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Governing Rural Populations in Zambia

- *Examining how rural resettlement schemes are managed*

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ABSTRACT

It has been argued by academics and development practitioners alike that land on secure tenure provides opportunities for farmers in rural areas to invest in land improvement and increase their productivity. For this reason, the Zambian government has created resettlement schemes – these being blocks of planned and serviced land accommodating settlers-community-people without land. I therefore explored how governance practices have affected the farmers on secure land tenure in the resettlement schemes in Northern Zambia.

I explored this problem by answering the question of: How does governance of the land resettlement schemes and government bureaucracy shape the economic and livelihood choices of settlers and would be settlers in the resettlement schemes? I used governance as a theoretical framework. The findings show that there are multiple actors involved in managing the resettlement schemes but these are not working together. The majority of actors are not aware of the Zambia National Resettlement Policy. The different actors have shaped the lives of settlers differently.

Keywords: resettlement schemes, governance, land tenure, rural development

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

Land resettlement schemes in Zambia were started in the colonial times (then Northern Rhodesia). At the time, the British South African Company (BSAC), a chartered company by the British government established resettlement schemes (Adams 1983). The resettlement schemes were created to accommodate local people (natives) that had been displaced from their land to create farms for white settler farmers from Britain (Kalapula 1984; Adams 1983).

In 1964 when Zambia gained independence from Britain, resettlement schemes were reformed by the new Zambian government. The Zambian government used the resettlement schemes as a strategy for rural development (Phiri 2009). That is to provide land on secure tenure to small scale farmers instead of the colonial motive of getting rid of natives from their fertile land (Adams 1983).

The argument by the government of Zambia (GRZ) supported by multilateral agencies and donors has been that land that is privately owned increases productivity, and encourages investments in agriculture and use of sustainable agriculture methods (Adam 2003; Hansungule et al 1998; Bruce and Dorney 1982; Smith 2004; Ng'ombe et al 2014). Therefore, resettlement schemes are seen as a way of creating private owned land that can attract investment, create employment and promote urban to rural migration (GRZ 1995). However, the implementation of land resettlement was without a policy until 2015 when the GRZ enacted a national resettlement policy (GRZ 2015). Resettlement schemes today are defined in the National Resettlement Policy as “block of planned and serviced land accommodating settlers-community” (ibid 2015: 9).

In this study I focus on governance of the resettlement schemes to understand how this government program has affected the settlers' lives. Although there have been a number of studies in Zambia on resettlement schemes such as those by Magande (1975), Adam (1983), Himonga and Munachonga (1991), Phiri (2009) and Buumba (2013), there have not been

many on governance. In addition, the previous studies have also lacked conceptualization of governance in resettlement schemes. Most of these studies have been on livelihoods and on resettlement schemes located in peri-urban areas and those near urban areas. Furthermore, no studies have been carried out after the adoption of the new land resettlement policy of 2015. Therefore, research on governance in resettlement schemes is needed to understand how these areas are governed after the adoption of the resettlement policy and how governance has shaped settlers' lives.

In this thesis, I probe how the management of resettlement schemes has shaped the lives of the people living in them. I explore and examine practices of state governance and bureaucracy on people moving from customary tenure where they are governed by the traditional rulers to state land where they are governed by state authority. Further, I want to understand how governance and bureaucracy have affected the government's goal of using resettlement schemes to reduce poverty in rural areas and with it reduce rural to urban migration while promoting urban to rural migration.

The GRZ in the new policy is aiming to manage resettlement schemes for agriculture purposes sustainably that is to reduce environmental degradation and promote climate smart agriculture (GRZ 2015). The policy also aims to reduce poverty in rural areas by and through agriculture. The government is encouraging remigration into rural areas. A number of categories of people to benefit from land resettlement program have been drawn up. The two broad categories are voluntary and involuntary resettlements (ibid 2015).

The voluntary category is for people who are unemployed or those on contract jobs or about to retire from government employment and want to go to rural areas and invest in agriculture for a living and/or to make money (ibid 2015). To qualify for the voluntary resettlement category, one must be at least 18 years and with capacity to develop, that is be able to use the piece of land to grow crops within twelve months. On the other hand, involuntary

resettlements are for people that are displaced for a range of reasons including: natural disasters, development projects, conflicts etc. (ibid 2015).

In this study, I have chosen to focus exclusively on voluntary settlers. I have focused on this group (voluntary settlers) because they constitute the majority of the settler population. Second, because I want to understand the rationale behind the choice of people to resettle. I am using governance as a theoretical framework in order to understand how people that are settled in resettlement schemes are influence by government bureaucracy and other actors involved in the management of the resettlement schemes.

1.1 Research Problems, Aim and Research Questions

The GRZ has since independence used resettlement scheme to address rural poverty, rural-urban migration and to create employment (Adam 2003). Despite these efforts by government and others, there is little to show for. Poverty remains significantly high in rural areas and unemployment has not reduced nor has rural to urban migration (Adam 2003; Ng'ombe et al 2014; GRZ 2015). There is therefore need to understand why resettlement schemes have not addressed the problems that led to creation of resettlement schemes in the first place.

One of the areas that could answer the challenges of resettlement schemes not addressing the problems outline above could be governance. Little is understood about how the resettlement schemes are managed especially after adoption of the resettlement policy. In addition, little is also known on how the people who settle these areas feel and how bureaucracy affects them. There is therefore need for more research to understand how the resettlement schemes are managed and to know how governance influences settlers and therefore the goals of the resettlement schemes, especially now after the adoption of the new National Resettlement Policy of 2015.

Therefore, the aim of this research is to explore governance in resettlement schemes in order to understand how the government's strategies have affected the resettlement schemes and settlers' lives. This study analyzes

experiences of actors involved in resettlement schemes i.e. the people who have voluntarily settled in the resettlement schemes, those that wanted to settle in the resettlement schemes as well as the bureaucrats that make decisions in order to fully understand how governance (as conceptualized in detail below in section 2.0) has shaped lives and practices in the resettlement schemes. The study is explored through the following main research question:

How does governance of the land resettlement schemes and government bureaucracy shape the economic and livelihood choices of settlers and would be settlers in the resettlement schemes?

In order to answer this overarching question, I have broken it down into four sub-questions as below:

- i) What kind of policy instruments has government crafted and used in supporting the settlers in the resettlement schemes?
- ii) How do these policy instruments shape opportunities/challenges for households in the schemes?
- iii) How do different actors involved in the establishment and running of settlement schemes perceive their roles in management, practices and running of the resettlement schemes?
- iv) How do the governance practices of these actors shape the lives of settlers in the resettlement schemes?

These questions will help me understand how governance of resettlement schemes has shaped people's lives, farming practices, and the conduct of settlers in their everyday life. In addition, these questions will help me understand how settlers have seized opportunities in the resettlement schemes to improve their lives and how they have dealt with challenges arising from governance.

1.2 Limitation

This study was born out of my deep interest in understanding the land tenure systems in Zambia and how it affects farmers and their livelihoods on one hand; and on the other hand, I wanted to understand how government

programmes and the desire of the state to control and direct agriculture and people have affected the latter's lives.

The study is limited by the fact that it was conducted in one agro-ecological zone (Zambia has three), the least productive and therefore may not be reflective of the other zones in terms of agricultural productivity and the value associated with land. Second, this study was carried out over a 12 week period. This is relatively a short period for me to have observed government officials and other actors on how new decisions were made and or implemented. I therefore mainly talked to people about their views, roles and responsibilities. I have also not looked at other arms of governance such as institutions, gender, norms and values, and so on. Hence, this thesis is about perceptions of governance rather than practices of governance. Lastly, given the time constraints, I could not interview officials from all the 19 ministries listed in the resettlement policy. I selected eight ministries that I judged to be key based on their assigned roles in the resettlement policy.

1.3 Thesis Outline

This thesis is divided into six chapters. The second chapter looks at the background information. I have named this chapter "understanding the context" and it provides historical background to the study and reviews literature on resettlement schemes and what other scholars have studied and documented. In chapter three, I discuss the theoretical framework that is used in the study, namely governance. Chapter four discusses the methods that were used in the field to collect data. Chapter five contains the empirical findings as well as the discussion of the empirical findings using the lenses of governance. Chapter six contains my conclusions.

2.0 UNDERSTANDING THE CONTEXT

Zambia gained its independence in 1964 from Britain. At independence and a few years thereafter, Zambia was considered as one of the most industrialized countries in Africa. She was known for her copper ore resources and the export of copper made Zambia relatively rich during the 1960s and early 1970s (The World Bank 2002). However, Zambia's

fortunes began to decline in 1970s. The nationalization of the copper mines in the 1970s, under-investment, and lack of experienced mine management compounded by the fall in the world prices of copper and the rising oil prices led to an economic decline beginning in the 1974 (The World Bank 2002; Clapp 2015). In order to compensate for the falling copper prices and national revenue, Zambia borrowed extensively and in early 1990s, it was classified as a low-income country (World Bank 2002). Today, Zambia remains one of the poorest countries, with a per capita GDP of about US\$400 (ibid; GRZ 2015).

