

Farming, Resistance and Coping in the Occupied West Bank

– A study of Palestinian agricultural actors' framing of
farming

Mascha Wendler



Department of Urban and Rural Development

Master's Thesis • 30 HEC

Rural Development and Natural Resource Management - Master's Programme

Uppsala 2018

Farming, Resistance and Coping in the Occupied West Bank

- A study of Palestinian agricultural actors' framing of farming

Mascha Wendler

Supervisor: Camilla Eriksson, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences (SLU), Department of Urban and Rural Development

Assistant Supervisor: Martin Westin, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences (SLU), Department of Urban and Rural Development

Examiner: Emil Sandström, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences (SLU), Department of Urban and Rural Development

Credits: 30 HEC

Level: Second cycle, A2E

Course title: Master's thesis in Rural Development and Natural Resource Management

Course code: EX0777

Programme/Education: Rural Development and Natural Resource Management – Master's Programme

Place of publication: Uppsala

Year of publication: 2018

Cover picture: The Om Sleiman Farm with the settlement Modi'in Illit in the background; © Mascha Wendler

Copyright: all featured images are used with permission from copyright owner.

Online publication: <https://stud.epsilon.slu.se>

Keywords: Palestine, West Bank, food security, food sovereignty, farming as resistance, agriculture, framing, collective action frames, patriotism

Sveriges lantbruksuniversitet

Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences

Faculty of Natural Resources and Agricultural Sciences

Department of Urban and Rural Development

Abstract

Farming has a long cultural tradition in the occupied Palestinian territories (oPt) but today it is affected by the Israeli occupation. This thesis investigates how different agricultural actors in the West Bank frame farming as a practice and what collective action frames they have developed connected to their understanding of farming. The aim is to illuminate how these different actors construct meaning around the practice of farming, and how people can understand and use farming in different ways. Some of my informants clearly link farming practices to a bigger symbolism of farming as a practice of resistance against the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories. Little attention has been given to the non-violent resistance in the occupied Palestinian territories and especially to farming as a tool of resistance. However, not all of my informants align the same symbolism to the practice of farming, as for some of the informants it is considered to be foremost a coping strategy.

This research contributes to the discussion around the the concept of food sovereignty. Different scholars have addressed the existence of contradictions inside the food sovereignty movement since different contexts have different understandings of or implementation-approaches to the concept. In Palestine, the idea of food sovereignty is becoming more popular as part of the non-violent resistance movement, and the study reveals how some actor's link patriotic interests to ideas of (silent) food sovereignty.

Acknowledgements

This thesis has been possible thanks to many people in Sweden, Palestine and Germany. I would like to express my deepest gratitude to you.

I would first like to thank my supervisor Camilla Eriksson of the *Department of Urban and Rural Development* at *Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences* (SLU). I am really happy to have had you as my supervisor. You continuously gave me new perspectives and always encouraged me to improve.

I would also like to thank my assistant supervisor Martin Westin of the *Department of Urban and Rural Development* at *Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences* (SLU) for supporting my work especially when I had difficulties with figuring out my theoretical framework.

I would also like to thank all my informants for participating in my research. UAWC's employees were very supportive of this study and arranged my trip to the Jordan Valley. Bubu, thank you for introducing me to your farm, for your kindness and for the great meals you created for me and the other volunteers every day.

I would also like to acknowledge Natalia Mamonova of the *The Swedish Institute of International Affairs* as a reader of this thesis, and I am gratefully indebted to her for her very valuable comments on this thesis.

I also want to thank my friend and neighbour Louise de Vries for our daily walks to the library, all the encouraging lunch breaks and the uncountable coffees over the past few months. I always appreciated to have your viewpoints as an anthropologist and your interest in my research.

I would also like to thank all my friends for letting me recharge my batteries at our weekly Uplands Nation get-togethers where we most of the time were successfully not talking about our theses. A special thanks goes to my friend Johanna Koch and Josephine Biro for reviewing this thesis. I would also like to thank my boyfriend Patrik Larsson for being there for me when I had my small nervous breakdowns from time to time. Thank you to my parents for always supporting my decisions and being there when I need you.

Finally, I have to express my very profound gratitude to my friends and family that supported my research financially.

This accomplishment would not have been possible without any of you. Thank you.

Mascha Wendler

Uppsala, May 15, 2018

Table of Contents

1. Introduction	7
2. Research Questions.....	8
3. Research Problem.....	8
4. Choice of Informants & Methods.....	10
4.1. Choice of Informants	11
4.2. Participant Observation.....	11
4.3. Unstructured Qualitative Interviews	12
4.4. Focus Group Discussions.....	13
4.5. Document Analysis	13
5. Ethical Considerations, Self Reflection & Limitations.....	14
6. Theory: Frame Analysis	15
6.1. What is a <i>Frame</i> ?	15
6.2. What is a <i>Frame</i> Framing?	16
6.3. <i>Collective Action Frames</i>	17
6.4. Data Analysis Process	17
7. Historic, Social and Economic Background of the West Bank.....	18
7.1. Historic Background: The Middle East Conflict & Palestinian Resistance Movement	19
7.2. Socio-Economic & Food Security Situation of the West Bank.....	20
8. Analysis of my Research Data.....	22
8.1. The Union's Collective Action Frame	22
8.2. The Jordan Valley Farmers' Collective Action Frame	27
8.3. The Om Sleiman Farm's Collective Action Frame.....	31
9. Discussion of Research Data	37
9.1. Relations to Mamonova's Study in Ukraine	38
9.2.1. Claim of Comparability.....	39
9.2.2. Comparison of Findings	39
10. Conclusion	43
References	45
Figures	46

Table of Figures

Figure 1: West Bank Area A+B and C	19
Figure 2: Farms in Fatsa'el Village	27
Figure 3-5: The Om Sleiman Farm	33
Figure 6: The burned gate, perspective from the farm	35
Figure 7: The burned gate from nearby	35

Abbreviations

HDI	–	Human Development Index
LVC	–	La Vía Campesina
oPt	–	occupied Palestinian territories
PA	–	Palestinian National Authority
PLO	–	Palestinian Liberation Organisation
UAWC	–	Union of Agricultural Work Committees
UNDP	–	United Nations Development Programme
WWOOF	–	World-Wide Opportunities on Organic Farms

1. Introduction

Agriculture is an integral component of Palestinian communal, cultural, economic and social life. To date, agriculture has remained of great significance to Palestinians and their identity and culture, to which land and crops are central.

Over and above their traditional roles in the generation of income, employment and food, land and agriculture have come to symbolize Palestinian resilience and perseverance in the face of ongoing land loss due to prolonged occupation and the expansion of Israeli settlements. (UNCTAD, 2015, p.1)

In Palestine, farming has a long cultural tradition, but is now suffering from the Israeli occupation (World Bank, 2013). Since 1967, the West Bank is under Israeli occupation. The occupation has political, economic and social impacts on the lives of the Palestinians in the West Bank occupied Palestinian territories (oPt). The Palestinian resistance movement is enduring since long before 1967 but the two Intifadas¹ (1987-1993; 2000-2005) have dominated the public picture of Palestinian resistance as being mostly of violent character. Little attention has been given to non-violent approaches and especially perspectives that explores farming as a tool of resistance. This thesis investigates how different agricultural actors in the West Bank frame farming as a practice and what collective action frames they have developed connected to their understanding of farming. The aim is to illuminate how these different actors construct meaning around the practice of farming, and thereby, to give an example of how people understand and use farming in different ways. Additionally, this research contributes to the discussion around the concept of local context in food sovereignty, as the idea of food sovereignty is becoming more popular in the oPt as part of the Palestinian resistance movement. Food sovereignty is here defined as “the right of peoples to healthy and culturally appropriate food, and their right to define their own food and agriculture systems” (Nyéléni, 2007, p.1).

This thesis is based on qualitative data obtained during a field trip to the West Bank in January 2018. Participant observation, semi-structured interviews and a focus group discussion were the three methods I used in the field. Additionally, document analysis was used for contextualisation of the data.

¹ Intifada is Arabic for *uprising*.

2. Research Questions

This thesis focuses on answering the following two research questions.

1. What kind of collective action frames have different agricultural actors in the occupied West Bank developed in connection to the practice of farming?
2. How do their frames differentiate and/or relate to each other regarding the way they make sense of the practice of farming?

3. Research Problem

The *food sovereignty* movement is regarded to be the largest peasant movement of current times (Desmarais, 2007; Martínez-Torres and Rosset, 2010). The movement presents itself and is often considered in academia to be an alternative to the neo-liberal structures that dominate the current global food system (c.f. La Vía Campesina, 2018; Martínez-Torres and Rosset, 2010; Desmarais, 2007; McMichael, 2013; Clapp, 2016). La Vía Campesina (LVC)², one of the most famous representatives of the food sovereignty movement, defines the concept in the following way:

Food sovereignty is the right of peoples to healthy and culturally appropriate food produced through sustainable methods and their right to define their own food and agriculture systems. It develops a model of small-scale sustainable production benefiting communities and their environment. Food sovereignty prioritizes local food production and consumption, giving a country the right to protect its local producers from cheap imports and to control its production. It includes the struggle for land and genuine agrarian reform that ensures that the rights to use and manage lands, territories, water, seeds, livestock and biodiversity are in the hands of those who produce food and not of the corporate sector. (La Vía Campesina, 2018)

² In the 1980s international donor funding turned from supporting governments to the increased funding of NGOs in the low-income countries. Many of these NGOs claimed to represent *the peasantry*. This led peasants to form their own rural movements in Latin America to speak for themselves, as they felt not represented by these NGOs in their fight against the liberalisation and globalisation of agriculture at that time, that was neglecting small scale and family farms. By the early 1990s these movements started to link with peasant organizations outside of Latin America. In May 1993 La Vía Campesina was founded in Mons, Belgium, as a reaction to the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (1986-1994), and established its first declaration. Since then, LVC has spread across the globe, and represents today 200 million farmers in 81 countries in Asia, Africa, the Americas and Europe (Martínez-Torres and Rosset 2010; Desmarais 2007; La Vía Campesina 2018).

