy they have to be both accountable through the enabling of both positive and negative sanctions (Fischer, 2016) and responsive to the needs of the community. In order for these authorities to be responsive, there is a need for them to have discretionary power to transform needs and aspirations into policy and policy into practice (Ribot, 2003,

Pritchett and Woolcock, 2004). To be democratic, local institutions have to be representative, that is, they have to be accountable to the people and have to be empowered to respond (Ribot et al., 2008). Empowering other bodies like local NGOs, customary authorities and private corporations can de-legitimise elected local authorities (Ribot, 2013). This creates, reproduces and strengthens local elites by discouraging local participation from these structures. When local participation declines only the elites remain with the knowledge of how the local institutions operate while accumulating capitals.

3.4.2 Citizenship

Citizenship is seen to be a process where local community members are politically engaged and shape the fate of the polity in which they are involved (Isin and Turner, 2002). It is also defined as a social process through which individuals and groups are engaged in claiming, expanding or losing rights (Ribot, 2013). Authorities that are democratic foster citizenship, while those that are autocratic are less inviting of engagement (Ribot et al., 2008). Where public resources are transferred to private bodies or autocratic leaders, citizenship is diminished.

3.4.3 Public domain

A 'domain' is comprised of resources and decisions held by a public authority (Ribot et al., 2008, Ribot, 2013). The public authority has the power to defend citizens' rights and citizens are able to influence the public authority (Ibid). This strengthens public belonging and identification as a citizen with the public authorities and with other citizens in the community. Without public powers, there is no public domain and no room for democracy. Empowering local elites reduced the size of the public domain creates classifications in the local community where a few individuals or group benefits at the expense of others. A public domain is necessary for representation and for the promotion of citizenship (Ribot, 2013).

3.5 Linking the concept of capital with Institutional choice and recognition

For this study, I link the concept of capital and the institutional choice and recognition framework to understand how elites gain control over decision making processes. More specifically I begin by looking at who the elites are in CBNRM and what their background is. A look at the CRB election guidelines produced by the Zambia Wildlife Authority now DNPW outlines how the process is done but does not reflect the actual process on the ground which has other influences at play such as the amount of symbolic capital local community members have and how that influences the decision of the community.

By understanding the elite and their background, I show that the guidelines fail to acknowledge this crucial detail of social processes that are important for supporting local democracy. The concept of capital allows us to see how elite power is produced and reproduced while the choice and recognition framework explores how policy interacts with the existing field of power relationship or symbolic interactions. This is to say policy may be instrumental in supporting elites meaning that it is not just 'recognition' of an institution or local authority that influences the democratic outcome but that there should also be a consideration of the already existing domain of power or capitals that determines what happens after an institution is empowered.

By using 'choice and recognition', I investigate who the organisations (government or international) operating in the local communities choose to work with and how this affects the capital distribution and accumulation thus affecting representation, citizenship and the public domain in the local authorities chosen. Additionally, with regards to the local authorities, I seek to understand how decisions are made on the boards to establish if they have been given discretionary powers to be responsive to the needs of the people as well as analyse the sanctions, positive or negative, that are in place to make leaders or elites accountable. By putting the concept of capital and the choice and recognition framework together, it has given me a foundation for studying how elite power is produced and exercised as a result of both the social context and institutional interventions.

4.0 METHODOLOGY

In this chapter, I critically discuss my research approach for this study and explain the data collection process. This includes how the study sites and respondents were selected. Additionally, I describe the methods and tools I used to collect empirical data in the field and how I analysed the data collected.

4.1 Research design

This study is based on a transformative worldview that seeks to develop an action agenda to address the social issue of elite empowerment, and domination in local authorities to influence change in the lives of the actors involved (Creswell, 2014). In this research, I attempt to improve the governance in community-based natural resource management and to improve the situation for marginalised individuals and groups by using the findings from this research to make suggestions for a policy brief.

This research also draws upon the constructivist worldview to understand how elites gain control of decision-making processes through the interaction with the government, international NGOs and the local community (Creswell, 2014). For this reason, it was important to understand how community members make sense of their world and it socially constructed (Inglis and Thorpe, 2012, Creswell, 2014). Because this study is mainly transformative I decided to have both quantitative and qualitative methods in my research design. The qualitative methods were useful for data collection relating to life experiences of actors involved and for understanding how they frame their lifeworld (Silverman, 2015). The quantitative method (discussed in section 4.4) was used to improve the reliability and validity of the data collected in the qualitative study (Silverman, 2015, Bryman, 2012).

4.2 Qualitative methods

For the qualitative part of this study, I decided to do a case study (Yin, 2012) of Mukungule Game Management Area in order to have a 'real-word' understanding of the process of elite control and capture. The case study allowed me to collect detailed information for use in my evaluation (Creswell, 2014). I conducted seven weeks of data collection from February to March 2019. During this period, I had semi-structured interviews with Department of National Park and Wildlife staff, Community Resources Board and Village Action Group board members, Local community members and International NGO staff that are working in the area. In the interviews I used a question guide to ensure that I covered all the topics I felt were important for this study to meet my objective while at the same time allowing

me to have discussions with the respondents on topics they found to be important and insightful (Flick, 2006, Rubin and Rubin, 2005).

Interviews with local community members including those found on the boards were done in Bemba the local language spoken in Mukungule. This made the interviews free-flowing and allowed me to have an in-depth exploration of the relevant topics especially those that were not included in my interview guide. It also put my interviewees as ease and relaxed to answer the question in a language they were comfortable in. In the interviews I had with staff from DNPW and the international NGOs I used a slightly different guide because I wanted to ensure that I recorded both their personal view on the topics of the study as well as organisational views. Each of the interviews was audio recorded, translated (where needed), and transcribed.

In addition to the individual interviews, I had focus group discussions in the form of a participatory rural appraisal (PRA). The PRA tool I used was the Venn diagram on Institutions which shows institutions, organisations, groups and important individuals found in the local community and the villagers' view of their importance in the community (Cavestro, 2003).

Lastly, I complemented my data collection with observations of how community meetings are mobilised which allowed me to evaluate the process. Additionally, I was fortunate to attend the Northern Regional Community Resources Board Association quarterly meeting and General Management Plan (GMP) formulation for one of the Game Management Areas in the North Luangwa Ecosystem. While working in the North Luangwa I have attended such meetings before but coming back in the capacity of a researcher gave me a new perspective on the processes that occur. More important with my past experience it means these observations are not a snapshot of the conditions in this field (Flick, 2006).

The next sections describe in detail the methods I use in the qualitative part of the study. I first describe how the sampling of respondents was done, then talk about the individual interviews and PRAs were conducted. Lastly, I describe my data analysis methods, and validity and ethical considerations.

4.2.1 Sampling respondents

Respondents for the quantitative survey included members of the Community Resources Board from four (4) Chiefdoms. For the qualitative part of the study, my first contact in the VAGs was with the Chairpersons. This made it easy for me organise interviews with other board members as well as other local community members. I soon realised that Chairpersons were only referring me to local community members that they were closely related or associated to and so I decided to change my approach by choosing households to interview based on interesting topics that came up and random selection through community interaction. However,

the action by the Chairpersons provides insight into how social relations are structured within the local community.

4.2.2 Individual interviews

I conducted one-on-one interviews beginning with DNPW staff. I had interviews with three (3) extension services staff (all male) for CBNRM because I felt this would give me the expert view of the area under study and help me with the selection of the VAGs to visit of which it did. Following the interview guide I prepared for staff, I conducted the interview in an informal set up to ensure the discussion was as free flowing as possible (Silverman 2015). The interviews helped me to reformulate the interview guide for local community member interviews. In the following weeks, I went to VAG 1, VAG 2, and VAG 3 and conducted the interviews in the same fashion.

In VAG 1 I interviewed eight (8) respondents with three (3) women and five (5) men. In VAG 2 I had six (6) respondents who were all male. Lastly, in VAG 3, I interviewed four (4) women and one (1) man for a total of five (5) respondents. These respondents from the local community were leaders from the board, local community members, and some former board members. To conclude the individual interviews, I talked to staff (both male) from two (2) international NGOs that came up as prominent in the individual interviews and focus groups discussions I had in the local communities. This brought the total number of interviews to twenty four (24) with seven (7) women and seventeen (17) men. The interviews with staff both for DNPW and NGO lasted about 90 to 120 minutes while the interview with local community members averaged 60 mins.

Table 1.Details of interview respondents

Identity in text	Organisation represented[4]	Interview date
P1	DNPW	06/02/2019
P2	DNPW	11/02/2019
P3	DNPW	11/02/2019
P4	VAG 1	13/02/2019
P5	VAG 1	13/02/2019
P6	VAG 1	14/02/2019
P7	VAG 1	14/02/2019

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[4] Role of participant in organisation has been withheld to keep anonymity of respondents.

P8	VAG 1	14/02/2019
P9	VAG 1	15/02/2019
P10	VAG 1	15/02/2019
P11	VAG 1	15/02/2019
P14	VAG 2	26/02/2019
P15	VAG 2	26/02/2019
P16	VAG 2	26/02/2019
P17	VAG 2	27/02/2019
P18	VAG 2	27/02/2019
P19	VAG 2	27/02/2019
P20	VAG 3	05/03/2019
P21	VAG 3	05/03/2019
P22	VAG 3	05/03/2019
P23	VAG 3	06/03/2019
P24	VAG 3	06/03/2019
P25	NGO	18/03/2019
P26	NGO	18/03/2019

4.2.3 Participatory rural appraisal

In each of the 3 VAGs, I conducted 2 focus group discussions which had men only and women only for each. This was done to ensure that women would speak as freely as possible as advised but staff members that work in the GMA. As highlighted earlier the focus groups were conducted using a participatory rural appraisal method (Cavestro, 2003).

The PRA tool that I used was the Venn diagram on institutions (ibid). The objectives of the tool were to identify external and internal organisations, groups and important persons active in the community; identify who participates in local organisations and institutions; and to find out how the organisations and groups relate to each other (Cavestro, 2003). This helped to establish which groups and individuals hold symbolic capital in the community and how that affects the social capital in the community.

I facilitated the process and had Chrispin who works for one of the international NGOs that operates in the area and a former colleague took notes for me. I audio recorded the discussion to ensure nothing was missed during the note taking. The focus group took 1.5-2 hours. VAG 1 had six (6) men and nine (9) women in the PRA, VAG 2 had seven (7) women and seven (7) Men, and lastly, VAG 3 had seven (7) men and six (6) women. It was challenging to organise these focus group because people I spoke with were expecting a form of compensation for their time as is the practice when international NGOs hold focus groups which will be discussed further as part of the findings in later chapters.

Figure 1. Conducting PRA in VAG2 (Photo: Gilbert Mwale)

4.2.4 Data analysis

I started my data analysis as I was doing my data collection as is suggested by Creswell (2014) and Silverman (2015). I would make notes after my interviews and highlighted what I felt to be the major points in the interview. This was useful for me to know the topics that I needed to further probe in the following interviews and it also helped me with coming up with the conceptual framework that I have outlined in Chapter 3. I transcribed my interviews into Evernote to ensure that I had a backup online and later copied the transcriptions in to Microsoft Office Word. I used thematic analysis using qualitative data software Atlas.ti version 7 to identify emerging patterns in relations to my research questions. The themes were used to structure my findings that are found in the following chapters. The data from the quantitative survey was used to support the emerging themes of this study by providing descriptive statistics.

4.2.5 Validity and ethical consideration

I ensured the validity of my study by employing different strategies (Shenton, 2004, Creswell, 2014). I triangulated the data I got from employing the different methods in this study. This helped me to have a detailed and complete picture of the reality on the ground and to compare findings from different sources. Having worked in the area and going back as a researcher I was aware of my bias and ensured that it did not affect the data that I collected. I also made sure that the study was not tied

to the NGO I used to work for by informing/reminding the respondents that I was doing the study for my Masters degree. I ensured that the study did not put the participants in any risk of physical, psychological, social, economic, or legal harm (Creswell 2014) and made sure that all respondents understood that the interviews I was conducting were voluntary. In line with the transformative nature of the study, I made sure not to re/produce any elitism. However, to respect the culture I first had to ask for permission from the traditional chief to carry out the study in the Chiefdom which I felt is a form of legitimising authority.