The dependence on copper made the economy vulnerable to external shocks and when copper prices fell and oil prices rose in mid 1970s, Zambia found itself in a difficult economic position. Therefore, the government was forced to diversify its economy into agriculture and resettlement schemes and cooperatives became the preferred development strategies (Adam 1983; Quick 1978). Resettlement schemes and cooperatives were to perform two functions. One was to develop rural areas and contribute to reduced migration into urban areas. Second, resettlement schemes were to attract unemployed people from urban to rural areas and thus relieve pressure on the urban areas. However, resettlements schemes and cooperatives were neither without their challenges nor histories (Adam 1983).

2.1 History of Land Settlement Schemes

In 1890, the British government gave authority to a chartered company called British South Africa Company (BSAC) founded by Cecil Rhodes to manage Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) on its behalf (Adam 1983). In 1924, BSAC handed the territory over to British Colonial Office (ibid 1983). BSAC had vast interests in the area that included mining, hunting and farming. As the population of white settlers grew in what would today be Zambia, the natives were displaced from their fertile land along the line of railway and relocated in resettlement schemes (ibid 1983). Therefore, resettlement schemes were born in Zambia in colonial times to accommodate displaced people (ibid 2015; Kalapula, 1984). After Zambia gained independence in 1964, the programme was reformed by the Zambian

government to accommodate the land that Europeans had owned and was now available again to the local people and to be used as a strategy for rural development (Phiri 2009; Adam 1983).

2.2 Land Reforms in Zambia and Resettlement Schemes

At independence, Zambia inherited a dual system of land tenure from the British. These were customary land tenure and the state land tenure: the former recognizes land as a communal property under traditional leaders while the latter allows for private ownership. Literature suggests that between 90% - 96% of the land is under customary tenure managed by chiefs (chiefs are traditional leaders in charge of customs) (Adam 2003; Hansungule et al 1998; Ng'ombe et al 2014; Nolte 2014). The Land Act of 1947 gave approximately 30% of the land (including national parks etc.) to the colonial government and the remainder to the chiefs under what was so called natives' authority or to local African people (Hansungule et al 1998). A few years after independence, the Zambian government passed the Land Acquisition Act of 1970. This Act empowered the post-colonial government to repossess land that had been abandoned by white farmers and to strengthen the customary land tenure. Under the 1970 Act, customary land was without financial value (Hansungule et al 1998; Adam 2003; Quick 1977; Chitonge et al 2017). It could not be bought or sold as this land was not viewed as a commodity and the law did not allow the conversion of land from customary land to private property (Hansungule et al 1998; Ng'ombe and Keivani 2013).

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Zambian economy greatly suffered as a result of communist inspired policies by the Zambian government which were opposed by the World Bank and other multilateral donors and agencies. This led to Zambia being isolated and unable to acquire foreign assistance in terms of loans and grants as well as a fall in foreign direct investment (FDI). This was compounded by the fall in copper prices and the drought of early 1990s. The net effect of these events was a change in government. The Zambian constitution was amended in 1990 from one party state to multi-party state. The elections of 1991 produced a new kind

of leadership that looked to the West and neoliberal policies for economic recovery and growth. They were keen to commodify land so that they could encourage investment and attract FDI as had been recommended by the World Bank and others (Hansungule et al 1998; Ng'ombe et al 2014).

In 1995 the *Zambian Lands Act* (of 1995) was born. This piece of legislation was enacted in order to allow for land conversion from customary tenure to private ownership. It also gave the president of Zambia power to unilaterally get land anywhere in the country with or without consultations as all land was vested in the president. The conversion of land from customary land tenure to private ownership made it possible for foreign FDI in land (Nolte 2014; Kajoba 2012). The *Lands Act* of 1995 created formal rules for acquiring land and therefore converting this land to private ownership. However studies show that these rules are weakly enforced. The reasons for weak enforcement include corruption, absence of strong community groups and ignorance of law by local people. As a result of weakness in enforcing rules, the local people are being excluded from access to land. Nolte (2014: 1):

“While investors, local authorities and government officials have strong leverage, local land users are excluded from the process. If the process of transformations of customary land into state land continues, land administration will be inevitably shifted toward statutory jurisdiction. As a result, local chiefs will lose their discretionary power thereby further marginalizing local land users.”

As the study by Kerstin Nolte shows, the *Land Act* of 1995 has not been a silver bullet in addressing rural poverty and economic growth. At best what this law has done is to create new land owners dominated by Zambian elites and multi-national companies on exclusion of local users. In addition, Ng'ombe et al (2014) have noted that the privatization of land has created land shortages in peri-urban areas, increased poverty and have destabilized traditional political structures leading in some cases to increased conflict. The local people have not been able to come together to register their communal land for a cocktail of reasons including costs and ignorance of

the land policies. The promise of employment from the investors has not been forthcoming, and benefits from investors have not been shared equally (Calfucura 2016; Nolte 2014; Place 2009).

Access to land is important for people's livelihood yet the Land Act of 1995 only give access to some and denying it to others especially the very poor who are not aware of laws, have no access to legal services and lose their land to elites and companies (Lund 2008). As Sikor and Lund (2008) have noted, access to resources are also about power and authority. The less powerful and the poor have often been indirectly excluded from land ownership. Therefore, there is need to explore dynamics of governance to understand how resettlement schemes function and to see if this government programme has helped settlers to access land in regardless of their economic status.

When land becomes state land i.e. is on title and therefore private property or has been declared state land like being declared a national park (under National Parks Act), it can never be reverted back to customary land. In recent years, customary land has had its own pressures from over population in some areas to land grabbing by the wealthy and corporations in other places as well as instability created by the customary tenure. Other pressures on customary tenure arise from too much power vested in a chief. A chief could grab land from a local farmer without adequate notice, and the incentives provided by the land Act of 1995 where chiefs can sell land for lucrative prices has meant that more people are being displaced as chiefs sell land to investors both local and international (Chitonge et al; Smith 2004; Himonga and Munachonga 1991).

2.3 A Review of Empirical Evidence on Resettlement Schemes

Resettlements have been used throughout the developing world with mixed results. In China for example, Zhibin's (2003) study showed that people in resettlements had increased household incomes and improved food production. Adams et al (1999) indicates that there were increases in both crop production and household income in some Zimbabwean resettlements.

Bomford (1973) found that resettlements had improved household incomes in Zambia. Adams (1983) also concluded that farmers in resettlements schemes in Zambia's Southern Province were better off than their neighbors on the customary land tenure system in terms of both increased production and agricultural knowledge.

However, others studies have shown no significant improvements in settlers incomes and or livelihoods. Magande (1975) did not find any significant improvements in income among settlers of Ngwezi resettlement scheme in Southern Province of Zambia. Munshifwa (2007) conducted a study on Kambilombilo resettlement scheme in Zambia's Copperbelt province. He concluded that there was no significant increase in crop production when compared with farmers on customary land tenure. In Zimbabwe, Kinsey (2003) found that the resettlement programmes were failing to meet the objectives set by the government and in some cases poverty was higher than in areas outside the resettlements. In East Africa, studies have shown that resettlement schemes by the government have had negative environmental impact such as soil and water degradation (Woube 2005). Even in China where there were successes in terms of income, Zhibin (2003) found that there was disparity in income growth, with poor people not having significant improvements in their income.

Many studies have linked land tenure system in resettlements to these areas being successful or not. Smith (2004) says land on secure tenure in Zambia leads to improved farm performance. He concludes that land tenure security is responsible for better farm performance across the sub-Saharan Africa. Kinsey and Binswanger (1993:1480) suggest that land tenure is important in farmers accessing credit and therefore being more productive and increasing income.

“Associated with poorly defined land rights and with the withholding of title or documentation of usufruct rights are poor access to credit and a lack of investment - as in the cases of Burkina Faso, Costa Rica, and Zimbabwe.”

Where land tenure and government rules do not allow farmers to sell land or use the land as they please, the result have been less productive farms (ibid). However many local studies in Zambia do not show such disparities between different lands on different tenures as demonstrated by Munshifwa (2007) and Magande (1975) among others.

There is scant literature on governance of the settlement schemes themselves. Most research has been to understand whether resettlements schemes are impacting the settlers usually through the lenses of livelihood. Kinsey and Binswanger (1993) discuss the implications of certain rules such as restricting the sale of land in settlements. They conclude that restricting sales of land in a settlements make land a non-commodity and therefore difficult to attract investments.