Patel (2009) argues that food sovereignty is too broad and tries to be relatable for too diverse actors, but it fails in being clear on what the actual goals of the movement are. Other scholars have presented a contrary view of the movement: they consider it to be too specific, to be universally adaptable. Shattuck et al. (2015) addresses the issue of contradictions inside the food sovereignty movement, as different contexts have different understandings of or implementation approaches to the concept. They point out that its definition might not be generic across cultures: “The often-cited declarations of La Via [sic] Campesina and others serve as important goalposts of this growing movement, but one cannot point to a declaration and say that it encompasses all the multiplicity of efforts across geographies equally well” (Shattuck et al., 2015, p.429). Scholars like De Master (2013) and Mamonova (2018) emphasize by their case studies from Eastern Europe, that “history and the character of national identity both play key roles in shaping food sovereignty ideas and practices in a given society” (Mamonova, 2018, p.195). De Master (2013) discusses the adaptability of the food sovereignty principles for Polish small holders and stresses the difficulty of framing a universal peasant identity, as the peasantry is not as homogenous as the food sovereignty movement might imply. Schiavoni (2017) argues in her study from Venezuela that food sovereignty is a dynamic process that is (re-)shaped over time.

Mamonova (2018) explores how the meaning of household farming and small-scale agriculture can shift through political change. In her research on the relations between patriotism and food sovereignty in Ukraine before and after the Euromaidan revolution in 2014, she explores how “rising patriotism contribute to the emerging discourses on the ‘rights to food and to farm’” (p.190), which might trigger a food sovereignty movement in the country. The concept of food sovereignty shows many touch points with the narrative of patriotism as for instance the understanding of rights to land and to determine one’s food production. She concludes that “(...) food sovereignty is a dynamic, open- ended and context-specific process, in which meanings and practices of food and farming are being contentiously shaped and reshaped over time, as they respond to political, ideological and social transformations in the country” (Mamonova, 2018, p.208).

Following Mamonova’s research in Ukraine, my research aims to look into how agricultural actors in the West Bank frame ‘farming’ as a practice and what meaning they align to it. I chose to analyse the collective action frames of three different actor groups and to compare how their understanding of ‘what they are doing’ aligns or differentiates. Mamonova investigated in her comparative study how the Euromaidan revolution influenced people’s understanding of their farming practices. Palestine has a long history of resistance against the

Israeli occupation, which is closely linked to patriotic aspirations for an independent Palestinian state. The standard definition of *patriotism* conveys it to be love for one's country. Mamonova (2018) refers to Orwell, who is addressing patriotism's defensive character since the love for one's country is connected to being willing to protect one's idea of what defines this country against others. I believe that resistance is an integral part of patriotism. When I visited the West Bank in Summer 2017, I discovered that there are aspirations in the country to link resistance with farming practices and thereby create a new meaning of farming. Therefore, the West Bank presents an interesting context for investigating how people create meaning of farming as a practice and to compare it to Mamonova. Palestine shows similar features as the case of Ukraine when it comes to opposing the invasion and/or occupation by another state, and that some citizens consider themselves to be more entitled to the land than others.

Additionally, since some of my informants show a clear link to the food sovereignty movement and/or practice 'quiet food sovereignty', my research contributes to the discussion on food sovereignty being a concept that is dynamic in its meaning from place to place and over time. Mamonova (2018) explains quiet food sovereignty to be practices that clearly show similarities to the definition of food sovereignty but do not especially define themselves to be part of the movement (see p. 192).

4. Choice of Informants & Methods

I first came in touch with the topic of farming and food sovereignty in the West Bank when I visited a farm in Bil'in (Ramallah and Al Beireh Governorate, Area C) during a two-month stay in the Summer 2017. I returned to the West Bank in January 2018 for two weeks to conduct my research. My research involved unstructured qualitative interviews and a group discussion, as well as participant observation at the aforementioned farm in Bil'in for the whole time of my stay. I worked on this organic farm in Area C next to the separation wall to Israel. The unstructured qualitative interviews were conducted with the farmer of this farm, as well as with the director of the farmers union UAWC and a farmer in the Jordan Valley. Furthermore, I conducted a group discussion with farmers in another village of the Jordan Valley. Interviews took place in Ramallah and during a field trip to the Jordan Valley. Additionally, document analysis was used for contextualisation of the data.

In the following, the chosen methods and informants for conducting research will be further elaborated.

4.1. Choice of Informants

The goal of my research was to grasp the meaning of farming for different actors. Therefore, I decided to look at different stakeholders and identified three ‘groups’ I wanted to investigate. The first group is the Union of Agricultural Work Committees (UAWC). It is a bigger organisation promoting food sovereignty and is based in Ramallah but works all over the West Bank. The union is also the only member of LVC in the Middle East so far and therefore brings an interesting touch point between the international food sovereignty movement and the local understanding of the concept into the research. Since Fuad Abu Saif is the director of the union and has been working for the union even before they started to try to become a member of LVC, I consider his understandings of the concept and of what UAWC does as significant and will group him and UAWC as one actor.

My second group consists of farmers in the Jordan Valley in Area C, as actors that have a long family tradition in farming in the area. The climate of the Jordan Valley may be ideal for agriculture all year around, but the political situation creates one of the hardest environments of the West Bank. My information about their perspectives will mostly be based on a focus group discussion in Al-Auja and one interview with a farmer in Fatsa’el village. As the farmers live in similar settings, they will be treated as one homogenous group. The farmers are a good example of peasantry that fits with LVC’s understanding of the concept, and since they have always lived in Area C, they have experienced the influence of the occupation over time. All farmers come from farming families: their fathers, grandfathers and great grandfathers practiced agriculture in the Jordan Valley before them. All the farmers, in Al-Auja and Fatsa’el, were members of UAWC, they lived and ran small-scale farms in the area. The farmers taking part in the group discussion were all over 40 years old and ranged up to the age of 75, the farmer I interviewed in Fatsa’el was in his 30s.

My third stakeholder is Bubu, the independent farmer that is self-taught in the field of agriculture and runs a farm as a political idea. He is originally from Jerusalem, has been living in Ramallah for many years now but operates the farm in Area C. He runs the farm with the help of international volunteers. I consider his viewpoint interesting because there is a lot of symbolism and thought behind his farm and why he taught himself to be a farmer.

4.2. Participant Observation

I conducted participant observation during my whole stay. Therefore, I worked on an organic farm in the village Bil’in, which is located in Area C next to the separation wall to Israel. The work consisted of irrigating, planting, seeding, harvesting, packaging, and preparing lunch.

On the other side of the wall you will find the settlement Modi'in Illit which is constantly under construction. The farm was established in the past years with the help of volunteers, which are recruited through WWOOF (World-Wide Opportunities on Organic Farms). The farmer Bubu used to run the first hostel in Ramallah with his brother and had no farming background. The idea of the farm arose from discussions with a long-time hostel guest from the USA with Gazan descent. Their idea was to establish the farm out of political motivation and therefore Bil'in was strategically chosen. The village is famous in the West Bank for its weekly protest against the separation wall and became also well known abroad through the documentary "Five Broken Cameras" (2011). They approached a landowner in Bil'in, who became convinced by their idea and offered them the land rent-free for a five-year period.

I visited the farm a few times in Summer 2017 and its concept made me interested into farming and food sovereignty in the West Bank. The goal of the farm is to be self-sufficient. More aims of the farm will be discussed in the analysis part of this thesis. By conducting a short fieldwork on the farm, I wanted to get a better understanding of not only how a farm that aims for self-sufficiency works, but also of the conditions in Area C in which people establish a farm like this. I was able to experience first hand how the limitation of resources (e.g. water or technical equipment) and the constant sound from the construction of the settlement influences the working conditions on the farm.

Participant observation helps the researcher to understand peoples' perspectives of the world and how they understand it (Silverman, 2015). What does it do to people seeing a constant threat to the land they consider theirs? How does it feel to see, for instance, the technical advantages people can have just a few hundred meters away in the settlement while one struggles to access basic tools and resources? The participant observation helped me to contextualise the motives of people to aim for food sovereignty. Additionally, it is also appealing to have researched this particular farm that is considered by Bubu as an act of peaceful resistance.

4.3. Unstructured Qualitative Interviews

Unstructured qualitative interviews were conducted with Bubu, the farm owner of the aforementioned farm in Bil'in and with a farmer in the Jordan Valley that is a member of UAWC, as well as the general director of UAWC, Fuad Abu Saif. The interviews with the different farmers involved their understanding of and expectations from food sovereignty, as well as questions regarding their life story, issues with the occupation and what kind of agriculture they practice on their farms. I choose to study this particular place, because the

farmers in the Jordan Valley have, other than Bubu, a long tradition in farming and different perspectives than him. The interview with Fuad gave me an insight into the structure of the union and what goals the union has. Overall, these interviews were the most important source regarding my research questions, as they give me direct insight in how people reason their actions and form collective action frames. I chose an unstructured interview approach since I wanted to give the possibility to speak freely and “ascribe meaning while bearing in mind the broader aims of the project” (Silverman, 2015, p.166). During the research for my bachelor thesis, I experienced that not following a strict question-protocol and leaving the questions open for diverse and even unexpected answers enriches the quality of the data in the end. An unstructured interview seems more like an informal conversation for the informant and often makes people more comfortable to share their perspective.

4.4. Focus Group Discussions

A focus group discussion was conducted with a group of farmers in the town of Al-Auja in the Jordan Valley. Ten farmers were invited and showed up to the meeting, but there was a fluctuation in how many people took part in the approximately 1.5-hour long discussion. I chose to conduct a focus group discussion in this case because I was unsure how comfortable each participant would feel with answering my questions and since all farmers knew each other, the setting in a group might make them feel more comfortable. Group discussions give informants the option to contribute by simply follow the discussion until they feel an urge to say something themselves. Another benefit of this method is that the researcher can discover different understandings of practices and situations. Social norms can be spotted in case the group disagrees with the statement of one participant (Hennink et al., 2011).

4.5. Document Analysis

Document analysis “is a systematic procedure for reviewing or evaluating documents“ (Bowen, 2009, p.27). I used this method to contextualise and deepen my knowledge of the research problem. Therefore, I looked not only into academic literature on food (in-)security and food sovereignty but also into reports of organizations like La Vía Campesina. These provided me with a better knowledge of how food sovereignty is generally understood.