4.4 Quantitative methods

For the qualitative part of the study, I did survey research to give a numeric description of the demographics and opinions (Creswell 2014) of CRB members in the North Luangwa Ecosystem. The data was collected over a period of four weeks between February and March 2019. The interviews were carried out with the 40 CRB members from 4 Chiefdoms around the North Luangwa ecosystem. I prepared a structured interview (Fowler 2009) that was administered by local Community Liaison Assistants (CLAs) working for the international NGO that operates in the GMA.

When I arrived in the field I had a chance to go through the interview questions with the local CLAs to make sure that they understood how to frame the questions during the interviews. It was not possible for me to administer the questionnaire because of the bad roads at the time due to rains and vast area that need to be covered. I used the data collected to identify who the elites are by summarizing in a table, characteristics of elites that emerge as shown in section *6.1.1* of the discussion. The table produced supports the results obtained from the qualitative part of the research. The data collected were categorised and analysed using the IBM SPSS statistics software.

4.5 Selection of study sites

I chose Mukungule Game Management Area as the location for my study because it is the most accessible during the rainy season when the data collection was done. This was convenient for me based on the resources and time available for this study. Having worked in the North Luangwa Ecosystem for 3 years helped me complete the study in the intended time because I had existing contact with relevant actors in my study site. My contacts included government staff, NGO staff, and contact persons in the local community.

Figure 2. Showing the state of the road going to Musalangu GMA vehicle got stuck while delivering questionnaire survey (Photo: Ephriam Lombe Mpika)

I selected three study village action groups (VAGs) which I decided to keep anonymous in order to protect the identity of respondents. The VAGs were chosen in order of proximity to the North Luangwa National Park with VAG 1 being the closest to the National park and VAG 3 being the furthest in relation to this study. My assumption at the time of data collection was that VAGs closest to the National Park will have more competition for leadership of the VAG than areas further hence the choice of VAGs. This was because during my interviews with respondents from DNPW the VAGs that came up the most were those that were closest to the National park.

5.0 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

In this chapter, I present my finding in the research. In section 5.1 and 5.2, I focus on answering my first main question on how elites gain control over decision making processes. Section 5.1 answer the first sub-question on who the elite are and their background while in section 5.2 I answer the questions on who make the decisions and who do those decisions benefit. In section 5.3 I answer the last main question under which conditions elites are responsive to the public by looking at the public interaction with the elite.

5.1 Who are the Elite?

Looking at the definition of the elite as given in Chapter 3, they are defined as a person or group that occupies a position or role allowing them access and control or possession of the resources that advantages them. The creation of the CRB and other CBO committees brought today's elites in the CBNRM because it has given them control over the natural resources in the chiefdoms. As government staff highlighted.

> *"This board [CRB] has the overall mandate of the whole chiefdom and it is the representation of the entire chiefdom. The function of this board is to collaborate with government in the sustainable management of natural resources as well as foster development in the chiefdom and safe guard human life from wildlife."* (P2: 20190211 DNPW)

Additionally, in another interview with NGO staff, this was further supported that members on the CRB have been given the access and control over the resource.

> *"The CRB is the main structure and point of entry for us in these communities. If we need to work with anyone in the community, we talk to the CRB to recommend people in the community to work with"* (P26 20190319 NGO).

This evidence shows that the transfer of control and access to natural resources have been placed in the hands of the CRB. The board or group can be call elite because any member that joins can accumulate the resource of reputation or symbolic capital. This elevates their position in the community whether they had high symbolic capital before or not. The board members not only have possession of the resources but are able to use those resources to their advantage as the following responses show.

"When someone becomes a CRB member there is a small allowance that comes in to your pocket when you have a meeting or assigned a duty to go in to town to buy some materials for a project. With that allowance, they use it to buy themselves beers or new clothes which makes them popular in the village. These are very poor areas so CRB members make themselves popular when they buy themselves nice clothes, nice food, and they establish a small shop where everyone goes to buy soap, cooking oils and other groceries, so that makes them popular" (P3 DNPW, 2019).

The board members gain economic capital through the allowances that they get on the board. They are able to convert that capital into social capital and symbolic capital as the respondent put it, they become 'popular'. The board members are also at an advantage because they are the first to receive benefits that come from wildlife resources such as community development projects and edible bush meat from legal hunting. As one VAG committee board member put it,

"I*f there is a new project that comes like fish farming because I am part of the committee, I will be one of the first to have fish or a fish farm from this project. That is how we benefit. If there is distribution of seed in the village we are assured as VAG committee members to have a share."* (P16: 20190226 VAG 2).

"When there is sharing of meat, by being on the VAG committee you are assured of having a piece and the share is a bit different [bigger] from other community members." (P7: 20190214 VAG 2)

The board members also gain social capital through direct interaction with DNPW and NGO staff. This adds to their social network and makes them more likely to be the contact person for future government or NGO projects. They additionally build on institutionised cultural capital through capacity building programs aimed at community leaders.

"*They also benefit from the interaction that goes on between them, DNPW, FZS, and other organisations because of their positions, they also gain knowledge and capacity. In the community, being on the CRB is prestigious because they are regarded to be the leaders of the community.*" (P26 20190319 NGO).

The choice to devolve some power to a few local community members through the CRB has led to the creation and promotions of local elites. As can be observed this has resulted in them having larger symbolic capital than they had before. This has put them in an advantageous position to keep on accumulating economic, social and

cultural capital. This is a process highlighting elite control. Elite capture depends on the behaviours, beliefs, and integrity of the individual members and was linked to specific positions. As noted during my interview with DNPW *"Those that are in the top CRB, the CRB members. You find there are key positions in the CRB, for example, the Chairperson, Finance chairperson, resource chairperson, and CDC chairperson."* (P1: 20190206 DNPW 1:19). These positions where highlighted to be prone to elite capture. This could be because they are considered to be the 'top' positions and so more prestige is attached to them. They are also the positions that handle the finances and material resources of the board. Therefore, if there is poor representation from the board, then it is likely to lead to elite capture.

This shows us who the elites are in CBNRM and how they are produced and reproduced. To understand how they have become elites, I present next the findings on the history of the CRB, background of the elites and processes involving selection of the CRB leadership.

5.1.1 History of the CRB

I asked respondents to compare the management of natural resources 20-30 years ago with the way they are managed now. All the respondents from DNPW felt that the management system was better in the past. More specifically they compared the Luangwa Integrated Resources Development Project (LIRDP) which was implemented only in the South Luangwa ecosystem and the Administrative Management Design which was implement throughout the country. The LIRDP is described to have a bottom-up approach that gave the local community decision-making authority and fiscal power. When it comes to promoting local democracy, these are essential elements. As can be seen from the choice and recognition framework highlighted in the conceptual framework, this is because discretionary power devolution improves representation my promoting accountability and responsiveness of leaders. Respondents said that in the LIRDP the local community members respected the system and felt ownership of their natural resources so much that it helped reduce the illegal hunting (poaching) problem.

The benefit of the LIRDP
> *"Learning from past experience, my observation is that previously the management system was better than it is now. 20-30 years ago, like the area where I'm coming from (South Luangwa ecosystem, Malama Chiefdom), most of the responsibilities were given at the community level and VAG level. Decisions were made at VAG level, even the decision to employ the village scouts (which has now been legalised) was decided by the communities. The community decided [that] 'we need to have village scouts [and decided] who (village scouts) will work with the government scouts (wildlife police officers)'. Even [when it came to] allocating money to say 'we want our*

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scouts to be paid so much from the money given to the VAG' the communities were able to decide. They also decided how much [of the money] each household got.

Those days in the Lupande GMA they were given 80% of the hunting revenue which was shared at VAG level in all the VAGs. VAGs were making decisions to say we (the community) are going to employ one or two people and we are going to allocate so much money towards this person (employees and households). So, for me that was a plus because the people could respect that because. (P1: 20190206 DNPW)

According to this narrative, the LIDRP was working not only because it devolved discretionary power to everybody in the local community but because there was a 'fair' distribution of capital in the community. Locals received money from the natural resources at the household level and they decided who to employ from the community. This, however, does not account for the informal institutions that were and are present in the areas such as culture, tradition leadership influence, and gender relations. Elites would have still been present but because decisions were made publicly and transparently, the leadership looks to be representative of the local community. This made it difficult for elite capture to occur.

In contrast, the ADMADE programme is described as being top-down with the traditional chief being the deciding authority through the structure's sub-authorities. This programme legitimised the informal institution of traditional leadership by recognising their authority and devolving power to them. This made the traditional chief even more powerful and led to misappropriation of money from natural resources intended for community development and natural resources management. Probably because the legitimisation of the Chiefs' authority and the respect they hold through informal institutions or culture made it difficult to prosecute them. They accumulated large amounts of capital making them seem as though they were entitled to the resource by those that had less capital as the concept of capital dictates.

Legitimising traditional leadership
"The sub-authorities were being managed by the traditional chiefs and some indunas. Very few people who were not part of the traditional leadership were part of the committees. Only very few like a nephew who was trusted[5] by the chief were the ones who were in the sub-authorities. The chief was the

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[5] Trusted in this context refers to someone who is not likely to harm the chief to attain power. Though most chiefdoms in Zambia are patriarchal, the chieftaincy works on a matrilineal inheritance system. This means that nephews (nieces in some Chiefdoms) are looked at with suspicion when it comes to power relations.

chairperson. The sub-authorities were in place from 1985 up to the year 1998."

"In 1999 we decided to change from sub-authorities to CRBs. This was because we noticed some problems, that was, the chiefs were so powerful during the sub-authority management. They were able to make decisions on their own without consulting anyone. Yes, there were a lot of projects done under this programme but we, later on, started observing some misappropriation of funds because the chief was the final decision maker. When a chief makes a decision here in Zambia nobody can oppose it. If he says, 'I want ZWM50, 000 (USD3, 814)[6] now!' Nobody would ask what it is for. Apart from that, [when making] decisions for conservation (natural resources in the Chiefdom), nobody else apart from the chief could make a decision. For example, when making decisions to build a wildlife camp or school (suggested by DNPW or community) the chief would oppose because the chiefs were too powerful." (P3: 20190211 DNPW)

The narrative suggests that though the programme recorded some successes it could not be continued because of elite capture. Not only that, DNPW could not control the Chiefs to implement programmes that they wanted such as the building of wildlife camps. The Chiefs were more concerned with preserving their power and authority as well as their capital from both their heirs and DNPW. They only 'trust' people from their social network to take up management positions and probably benefit from the natural resources.

It appears DNPW also do not want to lose control over the management of natural resources and that is why the ADMADE programme was done away with. The CRB initiative was then adopted. The ADMADE is described to be the one that initiated community-based natural resource management in Zambia even though the LIRDP seemed to be the better of the two. I imagine adopting LIRDP meant less control for the Government with regards to natural resource.

"After that transformation and revision of the laws then the CRB was born under the Wildlife act no. 12 of 1998. So because of that change, there were some few changes which arose because once the CRB was formed most of the rights and powers were given to the CRB and not the VAG." (P1: 20190206 DNPW 1:9)

The rights and powers were devolved to 10 board members who would be easier to control than a whole community. This, however, also meant that the authority and power the Chief held before was transferred to the 10 elites.

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[6] Exchange rate used for Jun 2019 1 USD = 13.11 ZMW.

5.1.2 Background of the leaders

I was also able to get the background narrative of former and current VAG chairpersons in VAG 1 and 2. This was to understand the type of people in leadership positions that are or become elites. The first narrative was taken from the VAG 1 chairperson he describes the activities he takes part in within the community. These activities have allowed him to gain economic, social and cultural capital in the community that eventually lead him to take up other leadership positions on the CRB and new development projects introduced by NGOs.