This brief review of existing literature shows that there is a limited understanding of how practices of governance shape the challenges and opportunities for people in resettlement schemes. With this thesis, my effort is therefore to explore this gap and add to the body of knowledge on resettlement schemes in developing countries.

3.0 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In this chapter I introduce the conceptual framework I am using to interpret the empirical evidence, namely governance. Maxwell (2012:39) describes theoretical or conceptual framework as “the system of concepts, assumptions, expectations, beliefs, and theories that supports and informs your research”. Creswell (2014) adds that in some qualitative studies, theory or concepts come in the beginning of the research and are used as lenses to help researchers narrow down to what they want to study and the kind of questions that need to be asked. The governance conceptual framework will allow me to understand how resettlement schemes are managed and how that in turn affects the lives of the settlers. I discuss it in details below.

3.1 Governance

I understand the concept of governance as referring to the purposeful effort to direct, manage or steer some or all sectors of society in certain direction/s (Koimann 1993). This understanding of governance is influenced by Foucault (1991) who looks at governance as a conduct of conduct. Therefore, governance broadly deals with leading, directing and guiding the people either by some authority or by creating an environment where people internalize certain values, ethics etc., to direct their conduct (ibid). There are always multiple agencies involved in governance such as state, church, culture etc. I agree with Dean (2010: 18) who notes that governance is always in plural involving an array of different actors: a “plurality of governing agencies and authorities, of aspects of behaviour to be governed, of norms invoked, of purposes sought, and of effects, outcomes and consequences”. Similarly, Li (2007) states that any government intervention (such as the resettlement schemes) that seeks to improve people’s welfare are usually assembled from a variety of actors and elements such as discourses, institutions, different experts and different social groups.

In this thesis, I am using governance to examine how the Zambian government and other stakeholders are collaborating or competing to shape the lives of the settlers in the resettlement schemes. Since governance is always in the plural involving multiple agencies (Dean 2010: Emerson et al 2012), it is important to understand how it is done and at what cost or benefit to the settlers. A number of scholars such as Li (2007), Emerson et al (2012) have recognized that certain public programmes cannot be effectively managed by single agencies acting alone, suggesting the need for many organizations with different skills and technical capacities to be involved in a collaborative manner (McGuire 2006). This is based on the understanding that repeated interactions among different organizations allow actors to build trust, engage in discussions and deliberations, and work together to develop solutions (Emerson et al 2012).

As stated above, this is also a position shared by Li (2007) who believes that any government intervention that seeks to improve people’s welfare are

usually assembled from a variety of actors. There are many actors involved in the management of the resettlement schemes and these affect settlers differently. As in the definition of governance by 'Our Global Neighborhood' report (2015:2), governance is "the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs". I therefore seek to understand how this is done in resettlement schemes and at what cost or benefit to the settlers.

I also understand that for any actor whether state or private to govern, they must have the ability to exercise authority and power (Dean 2010; Foucault 1979). Here, I am using power to mean the ability to influence the behavior of others while I see authority as the right to exercise power. Therefore, governance is the exercise of authority (Dean 2010, Foucault 1991). Broadly, governance involves individuals, traditions and institutions and how these individuals and institutions interact to manage common affairs. It is important to understand who exercises authority in the management of the resettlement schemes and how that in turn affects the lives of the settlers in these areas. Equally important is to understand how the settlers have responded to the different actors that exercise power over them.

The resettlement schemes have all been established by Zambian government to make state land available to Zambians without land. In this thesis, I therefore focus on the government departments to understand how they govern or not govern the resettlement schemes that they have created. In addition to the above definition of governance, I also borrow the definition of governance from Fukuyama (2013:3) to mean "a government's ability to make and enforce rules and to deliver services". I therefore examine how government departments in Northern Province of Zambia are enforcing rules and delivering services and how it has shaped the lives of the people living in the resettlement schemes.

In a nutshell, the governance theoretical framework allows me to examine how people that have been resettled by government are managed. I therefore examine the government departments to see how rules are made and

enforced; and how service delivery (or lack thereof) has created opportunities and or challenges for settlers. This theoretical framework additionally allows me to examine other actors that are non-state to see their roles in the management of resettlement schemes and whether they are working in collaborative manner or not with the government departments and how settlers have been impacted.

4.0 METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

This chapter discusses the methods that I used to carry out this study. This was a qualitative study philosophically grounded in social constructivism. As is the case with qualitative studies, I sought to understand meaning that people ascribe to a problem, and in my case the governance of resettlement schemes (Crewell 2014). I elected to use qualitative methods because of the nature of the study that was undertaken and the kind of questions that were asked. I wanted to understand how governance of resettlement schemes is done, how decisions are made by government officers, settlers, traditional leaders and other institutions in allocating and managing land in the resettlement schemes and how these decisions affect the people that settle in these places.

Data was collected directly from informants through interviews and through observation. By collecting data this way, I have enriched the understanding of the research problem (Creswell 2014). However, I recognize that by conducting a study using qualitative method like I have outlined here, means that I was also heavily involved in the research as an instrument of data collection as well as a human being with my own biases and prejudices. The advantage of collecting data qualitatively was that I was able to triangulate with other sources for clarity in cases where information provided was not clear. It also enabled me to sometimes get back to my earlier informants for clarifications. Further, qualitative methods allowed me to probe my respondents for clarity if responses that they gave me were somewhat vague.

As Creswell (2014) notes, the advantage of qualitative research is that the whole research process provides opportunities for the researcher to understand participants meanings of the issue or the problem under study. However, the background of the researcher also has an effect on how the study is shaped (Creswell 2014; Silverman 2015; Bryman 2012). One of the disadvantages I faced in being involved in data collection was that in some cases some respondents did not trust me enough to release certain information that they considered sensitive to the state fearing I could be an agent of the state since I am a Zambian and live near the informants. Further strengths and weaknesses are discussed in relation to each method below.

4.1 Field Study

This was a case study involving three resettlement schemes in three districts of Mungwi, Kasama, and Mpulungu of Northern Province of Zambia. The three resettlements schemes are Misombizi (Mpulungu), Chafubu (Mungwi) and Lukulu South (Kasama).

I selected these three sites because they are quite different one from the other in terms of locations, occupancy rates and the sizes. Lukulu South is the nearest to Kasama, the biggest town in Northern Province. This resettlement scheme has a number of farm owners living in Kasama and only going there to farm (mostly crops). Chafubu resettlement scheme is relatively new and has the largest number of abandoned and or an unoccupied farm plots, and Misombizi resettlement scheme because it one of the oldest resettlement schemes in the province and has 100% occupancy rate. In studying these three resettlement schemes together helped me to understand governance across the resettlement schemes and gave me a more representative picture as opposed to just studying one of them.

4.2 Data Collection

I collected data in all the three districts over a period of 12 weeks, lasting from 8th January to 10th April, 2018. At the district level, I interviewed government officers from Ministries of Agriculture, Community Development and Social Services, and officials from the District councils of Mungwi and Mpulungu and Kasama Municipal Council. At the provincial

level, I interviewed officers from ministries of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries, Office of the Vice-President, Works and Supply, Chiefs and Traditional Affairs, Lands, Local Government and Housing, and Water Development. The officers were selected from the list of ministries indicated in the policy (National Resettlement Policy) as key in the running of resettlements.

Besides the provincial government officers, I intended to interview someone from the department of Resettlement in the office of the Vice-President in Lusaka but I could not do so due to logistics and time constraints. I mitigated this challenge by the detailed discussions I had with the Kasama based officers in the same department.

4.2.1 Open-ended Interviews

I conducted open-ended interviews with all government officials, NGOs (Netherlands Development Organization (SNV) and World Vision International), two traditional leaders (Chiefs) and resettlement committee chairpersons. All interviews were face to face and in English except for two interviews with resettlement committee chairpersons where the interviews were held in the local language – Bemba. I had an interview guide but I let the discussions flow in order to get as much information from the informants as possible. I had the same interview guide for government workers (except for the Resettlement Officer), traditional leaders, committee leaders and NGO representatives. The Resettlement Officers had a different interview guide since I wanted to understand how they operate on a daily basis as the management coordination of the resettlement schemes rests entirely on them.

I recorded most interviews with government officers except those that refused from departments of Lands, Surveys, Local Government, Kasama Council and Livestock. I also took notes throughout the interviews. The two chiefs I interviewed and the NGO representatives refused to be audio recorded. The former cited sensitivity of land as custodians of it while the latter because they were not familiar with the resettlement policy.