To analyse the UAWC’s framing, documents by Palestinian research institutions, and international and local news coverage regarding the topic were reviewed.

5. Ethical Considerations, Self-Reflection & Limitations

I let my informants choose to have their names and place of residence in the thesis or to have it anonymised as I do not want them to have negative consequences from supporting my research. I informed all participants that the thesis is going to be published online and the implication of my research being publicly accessible, in order to make it possible for them to make an informed decision.

There are a few limitations and/or important remarks regarding me as a researcher in the field and the way I conducted my research. First, I am a young German woman conducting research in a society in which it is not common in the countryside for a woman to be in contact with not-related men, and not to be veiled. Agriculture in Palestine is a male dominated field. However, I experienced people to be very open, friendly and tolerant of me choosing not to veil myself. Necessary to say is that the men I met were not strongly religious, which was expressed for instance by nearly all men being willing to shake my hand, which is not always the case in Palestine.

Second, I am also not able to communicate in Arabic in a sufficient way to conduct interviews in the language, hence all interviews were conducted in English. Some of the Jordan Valley farmers were not able to speak English and needed assistance of the other farmers and the two employees of the union that drove me to the Jordan Valley. As a trained anthropologist I am aware how important language is to generate meaning and that meaning is often not translatable from one to the other language. It is also clear to me that translations by a professional interpreter would have been more reliable than letting the union employees translate what was said. The fact that I could not hire a professional interpreter was simply caused by lack of funding for my thesis. Third, my research only lasted for two weeks, which is a very short amount of time to get a good understanding of the situation. It surely helped me that I had spent two months in the West Bank in the Summer of 2017 where I had gotten to know the culture a little bit better and had already met some of my research participants.

That the informants in the Jordan Valley were all members in UAWC and that the union facilitated the meetings has to be considered as well, as the union might have had certain intentions inviting these particular farmers. However, I got the impression that the farmers were not that well informed about the ideas of the union regarding, for instance food sovereignty, and that they talked very openly and critically about it.

6. Theory: Frame Analysis

To analyse the data, I obtained in the field, the theoretical approach of frame analysis will be used. In the following chapter it will be described how I define what a frame is, what is framed and how collective action frames are used. Frame analysis as a theoretical approach was coined by Erving Goffman (1974) and has since then been developed and extended by several scholars.

6.1. What is a *Frame*?

Goffman (1974) defines frame analysis as the examination “of the organization of experience” (p.11). Basically, frames come into action when an individual in any given situation answers the question: “What is it that’s going on here?” (Goffman, 1974, p.25). People use frames to make sense of the world and the experiences they have, based on previous experiences. Framing is the process of deploying frames. How one frames, for instance a situation, a problem or another person, influences the way one acts upon it (Goffman, 1974). The wide use of frames in diverse academic fields has led to different usage and understanding of what constitutes a frame in particular. Therefore, it is necessary to point out how the term frame will be used hereafter. I am going to focus on frames as *knowledge structures/cognitive representations*. During my research I collected data by interviewing and observing different groups separately. I focussed on how to understand peoples’ way to make sense of their practices. Treating frames as interactional constructions means to analyse interactions between different groups and/or individuals and how they “co-construct meanings while they are interacting“ (Dewulf et al., 2009, p. 160). Even though one group discussion (with farmers in the Jordan Valley) was part of the research process and during the group discussion the farmers’ developed a joined understanding of certain issues, using frames as interactional constructions is not of interest for the analysis process. The farmers in the Jordan Valley will be treated as one group with a certain viewpoint towards food sovereignty, as they share similar difficulties, life stories and opinions.

Knowledge structures are defined by Dewulf et al. (2009) as expectations individual’s have and are therefore not an interactive process between several individuals but based in the individual’s mind: “Cognitive frames are memory structures that help us to organize and interpret incoming perceptual information by fitting it into pre-existing categories about reality“ (Dewulf et al., 2009, p. 159). As I want to investigate what farming represents and means to different actors in the West Bank and how it is defined by them, frames will be treated as knowledge structures to analyse the data.

6.2. What is a *Frame Framing*?

Dewulf et al. (2009) mention (1) *issues*, (2) *identities and relationships*, as well as (3) *interaction processes* as three categories of what it is that is getting framed. They define these categories in the following way:

Issue frames refer to the meanings attached to agenda items, events or problems in the relevant domain or context. Identity and relationship frames refer to the meanings about oneself and one's relationships with a counter-part(s). Process frames refer to the interpretations that disputants assign to their interaction process (Dewulf et al., 1992, p.165).

I will focus on issues (*cognitive issue frames*) as well as identities and relationships (*cognitive identity and relationship frames*), since farming in the West Bank is related to issues of access and ownership but is also strongly linked to people's identity. As I did not investigate how the different groups frame the interaction process in between them, this category will not be used hereafter. Throughout my research I observed that the meaning of the issues people face in relation to farming are interwoven with how they perceive their own and other's identity. In the analysis of my research data I will therefore focus on the issues people frame and supplement the analysis by looking what implications this issue framing has for their identity and relationship frames.

Characterization frames, identity frames, and power frames are the *cognitive identity and relationship frames* I will consider in my analysis. Whereas identity frames focus on the individual's framing of itself and/or its group, characterization frames are descriptions of others, and power frames give an understanding of how an individual perceives structures of power. Power frames can "differ in terms of the source of the status differences, for example, perceived power stems from expertise, resources, membership in coalitions, morality, sympathy, etc." (Dewulf et al., 2009, p.169). When using *cognitive issue frames*, I will define the framing process similar to the description of *collective action frames* in the next subchapter: the individual has to first categorize an issue as problematic before one reacts (or not) to it (Dewulf et al., 2009; Snow and Benford, 1992).

6.3. Collective Action Frames

To analyse my field data, I will use Snow and Benford's (1992) analytical framework of *collective action frames*. Whereas a frame is an individual's way to make sense of the world around it, a collective action frame connects the result of this sense making (step 1) with a classification (step 2) and a reaction (step 3). Analysing collective action frames give the possibility to link people's understanding of the world to their behaviour. Snow and Benford focus in their definition on framing social conditions from an activist's point of view. Therefore, an activist decides in step 1, if she or he considers a social condition as unjust or not (*punctuation*), and then, in step 2, identifies the origin of the injustice (*diagnostic attribution*). Finally, in step 3, she or he suggests an appropriate way to act upon the problem to resolve it (*prognostic attribution*). Activists form collective action frames by establishing a causal relationship between different elements to create a meaningful interconnection (Snow and Benford, 1992). However, I am not limiting collective action frames to be useful in analysing activists' behaviour solely as I believe that every individual that is confronted with a problematic situation will consider why the situation occurs and how to act upon it. The main difference that I believe can occur is that in step 3 the individual might end up deciding not to resolve the problem, and in case of wanting to resolve it, her or his actions do not need necessarily to be classified as activism.

I will use collective action frames to analyse how my informants create meaning of *farming* as a practice. I choose collective action frames as the main framework of my analysis, as it is very problem focussed and I want to highlight the difficult situation out of which people have to act in the West Bank, especially in Area C, when it comes to farming.

6.4. Data Analysis Process

To analyse the data, I obtained in the field, I coded my data in three main categories: UAWC, Bubu, and the Jordan Valley farmers. Each interview and/or the group discussion was examined regarding what issues people cite and what that implies for what their overall issue is (*punctuation*), who they frame is to be blamed for that issue (*diagnostic attribution*) and how they describe what they personally do about the issue, if they try to resolve it or not (*prognostic attribution*). I especially looked into what issue, as well as identity and relationship frames their formulations imply. Participant observation and document analysis helped me to contextualise my data. Finally, I compared the collective action frames of my informants and relate my research data to Mamonova's (2018) findings from Ukraine.

7. Historic, Social and Economic Background of the West Bank

Before I am going to present, analyse and discuss my research data, I will give an insight into the historic, social and economic background of the West Bank. The purpose of this contextualisation is to make the different social settings, in which my informants live and act, more comprehensible.

The Palestinian occupied Territories (PoT) consist of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Together they have a population of 4.55 million (2016) (World Bank, 2016). The Gaza strip claims autonomy since 2005 and is governed by the Hamas but still experiences isolation through the borders controlled by Israel. The West Bank is under Israeli occupation since 1967 and is therefore partly ruled by Israel (Area C) and the Palestinian National Authority (PA) under lead of the Fatah (former Palestinian Liberation Organisation, PLO). Beside the approximately 2.7 million Palestinians, there are about 390.000 settlers living in 132 official settlements and 97 illegal outposts in the West Bank (Peace Now, 2018; CIA, 2017). The West Bank's population is predominantly of Sunni Muslim belief (80-85 per cent), around 1-2.5 per cent are Christians (Greek Orthodox mostly). The remaining share of the population are Jewish settlers (CIA, 2017).

The *Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip* (signed 1995), often referred to as *Oslo 2*, divided the West Bank into three different zones (see Figure 1):

- Area A: Full civil and security control by the PA. Consists mostly of urban areas.
- Area B: Palestinian civil control (PA) and joint Israeli-Palestinian security control.
- Area C: Full Israeli civil and security control. Constitutes more than 60 per cent of the West Bank (UN OCHAoPT, 2009).



Figure 1: West Bank Area A+B and C (UN OCHA 2011)

7.1. Historic Background: The Middle East Conflict & Palestinian Resistance Movement

The conflict between Palestine and Israel, best known as the Middle East conflict, is one of the most enduring conflicts of our time. The conflict started out in the 19th century and intensified when Israel was founded in 1948. Since then, the region was many times shaken by war between Israel and its neighbouring Arabic states. During the Six Day War in 1967 Israel took control of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and the Golan Heights (from Syria). This led to Israel gaining control of the Jordan River's headwaters and significant groundwater resources. Over the time of the occupation, laws were put into place to regulate the ownership and use of water in the region (Smith, 2013).