> *Utilising social and cultural capital*
> *"In the community, I have a position as the VAG chairperson. I am also found in our church committee at the district level [where] I am the vice secretary of the Music department and at church (village level), I am the Music director.*
>
> *I work for a safari camp [in the Chiefdom], I got my part-time job through a friend. This friend found me a job looking after the children of a tourist from the UK who came to the camp in our [National] park. I looked after the children for 2 months. When the white person saw that I worked well in these 2 months, he introduced me to the owner of the camp where he was staying. That's how I was offered the job as a camp attendant for the same place.*
>
> *In the last election what happened was that even I wasn't aware that there would be elections in our VAG. I was only told by some people in the community that some vehicles that are parked at the school are here to dissolve the VAG committee in readiness for elections. They urged me to go there immediately because after the dissolution there will be nominations meaning that those people who will be found there are the ones who will be nominated to stand for elections. So that's how I found myself there and was able to get a nomination form for filing in. Before this, I had no information about the nomination day.*
>
> *With regards to other activities I am involved in the community, there is a new [community development] project that we are working on together with an NGO[7]. I am part of the committee that was formed to lead this process.*
>
> *If you want people to vote for you, number one, people have to see honesty in you. Number 2, you are supposed to tell people what you will come to do once you been put in the VAG position. People will then judge if the person standing can work for them as a leader or not. So, if they see that the person can be a good leader, a great number of people get up and make sure that person becomes their leader in the VAG. People also look at the popularity of the person in addition to the honesty of the person in the village."* (P4:

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[7] Name of the NGO has been removed to maintain anonymity of the respondent.

20190213 VAG 1)

From experience, he understands what people look for in a leader and works to keep that reputation for himself. By being a leader in the church[8] and working at a safari camp he builds a reputation for himself as someone that people can relate to while proving his experience in natural resource management.

In the next narrative, I interviewed a former VAG committee member for VAG 1 when the CRB for Mukungule Chiefdom was formed. In this narrative, he describes his current role in the community after the committee role. He has used the symbolic capital he made on the board to remain an elite in the community by working and serving on different committees afterwards.

Democracy in practice
"Currently, I am the leader of the Community forestry committee as well as the Chairperson of the beekeeping committee. I am still working with the community of Mukungule and they always like me to be a leader because I support all the natural resources of Mukungule even the Wildlife [animals][9]. I don't want anyone to destroy the animals because it provides money for us in this community through tourism and other support groups like COCOBA[10].

I am also a sanitation leader at the clinic. We were trained by an NGO [11]to educate the community on how to keep their environment clean which includes having a pit latrine, rubbish pits, and thatched bathing areas. I am also a member of the Rural Health Centre as a sanitation worker. For me to join this sanitation committee there was a general meeting held in the community then they picked people per village to form a group of 20. Then we were trained, the training took 5 days. The people who made the selections are the people from the clinic who know which people are active in the community those that can work without being pushed. Because this is voluntary work they need to choose a person who they believe can help the community. They also look at how someone approaches people in their homes and someone with people skills.

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[8] Zambia was declared a Christian nation by the second Republican President Fredrick Chiluba in the 90s and so being religious is very important in the local communities. Local community members also believe in witchcraft and shun it, therefore, being associated with the church means you distance yourself from the act.

[9] Wild animals have lost favour in the community because of HAC hence the need to stress that he still supports them.

[10] These are microfinance groups introduced in the North Luangwa ecosystem by Frankfurt Zoological Society (FZS) aimed at promoting conservation of natural resource through savings and loan distribution.

[11] This is an International NGO working in the Chiefdom to promote community development through various strategies in heath and agriculture. Name has been withheld to keep anonymity of respondents.

For the beekeeping committee, 20 people were picked here from this VAG whom another NGO[12] was supposed to give beehives. We went through training to know how to keep bees and produce honey. After all the training, we were told that we could now form a committee from the group that we formed. We did this through a secret ballot process were some people would be suggested for a position then their names would be written on a small piece of paper as a vote. The one with the greatest number of votes would be the chairperson that's how I ended up winning. Three of us stood on the Chairperson position." (P5: 20190213 VAG 1)

From this narrative, we can see how the choice of the NGOs to look for the 'active' members of society has led to this person maintaining his elite position in society. The people with large symbolic capital is likely the ones to be picked for these NGO community development projects leaving behind those with lower capital. Granted the selection is done at community meetings for transparency but it neglects the symbolic interactions happening in the community including the informal institutions of these local communities.

Interestingly, the symbolic capital or reputation can also be used for driving 'political' change. I found out from him that he was the one that led a campaign around the community to remove the previous VAG chairperson because he felt the Chairperson had over stayed on the position and someone new was needed.

"These leaders on the CRB have a system to stay in power. What they do is that when the time for elections comes and information is given to them from FZS and DNPW offices, they wait until there is one week left to the election before they can spread the information to the rest of the community members. Therefore, those who wanted to stand for elections on the CRB and want to do campaigns are unable to do so because the time is too short. So here in this VAG, we took action that I led to a campaign in the community to ensure that we have a new and young chairperson for the VAG. We campaigned all around the VAG and that's how we removed the previous chairperson. We were able to do this because we understood the methods board members use to stay in power but in other areas where people don't know they ended up electing the same people who are now on the CRB." (P5: 20190213 VAG 1)

Though it is true that the previous VAG chairperson had stayed in his position for a long time (roughly 12 years), the true motives behind this campaign are debateable. One would wonder why this change did not come earlier. During our discussion, I got an impression that this respondent and the previous chairperson

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[12] Name of NGO has been withheld to maintain anonymity.

where not on good terms. He introduced himself as the first VAG chairperson when in fact he was not. The first VAG chairperson was the one that was recently removed. It is possible that he used his capital and influence to remove his rival from power.

After this interview, I decided to make a follow up with the previous VAG Chairperson to get his side of the story. Like the other elites, he too had built up symbolic capital using his economic, social and cultural capital. He suggested that the only reason he lost the last election was that staff from DNPW wanted him off as chairperson. This was contrary to the previous narrative which suggested he was removed after losing his popularity. He instead told me that DNPW staff organised a vehicle to ferry DNPW game rangers to the voting stations, just so they could vote to remove him. According to him, he felt they [DNPW] were not happy that he was the voice of the people in demanding for what the people wanted especially in animal-crop damage mitigation and also because DNPW could not control him. He strongly felt that he was still the people's favourite in the community.

The people or Government's choice?
"When I returned [from working outside of the village for 6 years], I was chosen as the VAG chairperson …until when I stopped in 2018. I was chosen as VAG chairperson about 2003. Before I was also the P.T.A chairperson for 3 years, I also worked for 3 years at the clinic with the Neighbourhood Health Committee. At the same time, I work at the Chief's palace to help lead groups in the community. When the Chief would go educate and check on people in the Chiefdom he would take me along with him as an advisor. In the village I am not the Headman but was put as the vice. I am second to the Headman.

We were about 13 the people who stood in the last election. The competition wasn't even strong because people didn't pay attention to these other candidates. Everybody in the community wanted me as Chairperson then this was just changed by the scouts. The scouts were the only ones who wanted the other person. In the end, there was only a difference of 8 votes between the winner and myself. There were too many scouts even those that were supposed to be on duty were pulled out to come and vote. It was like having an election for a member of parliament.

I didn't go ahead with the petition because I was also scared that these scouts may hold a grudge on me and try to frame me by hiding elephant tusks in my house so that they can remove me from power. So I just let it be as it is, I know that I will come and lead again because people will come and vote for me again because they still want me. So I will let this person work so that people can see how he will mess up." (P11: 20190215 VAG 1).

From this narrative, the respondent was suggesting that he lost only because he

was not was the favourite for the DNPW game scouts. If this is true, then it suggests that elites are not only responsive to local community members but to organisations, the traditional leadership and other stakeholders in the Chiefdom. To be able to maintain their positions elites would have to ensure that they do not lose favour from all these actors.

From the three narratives, it is evident that popularity and social capital plays a major role in getting into these positions in the VAG committee and even on the CRB. In the previous narrative, the respondent highlighted his closeness to the Chief which possibly influenced his being CRB and VAG committee. In the next narrative, the respondent narrates how he was recalled by the traditional Chief to serve on the CRB. Like in all the other narratives, the VAG chairperson is 'active' in the community and has high symbolic capital.

The importance of capital in elections
"In the community am the VAG Chairperson. I am also the Chairperson of the Horticulture group that was recently formed by an NGO[13] as a community development project. I can say I am active in the community because of the response I get from people. A lot of the times people want me to take up leadership positions, but I just have to decline the offers. Just recently there were elections at the Parent-Teacher Association and they wanted me to be the Chairperson. I had to refuse because I saw that I already hold too many leadership positions and if I keep accepting these offers it might affect the way I work. People want honesty in their leaders. When they see honesty in things that you do or work on then they feel that even in groups that come up you can be a good leader.
The CRB was formed in 2004 but for us to start functioning fully we started in 2008. From 2004 it was just the formation and setting up of documents then in 2008 that when we start receiving funding from Chilanga (DNPW head office). I joined the CRB in 2004 I was part of the interim committee. I served for 2 terms then on the 3rd term, the late extension officer from DNPW told people in the community that I wasn't allowed to stand because you can't serve on the board for 3 terms. People were not happy with this decision. So a new CRB was put in but they didn't work so well that the Chief called me to his palace and asked me to recontest in the next elections. He called me together with the Secretary who was equally not allowed to stand previously because of 'no third term'. That's how we stood again in the following election and we both managed to win in our VAGs and I was put back on the CRB. (P15: 20190215 VAG 2)

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[13] The name of the NGO has been withheld to maintain anonymity of the respondent.

In this narrative, the respondent highlights how he manages to keep his social, cultural capital and reputation in the village. Additionally, he reminds us that the Chief still has influence and authority over the formal institution like the CRB in the Chiefdom. This authority comes from culture and tradition, the informal institutions. In the same narrative, the respondent further talks about the CRB election process and how people in the community are abusing the campaign process to buy voters. He sees this as one of the reasons women don't stand and why some people are left out in the process. From it, we learn the CRB had never had a female member on the CRB until the last election. This means that in all the 10 VAGs this was the first woman to be elected chairperson.

"People are problematic, during the campaign some candidates were buying people beer, and others bought fish and started distributing and so on… Some people think that being on the CRB you get a salary and so do whatever it takes to get on the CRB. Some people even differ and create enmity amongst themselves. Some even today after elections are done they still don't speak to each other. Then sometimes you will find that women want to stand as well but they look down on themselves thinking they won't manage to do the campaign. So, you find a lot of people are left out because of this process because people feel that you need to have money [to win votes]. People these days do not just want to vote for someone who hasn't given them something [bribe].

I think the election process would have been better if they removed the campaign period. VAG committee members should be elected at a community general meeting when everybody is present. The votes can still be secret by giving candidates a number or symbol right at the meeting then allowing people to choose right there and then. I think women would be willing to stand then because right now we only have one woman on the CRB. I don't even know what happened in her VAG for her to win. It's a very big success for Mukungule CRB because this is the first time a woman has been on the CRB.

I think the number of women on these boards (VAG committees) is low because some women need to be encouraged or motivated to stand. Then others are scared of their husbands because these positions require a lot of traveling and some husbands do not feel comfortable with the wives traveling a lot, especially with other men. As a result, a lot of women are scared. You find that most of the time the women found on the VAG committees are women who are not married. Sometimes even people in the community think that women cannot lead. So, women are brought down and discouraged. Men are stubborn even when they are told by the community that they won't make it they still argue and stand." (P15: 20190215 VAG 2 15:21)

The respondent in this narrative sees the campaign period as the source of elite capture. Those elites in the community with large economic capital use that capital to get into positions of power because they think they will earn a salary for it. He thinks by instead choosing leader publicly at community meetings this would help to solve the elite capture problem. Once again though, this solution only puts the community at the mercy of different types of elites. The elites found in the informal institutions. This is evident when he highlights that married women are not allowed to stand by their husbands in the CRB election.