I interviewed heads of government departments most of whom I had interacted with in different capacities (see section on ‘reflexivity’ below). This meant that in most cases, the interviews were unstructured and there was mutual respect and understanding. This made it easy for information to flow and there was trust that the information was for academic purposes. This could also have been a limitation as some informants could have held back information because they could have assumed it was not important for my purpose.

When interviewing chiefs, there were too many traditional rules to observe such as how to greet them and what could be asked and not asked. This meant that the chiefs had more power in deciding where and when the interviews could be held. Plus, it was difficult to ask follow up questions as I was not sure if certain questions would be appropriate. In the end, I asked all the questions but the interviews were heavily formal and took longer. This could have affected the result as I missed the opportunity of having recordings that I could turn to in case I needed clarity from my field notes.

4.2.2 Observations

Besides interviews, I collected additional information through observation in my interactions with government officials as well as the people in the resettlement schemes. Observations were important in understanding things like gender dynamics, relations between committee members and others. It was also important to understand body language on certain issues as well as looking at the crop fields, the types of crops grown and the farming methods practiced. I spent six days in each resettlement scheme so that I could also understand things that people could not explain in words. I took field notes of what I saw and observed while discussing in focus groups or while visiting the fields. Observation was particularly important [although it had the disadvantage of time consuming (Viten 1994)], in triangulating data between what the people had told me and what was obtaining on the ground or what could not be explained in words.

4.2.4 Focus Group Discussions

In addition to open-ended interviews and observations, I collected additional data using focus group discussions (FGDs). FGDs were important in collecting general views from settlers and also acted to fill the gap that I created when I elected not to interview individual settlers. This was a conscious decision I made given that I already had over 30 interviews with government officers and others. I did not want to have additional interviews because of time constraints especially when transcribing interviews. I held nine FGDs, three in each resettlement scheme to triangulate any information I had received from informants and observations. The FGDs provided new insights, feelings and experiences of the actual people that live in the resettlement schemes. The purpose of these discussions was to get experiences from people that live in the resettlement schemes and to understand how they think and perceive governance. In conducting FGDs, I followed the recommendation of Silverman (2015) where my role was mainly to facilitate the discussions.

I randomly selected people to the focus group discussions from resettlement schemes registers (these are registers of people that are settled in the resettlement schemes) held by the department of Resettlement. I had one group for only women of 6-8 people, another for only men also of 6 -8 people and the last one was mixed, but 6-10 in each resettlement scheme. The weakness of FGD is that some people in the groups dominate discussions (Silverman 2015). I mitigated this by having groups that were composed differently based on gender i.e. men alone, women alone and then a mixed one. I also encouraged everyone to participate.

4.3 Data Analysis

Willig (2014:1) says that, “interpretation is the challenge at the heart of qualitative research. Without interpretation, we cannot make sense of our data”. Therefore my main task was to interpret the data that had been collected from the field. As Creswell (2014:195) notes, “data analysis in qualitative research” goes “hand-in-hand with data collection and the write-up of findings”. In analyzing the data, I followed the steps outlined by Creswell (2014). Data analysis started with transcription of key interviews

with government officers. Then the field notes from observation and the interviews that had not been recorded on audio were reviewed. I compared the different responses from the different informants to identify themes and patterns that were emerging from the interviews. A list of major ideas that emerged was drawn. Since I was not using any software for analysis, data was hand coded according to the themes and patterns that were emerging. The themes from the data were then reviewed using the lenses of governance theoretical framework so that they could answer the questions for the study. The transcripts, field notes and audio recordings were reviewed at every stage to make sure that all key information had been captured and analyzed.

4.4 Reflexivity

My perceptions of governance of resettlement schemes have been influenced by my personal experiences working in rural areas. I have worked in rural Zambia for over 10 years and I was indirectly involved with resettlement schemes. In my undergraduate years, I conducted a study on refugees' perceptions of their environment in Meheba refugee resettlement in North Western Zambia. I therefore understand the context well and I am aware of the challenges in these areas that helped me ask relevant questions to informants.

I was also mindful that I knew the geographical areas of research well and therefore I had my own positions and prejudices about the resettlement schemes and how they were managed. Nonetheless, as Kvale and Brinkmann (2009: 242) observe "objectivity in qualitative inquiry here means striving for objectivity about subjectivity". I was aware of my biases, pre-judgments and prejudices but I mitigated these by listening to interviewees and took their opinions and positions without undue influence. My experience working in rural areas shaped my biases and I started the study with a perception that resettlement schemes are difficult to govern because of the many actors involved and lack of clarity as to what they are supposed to achieve. I remained self-reflexive and critically reflected on my perceptions throughout the study process so that I did not affect the

research negatively. I increased the credibility of the findings by triangulating with different stakeholders involved in the resettlement schemes as well by observations.

In order to protect the informants' rights, I started by asking their permission to speak with them. I then explained to them orally the objectives of the study and explained to them their rights to end the interview any time they liked if they did not feel like continuing. I also assured them of anonymity for all the responses provided. Since I was recording the conversations, I also explained this to the informants. Those that wished not be recorded were not recorded. All the informants gave me their consent before being interviewed and I respected their wishes if they told me something was off record but said it to illustrate a point.

5.0 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS

In this chapter, I discuss the empirical findings from the study. I examine how governance by the government and others has shaped opportunities and challenges in the resettlement schemes. I start by discussing the policy framework and then move to different actors involved in governance.

5.1 Government Policy Framework

The resettlement schemes have been established under the office of the vice-president of Zambia (GRZ 2015). Their management is guided by the Zambia National Resettlement Policy of 2015. The policy was formulated after wide consultations with different stakeholders that included donors, investors, government bureaucrats, traditional leaders and private citizens etc. The policy is consistent with the Land Act of 1995 and aims to provide secure land tenure to small scale framers in order to boost food production and reduce poverty in rural areas (Hansungule et al 1998; Ng'ombe et al 2014; Nolte 2014). Below, I discuss how this policy is enforced in the resettlement schemes and the implications on the settlers.

5.1.1 Department of Resettlements

The department of Resettlement in the office of the vice-president has been created to coordinate governance of the resettlement schemes. This department is staffed up to the provincial level but is without staff at district level. The Department of Resettlement is responsible among many other things for identifying land in consultation with other ministries, advertising for available land in resettlement schemes as well as allocating the land in the resettlement schemes (GRZ 2015).

In Northern Province, there are a total of five officers, the Principle Resettlement Officer and four other support officers. Together, they run the six resettlement schemes in the province. In my interview with the department of Resettlement officers, the key issues they raised were lack of finances and staff. Poor funding coming from the treasury to the department remained their major challenge; therefore they could not effectively coordinate all departments. Some government officers I interviewed felt that this department is in a wrong ministry. An officer that I interviewed in the ministry of agriculture put it this way:

“The office of the Vice-President is an appendage of government. It’s an office without power. If I refused to turn up for a meeting, nothing happens. If that department was in the ministry of Agriculture or even Community Development, the results would be different”. [02/03/18 – Kasama]

The perceived “lack of power” associated with the office of the vice-president where the department of Resettlement is, means that this office cannot effectively coordinate other government departments. It lacks the authority to direct other departments to support its works. Therefore, this affects the resettlement schemes as service delivery is dependent on the different government departments.

Other government officers felt that lack of coordination and collaboration was not only due to poor funding but personnel that occupied the different offices. One government officer said this:

“This is a two way thing. First, funding is down for everyone let alone for a department like Resettlement that is not a

priority to politicians. There are only a handful of voters in these places we're talking about. Second, we as officers in these offices make it either easy or difficult for our colleagues to work with us. A smile costs nothing but if you don't show up at other people's meetings, who would show up at yours especially if there are no allowances involved". [13/03/18 – Kasama]

While the creation of the Resettlement department is necessary and important, inadequate resources allocated to it has made the department less capable to carry out its mandate. This means that the department of Resettlement is not able to monitor farmers, hold coordination and policy dissemination meetings with other actors etc. As a result of both lack of adequate staff and financial resources, the National Resettlement Policy has not been disseminated resulting in a number of actors not being aware of the policy.

Some settlers I spoke with in FGDs said they could not raise certain issues such as conflicts with their neighbors because they did not meet with the officers from the department of resettlement. *"We hardly ever meet with the officers (from resettlement department). They only meet with the (resettlement scheme) committee members in Kasama". [04/04/18 – Kasama]*

If we understand governance according to Dean (2010), then governance is about directing people or actors to achieve an outcome. If the department of Resettlement cannot perform its duties because of lack of financial and human resources, then it goes without saying that the intended outcome of the resettlement schemes cannot be achieved. If the resettlement department has no money, it cannot attract others to its meetings. Therefore finances in this sense are not just important in governance at the resettlement scheme level but also at bringing the different actors together to have an agreed outcome.