Before I will go over to discuss the implications of the occupation, I want to give a short introduction to the more recent Palestinian resistance movement, starting with the First Intifada (1987-1993). The Intifada (Arabic for "uprising") was a protest movement against the Israeli occupation. More than 1.000 Palestinians and around 160 Israelis were killed over the six

years of conflict that ended with the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, that involved PLO leader Yassir Arafat and Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin. This agreement, as well as the aforementioned Oslo 2 (1995), set a five-year process between Israel and Palestine and intended to give the PA the absolute control over the West Bank and the Gaza strip while Israel would withdraw completely from these areas. Thereby, a two-state solution would be implemented. The accord was never realized as hardliners and extremists on both sides opposed its objectives and hindered the process through attacks and assaults. On the Palestinian side, Hamas was trying to hinder the peace process by increasingly committing terror attacks. On the Israeli side, the settlement building continued and increased. When in 2000 the Oslo Accord failed after negotiations in Camp David, the Second Intifada (“Al-Aqsa-Intifada”) broke out. It is generally considered to have ended in 2005 after Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon agreed to stop the violence on both sides. Even though it has decreased over the years, violent protest and quelling on both sides have remained common until the present day. Justified by security, Israel has been building a separation wall around and partly inside the West Bank since 2002 (Morris, 2000; Smith, 2013).

7.2. Socio-Economic & Food Security Situation of the West Bank

In 2016 the Human Development Index (HDI) of the whole PoT was 0.684. This value makes it 114 out of 188 countries and territories that were measured, and positions Palestine in the medium category of the index (UNDP, 2016). The UNDP states that “[t]he poverty line by national standards for Palestine, as set by PCBS [Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics] in 2011, is 2,293 NIS (\$637) per month for a family of two adults and three children” (UNDP, 2014, p.53). According to the report, 17.8 per cent of the West Bank’s population live in poverty with 7.8 per cent living in “deep poverty” (NIS 1,832 or less per month). Palestine has a high fertility rate and its median age is 19.7 years, in comparison to other Arab states or countries of the medium-HDI-category, Palestine is doing better in “terms of health outcomes (...), mortality rates, child nutrition and life expectancy at birth” (State of Palestine, 2016, p.18).

In 2013 the World Bank published a report on the potential of Area C to contribute to the economy of Palestine. In this report it is stated that the economic activity of Area C is limited but that the potential contribution is large: “Area C is richly endowed with natural resources and it is contiguous, whereas Areas A and B are smaller territorial islands. The manner in which Area C is currently administered virtually precludes Palestinian businesses from investing there” (World Bank, 2013). When addressing agriculture in Area C, the report is seeing the main

challenges in the restrictions of land and water use of Palestinians compared to Israeli settlements and the limitations to obtain permissions for creating necessary infrastructure. The separation wall, which not only surrounds but also draws through the West Bank, has in many cases cut farmers off from their land. The high production of the settlements in the Jordan Valley elucidate the potential of the land when good access to water is ensured. Around 16 per cent of the West Bank's households were considered to be food insecure in 2014. Major differences in the food security status was discovered based on the household head's occupation, as well as the household being located in Area A, B or C. In comparison to all professions listed in the survey, the "agriculture, animal breeding and fishing" sector contains the biggest risk for households whose head is working in that sector to be severely food insecure. Only households that are relying on social assistance and international organisations' help are more at risk (State of Palestine, 2016). Households in Area C are more likely to be food insecure, which correlates with the statement that "when less restrictions [of movement] are in place, then the lower the likelihood of being food insecure" (State of Palestine 2016, p. 36), as the restrictions of movement are higher in Area C. The survey also indicates that more people move out of Area C than move into it, and that it is especially food insecure households that move into Area A and B. The MA'AN Development Center argues that "food security in the oPt [occupied Palestinian territories] is largely dependent on the lack of Palestinian food sovereignty" (MA'AN Development Center, 2015, p.5). Its report states that the Israeli occupation is mainly responsible for the poor state of food security. The lack of access to resources like water and agricultural inputs but also infrastructure and international trade (import and export) hamper the Palestinian population's wellbeing. Not being able to access these diverse resources is based on administrative power relations (e.g. water resources are controlled by the Israeli military since 1967) and lack of free movement for Palestinians. Permits are needed to travel outside of the West Bank and therefore to access air and ship transport as well as markets. Another issue for the Palestinian agricultural sector and a self-determined food system is openness of the Palestinian market for Israeli agriculture products that are cheaper than the products produced by Palestinian farmers and therefore make it hard to compete. Beyond that, the building of Israeli settlements in Area C is criticised as illegally grabbing land from Palestinians and increasing the pressure for land access. This issue is intensified by the fact that in about 70 per cent of Area C, construction is prohibited for Palestinians, even when people lived and tilled land for decades in these areas. Unemployment, poverty, in combination with the high food prices are reasons for food insecurity in the West Bank, but the Israeli occupation is seen as the main impediment for Palestinian food security and economic empowerment (UN OCHAoPT, 2009; MA'AN Development Center, 2015; ARIJ, 2015).

8. Analysis of my Research Data

I will now present the most interesting insights from my research data regarding my research questions. Therefore, I will analyse the collective action frames of my three informant groups. A focus will be on the framing of issues; however, identity and relationship framing have many touch points with how people frame issues in this particular case and therefore will be relevant intermittently.

8.1. The Union's Collective Action Frame

The analysis in this section is based on an interview from January 14, 2018 with Fuad Abu Saif, general director of UAWC, and documents from UAWC's official website. The interview involved Fuad talking about UAWC's goals and work with agriculture in the West Bank, UAWC's linkage to LVC, the issues of agriculture in the West Bank today and the obstacles UAWC meets in its work.

Punctuation

Punctuating what social condition UAWC's work revolves around, is best put by the following statement from its website: "UAWC was established in 1986 in response to the vulnerable socio-political circumstance of farmers that resulted from occupation policies in confiscating lands and water in the early eighties and therefore directly harmed the interests of farmers and Palestinians" (UAWC1, 2018). This statement frames the occupation and its impact on the lives of Palestinians as unfair. Fuad asserts a similar picture during the interview, in which he describes food security as the main issue of Palestinians today, but that he believes it to be a politically made issue. He notes that many partners of UAWC think they have to address poverty and hunger first, but he is sure that "[t]he root of the problem is political. We have an occupation, and this means that we have no access to our resources, we do not have sovereignty over our resources" (Fuad, 2018). Fuad mentions a study by the World Bank, which states that Palestinians lose around four billion dollars every year because they cannot use their resources. To him, this is a clear indicator that food sovereignty is the issue, as this amount of money would be sufficient to stabilize the economy of the small nation. In his opinion, there would be no food insecurity if there was food sovereignty in Palestine:

The majority [of farmers in the Jordan Valley], they are losing day after day their sovereignty. They cannot decide what to plant, they cannot decide when they have to plant, also for example, not the quantity of the water they get, they do not have sovereignty

over the border, over checkpoints, over what area they can access or not. So that area [Jordan Valley] reflects a very good example when we talk about sovereignty and resilience, that it is a political issue, in that area, which is a very important part of the West Bank. And where you can smell that there is no sovereignty, and not food insecurity. Because, come on, the area is very rich in resources, land is important, the climate is very good and important, it is maybe the best climate in all the region, where you can plant all over the year, different varieties. But, the problem is the occupation and the one that controls the land. (Fuad, 2018)

Fuad and UAWC's official website, put a focus on the occupation's negative effects on the Palestinians' access to the land and resources. Therefore, I interpret the social condition, that is punctuated by the union as the lack of the Palestinian people and especially Palestinian farmers to control their resources and therefore their ability to make a living in small-scale agriculture. As UAWC works to address this social condition, it is obvious that they consider it as an unjust state caused by an unfair political environment.

Diagnostic Attribution

The unions' punctuation is connected to the union's diagnostic attribution: who is responsible for the lack of freedom? Clearly it is the occupation, and during the interview with Fuad and by looking at the union website it becomes apparent that they frame Israel as responsible since it is the occupying power and builds the settlements through which Palestinians loose land. During the interview, Fuad frames Israel's actions in Area C as a strategy of forcing people out of the area by making life as difficult as possible for them.

Interestingly, Fuad points out, that it is not only the Israeli settlements in Area C that steal land, but that there are also big, state supported Palestinian companies "eating up the land" (Fuad, 2018) that make it impossible for small farmers to compete. He states that many of the farmers in Area C loose their land because it gets confiscated but continue to work as employees on their former land. Those who still own their land and produce have to sell their products in bad conditions to the bigger Palestinian companies because they do not have the means to market it themselves. Therefore, the occupation through Israel is surely still the origin of the lack of freedom but rural Palestinian people and farmers in Area C not only struggle with the settlements but also better-off compatriots exploiting their miserable situation. This remark makes it more apparent that UAWC is representing the economically weak part of the Palestinian population that lives in Area C and has no rights or means, the part of the population that is mostly based in agriculture. This focus on rural Palestinians reflects also the mission of

UAWC: “Effectively contributing towards empowering farmers and their families and enhancing their resilience (...)” (UAWC², 2018). The claim of the union to represent Palestinian farmers is similar to how the food sovereignty movement presents itself as the voice of the peasantry. UAWC frames itself in an opposition to the power system established through the occupation.