Next, I will look at how the elections are carried out to explore what local communities look for in their leaders and understand further why some people are left out.

5.1.3 Selection of the elite

On this section, I get from my respondents the local perspective of the election process, what they feel the local community wants from the people they choose and how they perceive women's participation. Some of the respondents described the process as 'democratic' with the chairperson of the VAG being the first one to receive the date of nomination and the nomination forms.

The nominations forms are supposed to be filled by anyone who wants to stand for elections to be the chairperson of the VAG. "*The nominations date is announced by the [sitting] Chairperson and he is the one who distributes application forms. The chairperson tells the applicants the people from town (DNPW and FZS) will come and interview all those that have applied.*" (P18: 20190227 VAG2 18:7) According to the respondents the elections are carried out by the DNPW and FZS who ensure that the screening process is done to ensure only qualified[14] candidates stand.

Additionally, *"When someone applies to stand the application has to be taken to the Chief in Mukungule village for approval then that person can stand."* (P17: 20190227 VAG2 17:10) The nomination forms are sent to the chief for approval and he decides who should stand and who should not. This legitimisation of traditional leadership is undemocratic and diminished citizenship. There is a threat of locals not seeing the CRB as a legitimate authority and so will mostly likely not be engaged in its operations. To make things worse, *"The Chief sometimes uses the CRB election guidelines to screen nominees but will sometimes pick a candidate because they are popular or because the chief likes that candidate even if they don't have the qualifications. If you try to oppose the chief strongly he will say 'since you don't want to hear what I am telling you, go and form a CRB in your [own] area (chiefdom)'."* (P3: 20190211 DNPW 3:16) Meaning that either things are done the

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[14] The qualifications of nominees are listed in the CRB election guidelines that were reviewed and passed in 2013 by the Zambia Wildlife Authority now DNPW. They state one must be a local resident; non-partisan; not a civil servant; aged 25yrs and above, be Zambian and have no criminal record.

Chief's way or there will be no CRB for the Chiefdom. This is characteristic of an autocratic system and elite capture is likely to occur. As in the ADMADE programme the Chief is likely to install his in-circle on the board. The evidence so far suggests this is not far from the truth.

As observed so far, the nomination process is already undemocratic. Once the nominations are done there is a campaign period and then elections are carried out. In the election, however, community members only get to vote for the VAG chairperson.

"There are elections held in the community so that people can choose who they want to be leaders of the VAG. People take the whole day to cast their vote then the person that get the most votes in the VAG elections becomes the Chairperson of that VAG. Then the person who comes second and the remaining people sit down with the new chairperson to have in-house elections to fill the other positions that are on the VAG board." (P4: 20190213 VAG1 4:11)

The rest of the positions in the VAG committee are shared by the newly elected committee. The process is the same on the CRB. The 'newly' elected VAG Chairpersons have an in-house election to decide who will be Chairperson of the CRB, Secretary, Women's Affairs Chairperson, Community Development Chairperson, Resources Management Chairperson, and the vice to all the positions. This means the local community does not get to decide what happens on the CRB. Some respondents felt this process was unfair.

"To select CRB members there is first a general meeting then people are selected at VAG level. Those 10 people selected to the CRB then have an in-house election to give themselves positions. The selection of CRB members' position is not ok but the selection of VAG members is fine. Those 10 people on the CRB should have been given positions by the community and not an in-house election. The way it is means that, since they are used to being on the CRB they always give themselves the same positions." (P5: 20190213 VAG1 5:11)

The concern from this respondent was that if someone keeps getting re-elected in their VAG committee then that person is likely to hold the same position on the CRB each time. This was echoed by respondent P26 who is an NGO staff. They are right to be concerned because the election guideline has made it easy for elites to control these positions. The whole process diminishes the public domain and reduces citizenship. While elites are free to keep on accumulating capital.

5.1.4 Leadership qualities

When I asked my respondents about what they think the community looks for in their leaders I got the following results. On the one hand, some respondents felt that money did not play a huge factor when it comes to winning the election. They felt that a person in the community must have good behaviour and relations with other community members if they want to be elected than have money and keep bad relations with people. Yet so far, the evidence suggests that money is key in campaigns and winning elections.

> *"If you want to stand for elections on the VAG you are not supposed to be a poacher, you are supposed to be a person who is willing to work for the community. You are supposed to be a good person who can work for the people. There is no other thing like having lots of money that is required only those qualities I have mentioned which are having good behaviour in the community."* (P6: 20190214 VAG1 6:7)

> *"The way it is when you stand, even though I've never stood I have witnessed this, the way you relate to people and what you share with them is important and will determine the number of votes that you will get. Money isn't a big factor. You can find someone has a lot of money in the community but has poor contact with people this person will not be popular but there are those people who don't have money but maintain a good relationship with people then this person will be better off. There are even people who have money but will never help out anyone because they don't have a heart for the people but you might go to someone without money they may be able to give you valuable advice that can even be better than money."* (P10: 20190215 VAG1 10:12)

> *"A lot of the times people look at the behaviour of a person. They know that this person is like this and can work in this manner. That's why even though some people may have money to campaign some people wouldn't vote for them because of their bad behaviour. Some may have no money but because they have a good name in the community people will vote for them."* (P20: 20190305 VAG3 20:8)

People in the community want good leaders. These leaders are defined as humble, respectful (even when drunk), social, law abiding, and not suspected of witchcraft (P26: 20190319 NGO 26:24). Evidently, elites respond to the leadership needs of the community to keep enjoying their positions. However, some may also use monetary capital to gain social capital by buying beer and food material as campaign materials during elections. It could be said that local community members overlook these qualities once a bad leader 'flashes money'. This proves the lack of citizenship

and belonging on the part of the community. They feel the CRB has nothing to offer them and the only way to benefit is to accept the bribes from the elites.

> "*Candidates move around the villages with their campaigns so that they can get votes just like it is in the presidential elections. Because of these campaigns, you can even find that people don't vote for someone who is honest but because someone is buying beer or stuff then they vote for him even if there is nothing that he can do for the community.*" (P24: 20190305 VAG3 9:9)

They say this is problematic because it leads to people voting for people with 'no vision' to lead. Part of the problem is that there are no regulations that govern the election campaigns and so candidates are left to use any means possible to win votes. What is even more worrying is that they liken this sort of campaigning to a presidential election. If there is truth to this then Zambian democracy needs to be re-organised.

Candidates that have no money to use during the campaign lose hope and sometimes end up dropping out of the race. *"We were 10 people who wanted to stand for elections but after we saw that our friends had money to campaign and we didn't, we dropped out so they remained 7 people who actually stood. 3 women and 4 men. These are the people who made serious campaigns."* (P24: 20190305 VAG3 24:6) This was what a VAG committee member from VAG3 told me. After dropping out, she ended being selected by the committee that won the election because they needed to fill up the positions in the committee to be 10.

5.1.5 Race for the chairperson position

The VAG elections are centred on the chairperson position and community members have taken notice of this. "*Some gain interest because they see the benefit the chairperson enjoys and so would like that position.*" (P1: 20190206 DNPW 1:26) Some people only want to join the VAG committee to be the chairperson if they don't make it then there is no point of being on the VAG committee as the case given in the narrative of leaders' background. *"People want the chairperson position because this is the top most leadership position. They want to be in-charge of everybody, and control other board members and also gain popularity in the community. Respect is given mostly to the Chairperson, not any other position that's why a lot of people want to have this position."* (P11: 20190215 VAG1 11:22) The chairperson position has become prestigious. *"The CRB chairperson position is very critical and so it must be someone who has done grade 12 in terms of education, he knows how to read, he knows how to speak English.*" (P3: 20190211 DNPW 3:24) The educational requirement is not mentioned in the CRB guidelines as a necessary qualification for candidates. Yet because this is considered a 'critical position' by

the authority in-charge of the screening process during elections (DNPW), it is seen as a symbol of someone who is educated by the community. As a result, those without education (institutionised cultural capital) are blocked from contesting the Chairperson position

5.1.6 Women Participation

It is evident in the findings that women's participation in the CRB and VAG committees is low. As the VAG2 chairperson pointed out, women are scared to stand because their husbands don't allow them and because they lack the confidence and resources to stand and campaign. *"Women, not all of them but most of them, think they cannot manage to convince people to vote for them as chairperson of the VAG. This discourages them from standing for elections. If they do stand for elections, they do not manage to move around the community to tell them (people) to vote for them [during campaigns].*" (P4: 20190213 VAG1 4:19) This is another example where overpromotion of the VAG Chairperson positions has led some in the community to feel the position is reserved for 'special' people. Women do stand but not for the top seat usually. It could be that the lack of relevant capital has prompted women to leave the top position for the men. It is therefore clear that even when women do manage to get on the CRB or VAG they do not actively participate in the natural resource management and governance processes.

> *"Very few women will volunteer to be on the committees. Even when they are part of the board they will not lobby to get higher positions in the CRB. Women have an inferiority complex, they feel higher positions should be left for men. Some women are stopped from joining the committees by their husbands. Such demoralises women from participation. Women who are more exposed and have experience are more likely to disagree with their husband on participation. Some women who end up on the VAG/CRB will limit their participation to menial jobs such as drawing water and cooking food for other committee members instead of actively participating in board meetings. Men make all the decisions."* (P1: 20190206 DNPW 1:20)

Exposure and experience play a vital role in ensuring women's participation in the VAG and CRB. This could be that women are likely to have better access to information relating to elections and board activities. It could also be that women through exposure become less dependent on their husband in this patriarchal system and have better bargaining power.

The women respondents that I interviewed believe that women want to stand and take up leadership positions. They do however feel that they are blocked by the community or system from doing so. One way that this is done is by withholding

information from those that have the aspirations to stand. One of my respondents in VAG 1 noted.

> *"I only know one woman on the VAG committee. She was determined to be on the VAG and was ready to stand, she was able to get the nomination information on time and registered her name. I think if we all heard that information on time we would have considered standing too but the information did not reach us in time we found that they had already nominated. A lot of women want to stand but we are blocked because they think that we can't lead. We know we can lead so long as we are given the knowledge just like Ingonge Wina[15] our female vice president. She is an example to prove that women can lead as well when given the chance."* (P9: 20190215 VAG1 9:8)

Poor information distribution is seen here to be one of the factors that lead to poor women participation. Earlier it was pointed out that the VAG chairperson is one place in charge of informing the VAG of the upcoming elections. It is possible that those in the Chairperson's social network receive that information first. This could explain why one woman was able to prepare herself in time to stand for election. She could be part of the inner-circle. Women, however, have expressed that they are ready to take up leadership positions. What is lacking is the proper institutions and guidelines to ensure a public domain and good information flow.

5.2 Decision making in CBNRM and who it benefits

5.2.1 It's the traditional Chief's decision

For convenience's sake, the government has opted to work more with the CRBs who they feel represent the community. In an interview with DNPW staff, he felt it was difficult to work with everyone in the community and engage them in decision making. It is much easier when their representatives work with the government. "*So, we involve communities through their representatives in the management of natural resources.*" (P2: 20190211 DNPW 2:1) However, respondents from the community say that the Chief is the one who has the final say. The CRB suggests to the Chief what needs to be done and then the Chief decides.

> *"The decision is made by the CRB after proposals are brought in from the communities through the VAGs. The decision is then taken to the chief who*

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[15] Ingonge Wina is Zambia's first female Vice President who was elected in 2016

gives his approval. If it is not approved, we either have to find a way to convince him or rethink the whole idea." (P15: 20190226 VAG2 15:23)

"The people that make the rules and law of natural resources are the CRB members and the Chief. Once the CRB makes these rules they take them to the Chief for approval if the Chief is happy with the rules that he signs and stamps them." (P9: 20190215 VAG1 9:18)

"The Chief has the power to make such decisions as well as decide on or suspend projects which he sees as not appropriate that the CRB has decided on. Then anything that he observes during the implementation of the project he has the power to call all of us and talk about what he has observed." (P4: 20190213 VAG1 4:33)

Not only does the Chief take over the decision-making process but he monitors and supervises projects that are implemented. This still as highlighted earlier can be linked to the amount of cultural capital the Chief holds. People in the community still respect the Chief's authority because that is the tradition and people still follow the informal institutions. The recognition of the Chief as the patron has contributed to the legitimising of this authority. This means that the level of democracy depends on the benevolence of the Chief.