5.2 Actors Involved in Management of Resettlement Schemes

There are a number of actors involved in the management of the resettlement schemes. The National Resettlement Policy identifies a number of government ministries, departments, traditional leaders, NGOs etc. as important in running of the resettlement schemes. However, not many of these government ministries or agencies let alone NGOs and others are aware that they have been included in the policy and have a role to play in the running of the resettlement schemes. I discuss the different actors separately starting with government departments

5.2.1 Coordination among Government Departments

The policy identifies 19 government departments, government agencies such Zambia Environmental Management Agency, traditional leaders and NGOs as being responsible for management of the schemes. Each of these departments or actor has been assigned certain functions. For example, the department of Lands in the policy has the following functions (GRZ 2015: 31):

“i) Facilitating acquisition of land for resettlement purposes; (ii) Ensure that all land given to Government for establishment of resettlement schemes is put on title; (iii) Numbering of plots for resettlement; (iv) Carrying out cadastral surveys in resettlement schemes; (v) Providing settlers with title deeds; (vi) Facilitating land dispute resolution; and (vii) Ensuring that resettlement schemes benefit from Land Development Fund”.

Although the department of Lands in the ministry of Lands and Natural Resources has been tasked to provide title deeds, the policy makes it clear that each settler must apply on his or her own and meet all the costs associated with this process.

However, out the 13 departments plus the two district councils and the municipal council whose officers I interviewed, only four were aware of the policy and or worked with the department of Resettlement to support the resettlement schemes. These were ministries of Agriculture, Lands and

Natural Resources, and Water Development plus Kasama Municipal Council. Of the remaining ministries and or departments, six had never even heard of the National Resettlement policy.

The Zambian government in its policy wanted different sectors and ministries to work together to support the resettlement schemes but this is obviously not the case. The lack of coordination and working together arises from each ministry having its own strategic plan and the absence of a provincial technical committee that can bring the different departments together. Some of the officers interviewed were of the view that resettlement schemes are few and host fewer people and therefore not worthy the efforts of the different ministries. As one officer in the ministry of agriculture put it:

“I have limited staff in this department. We work for the whole district where almost everyone is a farmer. You are talking of over 100,000 people. Why should I spend so much time and resources on 330 farmers in Chafubu [resettlement scheme]? Does that make sense?” [13/03/18 – Mungwi]

These findings from this study show that government officers in a number of ministries are not aware of the policy and are therefore not working in the resettlement schemes to advance the government goals in the National Resettlement policy. Instead, each department that works in the resettlement schemes work there as in any other place using their own sector approach without regards to policy on resettlement. In some places, I could not even conduct an interview because people in those departments like Livestock and Fisheries knew nothing about the resettlement schemes. The lack of awareness by government departments that should be implementing a policy means that the policy is not being implemented.

If we understand governance, to mean the rational act of shaping conduct using different techniques and tools (Foucault 1991; Dean 2010), then the Zambian government is not able to steer the settlers in the direction they want as stipulated in the policy. The Zambian government in the policy wanted to assemble different actors to deliver service to the settlers but this

is not happening. The state is absent especially in terms of service delivery. Therefore, the governance of the resettlement schemes is left to the settlers themselves to look for alternative people and organization such as NGOs to deliver services to them. For example, water sources in Misombizi resettlement scheme have been provided by an NGO - World Vision Zambia.

Generally, the policy has been welcomed by those familiar with it as providing direction but its effects on the people especially the settlers has been minimal. One council official put it this way:

“As long as there is no Act of Parliament, this policy is impotent. It can be thrown out any day. And this policy has not helped anyone anywhere and it is not known except by very few officers. It is not known because either it is not important or does not affect our work significantly. And, I doubt if there was consultations before the policy was approved”. [14/03/18 – Kasama]

From above sentiments by some government officers, it can be seen that resettlement schemes are not effectively managed by the government as some government officers either do not know that the policy exists or they simply ignore it because there are no consequences for doing so.

The absence of an Act of parliament on resettlements by the government is evidence that perhaps this is an area of no priority by the executive branch of government. Therefore, the government employees also respond to the policy half-heartedly. The implications on governance are clear. The government is not running the resettlement schemes as intended. As result, they are not able to achieve the outcome of making these places productive. Settlers have been left without adequate support and therefore, they have not been able to transform themselves into productive farmers. According to Li (2007), assemblage brings different actors together and that is what the Zambian government wanted so that there is learning and borrowing practices across the disciplines to support settlers. But if this assemblage is weak or none existent, settlers are affected as these actors begin to compete for influence, to influence the settlers conduct instead of working together to achieve one outcome or multiple related outcomes (Dean 2010).

5.2.1.1 Provincial Resettlement Committee

The resettlement policy establishes two committees related to the management of the resettlement schemes. These are provincial resettlement committee and a local committee for the settlers. The provincial resettlement committee is chaired by the Provincial Permanent Secretary (the most senior civil servant in a province) and it has 15 members coming from government departments, NGOs, Chiefs, Councils and politicians. These are members by virtue of their positions.

The roles of this committee include:

“i) Conduct settler selection interviews in order to select suitable individuals for resettlement; (ii) Allocation of plots; (iii) Initiating and monitoring of developmental projects in the schemes; (iv) Recommend issuance of title deeds to deserving settlers; (v) Enforce eviction of erring or illegal settlers; and (vi) Publicize rules and regulations for settlers” (GRZ 2015: 40).

In discussions with different actors, this committee hardly meets. Only three people ever remembered attending a committee meeting in mid-2016. The failure of this committee to meet regularly has meant the absence of government in the resettlement schemes. Other than the allocation of land that is done once in a while, there was no evidence that this committee performs any of its other roles. Since the committee does not meet regularly, not all members are familiar with the policy; some of its functions have been taken over by settlers themselves and other organizations. For example, the settlers ‘committee is now evicting erring settlers.

The implications of this are that these others like NGOs and chiefs do not know the intended outcome of the resettlement schemes and may be working against the policy. Policy rules and regulations have been broken but there is no one to enforce the rules and regulations. The government has resettled people in the schemes but is not able to effectively govern them to achieve the desired outcome because it cannot run its own committee.

5.2.2 Settlers' Committees

The policy also establishes a resettlement scheme committee of elected people among the settlers of five to ten on a three year term. For bigger resettlement schemes, these are further divided into sub-sections each having a sub-committee. The sub-committees report to the main committee.

The committee's roles include:

“(i) Disseminate the objectives of the resettlement programme to the settlers; (ii) Assist the Department of Resettlement to administer the resettlement by working closely with the Scheme Manager; (iii) Act as the mouth piece for the settlers; (iv) Plan and execute self-help projects; (v) Take responsibility for the coordination of the purchase of agricultural inputs and marketing of produce or any other project of benefit to the settlers; (vi) Ensure that statistics of population and produce in the schemes are updated and kept; (vii) Enforce regulations made by the department and the settlers themselves; (viii) Offer leadership in the Scheme such as conflict resolution; (ix) Protect the interest of the settlers; (x) Ensure that only authorized settlers live in the Scheme; and (xi) Recommend eviction of illegal or erring settlers to the Provincial Resettlement Committee” (GRZ 2015: 44).

From the interviews with the committee chairpersons as well as from FGDs, I found that this committee was very active and effectively running the resettlement schemes. In absence of the government it had reinvented itself and created a new institution with roles similar to those of the provincial committee. In some cases, this committee has evicted settlers as reported in FGDs in Lukulu South, a function that should be performed by the provincial committee. In Misombizi, the committee imposed fines on erring settlers to avoid eviction even though the policy does not give the committee such authority. The actions of the committee are contributing to some settlers abandoning their land. As one man in Chafubu Resettlement Scheme noted; *“These people (the people in committee) are always asking for contributions for funerals etc. and if you refuse, they threaten you with*

eviction. That is why some people are leaving this scheme” [19/03/18 – Chafubu - Mungwi]

This brings me to a principal finding of this thesis: the absence of government in resettlement schemes have created spaces for new types of governance which was not intended by the Zambian government. The implication of this rise of new governance is that it is not consistent with what government had planned. This new governance is similar to that obtaining on customary land tenure and is dictatorial in nature. For example, the chairman of the resettlement committee makes unilateral decisions without the erring party being heard. In other words, because of the absence of government, the customary rules and regulations are governing land that is state owned. As one woman in FDG noted, *“They don’t listen to us. They listen to their fellow men because they think they are chiefs here” [27/03/18 – Misombizi in Mpulungu].*

Government through its policy wanted to create private property governed by state laws but its absence has given rise to different governance systems based on customary laws. If we agree with Fukuyama (2013:3) that governance means, “a government's ability to make and enforce rules and to deliver services”, then we can conclude that the Zambian government has not been able to effectively govern the resettlement schemes. New institutions and governance systems have emerged that are consistent with customary and traditional values and norms and people in resettlement have supported them because they are familiar with them.