Prognostic Attribution

The aforementioned mission is also linked to what I analyse to be UAWC’s prognostic attribution to resolve the problem: building food sovereignty in the Palestinian territories. More in-depth, building food sovereignty means to the union what they summarize in their objectives. These include improving the livelihoods and protecting the rights of small farmers while also making small farms an important contributor to national food security; “[c]ontribute to preserving and protecting the natural resources of Palestine” (UAWC³, 2018). Furthermore, the union aims to be transparent and able to provide their services in a flexible but durable manner (UAWC³, 2018). Fuad (2018) mentions that UAWC provides different techniques as well as local seeds from the unions’ seed bank in Hebron to the farmers to strengthen and protect their livelihoods. He also explains that they give support when it comes to legal issues connected to demolitions and land grabbing. Organic farming is currently not a priority because the resources and techniques needed for this are simply not accessible at the moment in Palestine. Their main focus regarding that issue right now is to encourage the farmers to use less chemical fertilizer. The union also works on spreading awareness of the issues of farmers in Area C, among the Palestinians in area A and B but also to the PA, as they believe that Area C is often neglected:

We have to be honest with ourselves. (...) As Palestinians we do not do a good effort sometimes and we have to plan for the future. It is an area [Area C] we should focus on, and not leave it as it is. (...) There is no planning actually for that area, they ignore that area because of they have this [Oslo] agreement. (...) If you compare Jordan Valley now and before ten years, there was a huge difference. (Fuad, 2018)

Even though Fuad mentions these critical remarks in the direction of the PA, the unions’ identity frame is still strongly linked to a patriotic idea of enabling Palestinians to become independent from the occupation through Israel. Fuad is optimistic that, if all Palestinians would pull together when it comes to food sovereignty, it would lead to independence: “We have to keep

struggling through the occupation until we achieve our freedom” (Fuad, 2018). It just appears that Fuad does not consider the PA as a helpful or supportive partner in this struggle, as their hands are tied through agreements with Israel. Fuad’s patriotic ideas also become clear when he is discussing the issues of Israeli land grabbing and settlement building in Area C:

How they [the settlers] are dealing with our land. What are they doing here? Why do they have the right to go everywhere? Have access to every resource? But the Palestinians that live here for thousands of years, they don’t have. It is injustice, of course. (...) But finally we know it’s the Palestinians’ land. (Fuad, 2018)

Especially when Fuad discussed these issues in the Jordan Valley, it became apparent how the idea of building food sovereignty is linked to the idea that Palestinians have the historical right to practice agriculture in that region as he calls the Jordan Valley the “basket of food for the Palestinian people” (Fuad, 2018).

The prognostic attribution of the union also reflects in their relationship to the biggest food sovereignty movement in the world, La Vía Campesina (LVC). After an over ten years process, UAWC became the first member of LVC in the MENA region in late 2017. For the union, joining LVC had a strategic reason to support their aims and to improve their expertise of useful agricultural techniques. Fuad considers the membership in LVC’s worldwide network as a way to support their case by providing attention outside of the region they would maybe not get otherwise:

(...) once we go globally, I’m not saying it will khalas³ be finished, but it’s very important. Because the Palestinian case is a human case, and it means to refuse an occupation, it’s the same for me and for you, as a human. (Fuad, 2018)

UAWC wants to re-establish local farmer committees like most rural places had back in the days. These were actually the origin of the union but got lost when more and more people left agriculture. Fuad considers UAWC being based in these local committees to be like the structure of LVC. However, it seems like these committees are supposed to work in a certain way from the unions’ perspective:

³ Khalas means in Arabic *to be done* or *to be finished*

We believe that the most important thing is that the farmers should work collectively, not individually, their impact is like this so much bigger. And we have to link it to a national movement, to organisations that believe in the Palestinian rights. (Fuad, 2018)

This statement reveals clearly a certain agenda the union wishes the farmers to follow on the ground, when it comes to decision-making and taking actions. Hence, the union's approach cannot really be considered *bottom up* as it is clearly encouraged from above.

Summary

Summarizing, it can be said that UAWC in the West Bank develops a collective action frame to address the lack of control of their resources in order to build a self-determined stable livelihood through small-scale agriculture. This lack of freedom is in the union's view caused by the occupation through Israel and the associated inability of the PA to support Palestinians in Area C. UAWC considers self-sufficient farming, based on the idea of food sovereignty, as the solution to claim back the Palestinians' control over food by supporting farmers in legal matters and to strengthen farmers' expertise in local, self-sufficient food production. The union is the only member of LVC in the Middle East and frames itself to be a grass-roots organisation in the manner of LVC, representing the demands of Palestinian small-scale farmers.

8.2. The Jordan Valley Farmers' Collective Action Frame

The analysis in this section is based on my group interview in Al-Auja village as well as the single interview in Fatsa'el village I conducted on January 16, 2018 in the Jordan Valley, Area C of the West Bank.

Both, the group discussion and the interview, started by the farmers telling me about the sizes of their land, what they cultivate, and then focussed on changes they experienced over the years, their explanation for and response to these changes, and their expectations from the union.

Punctuation

The farmers experienced similar issues that they experienced mostly as changes of their working and living conditions that influenced the way they practice farming today. Mostly, these changes were reported in comparison to the late 1990s and early 2000s, but some farmers referred even to prior-occupational times, hence prior 1967. In the following, I have



Figure 2: Farms in Fatsa'el Village © Mascha Johanna Wendler, 2018

summarized the five main changes and issues the farmers reported:

- 1) *Lack of resources like water and certain, more qualitative fertilizer.* In both villages, the farmers complained about the limited amount of water they receive from the Israeli water company Mekorot (it only provides households with drinking water for domestic use, not industry or agriculture) and the limited possibilities to get access to groundwater and/or springs in the region, as they do not get permits for digging, and springs are foremost used by the Palestinian families that own them for their own demand. The lack of water supply is why the farmers mostly have to buy additional water. Several farmers pointed out that they used to cultivate bananas, but the lack of water makes it impossible now. They were also complaining that they are not allowed to use certain fertilizers anymore because of its alleged bad influence on the environment but Israel and the settlers still use these fertilizers. They now use mostly organic fertilizer or buy the products from big Palestinian companies.
- 2) *Decreasing and limited access to their land.* The land of some of the farmers is located on the other side of a check-point or close to a settlement. Out of security reasons they are only allowed to access their land during hours set by the Israelis or sometimes not at all. In Fatsa'el the village lost 3/4 of their original farmland to the nearby settlement.
- 3) *Limited access to affordable labour.* Over time many families lost their land to the

settlements, some left the region towards the North. There is less labour for young men in the region, some farmers reported that their sons or neighbours work on the farms of the settlements now, since they receive better wages there.

- 4) *Lack of access to markets and high competitiveness.* Back in the days they exported their products to for instance Jordan. This is not possible anymore because of the Israelis controlling the cross-border trade. They cannot compete price-wise with Israeli products, Israeli “B class” products are dumped on the Palestinian markets and are still cheaper than local products.
- 5) *Lack of technology and/or permits to advance their farms.* The farmers know about more sustainable technologies (e.g. rain fed agriculture) that would help them to become more sovereign, but they have a lack of material as well as financial means to advance their farms. They expect support from UAWC. Additionally, it is a very risky investment, as construction permits are difficult but necessary to get (even for building on their own land). Building water pools or a house goes hand in hand with the fear for demolition through the Israeli army.

Comprising, I argue, that the social condition the farmers punctuate is their lack of control over resources (e.g. water, land, technology etc.) and the general unsteadiness of their situation. I would summarize the social condition in this case as a lack of control and stability. The farmers in the Jordan Valley have a direct comparison to the settlements’ farms that are in much better condition than their own, and in connection with their first-hand experience that the settlements’ farm land used to belong to them and/or their neighbours. These conditions make them complain and consider their situation as unjust. Additionally, the older farmers also experienced how the occupation has changed their situation over time. The aforementioned issues that they reported elucidate the diverse injustices they associate with the occupation.

Diagnostic Attribution

It might seem apparent that their diagnostic attribution (identifying the origin of the injustice) is Israel, since Israel’s occupation of the West Bank brings all these regulations and power enforcements along and has had a limiting effect on the farmers’ situation over time. The occupation by Israel is surely the main reason and thus I do not want to disclaim these assumptions. I want to add that there is another actor that the farmers also hold liable for their poor situation: the Palestinian Authority (PA) for being absent in Area C. Surely, this absence is an outcome of the Oslo agreements and therefore also an outcome of the occupation. However, I believe it is important to take into consideration that the state is in the farmers’ daily experience

the Israeli *Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories*, since the PA is not present to support them in their daily struggles. The way the farmers describe their situation does not reflect any active resistance. Even though they are very aware of the problems the occupation creates for them, they do not show aspirations to protest against it directly.

Prognostic Attribution

The farmers do not seem to believe that their situation can be changed. When I asked them what they think of the concept of *food sovereignty* that UAWC promotes, they frame it as an absent concept, something that may have existed in the past but is not achievable in the current situation. “We cannot control our resources, we cannot control the market, so this word you’re asking about, it’s not for me,” the farmer in Fatsa’el answered (farmer in Fatsa’el, 2018). His answer reflects quite well what the other farmers expressed. Sovereignty is a wishful thought for the farmers in the Jordan Valley, but it does not exist in their reality. It is a concept that was lost a long time ago and they see no potential and/or possibility for opposing the occupation.

However, they have developed a way that seems in their understanding appropriate to maybe not resolve, but to manage their difficulties. The farmers certainly developed coping strategies to handle the situation: using organic instead of the conventional fertilizer; tilling only parts of their land that they have sufficient water and irrigation systems for; working on the settlements’ farms to generate a better income; and also, being a member of UAWC can all be considered to be ways of coping with the situation. They surely do not change the overall issue of the occupation, but for instance the membership in UAWC diversifies the risk of investing in new constructions and technologies for them. UAWC is probably the closest to represent a way of resolving their issues, as they provide support that the PA cannot and/or does not provide. However, the farmers’ framing of sovereignty reflects that there is no belief from the farmers’ side and/or no proper information given from the unions’ side on what the union tries to achieve. When I asked during the group discussion, what the farmers wished for from UAWC, the discussion became much more active and the two representatives of UAWC were subject to lots of demands the farmers had. Their membership in UAWC appears to be rather a *means to an end* to cope with their struggles than an actual belief in the overall goal of working for food sovereignty, as it appears as an unachievable concept to them. This also appears to be true for how they frame farming: it is a tradition in their families and the region and they surely take pride in their livelihood. However, especially for older farmers it is the best way to support their families and not a politically motivated act. Many mention that their sons work in the settlements but that also many moved to the city for education and work. There is an apparent hopelessness

in the area for how the farms will be run in the future as the pressure for land and the emigration of important labour force to the cities grows.