5.2.2 It's the CRB's decision

Regardless of who makes the final decision the CRB is mentioned to be involved in the decision-making process. The VAG committees and local community members are left out. Some attribute the VAG committees and community members being left out to the insufficient amount of money[16] that the CRBs/community receives that comes from the Government. What is more, is that the CRB does not issue finance reports to the local community and so the community is left to speculate about how finances are used.

"Communities get money from wildlife resources, but this money is small hence CRBs opt to do community projects. The key thing is to inform the community that money is not enough. If that information may be shared with everybody then people would still appreciate. This would create ownership with the communities but the way it happens even the VAG member find it hard to give information to the people because mainly things are done at the CRB levels. The VAG committee members seem to have no function. That is

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[16] Money from safari hunting, and concession fees.

the reason there is poor participation because communities are not informed." (P1: 20190206 DNPW 1:17)

"The CRB does not give a financial report and the community doesn't even know the amount of money the CRB receives. It is difficult to challenge them because they say it is the government's fault they haven't received the money. They said for the past two years they have not received any money." (P6: 20190214 VAG1 6:13)

The CRB looks to be top-down because the VAG committees and local community members are left out of the decision-making process. This means CRB make the decision on which information to give the community and which to withhold. This has created room for elite control and capture because it makes it difficult for local communities to hold their leaders accountable. Therefore, the CRB is not representative of the local community. Additionally, the CRB does not have discretionary decision-making and fiscal power and so are able to use that to escape being held accountable.

Revenues from trophy hunting concession fees are now paid to the Central Government before being disbursed. The money is sometimes delayed and not paid on time and in full. "*The CRBs are supposed to receive money on a quarterly basis from government, that is, safari hunting revenues which are supposed to be 50-50. The Government does not release money on 50-50 if they release money this quarter it will take maybe another 6 months before more money is released.*" (P3: 20190211 DNPW 3:15) According to respondents, this affects the operating of the VAG and CRB. They make plans for community projects but are unable to carry them out. "*The money that can be found at the VAG board is too little that we fail to work according to the way we plan so this makes it seem as though the VAG members do not want to work for the reasons they were chosen by the community.*" (P4: 20190213 VAG1 4:10) Some VAG committee members use this to their advantage in order to get re-elected.

"To convince people to re-elect them, the board members tell the people about the challenges they face on the board, the little money they get as a VAG and reason they fail to deliver their promises. They use the lack of funds as a reason for not working and people are able to be convinced of that because they trust their leaders and so give them another chance. So those leaders would run away from work and instead concentrate on complaining about the problems they face on the board." (P4: 20190213 VAG1 4:15)

Here the lack of complete devolution of power is seen to be creating and reproducing elite control and possible elite capture. The elite use 'trust' or symbolic capital to evade sanctioning by the people. With the poor information flow, the elites can then

use the little money they receive or their position for self-benefit either legally or illegally. One VAG member narrated to me how the Chairperson would promise jobs to individuals who paid him a bribe. According to the respondent, he collected different 'gifts' from different people and then would choose who to give the jobs to.

> *"The previous Chairperson wasn't working well with the community because when employment opportunities came in the CRB he used corrupt methods to employ people. People had to give him maybe chickens or goats and out of all those that gave, he would only select 2 people and the rest would lose out. Even I before I joined the VAG this happened to me. There was a CRB vehicle that was bought, and they needed a driver, I approached the Chairman that I wanted to be the driver. He told me that I should bring him chickens because there are so many people who want that job, so I did as he asked. In the end, they chose someone else to be the driver. The Chairman was so corrupt that when money for building a food shelter was released from the CRB he used it for personal things."* (P7: 20190214 VAG1 7:18)

The elite position of the Chairperson allowed him to use the resources for his own benefit. Because he was seen as someone with authority, he was able to manipulate others into giving him 'gifts' for favours. He was allegedly accumulating economic capital for himself because the system allowed him to be corrupt.

The money received in the CRB is not shared equally among the VAGs. *"The money is given to priority areas"* (P20: 20190305 VAG3 20:12) in the form of community projects as mentioned. As a result, some VAGs are seen to be benefiting from the money more. *"We should have been sharing whatever money we get at the CRB to all the VAGs equally so that each VAG can decide what to do with their share."* (P20: 20190305 VAG3 20:12) With no written rule on what constitutes 'priority area' the sharing is mostly likely done to the benefit of those elites with the largest capital and bargaining power. Those that would be able to convince other board members that their area/village is a priority. It is also safe to assume that it makes it easier for traditional leadership to hijack this benefit-sharing process.

Groups and committees that are created in the community are facing a similar challenge of favouritism and/or nepotism. In my interview with one of the NGO staff, he brought out that they encounter this problem in the Chiefdom.

> *"We do have some challenges in the selection of those[17] participants. There is too much favouritism. There are people that are holding those positions of influence so the selection in most cases you find out that it is not done on*

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[17] Referring to the selection of people to work with in their programmes to implement community development.

merit basis but is biasedly done because of maybe the connection that participant has with maybe the person on top or the person that has been charged with the responsibility of doing the selection." (P25: 20190318 NGO 25:5)

Similarly, in the PRA group I did in VAG 1 with the women, they expressed the difficulty of joining development programmes and/or committees brought in by NGOs and other organisations.

"Most of the groups like SMAGI[18], COCOBA, and others have a limited number of people that can join once that number is reached no one else is allowed to join. They usually choose among themselves, for example, those doctors at the clinic they choose people that they know. The only groups that anyone can join freely without favouritism are the church groups. To join other groups, you have to have some sort of connection to that group or know someone in that group." (P12: 2090219 PRA VAG 1 women group 12:1)

Social networks or social capital plays a major role in the empowerment of elites. In both the interviews, it was highlighted that those at the 'top' pick people that are in their social network and not on merit basis. Similarly, during my data collection, the Chairperson was directing me to people in his social network for interviews until I realised it. In CBNRM or programmes aimed at fostering local democracy, there is a danger of diminishing citizenship. This is because community members may view certain programmes to be exclusively meant for elites and so will not participate. Formal institutions need to be established to guide benefit sharing as well as participation in programmes and committees to prevent elite control and capture.

5.2.3 It's the Government's decision

During my interview with DNPW staff, I wanted to find out how the community reacts when the Government makes a decision that the community does not like. In response, it seemed the Government had the overall authority over decisions made. The reason given is that the Government has a larger scope of interest than local communities or their local authorities, traditional or otherwise. Communities should, therefore, accept the decisions made by the Government because it is 'for their own good'.

"Overall government acts in the interest of every Zambian that's why [on] some decisions, Government still retain the overall power over every resource. Communities do not look at the country at large they look at the

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[18] SMAGI is a group formed for community maternal health education and financial support.

interest of themselves within their area. But the Government looks at the interest of every Zambian. No matter how much communities can push some decisions are made in the interest of the whole nation which includes themselves. So, if they are not happy with the decisions then they just have to live with it there is nothing they can do." (P2: 20190211 DNPW 2:32)

"Sometimes we can block them[19] when they want to do a project which they don't have enough money for even when they insist. We tell them to plough it back in to conservation by paying village scouts instead. We know that communities need more projects because their crops are being raided but if you plough back money in conservation you are multiplying wildlife." (P3: 20190211 DNPW 3:41)

This is evidence that there isn't discretionary decision-making power devolution. Additionally, the Government is able to influence this decision because they are signatories to the CRB bank accounts where revenues from wildlife are received. According to my DNPW respondents, this is to ensure accountability and collective decision-making. *"This means that the communities themselves now cannot withdraw funds from their accounts. The consensus has to be struck between the community leadership (CRB) and the government staff. There has to be that consensus in order for the funds to be used."* (P2: 20190211 DNPW 2:10) I argue that it has had the opposite effect because elites can hide in the shadow of the government if they are not responsive to the people.

Along with DNPW, the other signatories are the CRB Bookkeeper, the Finance Management Chairperson and the CRB Chairperson. In order to withdraw money, two community representatives have to sign along with a signatory from the DNPW. This means community representatives have to travel from their villages to town which is counted as an official duty. Since it is official duty they are entitled to allowances (travel and accommodation) and this is how the signatories benefit. All the signatories make the trip to 'sign' for the money. *"They say that because for the CRB remove money there is a third signatory that come from the DNPW that has to agree on the payments to be made. If DNPW does not agree then they have to change the amount of money to be withdrawn and so to avoid this, they signatories are the ones that make the trip."* (P3: 20190211 DNPW 3:41) In this way, they exclude other CRB members from also benefiting from the travel and accommodation allowances.

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[19] Referring to the CRB

5.3 Public interaction with elites

5.3.1 Human-Animal conflict

Human-Animal conflict (HAC) has been seen to be the biggest challenge faced in the communities. "*In Nabwalya every year we have more than 500 HAC reports. Out of the 500 reports, you get may be 3-4 people killed from problem animals.*" (P3: 20190211 DNPW 3:17) Animals are also responsible for crop damage, damage to houses and other property. The Government does not compensate for any loss of life or damage caused by the animals. *"This puts us [DNPW] in a very awkward situation, the people are saying you like wildlife more than human beings."* (P3: 20190211 DNPW 3:17) With these communities being predominately farmers their source of livelihood is affected and so in order to make money to feed their families and cover other costs like school fees they carryout illegal activities like illegal hunting (poaching) or illegal fishing. *"Some people even use poison to fish, they dump poison into the stream and kill fish for food. They say that even if we teach them they have no other means to make money, they don't have any other thing to do. They say that is the only way they can make money so that they can take their children to school… They say if you give us jobs then we will stop all the illegal activities."* (P22: 20190305 VAG3 22:9) This is one way that communities protest the HAC and lack of compensation.

Communities also depend on their CRBs to mitigate this HAC. They take all reports to the CRB through their Chairpersons and Resource Management officers who take those reports to the DNPW camp so that game scouts can be deployed to scare problem animals away. If this is not done, they vent their frustrations on the CRB members. One VAG member from VAG1 said, *"This problem brings pressure on us CRB leaders because people bring the reports to us some of them insults depending on how they feel."* (P4: 20190213 VAG1 4:8) In the same vain, another member from VAG2 said that the community calls the problem animals the children of the CRB. They say to the CRB members *"come and see what your children have done come and pick them and take them somewhere else"* (P15: 20190226 VAG2 15:9). Implying that CRBs take care of the animals as one would their own child. Even so, the community still needs the CRB to collect the HAC reports so that there can be mitigation.

> *"The main reason we select these leaders is that we need them to attend to the HWC problem and take our reports to DNPW. Aside from that, I don't know any other work that they do because they don't hold meetings to explain what they do."* (P8: 20190214 VAG1 8:13)

> *"It's good to have the CRB because it makes things easy for us for example instead of taking reports of human wildlife conflict to DNPW camp we just*

go to the CRB. We are able to get information quicker through the CRB because these people are within." (P10: 20190215 VAG1 10:13)

Human animal conflict mitigation is important for communities. VAG committee members and CRBs know this and so "*are quick to respond to issues to do with HWC*" (P7: 20190214 VAG 1 7:16). The CRB buys fireworks that they distribute to farmers to chase away animals from their fields. This could explain why they are mostly known for human-animal conflict mitigation. The DNPW and NGOs are also introducing HWC mitigation measures in the community like chili fencing of crop fields. They are doing this not only to reduce crop damage but to reduce retaliation from angry farmers.