5.2.3 NGOs Roles in the Management of Resettlement Schemes

I interviewed two representatives from two international NGOs, namely Netherlands Development Organization (SNV) and World Vision International and one from a local NGO working on SUN (Scaling Up Nutrition) Project. Although all had worked in one or two resettlement schemes, their work was not in collaborations with the department of Resettlement. In fact all representatives were not aware that there was a policy guiding the resettlement schemes. Their work in the resettlement

schemes included drilling boreholes, water and sanitation education, agriculture extension services, nutrition support activities and so on.

The fact that it is NGOs providing these services (without being delegated by government and in isolation) and not the government shows that the government is not equipped to adequately govern these areas. Government has neglected these areas because either they are not politically important as an officer in department of agriculture said, “*There are not a lot of voters in the resettlement schemes*” [19/03/18 – Mungwi] or because they have inadequate resources to effectively govern the resettlement schemes. Whatever is the reason, the implications are that the absence of government in the resettlement schemes has allowed NGOs and others to bring in different kinds of governance. This has been compounded by lack of coordination among the different actors.

Everyone is working in the resettlement scheme independent of the others. As the Principal Officer in the department of resettlement said, “*we do not have resources to bring everyone together so our work is not completely coordinated with others*” [05/03/18 – Kasama]. Instead, there are multiple institutions involved and some are directly competing with the government like the chiefs (as discussed below) who want influence in these areas which is state land and therefore out of their jurisdictions.

5.2.4 Chiefs Roles in Management of the Resettlement Schemes

Chiefs are not directly involved in the running of the resettlement schemes. Their role is only to provide land to department of Resettlement. However, the study found that they are important in conflict management and resolution in the schemes. Although the land in resettlement scheme is state land, chiefs still maintain some loose power over the people in the resettlement. When conflict between or among the settlers arise, most people in the resettlement said they preferred going to the chiefs to settle their difference. “*We go to chiefs because we can’t afford legal fees demanded in courts of law*” [28/03/18 Misombizi Mpulungu] a man said in FGD in Misombizi.

The chiefs were preferred for conflict resolutions because they lived near, were generally seen to be less corrupt and the cost for settlers seeking help was minimal when compared to state options that are available. In addition, the settlers were familiar with traditional institutions that had served them well for years and were not willing to give them up.

I interviewed two chiefs, Paramount Chief Chitimukulu and Chief Mwamba. Both did not view resettlement schemes as beneficial to the people. They felt that resettlement schemes give land to people that do not deserve it and those that come from far leaving the local people without land. One chief put it this way:

“The idea of having titles to land is an idea introduced by the British colonialists to steal land from us, the people. This is our land, the people’s land. Why would you need a title? Who would I ... which chief would chase his own subject? Chase him to where? The problem is you educated people confusing our people with your foreign ideas.” [10/04/18 – Kasama]

It was clear from my discussions with the chiefs that they did not want the land on title because it reduced their influence and therefore their power on the subjects. A chief’s power is derived from the size of land he controls and the population therein. But also their reasons were legitimate.

“If I give all my land to people who convert it to state land, what about the poor who can’t afford the titles who are the majority? Where will they go? What about people in urban areas who identify themselves with my chiefdom, when they retire, where will they go? We need land under our control so that we can know how to share it among our people in the need. If all land went to people who can afford it, where will the poor go? Agriculture is the only trade they know. You want this country to be another Zimbabwe?” [10/04/18 – Kasama]

The chiefs I talked to do not want their land on title because it would deprive the poor from accessing the communal land. Both chiefs I spoke with said they would not be willing in future to release land to the Zambian government for resettlement schemes because there were no benefits in

doing so to the majority of Zambians. Chafubu resettlement scheme according to the paramount chief was illegally obtained and he is contemplating legal action against the state so that the land is reverted back to customary tenure. The land in question was released to government by an acting chief following the death of the previous paramount chief. Therefore, the current paramount chief who succeeded the dead chief believes that the person who acted had no authority to give away land. This finding means that people living in Chafubu resettlement scheme are living in fear of losing the land. This according to my discussions in the focus groups affected how some people invested. Some settlers said they did not plant trees because they feared being evicted in the future and losing out.

The two Chiefs interviewed see themselves as victims of land policies that seek to take away their authority and power. They view the reforms in land management from the Land Act of 1995 to the current policies as government trying to usurp power from them to foreign investors. Therefore, chiefs in the study area do not work with government to achieve the desired outcome of government as one chief put. *“I haven’t read the policy but even if I read it, it changes nothing. I am guided by our traditions and customs and not government policies.”* [10/04/18 – Kasama]. Their presence in the resettlement schemes are to strengthen their positions and hold on people and land which is otherwise outside their jurisdiction. But the absence of government officers in the resettlement schemes has given opportunities to chiefs to exercise authority on the settlers. For example, the chiefs are key in conflict resolutions and settling civil matters. Settlers go to chiefs’ courts instead of official government courts of law because the chiefs’ courts are cheaper and justice is swift in civil cases.

5.3 Access to Land on Title

The government and its partners including multi-national institutions like the World Bank have been pushing for private ownership of land. Their argument has been that more secure land tenures create high investments in agriculture and is good for the economy (Bruce and Migot-Adholla 1995).

However, there has been no evidence in this research to suggest that settlers in the resettlement schemes have invested more than people on customary land tenure. On average, people have only cultivated between 3 to 6 hectares of land under their possessions which does not show any significant difference with those growing food on the customary land in these areas.

Although people want their land on title to make it easier to sell land or access loans where possible, they do not think that a title will cause them to change their agriculture practices. Investment in land is limited by financial capacity and not the absence of title to the land. As one farmer in a FGD in Lukulu South noted:

“I am not waiting for a title to expand on my farm size. I am looking for money to expand my farm. If I had money today, between paying for a title and investing in the land, I will choose the latter. This land is mine and no one will take it away from me. It is God given. Government only helped me by creating boundaries with my neighbors”. [12/02/18 – Lukulu South – Kasama]

The GRZ through its World Bank and IMF influenced policies and actions seem to suggest that people’s agriculture practices and therefore their livelihoods will improve if they had titles to land. Whereas this could be true in some cases elsewhere in the country, there was no evidence here from this study. This study shows that whereas the government and its cooperating partners have been pushing the people to acquire titles, the people find the titles important but not a priority. The people’s priority is to increase their production on their farms by investing more in high value crops but they are limited by financial resources

In my discussions with both male and female settlers in FGDs, most people said their limiting factors to increasing their production was lack of access to finance for agriculture such as loans and that titles were not that important. When I interviewed government officers in the ministry of agriculture and the chairpersons of the committee to understand if titles for land would help farmers in the resettlement schemes access loans, both groups categorically said “NO”.

In terms of governance, it is therefore clear that there is disparity in priorities between the government and its partners on one hand, and the farmers and local people on the other, leading to policies being ineffective.

The government departments responsible for governing the resettlement schemes have not fully understood what people want in these areas. The government's desire to encourage people to acquire titles has not yielded any positive results. The people's priorities are to produce more crops whether their land is on title or not but they are limited by finance. The people are cultivating less land because of lack of access to agriculture inputs like fertilizers, improved seeds etc. and not because of the absence of title deeds.

Even for those that wanted title deeds, they said the process of getting a title is too long, too expensive and not worthy it. To get a title, a farmer needs the following:

- Offer letter from Department of Resettlement - (requires no payment)
- Letter from ministry of agriculture stating the purpose of plot (farm) – (requires no payment)
- Numbered site-plans from either the council or Department of Physical Planning – (requires payment to lands and the council)
- Cadastral diagrams from Department of Survey – (requires payment)
- Offer letter from Department of Land – (requires payment).

All these processes can take up to 10 years according to some settlers in FGDs. Other settlers in the FGDs said the biggest challenge for them was to raise the amount of money required by the department of Surveys to conduct a survey that would result into the production of cadastral map or diagrams. They (settlers) gave an average, of Zambian Kwacha 4,000 (an equivalent of \$400) per hectare as the amount that they were charged for their land to be surveyed. The farmers said they could not afford it and did not find it necessary to have titles as land on title attracted land rate, a fee for owning land.