Another observation I made was, that when I asked for the size of the farmers' land or what they were growing on their land, they talked about the whole agricultural area of their villages and not of what they individually own and cultivate. The same collective thinking was visible when they discussed their issues and changes over time in the region. Often farmers that were obviously not in the age to remember certain events talked about these events as something that happened to them. Also, when I asked about something more specific e.g. if they personally experienced demolitions through the Israeli army, they were agreeing even though it were actually their neighbours, whose assets were demolished. This non-individualistic framing of ownership and experiences could be interpreted as a strong collective frame. This might be only the case in these villages and could have a long cultural tradition, but I would interpret it as an indicator, that people frame themselves as a collective because they delimit themselves from another group of actors and see a need of building a strong collective sense in their group. I have already discussed that the farmers cannot rely on the PA to represent their interests when it comes to issues with the occupation, they are rather at the Israelis' mercy. I interpret the strong collective identity in the Jordan Valley villages as being connected to the framing of power of the local people. As there is no superior organisation on the state level that could advocate their rights, they had to build a strong sense of solidarity in the community to emphasize that it is all of them, who struggle with the same issues. I believe there is the possibility that UAWC takes over this representative task, but this development seems rather linked to expectations regarding support and needs the farmers have on the union. The farmers framing reflects how they consider themselves to be part of a certain group, how it is their group being unfairly treated and that they originally had the control of the land and the resources. They seem to frame themselves more as part of this specific group, whose rights need to be represented, than as advocates for all Palestinians. Their framing appears to be more focussed on their direct environment and not focussed on Palestinians that do not live in the region and that do not work in agriculture.

Summary

Summarizing, the farmers in the Jordan Valley frame their collective action frame to address their lack of control and security. This lack is caused by the occupation through Israel and the associated inactivity of the PA in Area C. The farmers are not visionary or ideological about their situation. They seem to accept that this is the situation they have to deal and cope with if they want to survive as farmers in Area C. They certainly developed coping strategies, and their

membership in UAWC can be considered as one of them, since the unions' services spread the farmers' risks and reduce the negative impact of the occupation. It does not seem like the aim for food sovereignty of the union is significant to the farmers.

8.3. The Om Sleiman Farm's Collective Action Frame

The analysis in this sub-chapter is based on an interview with Bubu⁴, the independent farmer of the farm in Bil'in, on January 20, 2018 and a two weeks participant observation period on his farm in January 2018. My observations from the farm will be used in the analysis of Bubu's prognostic attribution.

Punctuation

Bubu started the *Om Sleiman Farm* with a partner in 2013/2014. They both met when the partner, an US-American with Gaza origin, stayed in the hostel of Bubu and his brother in Ramallah. They became friends over time and discussed the issues of the Palestinians living in the West Bank, that Bubu summarized the following way:

Everything is controlled by the Israeli army. We don't have the right to control our resources, the water as a resource for example, 80% is controlled by the Israeli army, all the food that we're having is coming from Israel, it's kind of like a dumpster actually or the garbage bin of Israel that is happening inside the West Bank and we have zero control of that. And how Israel is actually winning because we're the main supporters of the Israeli economy, and it [Israel] is pushing us away from living inside of Area C, where it controls more and more the demographics. (Bubu. 2018)

This statement of Bubu is punctuating the social condition that needs to be addressed in his opinion as the Palestinians' lack of control over resources and their enforced dependency on Israel. Palestinians do not get the chance to access and use the resources of the land. At the same time this lack of access forces Palestinian farmers on the one hand to work for the Israelis or buy inputs from them. On the other hand, it leads to Palestinian consumers lacking access to Palestinian products, as Israeli products are often cheaper and more easily available on local markets. In Bubu's view Israel hinders Palestinians from supporting themselves and pushes them towards a dependency on Israel.

⁴ Bubu is the farmer's nickname, he prefers not to be named with his real name, but he agreed to give the full name of the farm and the location.

Diagnostic Attribution

Diagnostically Bubu attributes the issue of Palestinians' lack of control over resources and their enforced dependency to Israel, occupying the West Bank, as Israel enforces this system by using its power in the area. Bubu believes that Israel follows a certain agenda with their actions in the West Bank: "Simply, they don't want Palestinians to live in this area, which is the majority of the West Bank, 61%. They want to push them away, confiscate more land, confiscate more resources, stop the freedom of movement of the Palestinians" (Bubu, 2018). Israel's politics have pushed people out of farming. According to Bubu, two decades ago half of the population was working in farming but today it is only three per cent.

Prognostic Attribution

Bubu and his partner developed the prognostic attribution of building an organic farm that does not need any inputs from outside and is financially only depending directly on Palestinian families, that buy a share and receive in return a basket of vegetables on a weekly basis (*community supported agriculture*). They believe that when people get the possibility to access locally produced organic food, they do not need to buy Israeli products. In the beginning, eight families had a share. Today there are 15 families from Ramallah area receiving vegetables from the *Om Sleiman Farm*. The farm consists of five sections that in total comprise 54 beds. For the future, Bubu wishes to add different channels to the farm: fruit trees (some are already planted), chickens (for fertilizer), food-processing techniques (e.g. apple cider, vinegar, pickling, drying fruits and vegetables), vermiculture and seed saving.

So far, the farm is not completely self-sufficient and considering that the techniques to use rain fed agriculture are too expensive, water will most likely stay a running cost. However, Bubu is planning to introduce water saving techniques like covering the beds to minimize the evaporation (Bubu, 2018).

Bubu intends the farm to go further than just to provide families with organic vegetables: "We're not having food only for our bellies, but for our souls. There is a message behind the farm, it is not only food to feed ourselves" (Bubu, 2018). From 2019 onwards, the farm is supposed to be "a kind of school, to teach farmers again how to go back to their farms, how to deal with demolition orders, at minimum cost" (Bubu, 2018). Bubu's vision is that everyone can set up a farm like his without being dependent on funding from outside. Even though he likes the idea to be "unified as Palestinians", he does not want to be a member of UAWC since they depend on funding from abroad: "When you start depending on funding, I don't think it's independence. And I think if we as Palestinians want to be independent, this is the first step to having your own food, your own resources, and then you can actually be stronger towards your



Figure 3-5: The Om Sleiman Farm © Mascha Johanna Wendler, 2018

independence” (Bubu, 2018). The farm is apparently meant to be a political and cultural symbol, a way of reuniting Palestinians with their land and therefore with their roots in agriculture and using these roots as a way of striving for independence.

For Bubu it seems to have an identity-establishing impact to work on the farm:

I worked in many things, I worked in offices, I worked in high positions, I feel like I'm more human when I'm working as a farmer, you know, it's more delivering a message, than when I was a salesman. I'm really happy to do that and I can't think of anything actually stronger than working on the farm. (Bubu, 2018)

This meaningfulness, Bubu ascribes to his work as a farmer, seems to be rooted in a strong attachment to what he considers to be a root of Palestinian culture and politically a way of finally achieving independence from Israel. He strongly identifies with the values behind, the aims and the symbolism of the farm. The aspirations as well as the practices of how the farm is run by Bubu correlate with the pillars of the food sovereignty movement. Since he does not openly link himself to the movement, I would consider the farm to be a sort of *quiet food sovereignty*. Interestingly, Bubu does not match absolutely with what e.g. LVC considers to be a peasant. However, he clearly identifies with the roots of Palestinians in peasant agriculture to which he wants to return with his farm.

Even the location of the farm, Bil'in, carries a lot of symbolism since it is one of the most famous villages of the Palestinian (non-violent) resistance (Bubu, 2018; Al Jazeera, 2015). The farm is located a few hundred meters from the separation wall and the settlement Modi'in Illit, which is constantly under construction. During my participant observation on the farm I experienced the threatening atmosphere of the place. Everyday on our way to the farm we passed a nearby gate in the wall that is completely black from being burned during one of the weekly protests against the wall (see Figure 6 and 7). Every Friday we saw Israeli soldiers entering through this gate to walk to the weekly protests that now take place a few hundred meters down the wall from the gate, a spot not visible from the farm. However, we could hear the sound of rubber bullets being shot and see tear gas clouds rising during the protests.

During workdays⁵, not only the construction of the settlement was a constant backdrop of sound, but also the settlement's school played for the start and end of each break a short melody

⁵ In Israel and Palestine the first day of the working week is Sunday. Friday and Saturday form the weekend. As the farm needs to be irrigated on a daily basis, we spent time there every day.



Figure 6: The burned gate, perspective from the farm ©Mascha Johanna Wendler, 2017



Figure 7: The burned gate from nearby © Mascha Johanna Wendler, 2017

from children songs. It felt very disconcerting to work around the lack of resources on the farm, as for instance the shortage of water or not having any advanced technology, and to see at the same time, how people in the settlement seem to have a very comfortable life. Nonetheless, it is in a way understandable why Bubu and his partner chose to have the farm here in this difficult location. The farm appears like a spot of greenness and fruitfulness in its dry surrounding, it looks like a little spot of hope in a very hopeless place. I believe having the farm in Bil'in does not only resemble a symbol of hope for Palestinians by demonstrating that you can have a farm in the hardest environments of the West Bank but to symbolise by its visibility on the other side of the wall that Bubu and his partner are not going to be uninhibited by the wall, the settlement and/or the occupation in general (based on my field notes 2018).

Summary

The owners of the *Om Sleiman Farm* punctuate the social condition of Palestinians' lack of control over resources and their enforced dependency on Israel in the West Bank as unfair. Diagnostically they attribute this lack of control and the dependency of Palestinians to be caused by the Israeli occupation of the West Bank. As a prognostic attribution to these issues Bubu and his partner developed the idea of establishing a self-sufficient, organic farm based in *community supported agriculture*. In addition, there is a symbolic political and cultural idea to the farm, as they plan to teach other farmers to establish similar farms all over the West Bank and thereby resist the control of and dependency on Israel. Bubu shows a strong identification with this symbolic character of the farm.

9. Discussion of Research Data

I will now go over to discuss the main similarities and differences between the collective action frames of the three actor groups of my research. All three groups show a similar problem framing which involves the occupation through Israel limiting Palestinians access to resources, economic stability and independent decision-making and actions. They see a connection between the occupation and the bad state of many Palestinian livelihoods. However, the groups relate to these problems in different ways.

The Jordan Valley farmers are directly affected by the problems they frame, and they have to act upon them as part of their livelihood. Farming is the base of this livelihood, the farmers need to cultivate their land to feed their families. It is that livelihood that is threatened and affected by the occupation- Therefore, their prognostic attributions revolve more around coping strategies to strengthen this vulnerable livelihood.