> *"I think what happens when a person is not seeing the benefits and then is also experiencing HWC then even the small things, day to day things that one can do to contribute to natural resource management he wouldn't do. For example, if someone offers them money for trees that are in the GMA this person wouldn't hesitate. They would directly go and do it to gain that money so that they can feel that they have benefited from natural resources*." (P26: 20190319 NGO 26:20)

From the evidence above, it can be observed that the community now categories the CRB in the same class as the top managed DNPW and NGO. They only go to them to report their problems and sometime throw insults to them even though the CRB members are people from the community experiencing the same HAC. The lack of a public domain has left the local community no choice but to engage in illegal activities such as illegal hunting to show their discontent with the management structure. Additionally, by the DNPW and NGO implement HAC mitigation measure (the job that the community sees is meant for the CRB) they are undermining the CRB's authority and delegitimising them. This may lead to disengaged citizenship and further elite capitalisation of the boards.

5.3.2 Community meetings

Depending on who you talk to, you will get different responses on issues to do with community meetings. VAG committee and CRB members say that community meetings are held in their respective VAGS or villages, but people do not attend them. The reason why people do not attend is debatable, but respondents said if a headman calls for a community meeting then people show up. One of the reasons given was that it is mandatory to attend a village meeting called by a headman. "If someone misses a meeting 3 times they can be taken to the Chief for punishment." (P15: 20190226 VAG2 15:14) That is why some committees have chosen to work with headmen.

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"Every month we have VAG committee meetings. We also have community meetings which we organise through the village headmen to inform people how we are working and how to protect our natural resources. We meet the community every 3 months." (P18: 20190227 VAG2 18:9)

The local community respects the Headman's authority even though the rules are not formally written. This could be because of the strong informal rule that governs society whereas the CRB system is fairly new. People know the consequences of not attending the community meeting called by the headmen, but such consequences are lacking for CRB meetings. Ideally, this signifies that local community members recognise the Chief's authority more than the CRBs or VAG committees' authority.

Another reason as to why community members may not attend meetings could be the lack of incentives. People expect to be provided with food for lunch because that is the trend in some group and NGO meetings. *"In our group meetings like farmer's cooperatives, people are given food after meetings, so they expect the same to be done when the VAG committee calls for a meeting."* (P20: 20190305 VAG3 20:4) With all the speculation and no clear information about the amount of money the CRB receives, the local community members maybe not attending meetings as a protest to how that money is used or mis-used.

According to the respondents, the VAG committee use the community meetings to get community input on important decisions and set rules. They say that community at times are not happy with certain decision-making because they fail to attend meetings. *"If community members do not show up the VAG committee makes decisions without their input"* (P15: 20190226 VAG2 15:26) so there is a need for them to show up to give their input. What is interesting is that "*If the community are not happy with the new rules [or decision made] they do not follow them for example if they say that no cutting of trees to make charcoal those not happy with this will continue to burn charcoal and sell secretly.* (P9: 20190215 VAG1 9:19). The devolution of power goes as far as 10 board members found on the CRB. This fact may be influencing board member to hold a cosmetic community meeting to please not the community but the authorities that gave them that responsibility. That is why to them (CRB) it does not matter whether the community attends the meetings or not. They are the ones with the final decision-making power anyway at the village level.

6.0 DISCUSSION

In this chapter, I give the interpretations of the key findings in this study. The discussion links the findings to the conceptual framework presented in Chapter 3 on capital and choice and recognition. Reference is made to the existing literature on local democracy, community-based natural resource management, and elite control and capture. I conclude the sections with a key summary of my discussion to answer the two main research questions.

6.1 How elites gain control over decision making

6.1.1 Identifying the elite

The Community Resources Board has been given the mandate over the whole chiefdom to manage natural resources, bring about community development and mitigate human-wildlife conflict. This was legally done with the introduction of the Zambia Wildlife Authority that saw the rights and decision making given to the CRB and not the VAGs. The CRBs were preceded by the Luangwa Integrated Resource Development programme (LIRDP) and the Administrative Management Design (ADMADE) (Child, 2004). The LIRDP was the more democratic of the two with the decision-making authority being the VAGs. The VAGs were given discretionary power through the decision making and fiscal power making them responsive to the needs of the villagers (Ribot, 2013). 80% of the hunting revenues were given to the VAGs and shared equally among the villages (Lubilo and Child, 2010). The villages were engaged, and this created a sense of ownership and respect for the natural resources and the system. Out of the 20 National parks in Zambia, this pilot programme was only tested in the South Luangwa National Park ecosystem (Child 2004).

Unlike the LIRDP, the ADMADE was rolled out in the whole country which should explain why it is the framework that the CRB was based on (Lubilo and Child, 2010). The difference with the CRB was that 'democratic' elections were introduced and the decision-making was meant to be collective. The CRB was intended to have a bottom-up approach in order to foster democracy. By making it representative of the local community, it would have a wide public domain encouraging citizenship engagement (Ribot, 2013). Additionally, it was meant to curb opportunist behaviour by having accountability measures. This means that elites would not be able to use the system to accumulate capital for themselves further widening their control as in the case of the traditional leadership in the ADMADE programme.

In the ADMADE programme, however, the chief was the deciding authority through the sub-authorities which reduced the size of the public domain, diminished citizenship, and promoted elite capture (Child 2004, Ribot et al. 2008, Ribot 2013).

Following my definition of elites, traditional chiefs are elites because they have control and access to the resources in their chiefdom such as land, water, and subjects (community members). I call them subjects because due to culture and tradition they follow the chief and believe in the chiefs' sovereignty. These are unwritten rules or informal institutions that governed the local community (Mbewe, 2007). ADMADE was the beginning of the legitimisation of that authority. The Chief only chose people that he trusted to be on the sub-authority and was able to make decisions without consultation. When there was a misappropriation of funds (Lubilo and Child 2010), it was difficult to sanction a Chief because of the capital they possess in the Chiefdom. They are the custodians of the land and have been given this mandate through the land tenure system. This contributes to the local people's inability to challenge the Chief's authority. The land tenure system subjects people to the accountability relations, beliefs, and behaviour of the elite entrusted with that land. In this case the Chief. In addition, because of culture and tradition, institutions still being widely used, the Chief has large cultural capital and is seen as someone who is entitled to respect, obedience, and other resources.

The creation of the CRB may also be viewed as a way to 'control' the misappropriation of funds by the chief, however, this came with unintended consequences. It signified the transfer of power from the Chief and his indunas to other local elites, in the process forming and/or strengthening them [elites] (Ribot et al., 2008). Similar to the traditional leaders in the ADMADE programme, this recognition of the CRB as an authority enforces the behaviour of the board members to other community members. This is evident from the narratives on the background of the chairpersons. It is observed that the system may either be democratic or autocratic depending on the beliefs, values, and principles of the elite in-charge (Ribot, 2013). Additionally, it produces and reproduces elitism[20]. As the respondent from DNPW put it "*Some gain interest because they see the benefit the chairperson enjoys and so would like that position.*" (P1: 20190206 DNPW 1:26) This shows local community members observe elites and how they represent them but instead of objecting their behaviour they would like to take up those positions. This could be because the public domain is diminished and so each citizen wants to benefit themselves however they can at the expense of others (Wilfahrt, 2018).

Looking at the four narratives given by the former and current CRB leadership, one can easily observe that they have in common the large amounts of symbolic capital (Inglis and Thorpe, 2012). This symbolic reputation has come about through the accumulation of economic, social or cultural capital by the elites. They have built a reputation for themselves in the community and so people in the community always look to them to take up leadership positions. They are all involved in at least

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[20] Elitism is the practice and belief in rule by an elite (source: www.dictionary.com)

2-3 committees or groups in the community which is one of the characteristics as shown in *table 2*.

Table 2. highlights some characteristics that can be used to identify elites. This summary was the result of the survey that was carried out in the quantitative part of the study. The result corresponds with the qualities of CRB and VAG committee members that were interviewed in the qualitative part of the study. Elites are mostly male because of the poor participation of women in CBNRM. They are between 35-55 years old probably because the CRB election guidelines require a candidate to be 25years or older. This rule is not followed strictly because members below age 25years are present on the CRBs and VAG committees. Another likely explanation is that they have the energy to gain economic, social capital and cultural. Meaning they can be the most 'active' in the community. A quality people look for in their leaders. Additionally, because they have lived in the area for more than 10 years, it is possible that they have built a good reputation or symbolic capital in their villages. All are or have been married which shows just how much the local communities still follow their informal institutions. Marriage for the local communities signifies that someone is mature and responsible. If they can manage a family then they can manage a leadership role. Lastly, it can be observed just how much social, economic and cultural capital these elites on the board possess. They are leaders of 2-3 other committees in their villages, have more than one source of income, and have attained secondary education.

Table 2. Showing statistics of the CRBs in the North Luangwa Ecosystem highlighting key characteristics of elites

Gender	Frequency	Percent
Male	35	87.5
Female	5	12.5
Total	40	100.0

Age range (yrs.)	Frequency	Percent
18-35	14	35.0
35-55	23	57.5
55+	3	7.5
Total	40	100.0

Marital status	Frequency	Percent
Married lives with spouse	39	97.5
Divorced	1[21]	2.5
Total	40	100.0

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[21] This respondent turned out to be part of the CRB secretariat who is employed by the CRB and not elected by the local community.

Years in village	Frequency	Percent
2-10	2	5.0
11-20	11	27.5
21-30	9	22.5
31-40	11	27.5
41-50	5	12.5
51-60	2	5.0
Total	40	100.0

Education	Frequency	Percent
Primary	9	22.5
Secondary	30	75.0
College	1	2.5
Total	40	100.0

More than one source of income	Frequency	Percent
Yes	24	60.0
No	16	40.0
Total	40	100.0

No. of leadership positions in other Groups	Frequency	Percent
1	6	15.0
2	14	35.0
3	14	35.0
4	4	10.0
5	2	5.0
Total	40	100.0

Being in more than one group or committee comes with incentives most of the time especially if the groups/committees are introduced by an external organisation such as an NGO. 'Volunteering' in these committees has led to elites accumulating considerable amounts of economic, social, and cultural capital which the local community recognise and value. Furthermore, because of their acquired symbolic capital, the elites are able to use the capital to get themselves into different other groups and committees from which they can derive more benefits. In some positions like the CRB, they are able to seize new opportunities first in the community because they are 'the main point of entry' as stated by NGO staff.

The other thing the four narratives have in common is that the actors involved have the backing of the traditional Chief. Showing that just like in the ADMADE programme, those found on the CRB are people that are trusted by the Chief. In the fourth narrative, the Chairperson was asked by the chief to recontest going against the 'no-third term' rule of the CRB. This shows that local community members will

follow the words of the Chief before they follow formal institutions. Especially if it benefits them.

It can be observed that VAG elections are centred on the Chairperson position. The Chairperson position is seen as the most prestigious because of the benefits it comes with. On top of having popularity, the Chairperson is in-charge and can give orders to other committee members. The positions are also associated with someone who is educated as prescribed by the selection criteria even though it may not be the case. The VAG election is mainly for choosing the Chairpersons the rest of the positions are filled up by an in-house election. Similarly, on the CRB the 10 elected Chairpersons have an in-house election to give themselves positions. This process is undemocratic because it does not foster citizenship and has led to elite control (Ribot et al., 2008). Since these VAG Chairpersons have been able to retain their positions on the VAGs they always take up the same positions on the CRB each time which elite control is.

The CRB is made up of the Chairpersons of the VAGs and they are the first ones to receive the date of nominations and the nomination forms. When it comes to elections it means they have a head start. This possibly has contributed to elite capture. Some respondents accused VAG Chairpersons of withholding this information in order to keep control of their positions. If not for themselves, they may use this information to get people from their social network in to those positions.