On evidence of this study, the government has in many ways failed to govern the resettlement schemes as stipulated in its policies because the government has not fully understood the needs of its people and have policies that are not friendly to the poor. The price of services is too high for an average settler in the resettlement schemes. As one chief noted, *“the state has adopted western policies influenced by the NGOs such as Land-Alliance [Land Alliance is an NGO that is working on Land Issues mostly advising government on Land related policies, and they are pro-private ownership] without understanding its local environment”*. [10/04/18 – Kasama]

As Li (2007) notes, certain government programs risk producing outcomes that are contradictory to the aims of the program or even perverse. And here, it is clear that government’s push for settlers to have titles to land has not produced any result. No single settler has his or her land on title. Therefore, the push to privatize rural land may not be the panacea to Zambia’s rural poverty. It risks making many people landless without necessarily creating wealth for those that access land. If we take the definition of Dean, for governance to mean shaping the behavior of people, it can be concluded here that the *Zambian* government has not been very successful in shaping the behaviour of settlers to see the importance of land title deeds.

5.3.1 Farm Sizes

The farm sizes offered to settlers range between five to a maximum of 40ha on evidence of the three resettlement schemes visited. The small sizes of the farms limited what settlers could do. One ministry of agriculture officer said that only land of at least 200ha might be looked at favorably by the banks for financing so that in the event that the farmer failed to pay, the bank would get the farm and sell it to recover its loan. I interviewed five people that abandoned or refused to relocate to the resettlement schemes. I had wanted to interview more (eight), but others declined to be interviewed citing lack of interest in the topic.

Those that abandoned land said they did so because the size of farms in the resettlement was not enough to support their relocation. One individual noted:

“I can’t move from here (Kasama) to Luwingu or Kaputa to occupy a mere 15ha. What would that do to me? I thought they were giving land for farms like 400ha or 500ha where I can do proper farming. What would 15ha do for me? I can’t make profit from 15ha. I need a farm not a small holding for keeping a few chickens” [07/02/18 – Kasama]. Small plot sizes were compounded by poor fertility. One woman I interviewed said: ‘nothing could grow there. I think that that place is under a curse or something’ [08/02/18 – Kasama]

The government officers in ministries of agriculture and Lands also understand this but bureaucracy fails them to make changes as policies cannot be drafted or changed at local level but only at national level. As one government officer told me, *“Our priorities in the resettlement schemes are misplaced. You cannot give someone 15Ha of land and hope that such a small piece of land can attract a loan even when on title. We all know what is wrong but we can do nothing because decisions are made in Lusaka sometimes by politicians and civil servants with little understanding of these rural areas”*. [20/02/18 - Kasama]

Crop production, agriculture practices and the general behaviour of farmers in the resettlement schemes is not any different from those on customary land. Governance of resettlement schemes is quite complex. It is not just about changing the tenure systems. It is also about changing how markets operate. Nonetheless, the market model where it was hoped by the government that settlers with private land would acquire loans is not working because of lack of value in the land in certain rural areas plus the small sizes. My argument here is that private ownership although advocated for by many people and organizations including the Zambian government, does not answer to needs of people living on small pieces of land that are less productive.

The decision by the Zambian government to create smaller pieces of land although justified given the big rural population is not sustainable model for rural areas to attract investment. Seen from a governance lenses, the government created land that should have been able to attract investment but the small sizes have failed to do so. This has resulted in farmers having land that cannot help them access loans to improve their incomes from increased productivity and production.

5.4. Lack of Investments in the Resettlement Schemes

The government in its policy has pledged to build infrastructure in the resettlement schemes so that people moving to these areas have access to schools for their children, clinics and health centers, markets, roads etc. However, in all three resettlement schemes, the people complained of lack of infrastructure. In Misombizi resettlement scheme, there is only one community school that runs from grade one to grade five. Children of settlers in this area in higher grades have to go to schools in the nearby villages, which could be several kilometers. Some parents said their children walked 11 km to go school one way. In Chafubu and Lukulu South resettlement schemes, each has one government school. But given the sizes of these areas, some children cover long distances to attend school.

The roads in all the three resettlement schemes that I visited were barely passable. In Lukulu South, I could not access certain areas because there were no bridges on certain streams and rivers. In Chafubu, a number of farms could not be accessed by vehicle because the roads were washed away. The farmers that I spoke with in all places were also concerned with increased thefts because of the absence of state police.

Whereas in the villages security usually comes from safety in numbers, where a group of villagers live together and therefore take care of their security together, in the resettlement schemes each farmer lives alone (with his/her family) and therefore vulnerably to thieves. Many farmers I spoke to lost animals and crops to thieves because state security (police) are not near these places and by virtue of these farmers living in isolation, they cannot

form local security groups usually known as neighborhood watch committees.

The result of the absence of infrastructure, social amenities etc. has meant that some farmers have abandoned their farms, others have settled in urban areas only visiting these places once in a while, and those that have relocated cannot fully improve their livelihoods and transform themselves into viable medium scale farmers. The state's failure to provide the basic infrastructure has in essence meant that they have failed to effectively govern the resettlement schemes and thus direct the conduct of the settlers. Instead, the farmers who have settled in these areas have adopted their traditional ways of farming and managing land. The resettlement schemes are in some respects not governed at all because government has not provided basic infrastructure as one man said in FDG in Chafubu. *"Where I stay there is no government. No school, no road, no nothing to talk about"*. [21/03/18 – Chafubu – Mungwi]

This brings me to another key conclusion: this fact that the government management fails to provide infrastructure transforms settlement schemes into domains where government has no authority to exercise power. The institution that set up the resettlement in the first place has now lost its authority to govern the people therein as people look elsewhere for provision of services. As a camp extension officer told me. *"If there is meeting in the resettlement by World Vision or Heifer International, people would go there and not come to our meeting because they trust them better than us"* [19/02/18 – Kasama]. In Misombizi, the boreholes have been constructed by World Vision and therefore the settlers look more to NGOs than government to help them as one woman said in Misombizi: *"they (government people) only make empty promises. They do nothing except to come in their expensive vehicles. I have stopped attending their meetings. They just waste my time"*. [29/03/18 – Misombizi – Mpulungu]

The government officers are aware of the unfulfilled promises made to the farmers but they are not doing anything about it because of the absence of resources. As one officer in the Department of Resettlement said,

“We are aware of our obligations and we want to help but there is no money. I spend more time in office doing nothing. I have no funding and therefore I cannot even visit these places. If funding was to improve, we would do so much.” [13/02/18 – Kasama]. These concerns raised by the civil servants show that resettlement schemes are not well governed because they are isolated, unimportant politically and are starved of funding. This model of improving farming and promoting investment in rural areas using resettlement schemes does not seem to be working on evidence of this study. These areas are poorly managed, have failed to attract people from urban areas and have only been suitable for villagers who were subsistence farmers and have continued as such.

The Zambian government by not providing infrastructure in these areas has limited the opportunities for settlers. Private companies for example have not filled the gap to construct roads or schools etc. as there are no economic incentives to do so given the huge costs associated with such projects. Free markets work in areas where profits are guaranteed. For example, lack of roads means that settlers cannot access inputs on time and it raises costs of transportation. Lack of schools means that parents with school going children are forced to abandon the resettlement schemes to settle in areas where they children can attend school.

5.4.1 Lost Legitimacy

Government has stipulated in the policy that any farm not developed i.e. cultivated or used for intended purposes in 18 months from the date of offer shall be withdrawn from the farmer (GRZ 2015) but there is no single farm that has been withdrawn in the three resettlements schemes by government. There are a number of farms (around 30% on average) that have been deserted, abandoned or simply farmers not moved to their allocated farms to occupy them.

The department of Resettlement has not withdrawn them for a number of reasons that include lack of funding for the office to carry out scheduled

monitoring of farms, a semi-functional provincial resettlement committee and as above lack of infrastructure.

This therefore means that the state cannot effectively govern the resettlement schemes as per its policy and influence the settlers' behaviour. Because of the absence of infrastructure, the people that have settled in the resettlement scheme or those who have gotten land can ignore rules without fear of sanctions because the state is doing the same thing, it has lost the moral legitimacy to act. As one informant in Kasama told me; *"They cannot evict me from that plot. They do not even know that I am not there. Anyhow, even if they did, there are no roads."* [13/02/18 – Kasama]

The policy advocates for the use of mechanical power for farming and to move away from a hoe which is labor intensive. In all three places, people are working the land using a hoe. There is no evidence of using tractors or animal power (such as oxen or donkeys) for farming. This has limited the size of land that the settlers are able to cultivate and plant and hence not improved livelihood as the state had wanted in the policy. The amounts of incomes raised in the resettlement schemes are similar to those of other peasants growing food on customary land. There is no evidence of improved or environmentally friendly farming techniques such as conservation agriculture or climate smart agriculture or agroforestry. The farmers in resettlement schemes rely on tradition methods such as "chitemene" (slash and burn) to grow food.