Bubu is framing a more general issue of the Palestinian nation he is acting upon by establishing

his farm. The farm puts him into a position where he has to deal with these issues directly. Additionally, he is framing farming more as a solution, as he focuses on how farms like his give the Palestinian consumer more options to buy food that supports an independent economy and at the same time gives Palestinian farmers a possibility to establish a farm that is less vulnerable to stresses and risks created by the occupation. His prognostic attribution has many meeting points with the concept of food sovereignty.

Fuad has on the one side first hand experience of the issues through his work at UAWC but also refers to general issues of the West Bank power relations and of Palestinians in Area C. His and/or the union's framing shows touch points with the two other groups, since the vulnerability of the Palestinian farmers is what they punctuate, similar to the Jordan Valley farmers, but their prognostic attribution frames a certain kind of farming that is oriented towards food sovereignty as the solution to people's problems.

The Jordan Valley farmers show less political ambitions in their prognostic attribution than the union and Bubu. For them, farming functions mainly as the foundation of their livelihood that is endangered. Bubu's approach to farming carries more symbolism linked to resistance, independence and activism. UAWC is, in the first place, there to represent the interests of the farmers to facilitate their working and living conditions, but its ambitions are clearly linked to political ideas of patriotism and independence.

Interestingly, none of the groups frames the PA as an important ally but more as an institution that is not able to help them with their struggle, as they cannot operate in Area C and because their hands are tied through agreements.

In the next chapter I will present Mamonova's research and compare her main findings with my previous data analysis.

9.1. Relations to Mamonova's Study in Ukraine

In her research article "Patriotism and Food Sovereignty: Changes in the Social Imaginary of Small-Scale Farming in Post-Euromaidan Ukraine" (2018), Mamonova compares two primary qualitative and quantitative studies from 2012 and 2016 among rural households and urban food growers in Ukraine. Her comparative study investigated how practitioners of "people's farming"⁶ have changed their perception of this kind of farming from before and after the Euromaidan revolution in 2014. While informants in 2012 were perceiving people's farming mostly to be backward and considered large-scale farming as progressive; the informants of the 2016 study showed tendencies of a new identification with this traditional farming practice

⁶ People's farming, *hospodarstva naseleennyia* in Ukrainian, is a kind of "small-scale, household-based, often subsistence farming" (Mamonova 2018, p.190).

connected to the “re-discovery of ‘the lost world’ of national traditions and the popularisation of folk (peasant) culture“ (Mamonova 2018, p.195).

9.2.1. Claim of Comparability

There are clearly differences in the data collection and analysis, however, I believe that both cases show similarities in major points. Mamonova’s research has a bigger scale than my study. She conducted a survey and larger amount qualitative interviews. Also, she compares two different periods to each other, while my study is a snapshot in time. Her research focusses mostly on household farming, while my participants have very different relationships to farming. Still, all of my three informant groups deal with small-scale agriculture aiming for subsistence and selling. Palestine shows touch points with the case of Ukraine when it comes to opposing the invasion and/or occupation by another state (Russia; and Israel), and that some citizens are considered more entitled to the land than others. In both cases political ambitions are linked to farming and show touch points with the food sovereignty movement. Her theoretical approach (*social imaginary*) is similar to frame theory, as both theoretical frameworks aim to grasp people’s viewpoints and how their actions relate to them.

9.2.2. Comparison of Findings

I will now go over to investigate how Mamonova’s findings compare to my research data. Mamonova presents links of food sovereignty and patriotism in Ukraine. Both, food sovereignty and patriotism, carry the idea of certain rights that people have in relation to what they consider to be their land, what food they grow and consume, and what kind of farming practices they use (see p.194-196).

The informants of my study fit really well into these similarities of food sovereignty and patriotism Mamonova discovered in Ukraine. All informant groups showed clearly that they comprehended the land inside the West Bank to be their land, and that it should be them, Palestinians working the land and deciding what to grow. The Jordan Valley farmers frame themselves as the collective owners of the land and other resources in the area. Several of them complain how they used to grow bananas until around ten years ago, but due to the water restrictions they had to give up on this crop. The lack of resources hence determines what they can grow, not what they actually prefer.

Fuad mentions the seed bank UAWC runs in Hebron and the value of Palestinian seeding material for strengthening the farmers’ livelihood. He also emphasizes how it is Palestinian land that the settlers in Area C are using.

Bubu focuses on the Palestinian lack of control over the production and consumption of food. His framing implies that it is a fundamental right of the people to determine their food production and this links to the right to ownership of land and the control of what to grow on this land.

Mamonova emphasizes that people's farming in Ukraine is often a kind of *quiet food sovereignty* as its practices are not part of a special discourse and people take these farming practices for granted. However, she also stresses that the aim for smallholder autonomy and for resisting neoliberal market structures in agriculture is lacking from the Ukrainian context (see p.194). She considers patriotism in Ukraine primarily to be a reaction to *foreign aggression* (from Russia) that has led people to revalue native identity and to aspire self-determination and independence.

Except UAWC, none of my actors used the term food sovereignty directly or referred to the international movement. However, Bubu's farm structure shows contact points with the pillars of the food sovereignty movement and could hence be considered to be *quiet food sovereignty*. There seems to be a lack of the aim for smallholder autonomy among the Jordan Valley farmers that do not believe to have the means to change their situation without the support from the union for instance. Even though the farmers believe in their right to the land and the production of food, the bigger ideology behind these beliefs is not apparent. Ownership is foremost important out of economic reasons and not out of patriotism. UAWC openly advocates food sovereignty and links to the international movement by being for instance a member of LVC.

Bubu and the union are convinced that it lays in the hand of Palestinians to empower themselves and not to hope for the assistance of the PA. Nonetheless, similar to Mamonova's case, my informants barely show signs of resisting neoliberal market structures. Fuad is the only one that directly mentions criticism against industrial farms and companies when he blames big Palestinian companies of stealing land from Palestinian small holders that are unable to compete. However, all the informants advocate small-scale farming in some form or another but did not directly criticize neoliberal market structures. In the case of the Jordan Valley farmers it even appears that they would appreciate to be part of these structures since it would create a better income for their households. They mention how there used to be international trade with for instance Jordan, before Israel started controlling the borders, and they framed these trade relations as positive as it created income for Palestinian farmers. Mamonova's assessment of Ukrainian patriotism being an outcome of foreign aggression correlates with the case of Palestine whose patriotic aspirations are linked to the resistance against Israeli involvement and dominance. Even though the impact of Russia in Ukraine as

well as Israel's in Palestine both go back for at least a century, the Euromaidan revolution and its effects are very recent in comparison to the long-term active resistance movement in Palestine. Additionally, the way power and influence is manifested and experienced in these two cases of *foreign aggression* differentiates.

When comparing her findings from the 2012 study with the data of the 2016 research, Mamonova points out some main changes in people's perception. In 2016 her informants showed greater tendencies to value peasant and/or native culture higher and appreciated the quality of home-grown food. Connected to that, smallholders were considered to be not only important for national food security, but also as a driver for making Ukraine become "the breadbasket of the world" (p.202). Back in 2012 small-scale agriculture's role was often downplayed and the "Soviet belief that 'big is beautiful'" (p.193), hence that industrial agriculture was the most desired and relevant for national food security, was still noticeable. In 2016 large-scale land investments are often seen as 'land grabbing' and people were more critical towards agro-businesses and its linkage to the state.

The valuation of peasant and/or native food culture is also what resonates with the reasoning of why my informants practice farming. The union as well as Bubu consider small-scale agriculture as traditionally Palestinian and relevant for national food security. Fuad even uses a similar metaphor, when he describes the Jordan Valley to be the food basket for Palestinians (see page 18 of this thesis). The Jordan Valley farmers might not link that much symbolism to their profession, however, they clearly take pride in it and identify with being farmers and part of their community. While healthy, organic food is important for Bubu, organic farming is relevant but hard to achieve from the union's point of view. The use of organic agricultural practices is not voluntary for the Jordan Valley farmers but more an outcome of regulations. The Ukrainian criticism of agro-businesses correlates with Fuad's aforementioned comments on Palestinian industrial farms (see page 34 of this thesis).

Another observation that Mamonova made is that before the Euromaidan revolution, people were quite hopeless, especially on the countryside where many villages were 'dying' because of the lack of younger generations. People tended to be nostalgic for the Soviet times. In 2016 people were less wishing back the old times and even associated the Socialist past with corruption and economic elites, while the new democratic aspirations were linked to be in the interest of smallholders and made people hopeful. The informants showed an overall increasing mistrust in the state but at the same time many still hope for more state support.

Nonetheless, the absence of state support strengthened informal economic structures. However,

civil society was long time considered to be weak in Ukraine, especially on the countryside. In 2016 a stronger sense of being *one* nation was noticeable and people were more convinced about the fruitfulness of protesting for their rights. Overall, Mamonova considers the lack of aspirations for autonomy among the smallholders as one of the main hindrances of a food sovereignty movement in Ukraine (Mamonova 2018).

Comparing these findings of Mamonova to my research, it is interesting that her data of 2012 correlate with how the Jordan Valley farmers think back nostalgically of previous times and tend to be pessimistic about the social and economic situation in their villages, while Bubu and UAWC correlate better with the new optimism of the 2016 data. Furthermore, Mamonova's informants increasingly mistrust the state but even though my informants do not have high hopes for the PA's interference and help, they link the state's inactivity to the difficult political situation and are less reproachful. Finally, civil society is strong in Palestine and people have a long tradition of fighting for their rights. However, the farmers in the Jordan Valley refer foremost to their own community and/or local area, whereas Bubu and UAWC link more to the overall Palestinian people.

Summary

Overall, it can be said that there are many similarities between the linkage of farming, food sovereignty and patriotism between Mamonova's research in Ukraine and the framing of my informants. My research groups have a similar understanding of rights to land and determination of food production for themselves as well as a valuation of native food culture. Bubu practices some kind of *quiet food sovereignty*, while the union is open about this goal. The Jordan Valley farmers do not show sufficient correlations with the concept of food sovereignty to be considered *quiet*. All informants are not really critical towards liberal market structures.