The elections are carried out by DNPW and FZS while the Chief has the authority to approve or reject applications. The choice to give the Chief this authority diminishes citizenship because the community has limited rights to choose who they want to lead. The Chief may remove a strong contender to ensure that his favourite choice wins the 'election'. Because of the Chiefs power and authority (from informal and formal institutions), any opposition to his decision means that the elections may be cancelled. That is if anyone would even think about challenging that authority. The difference in capitals has led to a symbolic interaction where those with lower capitals do not see the need or have the will to challenge such authority (Ojha, 2008, Swarts, 1997).

During the election, money may or may not be a factor in determining the results of the elections. In areas where the local community is engaged and want to shape the polity (Isin and Turner, 2002), money or economic capital of a candidate is less likely to be a factor. People will likely choose leaders that can transform that economic capital into social capital to help them achieve their goals. If that citizenship is diminished, then the local community will seek any opportunity to benefit themselves and so their votes will be for sale.

Women participation is low on the VAG and almost none existent on the CRB. The men in the local community dominate the women because women have low economic, social, and cultural capital (Inglis and Thorpe, 2012, Bourdieu, 1993).

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Historically in these local communities or following the informal institutions, men are the providers of the family and so are in better positions to make money (economic capital), create social networks (social capital), and gain new knowledge and insights (cultural capital). This is not to say that women do not accumulate capital as well. They capital that they collect is not the relevant type to get them into the CRB or VAG committees. It is only when they collect relevant capital like information on the date of nominations for CRB election can they stand a chance to be part of the elites.

The husbands may not allow their wives to stand because they do not want to lose their symbolic capital or reputation in the community. Because the CRB and VAG are already male dominated, it means their wives would be travelling with men to attend important meetings in towns. As brought out by respondents, the husbands are worried about the rumours that might spread in the community about their wives with other men leading them to 'lose face' in the community. To save themselves from the embarrassment or social and cultural capital loss, they would rather their wives stay home. As noted in the findings, women who have experience and exposure have better bargaining power with their husbands and are more likely to disagree with the husband's decision. In the interest of promoting democracy women should be empowered with social, economic, and cultural capital to ensure that they are engaged citizens in CBNRM. This can be done by having policies and guidelines that ensure minimum social standards (Saito-Jensen et al. 2010).

Furthermore, women lack resources to campaign possibly because of traditional gender roles that are followed to some extent in the local communities. The man is the provider of the family and women are the care givers. This translates to men and women accumulating different types of capital in their daily activities. That, as highlighted earlier on, may be more relevant in a given field than others. Single women have better chances of accumulating the same type of relevant capital needed for CRB positions as men or elites because they may have much more time or freedom. This would explain why it was noted that the women found on the VAGs are usually single women.

Lastly, women are made to feel inferior even when the make it to the VAG committee or CRB because it is already male dominated. It could be that in trying to keep her symbol or image in the community as a 'good' woman she will play the traditional woman role of ensuring the man or breadwinner's happiness. Alternatively, it could be because traditional gender roles stipulate that a woman is not allowed to talk where men are present as some of my respondents alluded to. They may not take part in discussions or decision making because of this. More should be done on this subject to promote local democracy and ensure women are included in decision-making processes.

6.1.2 Decision making

The findings show that even though CRBs have legally been given the mandate to manage the natural resources (Government of Zambia, 2015), the Chief has the final say on the decisions being made in the Chiefdom. This is because of the capital the Chief has through the customary land tenure system and traditional practices/institutions. In the role of patron, the Chief is allowed to monitor and supervise project implementation which further legitimizes his authority as ruler of the Chiefdom. This recognition of authority ensures that the Chief can enjoy access to resources further gaining capital and enforcing his beliefs and way of ruling to the local communities including the CRB.

Elites in the community, therefore, work to gain the trust of the Chief using their capital because they want leadership roles such as the Chairperson positions in the VAG and/ or CRB. This then can be seen as leading to elite control. Elite capture of resources develops when the VAG committee and CRB benefit themselves by accumulating capital at the expense of the local community members (Khan, 2012, Inglis and Thorpe, 2012). This is likely to happen because of insufficient amounts of money given to the CRB from the government. As a result, local community members cannot sanction their leaders because they cannot be held accountable. Additionally, the leaders/elites gain large amounts of capital that make them seem like the ideal candidate to lead and so go unchallenged.

Local community members may not also be engaged because funds are too little to meet community needs in addition to poor accountability because the allegedly CRB does not give financial reports. It is also difficult to hold them accountable because they may blame the Government for not paying them on time and in full. Discretionary fiscal power is not present because the money is first paid to the central Government before being paid to the CRB. As reported, board members use these challenges to get re-elected because 'it is not their fault'. Meanwhile, they are accumulating economic, social and cultural capital (Inglis and Thorpe, 2012) on these boards through allowances, interactions with NGOs and private businesses and training workshops further making them the preferred candidates in VAG elections.

The results of the poor accountability and partial devolution of power has led to poor engagement from citizens in this system (Ribot, 2004). This has made the citizens or local community to look for other means in which they can also benefit from the natural resources such as illegal hunting and selling of their vote during CRB elections. They also do this by trying to gain favour from the elites in-charge, in this case, the CRB members. The CRB members try to gain favour from higher elites such as the Chief. Furthermore, because of poor accountability and poor devolution of power, some CRB and VAG committee members may use their positions for their own benefit. For example, the previous Chairperson in VAG1

was accused of promising jobs for bribes and used project money for 'personal things'.

Social interaction with elites pays off to a few in the community. Groups and committee that are created in the community are facing a challenge of favouritism and nepotism. The people holding influential positions are seen to make selections based on their social relations and corruption, not on merit basis. This is elite capture (Beard and Phakphian, 2009). According to the respondents, the only groups that anyone can join freely are the church groups probably because in the church group there isn't any monetary benefit. People here are more likely to benefit from social interactions that help them gain social capital. To join other groups that have monetary or physical benefits you need connections to someone in those groups. Connections made in social interactions in the church groups as the Chairperson of VAG1 possibly used from being the music director.

The 'Government has overall power on every resource.' This statement by the DNPW staff shows that the CBNRM in the GMAs is centralised and there is poor local democracy. The statement means that the Government has not devolved power which includes decision making and fiscal power to the local communities because 'Government acts in the interest of all Zambians while local communities act in their own interest' therefore communities must 'respect' the Government's decisions. These statements could be interpreted that the Government is not willing to let citizens influence the decision-making process and this diminishes the citizenship. This is characteristic of autocracies (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999, Ribot et al., 2008).

The Government blocks the CRB when they want to do a development project that they want because the government feels they don't have enough money. This takeaway the representativeness of the CRB to the community because they are unable to respond to immediate community needs. The Government is able to do this because they are signatories to the CRB bank accounts. This shows the lack of discretionary fiscal power. However, the reason given by DNPW respondents for this is to ensure accountability and collective decision making. This could be argued that it has had the opposite effect in that leaders can no longer be sanctioned by their communities and because communities are not involved in decision making they are not engaged citizens (Ribot, 2013). The lack of fiscal devolution has instead led to elite control and sometimes capture as the findings suggest. A few individuals are able to accumulate different capitals because they cannot be sanctioned. For example, consensus between Government and the CRB has to be reached before the money is withdrawn from the CRB account and so the signatories which are the book keeper, finance management chairperson and CRB Chairperson have to travel to town for this process. The trip attracts monetary allowances and so they benefit from it as well as social interaction with Government and NGOs. The trips are justified because they are the ones that need to negotiate with DNPW on the amount

to with draw in the process accumulate capital that they can use to stay in power and capture new opportunities in the community.

To answer the question of how the elites gain control over decision making processes it can be observed that capital, policy, and institutions play a central role. Elites will use their capital to gain control of partially democratic or autocratic institutions. This might lead to elite capture depending on the behaviour, accountability relations and beliefs of the elite (Ribot et al., 2018). In democratic institutions, it is difficult for elites to gain control. This is because democracies are representative of the community cultivating citizenship through the public domain (Ribot, 2013). The public domain makes it hard for elites to accumulate capital because citizens influence the public authorities. Elite use capital to get into positions of power and because the system is not democratic they use those positions to accumulate more capital and also empower other elites in their social network. Policies that ensure the growth and support of the public domain, and encourage citizenship by being representative are important to ensure that elites are not empowered (Saito-Jensen et al., 2010, Öjendal and Dellnäs, 2013).

6.2 Conditions under which elites are responsive to the public

6.2.1 The public interaction with elites

Human-Animal conflict is apparently one of the biggest challenges that the community in the Chiefdom is facing. Animals, in addition to taking human life, damage crops, houses, and other property. The Government does not compensate for any loss of life or damage caused by the animals. Being farmers, crops are the main source of livelihood for the community. Once the crops are damaged they have to look for other means to get food and money to take their children to school. As a result, they end up doing illegal activities like poaching or illegal fishing in protest (Lubilo, 2018). '*If they give us jobs then we will stop all the illegal activities.*' (P22: 20190305 VAG3 22:9)

In a way, this shows that despite having a system that is not decentralised, not democratic, and filled with elite control and capture, citizens are able to engage their leaders. They use illegal means because the public domain is small and so are unable to identify themselves with the public authority and other citizens (Lubilo, 2018). Others in the community who are still positively engaged citizens depend on the CRB to help in mitigating human-animal conflict. They say the main reason they select the CRB is that they need them to take reports of cases to the DNPW camp. This means that they have either lost confidence in the CRB to carry out their other functions of natural resource management and community development or are unaware of the CRB's other duties. Respondents were aware of the role of the CRB

and so it is safe to assume that people have chosen to engage the CRB only on matters on which they feel the CRB can respond to.

The local community members also voice their frustrations to the CRB on occasion blaming them of being just like the DNPW in caring for animals more than people. Calling the wild animals, the 'children' of the CRB shows that they [local community] do not feel the ownership of those animals probably because they do not benefit much from them. The VAG committees and CRB are quick to respond to human-animal conflict cases. This may be because they understand the importance of this issue to the local community or because people actively engage the CRB with insults and possibly physical violence. In either case, the CRB members accumulate or lose symbolic capital depending on how they respond to this problem. When they have the money, they buy fireworks to distribute to farmers making them appear to be responsive. They can also use this as a trade-off to gain votes in the next election.

The sharing of benefits is not equal, and this could be due to the little amount of money they receive from the Central Government. The CRB member with the most capital is likely to convince others that their VAG is a 'priority'. This could explain why some VAGs are seen to be benefiting more from the natural resources than other as expressed by VAG 3 respondents.

With HAC being a big challenge, the DNPW and NGOs introduce HAC mitigation measures to reduce crop damage and protect wildlife. This further diminishes the representativeness of the CRB leading to poor engagement from citizens. As can be observed from the PRA results in *figure 3, 4, and 5 in Appendix 1*, the CRB is considered less important in the community than NGOs and other organisations.

When the VAG committee and CRB call for a community meeting the attendance by the community is poor unlike when the headmen call for a meeting. One of the apparent reasons is that for the headmen meeting, attendance is mandatory, so people have to show up. It attracts punishment from the Chief if someone misses 3 consecutive meetings. Even though the Chief is seen as the authority figure in the community, there is still a possibility of losing symbolic capital on their part [Chief]. The Chief must ensure that there is a show of community engagement, possibly to his indunas[22], with citizens to maintain his popularity (capital) as well. By calling for the community meeting through the headmen, the Chief tries to show that he still listens to his subjects and so these are made mandatory. The VAG committees and CRB does not have such authority as observed and so they now resort to working with the headmen whenever they want to call a meeting or utilise the headmen's meetings whenever they need to.

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[22] These are the Chief's tribal council.

Another reason for the poor attendance is that people are not given any incentives to attend the meeting like they are given in meetings organised by NGOs or farmer's cooperative groups. As the Chairperson for VAG 3 explained: *"Some people do not attend meetings and they only do so when they hear there is a special occasion because they know there will be money."* Further, *"People in the community think that the VAG has a lot of money so when they don't see any community development projects being done they think that we are misusing of stealing that money."* (P20: 20190305 VAG3 20:18) The people in the community want a share of the money that they think the VAG committee members enjoy. They want to benefit too and have a sense of belonging and so protest by being absent from the meetings.