The government has failed to govern settlers in ways that make productive. In the absence of this leadership from government, settlers have depended on traditional methods. This means although government has been successful in resettling these people, their agricultural practices continued to be governed by traditional knowledge. If governance is understood in the words of Foucault (1991) to mean conduct of conduct, then it can be seen that government has failed to influence the behaviour of farmers to adopt environment friendly agricultural practices.

5.5 Bureaucracy in the Resettlement Schemes Management

Bureaucracy in management of land and therefore resettlement schemes was noted by farmers as problematic. There are too many agents or government departments responsible for the same activity that settlers felt they wasted a lot of time moving from one office to another. They gave example of land titles involving at least five departments (Agriculture, Resettlements, Council, Lands department, Survey's department). Associated with these departments was also the issue of costs. Each department charges one kind of fee or another for its service thus increasing the cost of services.

Some farmers especially women expressed concern with language used in the offices – English. One woman in Misombizi said the following: *“All of us Zambians speak one of the seven main local languages. These languages are also taught in our schools. But how come all documents are written in English? I can't read English but I can read Bemba.”* [28/03/18 – Misombizi – Mpulungu]. They said because all documents whether applications for resettlement land or applications for title etc. were in English and given that most women were less literate than their male counterparts, they were indirectly excluded from accessing services. Other women said government officers had the habit of saying – *“come tomorrow”*, which worked against them as they had many chores at home and finding time was not as easy as the officers implied.

Bureaucracy has weakened the governance of the resettlement schemes, discouraged certain group of people like women from accessing land, caused delays in issuance of titles to land and generally negatively affected the goals of the National Resettlement Policy.

Bureaucracy was a major problem with government departments. As one committee chairman said of the council officers; *“I'm always going there to ask the same question. No one attends to me. They keep on changing staff and they keep on asking me to come back tomorrow. I have work to do. Why should I leave my work just to queue at someone office?”* [16/02/18 – Lukulu South – Kasama]. A settler in Chafubu added this; *“these people are never in offices. You can go there at 08:00 hours. You won't see anyone until*

16:00 hours. They are always busy doing their own things.” [21/03/18 – Chafubu – Mungwi]

Bureaucracy has affected governance in many ways and most importantly it has led to settlers losing trust in government officers. This means that settlers are looking elsewhere for leadership such NGOs and therefore ignoring the institutions that created the resettlement schemes. One of the camp officers in talking about trainings said the following. *“I conduct training on best practices in agriculture but it appears no one listens to me. And in fairness to them, these training packages are in English and not easy to translate in local languages.”*[22/02/18 – Kasama]. Even government officers are aware that language is a barrier in both provision of the services and in settlers accessing services. This creates exclusion, with men owning more property than women. The farms are mostly owned by men representing around 85%.

If we understand governance as the government’s ability to steer the settlers in the direction of gender equality, this means that the state has not been able to achieve its objectives of promoting gender equality in property ownership. Most farms are owned by male farmers and wives are not usually the next of kin to inherit the farms in the event of death. Most male farmers I spoke with said they preferred either their male children or their male relatives to take over their land after death because their wives could marry other men if they died or were incapacitated. One committee chairman said, *“Wives are not our relatives. They will go to their homes when we die”* [28/03/18 – Misombizi- Mpulungu].

The implication are clear that despite the state wanting to transform the agriculture sector to be gender inclusive, the practices by the state compounded by bureaucracy has created the opposite effect – women have been excluded as one woman in Lukulu South resettlement scheme told me. *“We only work for them and their children. They own everything.”* [27/02/18 – Kasama]. The Zambian government in the resettlement policy

wanted women who are the majority to be involve in agriculture and own land but there are not many women that own land.

5.6 Farms as a social capital

I interviewed three people (all male) that lived in urban area (Kasama) but had acquired farms in the resettlement schemes. One of my interviewees, a local businessman put it this way: *“I got a small land in Chafubu resettlement. I have no intentions of moving there but I grow maize there for home consumption. For me it’s not important that I grow anything there. It is important that I have a farm because all my friends have farms.”* [26/02/18 – Kasama]. This was collaborated by the department of Resettlement where one officer told me that *“most people especially residents of Kasama apply in nearby resettlements schemes to show off that they have land”* [31/01/18 – Kasama]. This means that some people acquired land for social prestige.

These often use the poor within the resettlement schemes as labor and sometimes even hire the land from the poor to cultivate their crops as one other person told me. *“They entice us with money when schools are opening so that we get money for school fees. They then take our land and we end up working for them”*. In some cases, others have privately bought off land in the resettlement as the case in Chafubu was. Although the department of resettlement does not allow this practice, it does happen because they are absent and have less capacity to carry out frequent monitoring due to lack of money and staff. The well to do people have taken advantage of the situation and acquiring land from the poor.

In terms of governance, the acquiring of land by people in urban areas has meant that the purpose of the resettlement schemes have been defeated. The people who are supposed to move to decongest urban areas are not moving and the people acquiring land have no intention of improving agriculture practices but have gotten this land as social capital (Bourdieu 1991), to show off to their peers that they too have farms. Additionally, the settlers work on these farms for income leaving their land unattended to and thus

being unproductive themselves. The department of resettlement is aware and discourages this practice but they have no capacity in terms of resources (finance, personnel etc.) to effectively manage the situation and arrest the trend.

From a governance point of view, the Zambian government that established the resettlement schemes, and is supposed to manage them has not been able to do so effectively. The result has been that people that are better off in urban areas have moved into the resettlement schemes and changed the governance structures, increased production costs and affected the agricultural productivity of the settlers. Governance is about directing people's conduct to achieve a desired outcome (Dean 2010, Foucault 1991). The Zambian government in the policy wanted to create productive farmers, reduce rural poverty and introduce sustainable farming practice. However, they have not been able to achieve these goals because they have not been able to effectively provide support to the settlers. Instead, settlers have looked elsewhere for support as government has not been able to fulfill its pledge, other actors have taken advantage. Some local elite have taken advantage of the weak government presence and bought land from the poor and changed the governance of the resettlement schemes and excluded the poor who were the main focus of the government policy.

6.0 CONCLUSIONS

The resettlement schemes have been established by the Zambian government to provide land on title to settlers. I have looked at how these areas are governed in Northern Province of Zambia. The study has shown that the resettlement schemes have been poorly governed. The government that set up these schemes has not provided basic infrastructure and support to make the resettlement schemes successful and achieve the intended outcome. As a result, the resettlement schemes have remained unproductive.

The absence of the Zambian government departments that provide services in the resettlement scheme has given rise to new forms of governance. Other

actors like chiefs and NGOs have risen up to fill the vacuum that the government has left. But major infrastructure like roads and bridges, have not been taken up by anyone leaving the settlers alone to cope with whatever is available. The result has been that these areas have not been able to be productive. However, these other actors have not been working towards the goals of the resettlement schemes as they do not even know the policy on resettlement exists. This has affected the settlers that have lacked a coordinated response and leadership from those that manage the schemes. The resettlement schemes committees have become powerful exercising power that they should not have had leading to exclusion of women and others in the resettlement schemes.

The government has managed to resettle people and provided state land although individual farmers have no leases yet. Many have argued that provision of land on secure tenure (Smith 2004; Adams 2003; Place 2009) will lead to improvements in income and farm production. There is no evidence from this study to suggest that land tenure influences income and farm productivity. I therefore argue here that the privatization of land promoted by the Lands Act of 1995 has not produced productive farmers or increased investments in land by the local farmers. What this law has done at best is to create classes of people, those with land and those without; and giving access to a few elite farmers while denying access to the many that are poor. Therefore providing state land to a few farmers in places like the resettlement schemes may not be the answer to rural development. There is need for a more integrated approach and collaborative governance if places like resettlement schemes are to be productive. The market driven policies of the government of Zambia supported by the World Bank and other neoliberal institutions are clearly not working for the poor in the resettlement schemes.

The evidence from my study does not show any increase in land investment in resettlement schemes despite land being on a secure land tenure. Land tenure alone is not enough. The governance practices are equally important such as sizes of land, provision of infrastructure (such as roads and bridges)

and basic services like health, education, extension services etc. Without the necessary investment in these areas, the secure tenure system alone cannot achieve the goals of changing farmers' practices or increasing farm productivity. In some cases, the absence of government services has created opportunities for elite Zambians to buy land and keep it for future use or sale, thus denying the poor access to land while not utilizing the land for agriculture purposes.

Resettlement schemes in rural areas that were intended to run as models for productive farming have ended up being like the other areas under customary land. This has mainly been due to government not meeting its obligations to settlers as well as the nature of rural areas where markets for produce are small with almost everyone producing food for his or her household.

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