Differences between Mamonova and my case lay in how *foreign aggression* is manifested, the strength of civil society, and the aims for autonomy among my informants. The idea of resistance is more established among my informants and in Palestine in general, this also correlates with the stronger wish for being autonomous. However, the Jordan Valley farmers show less ambitions for resisting the conditions of the occupation and to aim for autonomy. They are also more pessimistic about the situation in their villages which correlates more with Mamonova's pre-Euromaidan findings, while Bubu and the union frame a more hopeful picture similarly to Mamonova's 2016 findings.

10. Conclusion

In this thesis I investigate the collective action frames different agricultural actors in the West Bank have developed in relationship to the practice of farming. I analyse the data of the three main informant groups. These three groups are allocated as follows: (1) Fuad Abu Saif as a representative of the Union of Agricultural Work Committees (UAWC), an interview with him is combined with the information from the union's website; (2) Bubu, an independent farmer in Bil'in; and (3) several farmers in two villages of the Jordan Valley. All three groups show a similar problem framing which involves the occupation through Israel limiting Palestinians access to resources, economic stability and independent decision-making and actions, and therefore people's ability to farm and trade their products. All of them see a connection between the occupation and the bad state of many Palestinian livelihoods. UAWC and Bubu show aspirations of resistance against the occupation in their collective action frames, since they believe that autonomous farming will support the overall political independence. The Jordan Valley farmers rather struggle with the impacts of the occupation on their livelihoods therefore they have developed different coping strategies to strengthen their weak livelihoods. The aim of this thesis also is to contribute to the discussion around the dimension of local context in food sovereignty, as the idea of food sovereignty shows many touch points with patriotism and has found an echo in the Palestinian resistance movement. This is why I compare the aforementioned findings with Mamonova's research (2018) on food sovereignty and patriotism in Ukraine. I analyse that Mamonova's informants as well as my informants show a similar understanding of the rights to land and to determine what to grow, as well as a valuation of native food culture. Some of my informants practice some kind of food sovereignty, Bubu quieter while UAWC is overt about this goal. In comparison to Mamonova's interviewees, my informants show a stronger understanding of how farming supports patriotic ideas as some define it as a form of resistance against the occupation and a way to claim autonomy. For the Jordan Valley farmers, farming is part of their livelihood and foremost a practice linked to survival.

I point out the different meanings of farming for some agricultural actors in the West Bank and how the practice of farming can be considered as a base of a livelihood, as a coping strategy but also as a way of resistance and chance for political change and autonomy. I thereby give an example on how diverse people can make use of farming in a certain context and how the concept food sovereignty can be assigned a new meaning in a particular context. I consider this thesis as an entry point for further research on the dimension of food

sovereignty and patriotism in the Palestinian context. As part of the discussion of local context in food sovereignty, this research gives some insights into how diverse people relate to this concept. The data I obtained in the field searches into people's diverse viewpoints, but it is insufficient to make general statements. Further research could conduct more comprehensive, long-term data from other regions of the West Bank. I believe that participant observations at all research sites are necessary to entirely grasp peoples' actions and their framing of it and to be able to make assumptions about how the different living conditions of people all over the West Bank interact with how they frame for instance the possibility to link farming with resistance. It is conceivable that further research could investigate how the particular local settings people live in influence their perception of how farming can be used in a political and more symbolic sense.

References

- Activestills Collective. (2015). A decade of anti-wall struggle: Palestinians and solidarity groups mark ten years of protest against Israel's separation wall. *Al Jazeera*. Retrieved March 15, 2018, from <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/inpictures/2015/02/decade-anti-wall-struggle-150216104252849.html>
- Bowen, G. A. (2009). Document Analysis as a Qualitative Research Method. *Qualitative Research Journal*, 9(2), 27–40. <https://doi.org/10.3316/QRJ0902027>
- Burnat, E., & Davidi, G. (2011). *Five Broken Cameras*. Occupied Palestinian Territories: Alegria Productions.
- Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). (2017). Middle East: West Bank. The World Factbook. Retrieved March 15, 2018, from <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/we.html>
- Clapp, J. (2012). *Food*. Cambridge, England: Polity Press.
- De Master, K. (2013). Navigating De- and Re-Peasantisation: Potential Limitations of a Universal Food Sovereignty Approach for Polish Smallholders. Paper for the conference 'Food sovereignty: a critical dialogue', Yale University/ISS. Retrieved March 15, 2018, from https://www.iss.nl/fileadmin/ASSETS/iss/Research_and_projects/Research_networks/ICAS/81_DeMaster_2013.pdf
- Desmarais, A. A. (2007). *La Via Campesina: Globalization and the Power of Peasants*. Fernwood Publishing and Pluto Press: Halifax and London.
- Dewulf, A., Gray, B., Putnam, L., Lewicki, R., Aarts, N., Bouwen, R., & van Woerkum, C. (2009). Disentangling approaches to framing in conflict and negotiation research: A meta-paradigmatic perspective. *Human Relations*, 62(2), 155–193. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0018726708100356>
- Goffman, E. (1974). *Frame analysis: An essay on the organization of experience*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
- Hennink, M., Hutter, I., & Bailey, A. (2011). *Qualitative Research Methods*. London: SAGE Publications.
- La Via Campesina. (2018). The international peasant's voice. Retrieved February 4, 2018, from <https://viacampesina.org/en/international-peasants-voice/>
- MA'AN Development Center. (2015). *Food Security in the Occupied Palestinian Territories*. Retrieved February 20, 2018, from <http://maan-ctr.org/old/pdfs/FSReport/FS.pdf>
- Mamonova, N. (2018). Patriotism and Food Sovereignty: Changes in the Social Imaginary of Small-Scale Farming in Post-Euromaidan Ukraine: Patriotism and Food Sovereignty. *Sociologia Ruralis*, 58(1), 190–212. <https://doi.org/10.1111/soru.12188>
- Martínez-Torres, M. E., & Rosset, P. M. (2010). La Via Campesina: the birth and evolution of

- a transnational social movement. *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 37(1), 149–175.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150903498804>
- McMichael, P. (2013). *Food Regimes and Agrarian Questions*. Halifax and Winnipeg: Fernwood Publishing.
- Morris, B. (2000). *Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-1999*. London: John Murray.
- Nyeléni. (2007). Declaration of Nyéléni. Retrieved February 4, 2018, from <https://nyeleni.org/IMG/pdf/DeclNyeleni-en.pdf>
- Patel, R. (2009). Food sovereignty. *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 36(3), 663–706.
- Peace Now. (2018). Population. Retrieved March 14, 2018, from <http://peacenow.org.il/en/settlements-watch/settlements-data/population>
- Schiavoni, C. (2017). The contested terrain of food sovereignty construction: toward a historical, relational and interactive approach. *Journal of Peasant Studies* 44 (1) pp. 1–32
- Shattuck, A., Schiavoni, C. M., & VanGelder, Z. (2015). Translating the Politics of Food Sovereignty: Digging into Contradictions, Uncovering New Dimensions. *Globalizations*, 12(4), 421–433. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2015.1041243>
- Silverman, D. (2015). *Interpreting Qualitative Data* (5th Ed.). London: SAGE Publications.
- Smith, C. D. (2013). *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History with Documents* (8th Ed.). Boston: Bedford-St. Martin's.
- Snow, D. A., & Benford, R. D. (1992). Master frames and cycles of protest. In A. Morris & C. McClurg Mueller, *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory* (S. 133–155). New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
- State of Palestine. (2016). *Socio-Economic & Food Security Survey 2014*. Retrieved January 4, 2018, from http://fscluster.org/sites/default/files/documents/sefsec2014_report_all_web.pdf
- The Applied Research Institute – Jerusalem (ARIJ). (2015). *Palestinian Agricultural Production and Marketing between Reality and Challenges*. Retrieved January 4, 2018, from http://www.arij.org/files/arijadmin/IDRC/finalcermony/2015_05_06_-_Booklet_-_FPCA_project_-_English_final_-_March_2015-_not_for_IDRC.pdf
- Union Of Agricultural Work Committees (UAWC)¹. (2018). About Us. Retrieved January 26, 2018, from www.uawc-pal.org/UAWCAbout.php
- Union Of Agricultural Work Committees (UAWC)². (2018). UAWC Mission. Retrieved January 26, 2018, from www.uawc-pal.org/UAWCMission.php
- Union Of Agricultural Work Committees (UAWC)³. (2018). UAWC Objectives. Retrieved January 26, 2018, from <http://www.uawc-pal.org/UAWCObjectives.php>

- United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). (2015). *The Besieged Palestinian Agricultural Sector*. Retrieved February 6, 2018, from http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/gdsapp2015d1_en.pdf
- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). (2014). *The 2014 Palestine Human Development Report: Development for Empowerment*. Retrieved February 6, 2018, from <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/UNDP-papp-research-PHDR2015.pdf>
- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). (2016). *Briefing note for countries on the 2016 Human Development Report: Palestine, State of* (Human Development Report). Retrieved February 5, 2018, from http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/PSE.pdf
- United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs occupied Palestinian Territories (UN OCHAoPT). (2009). *Restricting Space: The Planning Regime Applied by Israel in Area C of the West Bank*. Retrieved February 8, 2018, from https://www.ochaopt.org/sites/default/files/special_focus_area_c_demolitions_december_2009.pdf
- World Bank. (2013). *West Bank and Gaza - Area C and the future of the Palestinian economy* (English). World Bank Group. Retrieved February 15, 2018, from <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/137111468329419171/West-Bank-and-Gaza-Area-C-and-the-future-of-the-Palestinian-economy>
- World Bank. (2016). *Country Profile: West Bank and Gaza*. World Development Indicators Database. Retrieved January 5, 2018, from http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/reportwidget.aspx?Report_Name=CountryProfile&Id=b450fd57&tbar=y&dd=y&inf=n&zm=n&country=PSE

Figures

- United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA). (2011). *West Bank: Area C Map*. Retrieved January 6, 2018, from http://www.itcoopjer.org/sites/default/files/ocha_opt_area_c_map_2011_02_22_0.pdf