The VAG committees say they use these community meetings to get the communities input on projects to implement in the Chiefdom, but it may be a way to ensure that communities are seen to be kept informed and involved so that they do not lose their reputation and symbolic capital needed for re-election. The committee members want to be seen doing the right thing not only by the locals but also by other stakeholders such as the Government and NGOs. After all, this will help them get into other committee boards or community projects. This is more likely the case because as noted if people don't show up, the VAG committees go ahead and make the plans on their own. What happens after is that the community may not be happy with their plans or rules created but it wouldn't matter because the VAG committee 'put in an effort'. If the community is not happy they exclude themselves from the decisions or rules and possibly CRB elections. This means by default the same leaders make it back on to the CRB.

The elites are seen to be responsive to the public in two types of conditions. The first condition is where they are representative of the community. They community should be able to reward or punish the elites through sanctions depending on their responsiveness to community needs (Fischer, 2016). For this, it is important that the leaders are given discretionary power both in decision making and monetary terms after the strengthening of the public domain. Secondly, elites are responsive to the public in situations where they are at risk of losing symbolic capital or their reputations which threatens their ability to stay in positions of power not only in democracies (Wilfahrt, 2018) but in autocracies as well. The Chief is responsive to his indunas. The CRB is responsive to the Chief, the Government, and NGOs.

7.0 CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter, I give a summary of the key findings for this research based on the research questions explaining how this study adds to existing knowledge. After which, I outline the limitations of this study with regards to the research design and methodology. What follows is the implications for policy and practice and lastly, I give suggestions for further studies.

7.1 Summary of key findings- contribution to literature

The findings in this thesis 'unpack the elite' in community-based natural resources management by providing important insights on who they are, their varying backgrounds, and how they seek to maintain their positions of power.

The creation of the Community Resource Boards has brought today's elites in community-based natural resources management. The CRBs have been given the mandate to manage natural resources, bring about community development and mitigate human-animal conflict in the boundaries of their Chiefdoms. The choice to devolve this power to 10 local community members found on this board has led to the creation and promotion of local elites. This is because they are able to benefit by accumulating economic, social, and cultural capital for themselves in their local community. They use this accumulated capital to build a reputation for themselves which opens up more opportunities for the few to benefit even further.

CRBs were preceded by the Luangwa Integrated Resource Development Programme (LIRDP) and the Administrative Management Design (ADMADE). The LIRDP was more democratic than the ADMADE programme because it devolved discretionary decision making and fiscal power to all in the local community through the village action groups. The ADMADE programme supported the tradition leadership through sub-authorities legitimising this informal institution in the process. However, the ADMADE was the framework that the CRB was built on. The difference was that the Government devolved power to elected local representatives instead of the traditional authorities. This, however, did not take in to consideration the social structures and capital relations within the communities and consequently transferred power that belonged to the traditional leadership in the ADMADE program to other local elites. Instead of following the LIRDP which was the more democratic model, rights and powers were devolved to 10 board members in order to maintain government control. It is easier to control 10 board members that a whole community.

Looking are the background of elites it was evident that elites understand what qualities people look for in their leaders. They build a reputation according to those needs. Organisations that implement community development projects are always looking for 'active' members of society and so elites in the community have better

chances of making their way in to committees or boards. Once on these community development boards the accumulate even more symbolic capital which they use to get into other positions on different boards. Symbolic capital can also be used to drive 'political' change on the CRB and other community development committees. Elites are able to mobilise the community to remove other elites from power depending on their influence and amount of symbolic capital. The formal institution also helps drive this process along smoothly. Popularity and capital play a major role in getting into positions of power but having good social relations with the Traditional Chief is an advantage. This Traditional elite still has influence and authority over the formal institutions like the CRB. This authority comes from both informal institutions like traditions and formal institutions like the land tenure system.

The CRB elections are described to be 'democratic' which is not true. In the nomination periods, applicants have to undergo a screening process by DNPW and the Chief in order to be allowed to stand. The Chief has the final decision on who is allowed to stand or not. This is problematic because the Chief is likely to install his inner-circle on the board of which the evidence seems to suggest is true. What is more is that with the current CRB election guidelines, the local community only get to choose who the VAG Chairperson should be. The election on the CRB is done through an in-house election. The newly elected VAG chairpersons decide which position to give themselves. This has led to elite control and elite capture. The whole process diminishes the public domain and reduces citizenship.

To win elections elites portray themselves in the community as humble, respectful, social, law abiding and free of witchcraft. If that fails, then during election campaigns they use their monetary capital to buy votes from local community members. This is problematic because it leads to people selecting unqualified leaders. The problem is that there are no regulations that govern the election campaigns and so candidate use any means possible to win votes.

The VAG elections are centred on the chairperson position and elites have taken note of this fact. They only want to join the VAG committee to get the Chairperson positions and don't see the point of having any other position. The Chairperson position has become prestigious. Only those that have high education (institutionised cultural capital) now are allowed to contest for this position. This has made it even harder for other local community members to challenge elites and to make the process democratic.

It is evident from the finding that women's participation in the CRB and VAG committee is low. Women are scared to stand because their husbands do not allow them to and because they lack the confidence and resources to stand and campaign. Over promotion of the Chairperson position has also contributed to the low self-confidence levels. Even when women do manage to get on the VAG committee and CRB they do not actively participate in the governance processes and decision-

making. It was however noted that women with exposure and experience become less dependent on their husband in this patriarchal system and have better bargaining power. They are able to convince their husband to let them stand because they build up relevant symbolic capital. Poor information distribution contributes to the poor participation of women. What is lacking is the proper institutions and guidelines to ensure a large public domain for good information flow.

For convenience, the Government has chosen to work with the CRB in CBNRM who they feel represent the community. However, respondents from the community say that the Chief is the one who has the final decision-making power. The CRB suggest to the Chief, who is the patron, what needs to be done and then the Chief decides. The CRB is mentioned to be involved while the VAG committee and community members are left out in this 'democratic' process. The CRB makes the decision on which information to give the community and which to withhold. This has created elite control and capture of resources and leaders cannot be held accountable as a result. It doesn't help that the CRB does not have discretionary decision-making and fiscal power. They escape sanctions because of this. The Government has overall decision-making power because according to them they have the interest of the whole nation and not just one community. I argue that this has had the opposite effect because elites can hide in the shadow of the government if they are not responsive to the needs of the people.

Human-Animal conflict has been seen to be the biggest challenge faced in the communities. With a lack of compensation, the communities have turned to illegal activities like illegal hunting and fishing. This is a protest because they lack a public domain in which citizens can be engaged to foster belonging and ownership of natural resources. HAC mitigation is important for communities. The elites on the CRB know this and so are quick to respond to issues related to it to preserve their reputation. DNPW and NGOs also implement HAC mitigation measure, a job entrusted to the CRBs, this undermines the CRBs authority. It leads to diminishing citizenship and further elite capitalisation of resources. Evidently, local community members do not attend CRB and VAG meetings. They do, however, attend headmen meetings which are mandatory. The local community respects the Headman's authority even though the rules are not formally written. This signifies that people recognise the Chief's authority more than the CRBs or VAG committees' authority. The CRB uses community meetings for getting input to make decisions. If the people do not show up they go ahead and make the decision without them. The fact the decision-making was entrusted to 10 board member makes the community meeting seem cosmetic. People may have realised this and so shun the meeting and it is reinforced when the CRB makes decisions without the people's input.

This study has contributed to the literature on elites with a focus on local natural resources management. By understanding who the elites are, I add insight into how mechanisms of elite control and capture operate. Elites use their capital (economic,

social, and cultural) (Bourdieu, 1993, Inglis and Thorpe, 2012) to gain control of democratic and undemocratic institutions. Whether the leads to elite capture depends on the behaviour, accountability relations and beliefs of the elite (Ribot et al., 2008). In democratic institutions, however, elites have a difficult time controlling or capturing resources because the public domain ensures that citizens are engaged and hold their leaders accountable through positive and negative sanctions. Elites are responsive to the public in circumstances where they face sanctions and in situations where they risk losing or have an opportunity of gaining symbolic capital (Wilfahrt, 2018). This is because elites are built on capital accumulation and work to maintain this capital. This makes elites to respond to public needs even in autocratic institutions. Policies that foster democracy are important to ensure elites are not empowered (Öjendal and Dellnäs, 2013).

7.2 Limitations of the study

The choice of methodology in this study helped me to collect empirically rich data relevant for answering the two main research questions. However, l was not able to access some areas in the Chiefdom because of the inaccessibility due to bad roads and in the rainy season. Because of the rain, it was difficult setting up interviews and sometimes respondents would not show up because of this.

Having worked in the area for 3 years, it was likely that some respondents thought I was still representing the NGO I used to work for. I was aware of my bias and ensured that it did not affect the data that I collected. This was evident during my sampling of respondent were, as if by instinct, my first contact in the community was with the CRB chairperson. Having the view of both NGO staff and student research helped me quickly realise this and helped me to change my methods to randomly selecting participants and following up on interesting topics.

My link to my former work would have created a bias in the PRAs that were focused on identifying the institutions and organisations working in the areas and their importance to the local community. Especially because my note taker was from an NGO that works in the area. I made sure that the study was not tied to the NGO by informing and reminding the respondents that I was doing the research for my Masters degree. I feel this reduced the bias of respondents making that NGO seem more important than other organisations, but I do not rule out the possibility that it did affect the responses. The respondents may have exaggerated the importance of the NGO to please the NGO representative more so that it is still operating in the area.

7.3 Implications for policy and practice

This study revealed how elites gain control over decision making processes in community-based natural resources management. Further, it revealed the conditions under which elites are responsive to the public. The findings indicate that policy that takes in to account the capital relations in the local community is necessary. There should be a review of the policy to devolve discretionary decision-making and fiscal power to the village action groups (VAGs) instead of the CRB. This will help to make the VAG leadership representative of the community by making them accountable and responsive to the needs of the community. In doing so this will promote the growth of the public domain and increase citizenship within the local communities (Ribot, 2013).

Decentralisation will lead to better local democracy. One point of entry would be to assess the Luangwa Integrated Resource Development project (LIRDP) to learn of the successes and challenges and how they can be applicable in today's context (Child, 2004). On the fiscal devolution of power, the Department of National Parks and Wildlife should no longer be signatories to the Community accounts because this creates room for elite capture and corruption. The Government should instead provide relevant audit queries to ensure good financial management. There should be clear sanctions that reward or punish leaders in relation to how the carry out their duties (Fischer, 2016).

I also suggest a review of the CRB election guidelines to remove the focus on the Chairperson position. This has contributed to the re/production of elites because it has become a symbol of authority in the local communities. Every position on the VAG should be contested by willing candidates equally and the role of each position should be clearly outlined. The process of screening by the traditional Chief should be removed from the CRB election guidelines in order to create engaged citizenship within the community. Lastly, there should be some regulations put in place for the campaign period to discourage vote buying. The elites in the community will always be present but a decentralised and democratic system will ensure that they do not control decision-making processes hence prevent elite capture.

7.4 Suggestions for further studies

My findings revealed further interesting issues in relation to local democracy and community-based natural resources management. For the purpose of this study, I focused on the findings that were most relevant for answering my research questions and related to my research problem. I suggest a few topics next for further research.

- Further research to explore traditional elites in community-based natural resource management.
- To explore further how capital contributes to women being marginalised in community-based natural resources management.

- To explore how the transformation of the parastatal Zambia Wildlife Authority into the Government Department of National Parks and wildlife has affected local democracy and community-based natural resources management in Zambia.

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
9.0 APPENDIX 1. PRA RESULTS

Figure 3. PRA results in VAG 1 Women's group top, Men's group bottom (Photo: Gilbert Mwale)

*Figure 4. PRA results in VAG 2 Women's group top, Men's group bottom (Photo: Gilbert Mwale)*

Figure 5. PRA results in VAG 3 Women's group top, men's group bottom (Photo: Gilbert Mwale)